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

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THE

CHRISTIAN

DOCTRINE OF SIN,

EXHIBITED BY

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DR JULIUS MÜLLER,

ORDINARY PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HALLE-WITTENBERG.

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GERMAN, OF THE THIRD IMPROVED AND ENLARGED EDITION,

BY

WILLIAM PULSFORD.

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DEDICATION.

TO TWO DEAR FRIENDS,
UNKNOWN TO THE WORLD, AND
TO EACH OTHER, WHOSE MODEST VIR-
TUES WILL NOT ALLOW THEIR NAMES TO BE
DISCLOSED, THIS TRANSLATION IS DEDICATED, BY
ONE, WHO, OWES TO THEM THE IMMEDIATE OCCASION
OF THE BUILDING UP OF HIS MIND IN THOSE STUDIES OF
WHICH THIS WORK IS ONE OF THE FIRST-FRUITS, WHO MOREOVER
FEELS LASTINGLY INDEBTED TO THEM FOR MUCH TENDER ENCOURAGE-
MENT, WISE AND JUDICIOUS COUNSEL, AND PIOUS ADVICE, IN DARK, AND
PAINFUL SEASONS OF MENTAL DOUBT, AND SPIRITUAL PERPLEXITY,
AND WHO DOES NOT CEASE TO PRAY THAT THEY MAY NEVER
FIND CAUSE OF REGRET IN THE RESULTS THEY HAVE
MANIFOLDLY AIDED IN BRINGING ABOUT, AND THAT
TO THE END OF HIS DAYS ON EARTH HE MAY
CONTINUE TO BE BLEST BY THEIR DEAR
FRIENDSHIP, WHICH, IN THE PAST,
HAS SO OFTEN BEEN, HIS ONLY
SOLACE AND STAY.

DES VERFASSERS

VORREDE

ZU DIESER ÜBERSETZUNG.

Von meinem geehrten Freund Herrn Prediger Pulsford aufgefordert, diese Schrift in ihrem englischen Gewand mit einigen Worten bei ihren Lesern einzuführen, wünsche ich vor Allem Zeugniss ablegen zu können von der Treue mit der diese Uebersetzung ihrem Original entspricht. Dazu nun würde mich nur die Kenntniss der englischen Sprache in Stand setzen, die mir gebricht; ich kann mich, da mir selbst natürlich am meisten daran liegen muss, meinen brittischen Lesern nicht anders zu erscheinen als ich bin, in dieser Beziehung, lediglich auf die unverdrossene Mühe und Sorgfalt des Herrn Uebersetzers verlassen, deren Zeuge ich seit länger als Jahresfrist gewesen bin, und auf gründliche Einsicht in die Gedanken des Buches und ihren innern Zusammenhang, von der ich öfters Gelegenheit gehabt habe mich zu überzeugen.—Ein anderes Bedenken ist es, welches mich, während ich meinen lieben Freund mit der Arbeit beschäftigt sah, oft zweifelhaft gemacht hat, ob diese Schrift auch geeignet ist in die Literatur des brittischen Volkes verpflanzt zu werden. Sie ist zum grössten Theil speculativ-theologischen Inhalts und hängt auf dieser Seite eng zusammen mit der neuern Entwickelung der deutschen Philosophie; diese aber hat seit Kant einen so eigenthümlichen Gang genommen, dass selbst der stammverwandte und jeder höchsten Aufgabe gewachsene englische Geist zurückhaltender als früher gewesen ist in seiner Theilnahme an diesen kühnen Versuchen, die Schleier zu heben, von denen die Ursprünge des Seins und unsere Erkenntniss verhüllt sind. Indessen würde es gradezu unrichtig sein, wenn es sich um die eigentlichen Quellen der Erkenntniss für diese

Lehre von der Sünde handelt, andere zu nennen als die Heilige Schrift und die Erfahrung, die treue Beobachtung der Thatsachen unsers sittlichen Lebens und Bewusstseins,—Quellen, die jedem Gliede der allgemeinen Kirche Christi und der Theologie aller christlichen Nationen gegenwartig sind, wenn sie nur Ernst machen will, daraus zu schöpfen. Es muss demnach auch der Leser, der auf die kritische und historisch-philosophische Seite des Werkes weniger eingeht, möglich sein mitzuforschen mit dem Verfasser über Wesen und Ursprung der Sünde und aus jenen Quellen ein selbständiges Urtheil zu gewinnen über die Hauptresultate dieser Forschung.

Und so möge dem Buch auch in dieser erneuerten Gestalt durch den begleitenden Segen Gottes gelingen, namentlich manchen jüngern Theologen über die Tiefe und den Umfang unserer Sünde und Schuld verständigen zu helfen, damit er daran in anbetender Demuth die Grösse des Erlösungswerkes messen lerne.

J. MÜLLER.

Halle, den 2ten. September 1852.

THE

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

TO THIS

TRANSLATION.

In complying with the request of my honoured friend, the Rev. W. Pulsford, to introduce this work in its English dress to its readers with a few words, I should desire above everything to be able to bear my testimony to the fidelity with which this translation corresponds with its original. But only a knowledge of the English language would enable me to do this, which I do not possess; of course I am most of all concerned not to appear to my British readers otherwise than I am, and in this respect I can entirely rely upon the unwearying labour and anxious care of the Translator, of which I have been witness for more than a year, as well as upon his thorough insight into the thoughts of the book and their internal connection, of which I have often had opportunity of convincing myself. There is another consideration which, as I saw my dear Friend engaged in his work, has often made me doubt, namely, whether this work is also adapted to become transplanted into the literature of the British people. It is for the most part of speculative, theological contents, and in this respect stands in close connection with the modern development of German philosophy; but this, since Kant has taken such a singularly original course, that even the English spirit, allied in race, and equipped for every high task, has kept itself more aloof than formerly in its participations in these adventurous attempts to lift the vail by which the principle of being and our knowledge are concealed. However, it would be decidedly incorrect, in the question respecting the real sources of knowledge for this doctrine of sin, to mention others than the Holy Scripture and experience, the faithful observation of the facts of our

moral life and consciousness,—sources, which are present to every member of the universal Church of Christ, and to the theology of all Christian nations, if they only seek in earnest to draw from the same. It must accordingly, therefore, be also possible for the reader who enters less into the critical and historico-philosophical side of the work to co-operate with the author in his inquiries respecting the nature and origin of sin, and from the above mentioned sources to obtain an independent opinion concerning the main results of this investigation.

And thus may the work, in this its new form, accompanied by the blessing of God, be especially of service to many a younger theologian, in assisting him to understand the depth, and wide embrace, of our sin and guilt, in order that he may thereby, in prayerful humility, learn to measure the greatness of the work of Redemption.

J. MÜLLER.

HALLE, the 2d. September, 1852.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

No one acquainted with the work, can doubt that the British theological public may, with good ground, be congratulated on the appearance, at length, in their own language, of Dr JULIUS MÜLLER'S celebrated work on "The Christian Doctrine of Sin."—If they could be equally congratulated, as to the ability and completeness of the translation, nothing would be left to be desired; but respecting this, the Translator is painfully conscious of the abilities required fully to surmount the difficulties involved in such an undertaking, and of the comparative poverty of those which he has brought to his task. Nevertheless, there are considerations, by which he hopes to enlist the kind indulgence of his readers, on the behalf of its execution, and which equally furnish him with the ground on which he asks their confidence in the same. In enumerating these considerations, the Translator asks permission of the reader to drop the professional form of language, and to be allowed to speak to him as a personal Friend and Brother.

I took up the study of these volumes from no market speculation, but from a holy necessity of soul, arising from great distress and perplexity of mind, driving me in search of some more satisfactory, if not certain, knowledge, in relation to the great questions herein discussed, than I knew where to find in the *scientific* theological literature of my own language. For some years it had been my privilege to minister in Holy things, in which I often experienced the bitter painfulness of not being able, as a *Teacher* of others, to say—"I believe and therefore speak." It was in this state of mind that I relinquished my

ministry, and with a soul thirsting for light which should reveal to me *the scientific ground*, and *form*, of those great fundamental truths which had long, by the Divine Grace, been sacred treasures in my heart. By the Providence of God, who provides food for every appetite he creates, and conducts every thirsting soul to the healing waters, the following pages were soon after my arrival in Germany brought under my consideration; I read and re-read, nay, more, devoured them, with an avidity of appetite prepared to do its best to digest them. This done, in prayerful solitude, alone with God, they were then, with a dear and esteemed Friend (Professor Dr WEISSENBORN), who had been long familiar with the pale cast of thought in which they so abound, discussed, page by page, and each thought and argument examined in the light of Christian consciousness, and tried by the inspired word of Holy Scripture. In this way, whatever in the book could supply nourishment to me, in my state, readily became incorporated and assimilated, became bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh: and as the happy consequences of the same, many a doubt was soon cast out from my mind, on many points a scientific knowledge revealed itself, answering to my subjective certitudes, and a freedom and elasticity of spirit possessed me, together with an earnest confidence in the wholesome form of sound words; all of which furnished me with indubitable evidence that the light which had conducted me out of the narrows of dark perplexity into the breadth and freedom of more open vision, which had led me to perceive the *necessary* grounds of the great fundamental doctrines of Bible Christianity, in the Divine Love and Wisdom, and had induced upon me such a quietude of mind and repose of heart, not only in view of the darkness which attaches to our present earthly life, but also in prospect of the removal of that more appalling vail to our knowledge, which hides from us the accumulating results of time and the revelations of eternity, could be none other "than light from Heaven."

With such personal results, I became moved, in consideration of those still in search of what I had found, to contemplate the translation which is now presented to the reader. The work thus undertaken has been so far conducted to its issue, with what ability I was able to command, and without any consideration of the requisite amount of long wearying labour, which indeed has

not been small. No one can be more aware of the imperfections attaching to my labour than I myself, nevertheless they are, it is confidently hoped, confined to the intractable forms of expressions, which are often far too German, but which, although conscious of the same, I have found, from a residence in the country of three years, exclusively spent in the study of its literature, impossible wholly to avoid. The translation, on the whole, will be found to be a close rendering of the original; still, wherever I felt that a circumlocution, or exegetical remark would elucidate the thought, such changes and additions have been unhesitatingly made. For the sake of comparison, the paragraphs, and even the sentences will be found to correspond with the original. In further elucidation some, many, of the more difficult German words and expressions have been retained in the text within brackets. But in doing this I have also had in view my intention of publishing, in the course of the next year, *(Deo volente)*, a brief analysis of the entire work, in order succinctly to exhibit the logical thread of its connection, laid bare of the very abundant extraneous matter, which tends to obscure the same even in the original. To this analysis will be added copious notes, exhibiting the various points of difference and coincidence between the stand-point of the author, and that of the most generally accredited scientific stand-point of our own theology, as well as indexes to the whole which will make the work as complete and as adapted as possible to become a text book for the English student of scientific theology—one of these indexes will be composed of the words above referred to, accompanied with concise explanations. In view of this volume I shall be obliged to any of my readers who will be at the trouble to point out to me any passages requiring elucidation, also, to the periodical press which may honour the work by a notice or review in its journals, if it will be so kind as to send me through the post a copy of such notice or review, printed separately on thin paper, addressed, Halle $^{a}/_{d}$. Saale, Prussia.

It will scarcely be necessary for me to say, that I do not profess adherence to everything herein propounded, or that, where I agree in the *result* arrived at, I always agree in the *method* of arriving at the same. To some things I object, to others I demur; some others appear to me less thoroughly grounded than the

character of the work, and the connection in which they stand seem to require. Still, the work as a whole has my entire sympathy. It is one of those immortal productions which distinguish nations, by a Master-mind singularly furnished and equipped, to grapple with those highest subjects which have excited the attention, and occupied the minds, of the greatest spirits in every age. The measure of success which has attended his labours has long been adjudged by his fellow-countrymen, by whom the work is ranked, among the very first productions of the human mind in modern times, and, as an invincible bull-work in the defence of Bible Christianity, and Evangelical Religion. And its introduction into this country, is not without the hope, that it will contribute not a little, to stem the fast deepening stream of a religious pantheistico-mystical rationalism, which in divers directions is so widely diffusing itself among us.

It may be well perhaps to caution the general reader, lest he fall into the mistake which some of the author's own countrymen have not escaped, against attributing to the author opinions which he causes to appear in their own defence, clothed, after the manner of the ancients, in every possible sophistic plausibility, only that he may the more successfully exhibit their fallaciousness: —as an example of this the reader may be referred to the 4th chapter of the 2d Book, where the theory of contrast is thus allowed to speak for itself.

I cannot close these prefatory remarks without expressing my deep and lasting obligations to the University of Halle-Wittenberg, and to all those Professors whose colleges it has been my privilege to attend, and with whom I have had the honour of acquaintance —but more especially to the revered author of this work, for that most kind and friendly regard it has been my happiness to experience from him, especially in relation to this translation; to Dr G. Weissenborn for very valuable assistance in the study of these volumes; to Professor Dr Ed. Erdmann for kind and considerate attention paid to me, as well as for the cheerful readiness of the advice with which he has aided my studies, and the many facilities afforded to me in the prosecution of the same; to Professor Dr Roediger, for much real kindness and invaluable service in my acquisition of the language during a residence of six months in his family; and to beloved and

honoured THOLUCK, for benefits derived and obligations conferred in ways so various that I am no longer able to characterize them. May God reward him according to the same!

Then in the revision of these sheets for the press I am greatly indebted to a beloved brother, the Rev. J. PULSFORD of Hull, for his patient and invaluable aid.

And now I lay my work at the feet of the Great Head of the Church, for whose glory it was at first undertaken, and by whose aid it has been thus far advanced towards its completion, deeply thankful for the benefits which I have myself derived, and with the prayer, that He will be graciously pleased to accept it, as done *unto Him*, and to accompany it with His Spirit that it may ever serve unto the true edification of the reader, and thus to the building up of the Church, which is His body, which is the fulness of Him that filleth all in all.

W. PULSFORD.

HULL, October 16. 1852.

TO THE

REVEREND THEOLOGICAL FACULTY

IN

GÖTTINGEN.

REVEREND GENTLEMEN,—In humbly dedicating this treatise to you, I feel that I am only paying a small tribute of the gratitude to which you have the most righteous claims. For seven years ago to-day, when I ventured to obey the call to your university-church, you were graciously pleased to receive me with best wishes, and by your kind sympathy, and wholesome counsel, the difficult transition from the practical sphere of a parish clergyman, to that of university preacher, was made very much easier. In the course of the following year, the same good pleasure, conducted me to the academical chair, and so long as I filled these two functions in your University, it ever remained toward me faithful and true. And in the spring of 1835, as I was about to change my residence from Göttingen, my second home in more than one respect, to Marburg, in order to be able to devote myself entirely to the duties of academical instruction, you were again graciously pleased to accompany my escort with the honourable presentation of the highest academico-theological honours.

For this continued kindness, up to the present time, a suitable opportunity publicly to express to you my thanks, has ever failed me, but the earnest monition contained in those honours, and in the confidence of those conferring them, I have not forgotten. It is this monition which has so often swept before me in the writing of this treatise; therefore however much or little of its contents may be honoured by your assent, sincere attachment to the inalienable treasure of our Church, to whose protection, your

Doctors of theology are especially in duty bound, to the spirit of free, scientific inquiry, which recognizes no other authority than the immutable basis of the Divine word, in the Holy Scripture, you will not find wanting.

DR J. MÜLLER.

MARBURG, July 9. 1838.

To Doctors LÜCKE and GIESELER, I hand over to you Reverend Gentlemen, this new edition of this work, which you at its first imperfect appearance allowed me to dedicate to you.

J. MÜLLER.

HALLE, April 29. 1849.

FROM THE

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE author thinks he may be permitted to pass over a detailed justification of his undertaking the preparation of this treatise. While it is decidely a glad feature of our times, that in the sphere of theology, the interest of positive dogmatics begins to show symptoms of greater energy, it is nevertheless greatly to be desired that it may not seek an over-hasty satisfaction in ever new exhibitions of it in its entirety. We do not wish for a moment to dispute the high merit which belongs to some distinguished attempts in this direction, as the products of the most recent time, but we first of all, and that most pressingly, want stones for the building, brought up out of the inexhaustibly rich shaft of Holy Scripture, and of the Christian consciousness, resting upon the same; we want as preparatory, comprehensive treatises on individual points of doctrine, especially on the chief moments of Christian doctrine. The investigations in the present treatise of a subject, the deep, all-involving significance of which for the Christian doctrine of faith, no one will deny, have been pursued from this point of view. It was an immoveable conviction of the author, so long ago as he sat at the feet of his beloved and honoured teacher, NEANDER, that Christianity is most thoroughly a *practical* system in the highest and most intimate sense, that everything in it relates to the great contrast between sin and redemption, and that it is impossible to understand the doctrine of redemption, which is its very essence, until we have a thorough knowledge of sin. Christian theology here, if anywhere, *wages war, pro aris et focis*, in repelling deistical extenuations and pantheistical attenuations of this doctrine.

Or have we not reason really to fear that the subject withdraws itself from these investigations just in proportion to their determined endeavours to comprehend it? Were it not perhaps more advisable to leave the dark form of sin veiled in the silent depth of feeling? Or is it really as a celebrated writer of our day conveniently represents it, that this contradiction in our being, loses its real significance, if we bring it nearer to us, so that in the place of the deepest mystery, we retain only empty words, which but too easily dissipates the religious dread of sin? Certainly, if it is a purely speculative knowledge of sin from mere notions which is aimed at, independent of all empirical presuppositions; such an attempt stands in the singular relation to sin, that it must deny it *as sin*, in order at all to make it the subject of consideration. But that a course of thought on sin, which rests upon the basis of the Christian faith, must nevertheless lead to the removal of the religious horror of sin, could indeed only then be maintained, if, this horror was improper, or, if ROUSSEAU was right, in his axiomatic words: *l'homme en commençant à penser cesse de sentir.* Healthful Christian feeling has no need to fear thought, and healthful thinking does not separate itself from feeling, but as the former is nourished and refreshed by the latter, the latter finds its confirmation and intelligence in the former.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

In presenting the third edition of this book, to those who, in the midst of the powerful fermentations of our political and ecclesiastical life, have time enough to take part in detailed investigations of a subject, lying apparently so wide of those interests, I limit myself to a remark or two on the relation of this, to the former, edition. The additions which it has received, have been principally occasioned by Rothe's ethics, which has been published since its appearance. The author of this remarkable book has formally, in the very preface, thrown down to me the glove. I feel myself the more obliged to accept the challenge, because I know that, in the highest questions of human life, I am one with my dear opponent. For only on this condition can the discussion of a subject, such as the present, be of advantage; only when a common ground, a sphere of peace, is previously given, will it be possible successfully to seek peace in war. Where, on the contrary, the diversity of scientific doctrines arises from a principiell contrast of fundamental ethical views, there can only be a fruitless strife, in the constant appeal to axioms which the opponent does not admit. I cannot find fault with one, who is able to quiet himself, concerning the disharmony in our moral life, with the well known dialectick of immediacy and mediation, and refuses salvation by the Holy Son of God revealed among sinful men, if he regards, the course and results of my investigations concerning sin, as strange; for to him, the inward motives, by which they become enforced, do not exist, or he is entirely insensible of their power. Besides if added to this, as in the controverting review of this treatise by Professor Zeller (*theologische Jahrbücher, Jahrg.* 1846-47), there is the decided opinion, that the author

belongs to a theological party which hold together for the maintenance of the opinions of its individual members, and that therefore his tenets must be interpreted according to the otherwise well-known sentiments and fundamental principles of this party, it were certainly very foolish to require of this treatise that it should first and foremost correctly comprehend, and faithfully exhibit the disputed thinkings in their connection; and just as immodest would it be to expect the interest of readers in a detailed debate, whose opposition was built upon such a basis. Moreover, pantheism is at present, in its contrast to the belief in a personal God, whose Holy will is our highest law, so busily engaged in also drawing its consequences into the spheres of practical life, that every one who wishes may easily form an opinion as to the side on which the salvation, and that on which the destruction, of the world stands. But as there is real progress in this, one may in a certain sense congratulate the present time, in that in the sphere of science, this contrast continually concentrates itself in the question, whether there is a positive distinction between good and evil, or whether this distinction resolves itself into the dialectical stream of the so-called concrete morality.

HALLE, Jubilate Sunday, 1849.

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INTRODUCTION.

AN exhibition of the *Christian doctrine of Sin* may fulfil a twofold purpose, inasmuch as it may not only instruct the reader as to what has been taught in the Christian Church at different times concerning this subject, whether true or otherwise; but also unveil, so far as it is able, the truth of the doctrine itself. It may either endeavour to arrive at the doctrine of Christ and the Apostles from the New Testament Scriptures, which, indeed, can only be successful in his case, who, with the capacity thoroughly to enter into the peculiar trains of thought of the individual writers, unites the ability both to comprehend their complexity and to recognize their deep unity: or, setting out from the present consciousness of the Church, which most assuredly is not forsaken by the Spirit, who has founded it—it may seek systematically to develop the doctrine of sin according to all its essential characteristics. In adopting the second course, it has the advantage of being able to place itself everywhere in direct relation, as well with the deviating theological views, as also with all other opinions and modes of thought concerning this subject, which agitate the present time. For if the scientific treatment of Christian doctrine has, first of all, for its object the understanding of the Christian consciousness with respect to its own contents, elements, principles, and their internal connection, in order to this understanding, it is also necessary that the Christian knowledge of faith (Glaubenserkenntniss) make itself clear as to its relation with other modes of thought influential at the time.

Now of these two methods the *first* may be pursued quite apart from the second, and without its being in any way involved in the consideration. Indeed, unless this is the case, there is

danger of disturbing the purity and impartiality of the historical, critical investigations, inasmuch as they stand in connection with every biblical theological problem. With the *second* it is different. This necessarily presupposes, especially on the ground of Protestant theology, the investigation of the first, and the embodiment of its conclusions. For the scientific exhibition of a doctrine, from the ground of Christian consciousness, bears to the contents of the New Testament Scriptures this double relation; on the one hand, it is the fuller development of the germs of doctrine contained in them, and on the other hand, it has in them its criterion and corrective. If then it is the fuller development of germinal doctrine, and has therefore to determine, in a progressive manner, the hitherto undetermined, it cannot be a requirement of the normal relation of Scripture contents to the scientific exhibition of Christian doctrine, that every individual statement must be based upon the express testimony of Scripture. Much rather it is easy to understand how that in this radical relation, the more exact determinations of a point of doctrine, which stand in contrast with each other, may sometimes, with equal confidence—and with equal right and unright—appeal to the Holy Scriptures. Besides, such a requirement is already excluded by the previous recognition of the New Testament having been handed down to us as a manifold composition bearing the different peculiarities of the Apostles; for no one who unites, with the acknowledgment of a plurality of forms of doctrine, a determined sense, will still expect a literal agreement in every representation. Nevertheless, the substantial contents of Holy Scripture remain the touch-stone for Christian thinking, to which it ever applies its conclusions, and is only confident of their truth, when they are confirmed by it, or at least found to be compatible with it. Of course it is from the internal fountain of Christian consciousness that it first of all draws, but this consciousness requires such a norm, because regarded in itself, although, only real in the living members of the Christian Church, it has no security against the intromission of heterogeneous and disturbing elements. The theological conception of this consciousness may also easily stamp an impression upon it, which may counterfeit its true nature, if the scientific fixation of the doctrine has not an objective ground of appeal by which the rectitude of its declaration

of facts of Christian consciousness may be decided. The determinateness of the religious consciousness from which this doctrine immediately proceeds, lays claim to a certitude of inward experience, of inward life; but since it owes its own existence in the human spirit to divine revelation, how can its theological development dare to break away from the original testimonies of this revelation ?[1]

If we select in the present work, for the treatment of the doctrine of sin, the *second of these methods*, we shall have to ascertain our position at every step of our investigation, by an appeal to the contents of Holy Scripture, and thus assure ourselves that we have not wandered from the right way.

But since we propose to exhibit the Christian doctrine of sin in this more extensive form, one of its sides obtains a deep and thoroughly important significance, which entirely disappears in that narrower method of its exhibition. It is the *speculative side*. For that this doctrine has such a side, reflection on its internal nature, as well as on the great whole to which it belongs, leaves not a doubt.

In our day a writer cannot hope to make himself intelligible to his readers, as to the relation of Christian doctrine to speculation, until he has told them, what he understands by speculation. For there is not a more mistaken opinion than that speculation is a fixed notion, about which unanimity of opinion prevails. Much rather it must necessarily be very differently conceived of, according as the thinking world is animated by different radical principles. No metaphysical theory is able to indifferentiate these contrasts, much rather is the theory itself dependent on them.

However there is, notwithstanding the different determinations of the notion of speculative thinking, a common ground on which all are agreed. With all, speculation stands opposed to *reflection*, a method of thought which has to do with something given, and appropriates the same by continued analysis and synthesis of its elements. If speculative, stands thus opposed to reflective

[1] For the more exact determination of this relation the reader may refer to *Dorner's* sagacious exposition of the connection, in which the material principle of Protestantism, from its own contents, presses on to the formal, in his work concerning—*Das Princip unserer Kirche nach dem innern Verhältniss seiner beiden Seiten.* 1841.

thinking, it must necessarily belong to the former, not to set out from anything given as its subject, but from determinations which thought finds in itself as the necessary, and primary ground of all being, as of all thinking. In this sense, of course, all speculative thinking is of an *à priori*, and all reflective thinking of an *à posteriori* nature. Here empiricism, which finds the origin of our knowledge absolutely in experience, appears in necessary antagonism not merely against this or that speculative system, but against speculation as such; its thinking sets out from perception and observation, and does not tolerate deductions from principles which are certified to the spirit, independently of experience. Still it has a claim to the name of philosophy, so long as it has for its goal, although not for its starting-point, the knowledge of the universal and necessary, but in form it is essentially bound to the reflective method.

Definitions, of the nature of speculative knowledge, more in detail, must be very different according as they proceed from *pantheistic* or *theistic* principles. Unquestionably the strongest current of our German literature is that which has its source in pantheistic modes of thought; and this pantheistic predominance may be seen, not only in our philosophy, but also in the other sciences, and perhaps prevails most of all in our polite literature; indeed the religious and political convulsions of the most recent times have made manifoldly evident how deeply these methods of representation have already become, by a great part of our people, thoroughly incorporated. After deistic rationalism ceased to exert much influence, at least in scientific and aesthetic literature, pantheism assumed to itself the right of inheritance, while impure, mongrel forms of rationalism have attempted in vain to disturb its possession. It has, too, succeeded in prepossessing the spirit of the age in its favour, which gives it the great advantage of not being under the necessity of criticising and controverting other modes of thought, which are no longer in connection with its own principles, but allows it to pass judgment upon them, quite according to its own rule, as if the right of doing so was a matter of course.

Now, pantheism is able to determine the notion of speculation with its radical question as to the relation between the finite and the infinite, of course only according to the category

of the *immanent*, or, more correctly speaking, of *substantial identity*. If it attributes to the nature of speculation, that it sees everything in the absolute, deduces everything from it, leads everything back to it, and in it elevates to unity all the antitheses of the understanding, it follows that its absolute is not an existing self-consciousness and a self-conscious existence *(seiendes Denken und denkendes Sein)*, which is free of all relations, grounded in itself and in itself perfect, but merely the *necessary principle of the world*, which by the world-process brings about its absoluteness,—the absolute world-unity. It further follows from the category of the immanent, thus conceived of, that this speculation must require, as on the one hand, an inviolable *necessity*, so on the other, a rigid *continuity*, for the deduction from the original principle, of finite being, for the development of determinations which mutually sustain each other, extend themselves to totality, and return back again into their own centre. It is true, this requirement has hitherto remained, even in pantheistic systems, a mere postulate, or where profession of its fulfilment has been made, a mere assertion. *Spinoza*, indeed, makes this pretension, and maintains that all things proceed from the infinite nature of God, with the same necessity, and in the same manner, as it follows from the very nature of the triangle *(ex natura trianguli)* from eternity to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. But what is this more than empty boasting, which moreover seeks its speculative honour in the deepest degradation of the infinite nature of God, if indeed the *modi should be found to be*, strictly speaking, nothing more than affections of the substance, and it is in no manner shown how the substance comes to place *modi* in itself, or to have them? And does it fare better with this necessity in the panlogical system of *Hegel*, where every determination is said to be generated from the former, in the unbroken chain of the dialectical process, and which does not know how otherwise, by means of logic to arrive at nature, than by the desperate resolve of the logical idea, "*ex ipsa prodere*" ("*sich aus sich selbst zu entlassen*")? But in spite of this unfortunate experiment, the above demand nevertheless very well denotes the spirit and task of this speculative tendency, and the speculation of Christian Theism permits itself to be unconsciously drawn into this mystic circle, if it is so simple as

to recognise this demand as an axiom of all speculation—imagining that it refers only to the method and not to the contents. If speculative thinking were really, by its very nature, bound to this law, we should only be able, upon the stand-point of Christian Theism, to conclude that the origin of finite being, from the absolute, is not even a matter for *speculation*, but that we are able only to know just so much about it, as God may have communicated to us by *positive revelation*. It were vain presumption to wish to limit God by the limitation of our speculative thinking, and not to allow that He may make the transition from Himself to another being, by a free act, lest He should complicate the circle of our school metaphysics, and break the chain of our logical process, in the absence of which process it were all over with our speculation. Under this supposition, indeed, every possibility of reconciling religion and speculation were cut off; for religion, once for all, knows nothing of a Deity deficient of all spiritual organs for the production of a world by their act. It is also the essential endeavour of religion to recognise the world from the Divine point of view, and God in His relation to the world; but it is in this endeavour essentially conscious that it has not here to do with an object which, because he knowing partakes of His nature, is therefore obliged to allow Himself to be known; but with the object, in opposition to which we are truly subject, subjected to Him, and waiting for His self-communication, in order that it may not happen to us by a divine irony, that, when we, presuming on the irresistible power of our formalism of ideas, imagine to call forth the treasures of knowledge, we do not carry off coal instead of gold. Fortunately, however, it is only by an unjust limitation of the notion of speculation, that it is said to be bound to the principle of the immanent, so understood. It may be shown, not indeed from what this principle has achieved in the history of philosophy, but from its very nature, that only under its presupposition, speculation can become a connection of perfectly homogeneous elements of knowledge, which, shut up in itself, uninterruptedly progresses in the same manner from beginning to end; but who answers for it, that the nature and reality of the object correspond to this connection?—that the thinker in this procedure does not reflect, in a self-generated ideal world, only just a side of his own being,

since he will only allow the Object to reveal Himself to this one side of his being? That is genuine philosophy, which prizes *the truth* immeasurably higher than the *scientific form*, which is resolved to destroy each plan, and to begin the structure afresh, so soon as it is convinced, that it is too narrow in its entire disposition to embrace the reality.[1]

Rothe, at paragraph two in the introduction to his Ethics, has recently discussed in a most thorough manner, the nature of *speculative knowledge*, and the distinction between *philosophical and theological speculation*, and that too from a stand-point of personal faith, which is so decidedly that of Christian Theism, that we may be sure this speculative theologian would rather turn his back upon every form of speculation—indeed, would wish to know nothing further of the very catechism, rather than trust to a method, which, in its results, might rob him of the personal God, the "*Thou*" of our prayers.—He determines the common nature of all speculative knowledge to be that which sets out from a primary *datum*, which it is justified in regarding as possessed of the most immediate certitude, and from which it may develop with inward logical necessity a system of thoughts, ever evolving out of each other a succession of new ideas. "This system of *à priori* generated thought, to be successful as a speculation, must be an absolutely corresponding thought-measured image of the universe (in the widest sense of the word, including God Himself); but the speculative process takes no account whether there be such a universe existing, or how the system of ideas which it constructs are related to this reality; but without looking either to the right hand or to the left, it follows strictly the logical necessity, by which every newly won idea, by virtue of its relation to all remaining ones, brings forth from its own inherent fruitfulness still new ones." The distinction between philosophical and theological speculation rests entirely upon the difference of the primary *data* from which they set out; in the former, it is that of *self-consciousness*, in the latter, that of *God-consciousness*; the

[1] Comp.—concerning the position of Christian Theology in relation to the principle of the immanent in the narrowest conception of the notion, as it stands, for instance, at the basis of Strauss' Dogmatics—my little treatise: *Das Verhältniss der dogmatischen Theologie zu den antireligiösen Richtungen der gegenwärtigen Zeit.* 1843.

method is the same in both; also theological speculation is absolutely bound to the same ever uniform, and equal, logico-dialectical law, and to this alone; the speculative operation must be carried on quite independently of piety, and so long as it is in process of its completion, but not yet fully complete, there must not even be a glance at the religious disposition of mind, but only then, when it is completed, in order to compare its result with the religious consciousness, that the system constructed, if not found to be in correspondence with it, may be destroyed, and the construction of a new one commenced.

With respect to this determination of the notion in question, we are so far agreed with *Rothe*, that all speculative knowledge proceeds upon a self-connected system of thought. But of course we cannot regard this procedure in systematic connection, as something exclusively peculiar to speculation. For empirical knowledge, in so far as it is not merely individual sensation or perception, but knowledge, tacitly presupposes the agreement of all empiricism; for absolutely individual sensation or perception would never be adequate to the thought-measured form of judgment. It is true this character attaches, in the highest degree, to speculative knowledge, not simply because it belongs to its very nature to reduce its systematic connection to the very simplest elements of thought, but also because it is absolutely necessary that it should become clearly conscious of the same, that it should express the determinate relation of the individual, to the organic entirety of knowledge of which it is a fragment. But when *Rothe* places this systematic entirety of knowledge directly as a pure *à priori* process, effected by means of logic, as if it could only be a system under this condition, we are obliged to regard this narrow notion of the system, even on his own stand-point, as an unjustifiable *à priori*-limitation of speculative knowledge, and so far, as reasoning in a circle. That entirety of knowledge is indeed said to be an image of the real universe; nay, more, the empirical reality is expressly recognised by *Rothe* as the touch-stone by which the correctness of speculation is to be decided; how now, if it therefore fails in this required coincidence with the reality, because in the real connection of being there are living syntheses which mock at the necessary thinking, turning points, where new principles make their appearance, whose reality ever defy

construction by means of mere logic? Is the thinking process here too, to hold itself absolutely apart from the reality, in order to produce its universe purely from itself? "Hang philosophy," if it will not teach us more deeply to understand the reality!

When *Rothe* further insists, with respect to theological speculation, that it must avoid all leering towards the contents of Christian piety until it is complete as a system of thought, we may add, that every development of determinate knowledge, which proceeds from a ground-thought, as its germ, can only follow its own inward impulse, otherwise its self-evolution would be interrupted, and disturbed, by comparing its individual elements with individual expressions of religious consciousness, or even statements of Holy Scripture. Further, that the requirement is not peculiar to speculative knowledge, but becomes a necessity even in a treatment of the doctrines of faith—which strives to rid itself as much as possible of every speculative element—the moment it enters upon a real development of thought. While this developing process lasts, the entire attention of the spirit is directed to the contents and inward connection of the individual moments of thought, and only then compares it with that which is otherwise outwardly certain, when it has arrived at a result, in order, if it be found contradictory, to reject it. But *Rothe* requires us to build an entire system of theology, without once making such a comparison. This appears to us like an artistic and violent abstraction of the schools which we know not how to apply to anything in life. Do then speculation and piety reside in our spirits, next each other, as in two separate compartments? Is not the germ of Christian consciousness, where it really exists, the all-pervading, all-animating principle of spiritual life? And if this is the case, all "leering after piety" is out of the question. For piety will immediately and unavoidably discover itself to the thinker, whether his system, which is in process of formation in his spirit, stand in inward strife or harmony with his Christian faith. It is, at the same time, well to observe, that the question for a healthy Christian consciousness is not merely the relation of speculative thinking to an indeterminate "pious disposition of mind," but its relation to a determinate knowledge of faith, which is already a detached development, possesssed of decisions concerning subjects which speculation determines according to its

own principle: how then, we may ask, is a mutual ignorance here possible?

As a road to truth *Rothe* must allow us to think somewhat less of the value of a system of logical ideas.[1] We cannot regard the logical law in speculative thinking to be the real moving and propelling power, but must rather regard this power as residing in the concrete thoughts and perceptions. This is the reason of every system of philosophy being so distinctly impressed with the spiritual peculiarity of its author. But this

[1] Indeed expressions on this matter, of a directly contradictory character, may be found from *Rothe* himself. According to page 8, the system of *a priori*-produced thoughts, in order to succeed, must be the absolutely corresponding, thought-measured image of the universe, which, according to the conception of the last notion, includes in itself an exhausting, and, in its form, adequate knowledge of God. And according to page 10, it is an absurd opinion, which no sound speculative head will stumble upon, that one will really be able to succeed, by means of speculation, in constructing a *complete* and *perfect* ideal of the universe. With this we perfectly agree, but therefore think, that as the speculative thinker is previously certain that his speculation will not succeed in the absolute solution of its problem, his proposition ought not to be so stated, but only as embodying the question just so far as it is solvable; for the matter is not one of spiritual gymnastics, but of real knowledge. If he be "deeply convinced that all our knowledge is but in part," is fragmentary and imperfect, he will not of course be thereby prevented applying all his strength for the promotion of the same, but with this conviction he cannot set himself to give an absolutely corresponding image of the universe, which is not also imperfect. Indeed it is, in truth, a direct contradiction to set oneself to the solution of a problem, with the consciousness that it is insolvable; for in this case it is impossible really to regard it as a problem to be solved. An appeal cannot here be made to our prospective sanctification; for the Christian knows that he will one day, in the completion of the Divine kingdom, really attain this state; but in the task of forming an ideal system, absolutely corresponding to the universe, he knows that he will never arrive at its solution, not in this *aeon* which *Rothe* admits, but also not in the future; for in it, in the place of the present method of knowledge, also of speculative knowledge—knowledge *per speculum*, 1 Cor. xiii. 12—we shall have *sight*. Or shall, indeed, that which is the ever threatening consequence to all one-sided aphorisms, become in the end the real task, viz., that of having to create, in a scientifically constructed whole, for the satisfaction of the dialectic and systematizing impulse of the spirit, that which is only of value in itself, but none in its relation to the truth? Besides, it is on no condition admissible to embrace God and the world together in the notion of the universe, because the world must then be regarded as the complement of God, which is contradictory to the idea of the absolute. God is a universe in Himself; the world may or may not be.

ill accords with the wonderful phantom of an independent motion of the idea, which, in its necessary process, produces from itself the entire contents of truth, and which the subject has only to look at. But we are convinced that *Rothe* himself does not really believe in the reality of this phantom.—The dialectic building up of a system is really only the furnishing of a web of ideas, comprehensive enough to take up into itself, and elastic enough to fit itself to, the contents of the consciousness; and, least of all, in a system of ethics, which knows how harmoniously to unite in one chorus so many different voices, can one imagine it to be otherwise. The spirit which has not lost its internal unity will trust to its logical operations just so far as it confides in the life of which he knows himself to be partaker. It cannot be denied that the formation of a rigid and all-comprehensive chain of thought has the power to excite the spirit to the production of new ideas, since it thereby becomes conscious of the chasms of knowledge which require filling up; but its greatest value will ever consist in the criticism which it exercises on its own ideal world, in the discovery and removal of opposing elements. It is only bearing this, its true function, in mind, and renouncing its abstract independence, that it can be explained how it is that philosophical systems of very different, indeed of very opposite, starting-points, the more nearly approximate towards each other, according as they further advance in the sphere of the concrete; the spiritual life of the authors lays claim to the fellowship which their abstract principles deny.

But while *Rothe*, on the one hand, so highly exalts the character of speculation, on the other hand, he assumes positions which are entirely subversive, at least of theological speculation. Theological speculation he distinguishes from philosophical, by the *primary datum* from which it sets out, the God-consciousness. But as theological speculation is ever peculiarly determined, its primary *datum* is said to be for us not merely the absolute God-consciousness, but the Christian pious—nay according to page 23, 24, the evangelical Christian consciousness. But this is not at all a simple, primary *datum*, which could furnish the theologian with the starting point of his speculation,—for it presupposes other starting points,—but is rather a summary superscription of a fulness of concrete contents; and how, therefore, a thinking which

should make this evangelical Christian consciousness its axiom, without further grounding it, and should from it alone proceed to further determinations, can in any sense be said to be speculation, speculative theology, is not to be seen. The strictly speculative consists in the knowledge of the universal, and also in the knowledge of the individual and distinctive from the universal, and again in the universal; but *Rothe* would here wish to make the most concrete contents his express presuppositions, and thereby set them up in the place of the universal. Least of all would such a theological speculation—which moreover, be it remarked in passing, we are not able to find in this theological ethic—be justified, in the presence of philosophy, in boasting as an advantage, that its *primary datum*, in comparison with that of philosophy, was one of fuller contents. Philosophy would only answer, that may be very convenient, but just for that very reason it is injurious to the scientific value of your speculation. It is easy to discover the confusion which has misled *Rothe* in making that which is absolutely and immediately certain to the theological or religious subject, as such, the primary *datum* of his speculation. He has taken the subjective certitude, which for itself requires no further confirmation, for the objective, primary, necessarily axiomatic certitude. But speculation, be it that of philosophy, or theology, may not take for its axiom that which is subjectively most certain, but that which proves itself to be so, by a rigid necessity of thinking.

Whether a *fixed distinction* between theological and philosophical speculation can at all be made, will be further shown below: on the *difference of the starting-point*, as *Rothe* understands it, it cannot be based. It is not only inadmissible to make self-consciousness the primary *datum* on the one hand for philosophical speculation, and God-consciousness on the other hand for theological speculation; but neither the one nor the other is able to be made the starting-point of speculation in general. *Self-consciousness* is not able, for our self-consciousness can in no way be regarded as an absolutely original one, for the possibility of which no other presupposition is required, for in our self-consciousness we find ourselves conditioned; indeed, our self-consciousness is everywhere only so realised, that we become in the same act equally conscious of another being from whom we distinguish ourselves; why should

not this consciousness, that there is a being besides ourselves, have equal right to be the starting-point of speculation? Least of all of *Cartesius*, who, in the history of philosophy, as also by *Rothe*, is regarded as the originator of this starting-point, can it be maintained that he really made it a tenable, radical ground of thinking. His *cogito ergo sum* is certainly just as unassailable as every other tautology, but, according to his own unequivocal explanation, it does not furnish him with a beginning of all necessary thinking, therefore not of metaphysics; but is rather the determining transition from the region of *mere notions* into that of *real existence*, as opposed to universal scepticism in relation to all reality. But even this does not really serve *Cartesius*; for what advantage is it to establish that to the thinking activity there is a subject, and that I myself am conscious of being this subject, if all further progress so attaches itself to this point, that now, in this thinking, *i.e.* representing, according to *Cartesius'* use of language, different ideas are *met with*, whose reality is collectively dependent on a supreme idea which carries in itself the proof of its reality? One could just as well arrive at this result immediately from the fact of thinking, without this round-about method, touching the *existence* of the thinking subject. But neither can the *God-consciousness* be this starting-point. The reason is contained in an earlier remark; the thought of God is much too full a notion for the spirit, to be made the axiom of speculative thinking; in making it this, it would, so to speak, anticipate the main question. However, it is essential to speculation that it has an *à priori* beginning; but to exclude the question, whether there be an *à priori* proof for the existence of God, by making the consciousness of God, without anything further, the commencement of speculation, were a method of proceeding most certainly not to be justified in a speculative point of view.

Speculation can only lay claim to, as its starting-point, the notion of the *absolute* in its *abstract, negative* form, the *absolute* as the indifference *(indifferenz)* in which as yet there are no antitheses *(Gegensätze)* and distinctions, but in which there is the possibility of every contrast and distinction. This notion indeed, as every other, requires other notions for its explanation, but in its self-completion by means of a process of thought it is

independent of, and essentially prior to, all other notions and thoughts. Nevertheless, this starting-point also requires to be dialectically justified; for it must be shown, according to logical relation, that it is the first, and the presupposition of all other metaphysical notions. That this notion is very poor in determinations *(Bestimmungen)*, that its contents, as such, cannot be conceived of as really existing *(existirend)* is the fate of its position in the order of metaphysical notions. Nevertheless, no one who is acquainted with the history of philosophy, of gnosticism, of mysticism, above all, of the decidedly pantheistic mysticism, both within and without the sphere of Christianity, will deny its fearfully real significance for the inward life of humanity.

The *method of progress* from this point of setting out is undoubtedly first of all the *logical à priori*. For if there be a speculative thinking at all, the reason *(vernunft)* must be possessed of necessary and universal notions; but if it possesses these notions, it can only set out from them, in the task of constructing a system of universal knowledge; indeed it is the very nature of speculation consciously to attach all knowledge to these beginnings, and to hold itself ever in connection with them.—*Stahl* remarks, in the dissertation concerning the relation of theology to philosophy, appended to his "Elements of Christian Philosophy" *(Fundamenten einer christlichen Philosophie)*, p. 178, the course of all scientific inquiry is not, as is generally supposed, that of setting out from known *data*, and by logical consistency arriving at conclusions respecting the unknown, but much rather that of seeking to explain new hypotheses by means of phenomena which are already known and understood. We accede to this opinion if it be restricted to the original conception of a comprehensive train of thought; but the method of its representation, provided it be of a speculative nature, will not thereby be altered; if it wishes to appear as a system, it must make its beginning from the most simple determinations, which, according to the necessity of thinking, are the *prius* of all besides. But according to what we have said, we are very far from believing that these determinations, just as they are placed, like automatons, begin to set themselves in motion, according to their own inward logical necessity, towards an unknown end; so that the speculator must blindly abandon himself to them, in the spirit of Esther, ch. iv. 16—if I perish, I

perish. Much rather they only move as the speculator himself sets them in motion, *i. e.* in his consciousness there is already present a definite task, which they have to solve *(lösen sollen)*. This task is the *reality in its whole circumference*, therefore also the *highest reality, religion.*

But these universal, necessary notions of the reason, do not proceed to this end by each one of them giving birth to others in inexhaustible fruitfulness. Notions in this shadowy kingdom of the logico-metaphysical necessity of thought, do not at all possess such a positive generating power; and no principle of negation is able by a dialectic charm to impart to them this power: the mere logical law gives for the advancement from one determination to another, strictly speaking, only, either analysis of notions we already possess, or negations, denominations of what, according to the contents of the preceding determinations, *cannot have a place* in those which are to follow. Consequently these attach themselves to those preceding, if in relation to them they are not the mere repetition of their previous contents, but are really different from them, yet only in such a manner that their *possibility*—conceivableness—is conditioned by them. Accordingly the demand which, in this concatenation of moments, each makes upon the following, is limited to its not being in inexplicable contradiction with its foregoing; the *principium rationis sufficientis* has in this sphere only the analytical significance, above observed. On this negativity of the mere thought-necessity depends the destructive power which it exercises on everything positive, real, so soon as it is made the all-comprehending and all-governing principle of knowledge, and it is then only the timid inconsistency of the thinking subject, if with such a dialectic it does not ultimately lead to the doctrine of pure annihilation. This issue can be only consistently avoided, by bearing in mind the negative character of this thought-necessity, and requiring nothing from it which it cannot originally furnish, therefore, not the production of positively new moments of knowledge, and by placing the proper limitations upon the significance of the logical proof in this sphere.

Is there, then, no security that the progressing determination of our spirit furnishes us with any knowledge of the truth; that this speculating is nothing more than an arbitrary imagining, or a

mere assurance and maintenance, according to the impulses of the subjective want, without objective ground? The ground of this security is twofold: the first consists in the union of all these notions and decisions, as a systematic harmonious whole; in its supporting and corroborating, by virtue of its organic nature, each individual moment of its connection—ever determining the same more and more; receiving from it determinations, and thus growing together with it to an ever closer and concentrated unity. The second ground of security is seen by this entirety proving itself to be a key to a deeper understanding of the reality, and thus confirming itself by that which we already, by another method, know and possess of reality. The objection lies near at hand, that, in this way, speculative thinking receives, in addition to the starting point above denoted, still a second presupposition, namely, the entire reality in the consciousness of the thinking subject. Properly understood, this too cannot be denied, but it can never be for the speculative method *terminus a quo*, but only *terminus ad quem*.

A principle presents itself here, which, in the most decided manner, sets boundaries to the kingdom of logical necessity, namely, that of freedom, therefore of personality, since freedom, in so far as it is said to be *principium efficiens*, can only be thought of as the will of a personal being. Speculation, which seeks principles of reality, thus becomes driven in a dialectical way from its above-denoted starting point, the negative notion of the absolute, to the notion of absolute personality. But so soon as the knowledge of this principle is acquired, that which proceeds from it is by no means further to be determined by the mere notions of a mystical apriorism of an absolute logic; for it would only be making light of the notion of divine and human freedom, if it is to be nothing more than the power to realize that which is already contained in the necessary determinations of the being. Other notions are here required, such as are only intelligible as predicates of personality, if the thinking is to be able to follow, and to express as purely as possible the qualitatively changed manner, according to which, in this sphere, the activities of the principle depend upon itself. Not as if freedom there destroyed the necessary connection, where it does not separate itself from the idea of the being in which it is found, or where, as in God,

such a separation cannot be thought of, but, on the contrary, it glorifies it, by taking it up into a higher sphere. So far as I know, *Leibnitz*, in the preface to his *Theodicee*,[1] and elsewhere, was the first clearly and definitely to express this distinction. He discovers in the very heart of the metaphysical, logical, geometrical necessity, to which *Hobbes* and *Spinoza* reduce everything, and of the arbitrariness from which, according to *Bayle*, and a few modern philosophers of the Cartesian school, everything proceeds, the law of conformity or fittingness *(convenance)*, which depends upon the principle of the best. This conformity, according to *Leibnitz*, is the rule by which freedom works, while by the irrational necessity in which there is neither choice, goodness, nor understanding, and not less so by the principle of arbitrariness, freedom is excluded.[2] The distinction is essentially as just as it is fertile, although we cannot at all accede to the use which the author makes of it. The great matter is the principle of *design*, as it already appears in the sphere of nature, and here forms, as it were, a net-work of higher teleological connections *(Verknüpfungen)*, above the web of mere aiteological, as it entirely governs the sphere of the spirit and of history. But the *love* which designs the end, and the *wisdom* which realizes it, are only to be thought of as attributes of a *free* Being; and inversely if the Divine Intelligence, in the supposed interest of His Absoluteness, is to be regarded as exalted above the necessity of distinguishing between means and ends, then the predicates of free determination *(Wollens)*, of personality in general, lose in His case all significance, and we get as the last word of the great enigma, the still-born thought of a thinking, without a thinking being—since only a personal subject is truly subject, itself the bearer of the predicates relating to itself. But to recognise, that God has a plan in this world-creating, world-governing activity, that He has ordered means for the accomplishment of this plan, that consequently everything in the world cannot be regarded by Him in the light

[1] *Opp. philosophica ed. Erdmann*, t. I., p. 473—477. In the Theodicee itself the principal passage on this question is in paragraph 345, ss.

[2] Of similar significance is the distinction between *necessitas* and *convenientia*, of which the schoolmen, especially *Thomas Aquinas*, makes such frequent use.

of both means and ends,—that the thought of God, rests not in the world, so long as it is subject to constant change,—is ever what it is, only in this passing moment; but only then when it rests in its end *as attained*:—to recognise this is not merely more humanly but also more divinely to think of God, than when one determines His relation to the world strictly according to the principle of metaphysical necessity[1] or according to the aesthetic analogy of artistic creation.[2]

Moreover these living motive-powers of the Divine love and wisdom will not allow that our thinking, merely in order to save at any cost the logical apriorism for this sphere, deduces, as necessary consequence, *from the mere notions* of these attributes, the arrangement of the world dependent upon them. The design of Divine love, as soon as it becomes manifest, immediately furnishes evidence of its origin in this principle; but if, according to *Plato*, astonishment is an affection well becoming the dignity of the philosopher, it still more becomes the religious man. For the ultimate design of Divine love with respect to all spirits turned towards it, is so great, that it essentially surpasses all human expectation and conception, and where the thought of this final purpose has become a religious conviction,—so often as it enters into the consciousness, it produces ever and again new surprise and astonishment: eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him. Still less will it occur to us to think of preceding by our notions, perhaps as consequences of a general notion of wisdom, the inventive, manifold wisdom of God. For in relation to this we only acquire real knowledge by following this wisdom in its works, and as is a matter of course by attaching, in the most inward manner possible, this new, to all our previously acquired, knowledge; therefore to that which is *à priori* determined as true, for otherwise it could not be seen how the new knowledge should really become our own. The results of metaphysical thought-necessity are, as it were, the law which precedes the Gospel of this concrete knowledge; the Gospel can never be explained merely by the law, still in all moments of its contents it is essentially conditioned by it.

According to this we cannot regard speculative knowledge in

[1] As *Hegel*.—Tr. [2] As *Rothe*.—Tr.

the ethical and religious sphere as mere apriorism; its progress is much rather a constant, *mutual determining of à priori and empirical knowledge.*

The empirical factor becomes there most decidedly prominent where evil makes its appearance, therefore in relation to the Divine conduct and plans, which presuppose the existence of evil. This is the unavoidable stone of stumbling on which mere apriorism of thinking must go to pieces; and the investigations of this book hope to make plain that the determination, *à priori* to arrive at the knowledge of evil, is nothing else than that which must prove destructive to the very notion of evil. For this reason, therefore, it is quite in order that the advocates of that principle should take lively offence at the more exact and thorough investigation of this subject; for it throws an obstacle in their way, the existence of which, in order to maintain their position, they are compelled to deny.—

Is it perhaps a peculiarity of philosophical, in distinction from theological speculation, that it is not to know anything from experience respecting personality, sin, and redemption? If so, philosophy would come into the dilemma, of being either obliged to abandon the knowledge of that which alone breathes the warm breath of life into all other knowledge, and to shut itself up in an inaccessible castle of abstract notions, absolutely separated from all reality; or it must set itself to the establishment of determinations which contradict the peculiar nature of the subject, *i.e.* to err. It will ever remain a vain attempt to endeavour to distinguish and to reconcile philosophy with Christian religious science; therefore theology, by assigning to each of them a separate form and method, without regarding the all-comprehending spirit and principle of philosophy; just as little can philosophy withdraw itself from theology, for the reason that it must be absolutely left to its own judgment as to what, and what not, it is able to make the subject of its generalizing knowledge. The honour which philosophy claims, according to its original principle, of being the all-comprehending, universal science, the science of the sciences, no one can dispute; and the idea of *Fichte* was perfectly just in representing the system of philosophy, as the absolute doctrine of science, although his carrying out of the same must go to pieces, from the one-sidedness

and barrenness of his principle.—As the contrast, so also the union between the philosophic, and the scientific religious tendencies of the spirit, is not that of a merely formal but of a more real nature. A philosophy which, by its theory of knowledge, and the laws of its own method dependent on the same, is never able to do justice to personality and freedom, and the method of their operation as principles of reality, must be regarded as utterly inimical to the Christian religion and theology, and utterly preventive of either their quiet associative progress, or of their supplementing each other. And, on the other hand, a philosophy which truly satisfies the idea of Divine and human personality is naturally allied to religion, although it may ever develop itself at variance with individual doctrines of the same. It is not merely the world-historical power of Christianity, which conditions the possibility of such a philosophy; the very goad against which the systems radically inimical to Christianity kick, drives them forward; but the philosophy which satisfies the idea of Divine and human personality finds in Christianity its positive confirmation, as well as the completion of its beginnings of knowledge.—Only by the restoration of this relationship is the development of philosophy able to win back the quiet and sober bearing which it has lost, especially in modern times, by the rash change of prevailing systems and modes of thought of directly opposite principles. Only scepticism, or that view of the matter which comes to the same thing, which, indifferent as to the contents, or inimical to all enduring contents, places the nature of the idea merely in the process, in the dialectic stream and its immanent negativity—will regard this change as healthful and good, a change which not only prevents everything like completion of the individual parts, but sweeps away the very main pillars of the system. Every one else will regard in such a change a ridiculous satire of the result upon the avowed object of this science, namely, that of reducing all knowledge to its ultimate principles, and thereby to firm ground and basis. Especially he, who regards as agreeable to nature, a living fellowship between philosophy and the other sciences—no one of which will have any desire to exchange its sure progress for this here-and-there tossing about—a fellowship which does not perplex, but promotes and explains the real sciences, he will not regard this course of change in the

development of philosophy, as betokening health, but rather as that of an unnatural tentiginousness *(Spannung)* The systems of philosophy have fallen by their contradiction of Christianity; they have not been able to take firm hold in the spiritual life of modern times, because they could not truly attach themselves to the deepest and most powerful root of the same. If philosophy only once succeed in finding for this attachment the immoveable point of support, it will then also have tasks, which will not permit it to rest, both for the completion of its system, and for the ever deepening penetration into the individual spheres of knowledge; but it will no longer, like *Penelope,* be under the necessity of ever anew beginning its web.—But such a philosophy does not furnish *the basis* of Christian faith, which indeed possesses in itself the absolutely sufficient ground of its certitude, and must have entirely renounced itself before it could receive its ground of certitude from philosophy. A philosophy which wishes to furnish the ground of Christian faith, as if it were groundless without it, sets about its destruction and establishes itself in its place. What philosophy is able to render to faith, rests essentially in its endeavour to comprehend the entire contents, as a whole, of the human spirit, reduced to its ultimate principles, whether arising out of its tendency to the world, or out of its tendency to God. Its vocation lies in furnishing the Christian faith with the developed intelligence of its harmony with all the other elements of life, so far as they are really founded in the nature of humanity. For "*philosophy* is the unity of faith with all the formative elements of the time, in so far as these contain in themselves truth, and therefore also a living future.—The mind can only be at rest when religion is the measuring rod of all truth; and religion has only received its satisfactory solution, when, in its inward truth unchanged—for it is indeed the unchangeable, independent of every change of time —it takes up into itself all wisdom as well as all life."[1]—An unconstrained attachment, an attachment as arising out of the very nature of the thing, of such a philosophy to Christianity, one may denominate *Christian philosophy,* Christian Theism, although it

[1] *Steffens* in *Seiner christlichen Religionsphilosophie,* Th. I., S. 13.

never ceases to be *free philosophy*, and therefore never allows itself to be bound to a theological *datum* as its starting-point.

When only such a philosophy of Christian Theism shall be found, which shall know just as well how purely to express the idea of *personality*, as to preserve the *certain* results of the scientific culture of the age—which, without depreciating honourable attempts in this direction, we must still regard as a postulate—then, of course, dogmatic theology will be able to free itself of many elements which it is now obliged to take up into its sphere; but without, therefore, losing its position as a separate science in distinction from philosophy. In that case dogmatic theology would only have the task of teaching the facts of the saving revelation of God, and its result arising from its nature in humanity, without being obliged to enter upon the development of the general moments of religious knowledge, which constitute its presupposition.

Christian doctrine can never dispense with the *monographical* treatment of its individual parts; for only from a thorough investigation of the individual parts can result a satisfactory exhibition of the whole, which, free from empty formalism, shall everywhere rest upon full concrete notions. But the monography can only scientifically treat its subject, when it has respect to the whole to which it belongs, and if the knowledge of the whole is conditioned by a knowledge of its parts, it may here with equal propriety be maintained, in consequence of the mutual relation subsisting between the parts, that the knowledge of the parts is dependent upon the knowledge of the whole. The monography, supposing its relation to the system of Christian doctrine to be correct, is a member of an organic whole; therefore, as considered in itself, it may again be regarded as a whole, a relatively independent and united whole, it has at the same time through every moment of its contents reference to the greater entirety of which it forms a part. In so far as such a monography extends the representation of its subject to its speculative side, it presupposes an insight into the speculative premises in more remote connection, even into the most simple beginnings of knowledge, whether the consciousness of these connections be a

perfectly developed one, or one merely in its rudimentary elements. —Only the way which the monography, in the treatment of the speculative moments of its subject, has to take, in relation to that, which a comprehensive, speculative, theological exhibition of the whole adopts, will be just the very opposite. If the latter pursues the path of *progression*, that of *regression* will be assigned to the former. While the latter takes its starting-point from abstract metaphysical determinations, in order, in methodical progress, to arrive at fuller and more concrete knowledge, the former sets out from a determined contents of doctrine—although in this case, from such an one as is found to be possessed of contents common to the moral consciousness in all developed human life—and endeavours by its analysis, to arrive at the universal notions and principles, which, in the sphere of speculation, build the concealed presupposition of Christian truth. In the conviction that the truth cannot contradict itself, that what is true in theology, cannot be untrue in philosophy, it undertakes to show how the answer to questions of philosophy which stand connected with matters of religious interest, must run, if it is to be in harmony with the nature of Christianity, and the facts of moral consciousness which condition it. Of course, it is understood that the investigation dares not arbitrarily to transform the decisions of philosophy, in order to accommodate them to a practical end, to a subjective requirement; only so far is the investigation a scientific one, as it shows from the very nature of those decisions, that they, so far as the character of universal truth and necessity belong to them, of themselves find their place in a connected train of thought, which is to be recognized as the corresponding speculative presupposition to the express contents of Christianity.—

From what we have hitherto said, it follows that the object of this work is not, strictly speaking, to reproduce the Protestant ecclesiastical dogma concerning sin, and the subjects therewith in immediate connection, as they are laid down according to their fundamental elements in the symbolic books of our Church, and further developed by the older dogmatists. It will be allowed, it is hoped, that these investigations concerning sin are conducted in a Protestant spirit; but we are far from understanding by this Protestant spirit according perhaps to arbitrary interpretation

elsewhere to be found, the denial of all determinate contents of faith; and therefore the protestation against Christian Protestantism. But we are only there able to recognize it in life and science, where the religious life-principles of the Protestant Church are a matter of conviction and inward disposition of mind (*Gesinnung*). But we do not in the least ascribe to the Protestant, theological character of a dogmatic investigation, oneness of opinion with all the doctrinal positions of our confessional writings; and, what is more, we believe that one may rejoice in, and be proud of, the great dogmatic works of a *Gerhard*, *Quensted*, and others, as imperishable memorials of German, protestant science, without relinquishing the hope that Protestant theology will indeed, one day, produce a purer and more living exhibition of the system of Christian doctrine.

FIRST BOOK.

THE REALITY OF SIN.

FIRST SUBDIVISION.

THE NATURE OF SIN.

FIRST CHAPTER.

SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF THE LAW.

It requires no especial depth of consideration, but merely a little moral earnestness, meditatively to stand in the presence of a moral phenomenon of human life, and ever again to direct towards it the look of inquiry. This is the phenomenon of *evil*, the existence of a disturbing, disuniting element in a sphere, where the demand for harmony and unity makes itself most singularly emphatic. This element is everywhere to be seen, when the history of the human race, the course of its development in its main features and as a whole, passes before us; it betrays its presence too in manifold forms, if we only cast a glance upon the nearest relations of human society; and its existence cannot be concealed if we look within our own bosoms. It is a nightly shadow which darkens every circle of human life, and which we ever anew behold swallowing up its fairest and brightest forms.

Those indeed make light of it, who in their philosophic contemplations of the world, imagine to get rid of its great riddle,

the existence of evil, by refusing it earnest reflection. They complain of the painfulness of these reflections which are purposely directed to the night-side of life, find it quite natural that the darkness should only be the more dark, in proportion to the fixedness of the attention with which it is beheld, and counsel us, for our own sakes, to abandon the question concerning evil, inasmuch as our occupation with the same can only tend to sink us in the depths of gloomy melancholy.[1] How glady would we follow this advice, if *Novalis* was only right in his bold affirmation, which indeed may just as well be interpreted in the sense of the Gnostic *Karpocrates*, as perhaps in that of *Fichte*, that a man, who suddenly truly believed he were moral, would be so.[2] Were it possible to shake off "the old grievous delusion of sin," as an empty dream, by a resolute determination, who would not in so convenient a manner be released! But as the well known cunning of the ostrich does not save it from the shot of the huntsman, neither will the shutting of our eyes to the existence of evil cause it to vanish, but only the more certainly deliver us into its power.

In order to *overcome* an enemy, one must first of all *become acquainted* with him; and those very complaints about the painfulness of these considerations directly adduce the strongest evidence of the dangers attendant on the withdrawment from them. But there are other things which disturb us and hem us in, besides these moral relations, and we regard it as an honourable energy of character which resolves to overcome and surmount them, while with respect to moral disturbances, we look down upon the same course of conduct as something outrageous. We

[1] Advice, very similar to that of some modern philosophers, is found in a passage of *Boethius'* consol. philos. quoted by *Ritter* in his history of Christian philosophy *(Geschichete der christlichen Philosophy)*, part 2, p. 591.

> Voshaec fabula (of *Orpheus and Eurydice)* respicit,
> Quicunque in superum diem
> Mentem ducere quaeritis.
> Nam qui Tartareum in specus
> Victus lumina flexerit,
> Quidquid præcipium, trahit,
> Perdit, dum videt infernos.

[2] *Novalis' Schriften* Bd. 2, S. 248.—Tr.

have in common with the whole animal creation, the susceptibility of pain and physical suffering; it belongs to this lower sphere, the natural side of our being, and the victorious power of the spirit in surmounting the disturbances of this sphere is able to show itself doubly glorious. But in distinction from all other creatures, man is the subject of moral evil, of wickedness, it has taken possession of his *spirit*, of his very *will;* if then this disunity *(Entzweiung)* has so penetrated into the spirit, as to set it at variance with itself, what has man greater in himself, by which he may surmount this internal self-disjunction? However, this moral evil is not the only disturbing cause in our spiritual life,—and yet in the manner in which it acts upon our conscience, it stands absolutely alone. If one discovers in the peculiar organisation of his spirit, some striking deficiency, some insurmountable obstacle to a more perfect culture, to a vigorously progressing knowledge, he is of course pained thereat, but he does not reproach himself on account of it; but if he become conscious of willing that which is wicked, he immediately feels that in that he is inexcusable.

If our earthly existence be bound to many painful conditions, a thorough and comprehensive consideration teaches us to make them subserve our high nature, and our great destiny, and only excludes moral *evil* as absolutely *foreign* and *contradictory* to our nature, with whose existence no higher point of view, and no progress of knowledge reconciles us. To the problem, which foiled youth, matured manhood, returns; but the earnestness of life which he has experienced, the knowledge of man which he has acquired, have only increased its difficulty. Many philosophic systems may boast of having, by a speculative theory, entirely resolved moral evil into a known necessity, and thus imagine to have solved the last dark enigma of existence; but life goes on without either troubling itself about this false self-exaltation of the schools, or about that self-degradation which refuses thought to the subject of moral evil. The advocates of these opinions contradict themselves *by the fact,* that wickedness ever awakens in them entirely different sensations from those which arise from the unalterable limitations and conditions of this our individual existence; and that practically their treatment of moral evil is entirely different from the manner in which they act towards the necessary imperfections of our individual life. Their theory does

not explain the reality of moral life and consciousness, but gives them the lie; the reality revenges itself by taking no notice of their theory.

But *the nature*, from which evil stands so decidedly separate as an element foreign and contradictory to it, is not the prevalent constitution of the phenomenal reality of the universal moral condition of the human race, as it factually exists. With human nature as it is, evil in its manifold forms is much rather so inmostly grown together and incorporated with it, that, judging from the appearance, we should conclude that evil belonged to human nature. It is from a higher truth of our being that we pronounce evil to be contradictory to it; it is a deeper reflection of man upon himself, which, although not able to destroy it, still ever pronounces it to be that which is a perversion, and to be rejected.

By this deeper reflection upon ourselves we become conscious of a truth, which, laying claim to an unlimited importance, regulates our life, so far as the shaping of it *can be our task, i.e.* so far as it is *determined by our conscious self-determination.* In the degree in which our spirit is able by conscious self-determination to determine its own condition and its influence over other beings, in so far is it *will.* The mere moment *(Moment)* of self-determination does not suffice for the notion of will, for this in a certain sense we must ascribe to unintelligent creatures, to the organic life of nature, by virtue of its development from its own principle.[1] Self-determination only thereby becomes will, by its being a *conscious* determination; that its subject (the subject of self-determination or the self-determining subject) is able previously to present to its mind that which it brings to reality by its self-determination. Accordingly, there is not immediately expressed in that deeper truth of our nature *being (Sein)*, that which is; but the *obligation of being (Seinsollen)*, that which ought to be, more strictly speaking, an obligation *(sollen)* which is determined to pass into being, but which, so long as it is in the shape of transition into being, consequently not yet being, does not cease to appear in our consciousness as obligation, as the *rule* of life, as a necessity determining our will.

[1] In a certain sense—for, strictly speaking, it must be granted, that where self does not exist, we can say nothing of self-determination.

It is in the nature of this practical truth, not to realise itself in the form of *the necessity of nature*, placing that which corresponds to it immediately in reality. This truth falls within the sphere of the spirit, and can only by the spirit become reality. Therefore it does not exclude from the self-moving power of the will, the physical possibility of deviating from its contents. Its necessity is a spiritual necessity; it has elasticity enough to afford room for that possibility and its reality; it has too, unwasting strength enough, ever to maintain its authority in the face of factual contradiction.

This practical truth, absolutely regulating, and yet not coercing the will, is the *moral law*. The moral law, in so far as it is norm for the will, is nothing more than the good. In this it is seen that the notion of law has for its inward presupposition the *notion of the good*, which, in an ethical system, which follows the real order, must be deduced prior to that of the law, and independently of it. Therefore the impression of sublime majesty which the consideration of the moral law makes upon a mind not altogether hebetated is by no means conditioned merely by the form of an unconditional command, but more really by the nature of the contents from which indeed this form first of all proceeds. *Kant*, it is true, in his moral formalism, directly inverts this relation, by the requirement that the notion of the good must be determined subsequently to that of law, and by means of law, and here, in this sense, with enthusiasm, apostrophizes the great name of Duty;[1] but it has already been justly objected to by *Schleiermacher*, that this glorification must also be placed to the account of the morality of Eudaimonism, which surely cannot be denied a place in the formal notion of duty.[2] If we here deviate from this real order, it must be remembered that our task is not that of exhibiting a system of moral life, but that of recognising in its nature *the disturbance of moral life*. In order to arrive at this knowledge, our proceeding must, first of all, according to the nature of its subject, be a *descriptive* one. And indeed when we have taken up this disturbance into the mirror of our consideration, first of all in the form in which it appears most generally to the inward

[1] *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, S. 91, 125 *(sechste Aufl.)*

[2] *Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre*, S. 180 *(erste Ausg.)*

perception of man, we must set out from this appearance in order to penetrate into its nature.—

The moral law embraces the entire life of man, so far as it is conditioned by the will, but it only does so by occupying the highest stand-point over it. This stand-point is so high, that on it all the distinctions of moral duties in the different spheres and stages of human development vanish, and the original moral truth is only seen in simple, comprehensive outlines. Nevertheless, that which is to be regarded as moral in those individual spheres and degrees of development, must be capable of being placed within these outlines, and of being shewn to be their harmonious contents. This is a chasm which exists between the moral law and moral life in its concrete reality, and yet, apart from the question of harmony or discord between them, a limitation which attaches itself to the notion of law. The norms of the law require of man obedience throughout every moment of life, but still do not specifically indicate what his duty is, in his individual moral condition; it is never able with exactness to say how he must act in individually given circumstances: as opposed to the fulness of real life, the majestic grandeur of the law appears in its sublime uniformity, but also as an empty abstraction, devoid of life.

This sublime elevation which the moral law holds in relation to the real moral life, if it developes itself in harmony with its requirements, principally rests upon two grounds. The one is the significance of *individuality* in the widest sense of the word. For as a moral action, regarded as the determined precedence of moral life, is never simple, but always manifold and many-sided in its character, its full moral determination according to its contents and form is ever conditioned partly, by the peculiarity of the individual, and partly by the peculiar nature of the social relations in which he stands. Since then the law only lays down an outline for the will and life in their normal condition, most general in its character, and equally binding for all, it could not therein express the individual moral calling of the individual, as such.— More important for us in the present subject, is the second ground. For with respect to the first, it is an insolvable task for the moral law, perfectly to determine the individual; even ethical science, with its more extensive means, is only able to do so in an approximating manner—there ever remains between its notions

and postulates, and the individual case, an irrational relation, as it were an empty intervening space, which no rule is able to fill up, but only the *conscience* of the individual, which acts in the manner of an immediate feeling (moral tact.) The other ground on which the abstract position of the law rests as norm of our moral life, is *the moral condition of man*, which forms the presupposition and starting-point of the endeavour to meet the requirements of the law. We cannot here enter into the diversities of this condition, and will only remark that even there, where the starting-point is conditioned by a change of principles and renewing of the moral life, the endeavour after harmony with the moral law, retains the form of a perpetual conflict with inward and outward hindrances. Man requires even in this altered state still a moral instruction, which takes him just as he is—viz., although apprehended by the Divine principle of the moral law, is nevertheless inclined to sin and error, and teaches him to know the moral process, by which he is able from his present condition progressively to realize the moral law in his life. The law itself does not afford him such instruction, but without troubling itself about the transition and the intervening space between them, rests satisfied at having pointed out to him the right and the perfect.

What then are the *middle terms* by which ethics fills up that chasm, and unites the moral law to real life and to its given conditions? This union is not to be effected by lowering the notion of the moral law to a rule, which, while it accommodates itself to the moral ability of sinful, although by means of the redemption of Jesus, renewed man, only prescribes to him a relatively normal moral conduct. In this manner *Rothe*, who, in his theological ethics investigates the notion of moral law with his accustomed sagacity, solves this part of the present problem.[1] By such a solution the notion of the moral law would

[1] A. a. O. Bd. 3, § 806—809. *Rothe* distinguishes between moral law in the general, and in the strict real sense of the term. Under the former he understands the absolutely original and perfect disposition of human conduct, which, indeed, according to his conception of the moral, consists merely in the absolute determination of the material nature by means of personality. But he does not wish this simple principle to be regarded as real law, but rather as that of moral norm. As law it is only applicable to the Saviour, not for the about to be saved. The moral law, in the strict sense, is, according to him, "that

be robbed of the ideal position which, according to the otherwise general *scientific* use of language, essentially belongs to it, and the Kantian axiom, I can, for I ought, in its inverted form I can not, therefore I ought not, made the canon of what is to be really our moral law.[1] But that this altered *expression* for the notion of law, not only does not square with the biblical use of language, but endangers the entire ethical form, and thus the pure and complete recognition of sin, will become clear in the course of this investigation.—Just as little may ethics draw into the notion of moral law the individuating moments which are dependent on empirically given conditions, and are consequently different for different races, times, and individuals.[2] This would oblige us to regard the moral law as relatively mutable, which is decidedly contrary to the ideal significance of its notion.

The older theology, that of the middle ages, as that of the Protestant Church, was perfectly right, in considering the determinations of *universality*, *equality for all*, and *immutability*, as inseparable from the notion of moral law. With these determinations the most essential and most acknowledged attribute of moral law either stands or falls, viz., its *unconditional authority*. To speak therefore of different moral laws, as, of the heathen, Jewish, and Christian moral law, is not at all to be tolerated, at

rule of conduct in virtue of whose observation the real fulfilment of moral duty by natural sinful man is possible, and secured through the divine grace of which he becomes a participant in the redemption of Jesus."

[1] That *Rothe's* determination of the notion of moral law has this significance is clear, especially from the grounds on which he objects to regard "the moral norm," as moral law for us in our empirical condition. It is not immediately binding upon us, because we are absolutely unable, in consequence of our natural sinful depravity, truly to answer its requirements, l. l. p. 11. "It demands," it is said, p. 12, "an absolutely normal conduct, but we are only able, even by the aid of divine grace, to bring forth a relatively normal one." Now this may, with equal right, be applied to any or every moral requirement, even to that which Christ has termed the first and absolutely great command of the Old Testament law: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. And, in fact, according to the expression for the moral law just quoted, we are obliged to think that *Rothe* does not even regard this command as a real law of God.

[2] *Rothe* does this, too, since he therefrom deduces the consequence that the moral law in the system of its concrete determinations is subject to constant change, a. a. O. § 820 f.

least in the scientific use of language. The only distinction is that of the more or less perfect representation of the one moral law, which is one and harmonious in itself, and that which we call Christian moral law is only the pure and perfect expression of this one law.[1] This expression does not in any way presuppose the sinfulness of man, to whom it directs its requirement. The prohibitive form in which this demand in part appears, is only the inseparable exclusion of the opposite, from the denomination of right and good, which does not necessarily presuppose the reality, but only the possibility of this opposite.

Out of this universality and identity, namely of moral law, there arises the contents of *individual moral determinations*, which bring it into closer contact with man, as we find him in his empirical reality, shut up within the limits of space and time of this earthly life, drawn *in different directions* by his own necessities and the claims of others, in their individual and social relations; hemmed in and disturbed by the sin without him, and involved in, and perplexed by, the most complicated conflicts within himself. It is by means of the relation of the general moral norm to the factually given conditions and relations, that this complex of individual moral claims and duties is deducible from it; but it is

[1] Accordingly, we cannot of course agree with *Rothe*, in his not consenting to allow the moral phenomena of the Saviour, and the moral precepts of the New Testament, to be regarded as the Christian moral law, on the ground that the Saviour's morality is absolutely normal, while our morality, even to its completion, can only be relatively moral, and because the moral precepts of the New Testament presuppose quite different moral conditions (?) from the factual conditions of the present day. On the contrary, we must say that the morality of the Saviour is law for us, just because it is absolutely normal. *Rothe* wishes the morals of Christians in every age and in every individual sphere to be regarded as the Christian moral law. But even without claiming the vocation of a reformer of Christian morals, the Protestant Christian is able to recognize the morals of Christians, as law, only in so far as they may be reduced to the moral norms of the New Testament, *i. e.*, not at all as real law. But how can the divine authority, which is only resident in that which is real moral law, belong to the court of Christian morals, which is so decidedly variable, different even at the same time in different spheres? But this readiness to recognize an unconditional valid norm of our conduct in the objective reflection which the passing step of the world's process casts upon the mirror of moral consciousness, hangs strictly together with the pantheistic bias from which this ethic in its speculative basis has not kept itself free, and could not keep itself free with the above mentioned determinations concerning speculative method

only by referring this complex to it as its origin, that it has its certain objective point of support.

In this middle sphere, arises what is popularly called the *collision of duties*. This collision of individual, moral demands has its general ground in the finite limitations of human nature, and the variety of its moral relations. Strictly speaking in every moment of conscious life, man has more claims made upon him on different sides, than he is able to meet at the same time; accordingly he is always involved in this collision, and only then becomes conscious of it where these opposing demands press upon him with more than wonted earnestness, and with almost equal moral importance.

We have hitherto distinguished, in this series, two moments, the universal moral law, and the individual moral tasks; there is a third, by means of which the transition of the moral norm into the empirical reality of the individual is first made, viz., *the determinate duty*. It points out the moral conduct which is proper in the given moment of life, under the existing relations, excluding every other choice of conduct; accordingly we may say with *Schleiermacher*, although in a somewhat different form of thought, that the determination of every duty is the decision of a case of collision.[1] From this it follows that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a collision of duties. The pure harmony of distinctions in the unity of the moral law, and dependent on this, the unconditional authoritative character which its commands bear, is again restored in the duty decided on, and thus the end is made like the beginning. But on the way from the one to the other, the moral norm is divided into a multitude of mutually conditioning and limiting particulars of moral relations and their claims on the individual, so that the ascertaining what is really the present duty is often attached to the solution of a complexity of relations.—From what we have already seen, it follows that the fixation of this determinate duty in a given moment can never be fully arrived at by ethics, by means of a series of logical inferences drawn from the universal norm, but that this science must ever leave the ultimate determination to the conscience of the individual.—

[1] *System of moral doctrine*, published by *A. Schweizer*, § 327 (*System der Sittenlehre.*) Compare *Rothe's* treatment of this question, l. l. p. 63—75.

The perception of this moral law, as an unconditional authoritative norm of life, belongs so essentially to *human consciousness*, that we should be obliged to regard the individual, in whom it was entirely wanting, as an *imperfect* instance of human nature. But it is never entirely wanting, and this is a fact of great significance, a wonderful testimony to the original nobility of the human spirit, that in its lowest and darkest condition, by means of sin, there are ever to be found some traces of the highest knowledge, some illuminating rays of this ideal truth. And if in the very thickest of this moral darkness we meet with perverted moral representations, which appear incompatible with the very A, B, C, of this knowledge, they cannot well axiomatically pass for more than individual exceptions to the general rule. Besides, the most uncivilized and savage, immediately regard the precepts of rectitude, as valid and binding, when they pertain to the conduct of others towards them, and only when they determine their conduct towards others are they occasionally dark and doubtful. The moral law equally proves itself practically, to be an objective historical power, inasmuch as all rights and regulations in the family, the state, and in all human intercourse, *are based upon* the unchangeable contents of this law. In the form of such an objective power, this law surrounds every one, from the very earliest period of life, with a still, but never entirely to be rejected power, and obliges him in some degree to bow to its authority. But the subjective, impelling cause of this compliance is not only in innumerable cases dark and undeveloped, but it may even be an absolutely perverted one.

In these remarks concerning the relation of the moral law to human consciousness, it has been already recognised, that the ever-growing clearness with which this law appears in the consciousness, is closely associated with the progressive development of the human spirit; it follows from this that both in the consciousness of the individual, and of the race, it must be liable to become troubled and beclouded, from the influence, of inclinations and tendencies of will, contradictory to it. This is the reason that a positive moral legislation finds a place in the course of the historical revelations of God. The Mosaic law in its ethical part, is manifestly nothing else than an expression of the general moral law, in accordance with the truth of its contents, conformable to

the wants of the children of Israel; in order to preserve it from the darkening and perverting influence of human arbitrariness, and the slavery of sin, arose the necessity of fixing it as a positive authority, in writing.[1] But if it was to be established, as a code of statute law, clothed with political power, and woven into a whole with ritual and civil laws, if it was further to be closely attached to the character of the people of Israel, as well as to the requirements of their state of civilisation at the time, its representation was necessarily obliged to be general, and limited to the denoting of the moral norms in their broadest outlines. Consequently an unprejudiced consideration of the moral law will be obliged to allow, that, although it expresses the eternal principles of true morality, and is therefore still always qualified to bring about the knowledge of sin and repentance, there is in the Christian Church, through the efficacy of the holy prototype of Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, a far more developed and deeper knowledge of the moral law, than *could* have been communicated by Moses to the children of Israel.[2]

One cannot object to this manner of regarding the moral law, that it thereby becomes an abstract idea, which sweeps over man in powerless ineffectual transcendance. It is true there lies essentially in the very notion of moral law a certain renunciation of all immediate actuating energy; its function is the regulation of the will, and must withdraw itself so far from the will as not to prevent the possibility of its determining itself in opposition to the regulating norm of the law. But although it follows from this that the individual can, for himself, refuse the binding

[1] *Augustine* very beautifully says of the lex scripta (enarr. in Psalm lvii. 1.—*Benedict*, ed. of his works printed in Paris 1835–40, tom. IV. p. 769): Quia homines appetentes ea quae foris sunt, etiam a se ipsis exules facti sunt, data est etiam conscripta lex; non quia in cordibus scripta non erat; sed quia tu fugitivus eras cordis tui, ab illo qui ubiqui est comprehenderis et ad te ipsum intro revocaris.—

[2] It must therefore in a measure perplex the question relative to the continued significance of the moral law for the Christian life, if we regard—like the older theology of our Church, already in the dissertation of the *Konkordienformel*—de tertio legis divinae usu—the Mosaic law strictly according to its ethical moments. That we should require an arbitrary interpretation which would seek to represent everything which Christ set forth in the sermon on the mount as πλήρωσις τοῦ νόμου, as the direct meaning of the Old Testament commands, is clear from itself.

authority of the moral law, by means of his arbitrary will, this power is not without its limitation in a community of men. The existence of every community is so inseparably bound to certain fundamental outlines of this law, that, in the rejection of their authority, it would decide its own destiny, and even the individual, whose will no longer allows the determinations of the law, is not thereby entirely separated from it. The rejected law follows him in his self-perversion, and will not allow him entirely to get rid of the *feeling of an inward self-disjunction.* But how could the violation of the moral law, proceeding from the determination of the will, set the consciousness of man at variance with itself, if the law were not immanent in this consciousness?—

According to these determinations, our consciousness reveals to us the evil, which is in our will, first of all as *transgression of the law.* In this, man first of all awakes to the moral consciousness of a demand, which requires of him the unconditional submission of the determinations of his will to its claims, and demands that he rather surrender everything than refuse it obedience. At first it appears as an immediate feeling, as a sort of higher rational instinct, but on that account not less valid than when it has assumed the form of a developed insight into its inward necessity. From this moment, man is able to regard evil as evil, as resistance against an unconditional valid requirement, as actual opposition to a law which should ever be held as absolutely inviolable.

And who can deny that this conception contains a deep truth, that even in this, relative, yet indeterminate form, a strong consciousness is able to be distinctly realized of the rejectableness of evil? In this evil, man has made valid a principle of *subjective inclination and unlimited arbitrariness,* in opposition to the universal and everywhere equal authority, and holy necessity, of the law. This arbitrariness gets no advantage by occasionally sheltering itself behind the pretensions of a moral geniality, *(Geniality)* which, as it were, lays claim to an exceptional law and a privileged moral forum. The requirement which, in our day, is often made with respect to the moral law, namely, that it should modestly retire in the presence of powerful natures, strong passions, and complicated historical relations, which may claim unbounded justification, does not arise from a strong constitution

of mind, but from a weak deification of mere power. True strength rather consists in bending the will to the recognised authority of duty, in spite of the violent pressure of our own nature and relationships. One indeed pays man a very poor honour, if, in the last instance, he is to follow the rule which, in the concussion of the mere physical forces of nature, decides the right of the stronger.—Of course, it follows from what we have previously seen, that *the positive moral duty of the individual* in any given case is not to be known by the moral law alone, because it presupposes not merely the general contents of the moral law, but also the peculiarity of the individual subject and the particular character of his relations. By this we may explain a moral phenomenon which we everywhere meet with. If, for instance, we observe the manner in which moral conduct in life arises, we shall find, in thousands and thousands of cases, moral actions bearing the exact impression of the moral law, without their having had any conscious reference to the moral law and its general precepts. But, without this roundabout method of appealing to the universal, one follows in his determinations the requirements of his individual relationships, the moral significance, and obligatory power of which, he is at once and always conscious, and his individual peculiarity gives to his conduct that determinate form by which it is distinguished from the conduct of every other individual. But the individual is not to resolve to be either *without* the *general*, or *opposed* to it, but *within* it, and *subordinate* to it. The individual peculiarity has become untrue and distorted, and its relations unallowable, if they are no longer willing to tolerate subordination to the moral law.[1] The individual peculiarity, without reverence for the law, which is alike for every one, will operate destructively, just in proportion to its energy. That these determinate relations in social life,

[1] That in this we do not refer to *Jacobi's* polemic against the endeavour of the *Kantian* and *Fichtian* philosophy, to subordinate the entire moral life to the dominion of a set rule—especially in his letter to *Fichte*, will of course be understood, since *Jacobi*, as is well known in his "*Allwill*," has himself expressly combated this stand-point of moral *Genialität* and its assumption of self-legislation. Still one cannot at all say that *Jacobi* has anywhere resolved the antinomy which is here set up—between the sovereignty of personality over against the abstract law, in the one treatise, and between the subordination of personality under the universality of holy arrangements, in the other.

and their claims, present themselves to the individual with the authority of moral powers, arises from the moral law inherent in the human spirit. If these relations, in their individual form, sever themselves from their primary source, they are only able to attach themselves to man by means of the dark doubtful power of custom, or the interest of selfishness.—

If this is the signification of the moral law, notwithstanding the abstraction, which, according to its notion, attaches to it, sin in all its forms and individual expressions may still be exhibited as violation of the same.—

Unmistakeably, this form in which sin first of all comes before us is predominantly of an *objective* character. Whether one fixes the norm, the violations of which constitute the nature of sin, according to the Mosaic law, according to the example and teachings of Christ and the declarations of the Apostles, or derives it merely from the conscience, it is in any case independent of our choice, and subjective representation, nay, binds the same by means of a higher authority. That very often such subjective representations, even the most morally perverted, have given themselves out as conscientious, cannot in the least lead us astray; for what holy truth is there which has not occasionally been misunderstood, and intentionally misinterpreted, by hypocrisy and delusion?

But however, the *subjective* moment in this notion of sin is never entirely wanting, as is seen from its development. We could not distinguish the moral law from the law of nature, not even in its most general fundamental outlines, without fixing its exclusive relation to *self-determining existences* (*wollende Wesen*). Accordingly no one thinks of applying the notion of the transgression of law to animals; and even to children we cannot apply the notion, so long as the will, and therewith the moral law exist in them only *potentiâ*, at any rate only in a potential sense.[1]

[1] *Augustine* also on the same ground in *de pecc. mer. et remiss.* lib. I. 64, 65, fully admits that very young children are free from sins propriæ vitæ, while some Pelagians, in order that the inference of original sin might not be drawn from infant baptism, ascribe to new-born children real sin as the ground basis for the necessity of baptism l. l. The old Lutheran theologians on the contrary were obliged, chiefly on account of their fundamental article—that original sin, where it exists, must manifest itself in real sin—to attribute to new-born infants peccata actualia, comp. *Hutter* loci comm. art. x. cap. 1, 3. (S. 348 Ausg. v.

Just as little is one able to violate the moral law, if after the exercise of his conscious self-determination, its constant connection, be again entirely broken through by some *physical cause*. We say, by some physical cause; for if it is only the unrestrained power of the lower impulses which have for a moment broken loose, the validity of the requirement of the law would not in the least be lessened. For the will ought to be master in its own house, and that vehemence of the lower impulses is just that which ought not to be. But in the presence of the power of natural necessity the imperative of the law has no significance. It severs that connection in insanity, as well as also in cases of fever, although only in its highest stages, when delirium is present. In such conditions the concealed evil of the heart may be revealed, but sin cannot be committed.

This subjective moment is immediately given in the very nature of sin. But it characterizes as *sin*, whatever in the life of a self-determining being is found contradictory to the moral law, without troubling itself as to the origin of such an element in the individual, or about its particular relation to the moral consciousness of its subject, or the stage of its development and degree of its momentary activity. If we may regard this form of its notion, as in the main correct, although it does not perhaps disclose to us sufficiently the inward of sin, we must also admit that all further determinations which essentially attach to sin, as its results, are constantly to be found whenever *violation of the moral law objectively takes place.*—

In this sense too the Holy Scriptures determine the notion of sin, 1 John iii. 4: ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία. The expression stands in the connection of an argument against the lax opinion, which regarded the obligation to keep the Divine law in general, but at the same time made allowance for many sinful practices, because perhaps they did not happen to be expressly forbidden in the letter of the Ten Commandments.[1] Against this impure

1661). *Quenstedt*, who on this has a single quæstio, the 14th in the polemical section of the chapter *de peccato*: an infantes usu rationis destitutos cadant peccata actualia? This conclusion lies still nearer at hand upon this stand-point if ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν are applied to the newly-born child in baptism, it follows that it must already have real sin.

[1] *Lücke, Kommentar über die Briefe des Johannes zweite Ausg. S.* 213, 214. *Neander, Pflanzung der Kirche durch die Apostel. S.* 444, f. *(vierte Ausg.)*

disposition of mind the apostle inculcates in the preceding words: πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνομίαν ποιεῖ, the truth that the law is not satisfied with a half obedience, but demands a perfect purity of will and conduct. The blameworthiness of every thing sinful as opposed to the ἀγνὸν εἶναι, ver. 3, he brings to light by showing it to be in contradiction to the divine law. When John adds to the sentence: πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνομίαν ποιεῖ, this other one: καὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία, he of course intends thereby to determine the notion of sin—"and the nature of sin consists in this, that it is *recusancy (Lossagung)* against the law." The first clause, taken alone, might be understood to say that the separation from the law was only one individual moment in the notion of sin; the second clause, therefore, determines the thought more exactly, by making the two ideas exegetical of each other.[1] The older dogmatists of our church were accustomed to support their definition of sin by this passage.[2]—Some biblical terms which are used with respect to sin regard it in the same light. To these, in the New Testament belong besides ἀνομία (Matth. xiii. 41; Rom. vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 14; 2 Thess. ii. 7; Tit. ii. 14) especially παράβασις,[3] in the

[1] If one with *Köstlin (der Lehrbegriff des Evangeliums und der Briefe Johannis, S. 246)* adopts the reading which *Lachmann* has introduced into the text: καὶ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία, it appears from the otherwise accurate use of the article by John, that ἁμαρτία must be taken as the predicate—"and the recusancy (*Gesetzwidrigkeit*) against the law is sin." But with this reading the clause, in relation to the words immediately preceding, becomes intolerably weak and empty, and certainly is not made better even by the interpretation: sin is really sin, because it comes under the notion of ἀνομία, but the ἀνομία is absolutely sin. In the sense of this passage ἀνομία is manifestly the stronger, ἁμαρτία the weaker, less determinate word, consequently one would still with this reading be obliged, in spite of the omission of the article, to regard ἁμαρτία as the idea of the subject.

[2] *Melancthon:* defectus vel inclinatio vel actio pugnans cum lege Dei (*loci theoll. de peccato, Augs.* in the year 1569, p. 97.) *Gerhardt:* discrepantia, aberratio, deflexio a lege. *Calov:* illegalitus s. difformitas a lege. *Baier:* carentia comformitatis cum lege. *Buddeus:* violatio s. transgressio legis divinæ. *Baumgarten:* transgressio legis seu absentia conformitatis cum lege.

[3] While in all other passages where παράβασις occurs, one may retain the limitation of the notion to the spheres of life, in which sin appears as transgression of a *positive* law, of the law given in Paradise, or of the Mosaic law; it is not possible to do so with respect to Gal. iii. 19. For if one may refer τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν ἐτέθη (ὁ νόμος) to the outward

Old Testament שֵׁשׁ, שֵׁטִים Hos. v. 2, besides its Aramaic form סֵטִים Ps. ci. 3, from שׁוּט, שָׁטָה, to deviate from the way, שְׁגָגָה Lev. iv. 2; Num. xv. 27 (which, however, at least in the Mosaic legislation, denotes only a given kind of sin), from שָׁגָה to err from the way, then, too, the very commonly used עָוֹן (from עָוָה), the crooked, perverted, deviating from the right rule of the law. The same radical idea is unmistakeably to be seen in עַוְלָה, עָוֶל from עָוַל, to turn, turn aside, pervert. As to חֵטְא, חָטָא, חַטָּאת, the original significance of this word may be regarded simply as the *missing of the mark* at which the shooter or slinger aims, since this signification is still to be found in the Hiphil of the verb, Book of the Judges xx. 16.[1] But we find even in the Old Testament use of language without doubt still another turn given to the image, to which the conception of sin, as deviation from the norm prescribed by the law, may attach itself, namely to slip with the foot from the way, to make a false step, comp. Prov. xix. 2. The Septuaginta use *ἀνομία very* frequently, and in a very comprehensive sense for the most different Hebrew terms of sin in general, and its individual forms. On the contrary, *παράβασις* is only to be found once even for סֵטִים, Ps. ci. 3.

In order, however, to determine more fully *the relation of evil to the moral law*, we have still a threefold question to answer.

restraint of the sinful nature, or to the awakening of the consciousness of sin, still in any case the *παραβάσεις* will be here understood, as being already there when the positive law appears.—Also *ἀνομία*, as applied to sin, does not admit, in some of the above quoted passages, of that more limited signification.

[1] Comp. *Gesenius'* Thesaurus linguae Hebr. et chald. tom. 1., s. v. If the denoting, of evil by חֵטְא set out from this image, at the basis would lie the perception, that one never attains in evil, that which he strives for by means of the same; in favour of this idea, these passages may be adduced in which חָטָא appears to denote, something sought for, but not found, missed, Prov. viii. 36; Job v. 24. With greater certainty the denoting of bad disposition and conduct by נְבָלָה rests upon this perception.

First of all, is *everything which is evil* really a violation of the moral law? or strictly speaking, does the moral law merely regulate the *conduct*, and not the *disposition*, the abiding state of the inner life in general? In the second place, is evil only that which *opposes* the law, or also that which *does not yet perfectly correspond* to the requirement of the law? And lastly, is not perhaps the law and the consciousness of law, much rather the *consequence* of evil, than, according to the above determination of its notion, its *presupposition?*—

With respect to the first alternative *Schleiermacher* has avowed himself to be of the latter opinion. He maintains that the law refers immediately to the *action*,[1] and that in and for itself does not revert from the outward act to the inward act of the mind.[2] Although this conception of the moral law is manifestly related to that of *Kant*, who also regards it as the correct rule merely for the principles (*Maximen*) of action, for the individual decisions of the will, *Schleiermacher*, in accordance with his more inward and more comprehensive ethical point of view, makes the very opposite application of it. He will not, therefore, even allow that ethical knowledge in the doctrine of morals may assume the form of *law* or *obligation* (*Sollen.*)[3] He considers the law as insufficient to produce the knowledge of sin, and as unable to present to our view perfect holiness.[4]

Also quite consequentially *Schleiermacher* declines the definition of sin as transgression of the law.[5] For if the requirement of the law only refers to the act, and not to the state of being, the habitual condition of man, perfect moral goodness must be something over and above the fulfilment of the law, and consequently the definition of evil, as violation of the law, is evidently essentially deficient. For much which earnest consideration does not hesitate to denominate evil, would fail to be embraced by the notion that the requirement of the law only refers to action, inasmuch as the habitual corruption of character, perversion of inclinations and passions, will soon give to them

[1] *Kritik der Sittenlehre*, S. 179.
[2] *Glaubenslehre*, § 412, 5. (Bd. 2, S. 250, zweite Ausg.)
[3] *System der (allgemeinen) Sittenlehre*, § 93 (S. 55, der Ausg. von *Schweizer*.
[4] *Glaubenslehre* l. l.
[5] *Glaubenslehre*, § 66, 2 (Bd. 1, S. 399.)

such dominion over the soul, that in rendering them obedience it is no longer active, but passive. Or are, perhaps, those inward disturbances to be regarded as evil, because it is only the lacking opportunity which prevents their expression in perverted action? Certainly not, for so soon as the consuming flame of selfish desire and passion has been kindled in the heart of man, he has already fallen under the power of evil, although it should never burst forth into condemnable conduct.

In a certain sense we shall be obliged to accept *Schleiermacher's* idea of the law. If the law as moral contains a requirement, the *imperative* form is essentially proper to it, in so far as it addresses itself to the will, in order to its being carried out in the life, and it only becomes a *resolution* of the will, primarily of course by *the automatism of the will.*[1] According to this, while the act, which of course cannot here be regarded in a limited external manner, is the *primary* object of the requirement of the law, it follows that everything in the life of man, which essentially springs out of his act, must be its *secondary* object. In this way the barriers within which *Schleiermacher* wishes to limit the notion of law, are broken through. The law regulates not merely the *conduct* of man, but also his *being*, as it proceeds from the inward *act*, the disposition of his mind *(Gesinnung)*, which is always regarded, when rightly conceived of, as essentially possessing a fixed habitual tendency of the will; indeed the very movements and conditions of the mind, the inclinations and disinclinations of the soul, are regulated by the law, in so far as these are redetermined by the established tendency of the will.[2] And it also, without contradiction, essentially belongs to moral perfection that these inward and abiding elements of life be harmoniously arranged, which

1 The complete establishment of this sentence will only be found in the third book, in the connection of the investigations respecting the *freedom* of the will.

2 It is true that many men of note both among Theologians and Philosophers have, up to the present time, declared this proceeding of the being (in its moral determinateness) from the determination of the will to be impossible. Thus *Harless* in his *Christian Ethic* p. 13, conceiving of inclination in the sense of being, which is the case here, says "as I am, so I will," not *vice versa*. I will only here in passing remark that, while I quite admit the affirmation in this sentence, I cannot at all allow the negation. For with a just distinction we may both say, "as I will. so I am;" and "as I am, so I will."

surely no one will wish to find in the mere legality of the individual act as such. If now there is nothing in the notion of law to prevent its being directed to the abiding moral condition, we may quite generally denote it, when regarded according to the purity of its notion, as the *representation of the moral idea* in the *imperative* form.[1]

As such, the law dwelling in the spirit of man is a matter of *knowledge*, more or less clear; still not merely of knowledge, but by virtue of his moral nature, this knowledge, of law, is felt to be inseparably connected with an *impulse* to its fulfilment. For, as the good is regarded as law for our will, its authority in its practical determining relation to us will also be felt obligating our obedience. Indeed this perception of the good as law to our will, cannot be thought of apart from an impulse, be it ever so weak, to bring the will into harmony with it. Where this impulse is absolutely wanting, there can scarcely exist any knowledge of moral law worthy of the name. It is only reserved for that no longer human, but diabolical, hatred of man against God, the most horrible of all horrible phenomena in the moral life of the present day, to loosen or pervert this connection; to perceive, in the moral arrangement of things, the legislative will of God requiring human submission, but not on that account to feel any obligation to obedience of the same. There is nothing in this union of the knowledge of law with an impulse to its obedience, whereby the law furnishes the power to fulfil itself at any one step of human development. It is much rather the requirement of moral law that man should have this power in himself. According to what has been already said, it is unconditionally admitted that the purest representation of moral law, can never fully and precisely embody the highest expression *(erschöpfend auszudrucken)* either of the genesis of the moral, whether of the individual action, or of the moral life as a whole, or the individual moral character *(Bestimmtheit)* of the individual act of the will.

[1] *Lactantius* has evidently this idea of the law in his mind when he denominates Christ viva praesensque lex (instit. div. 1., iv. c. 17, 25), and *Augustine* too when he says, lex Domini ipsi est, qui venit legem implere, non solvere (enarr. I., in Ps. xviii.—opp. tom. IV., p. 114), so also Christ himself, especially Matt. xi. 28—30, alludes to this relation. That the requirement of the law extends to perfect holiness is well shown by *Augustine de spiritu et littera*, c. 14 and 36.

Notwithstanding this, there is nothing to prevent the law from representing *the perfection of moral life*, according to its fundamental outlines, and that too in the sense of moral being, as of moral conduct. It thus becomes clear that the legality which we are accustomed to distinguish from morality, is nothing less than a real harmony of action with the moral law; or, in other words, that in the moral sphere this distinction does not exist. True satisfaction is never rendered even to the civil law by mere external obedience, but only so far as that obedience proceeds from the genuine inward civilian disposition of mind, which holds the principle of the law. The ground of which is this, that the political, according to its real nature, rests entirely upon an ethical basis.—

This comprehensive signification of the moral law, common in the Old Testament representation, is also elsewhere in the Holy Scripture manifoldly attested. It is true that when the apostle Paul, Rom. x. 5, Gal. iii. 12, lays so much stress upon *ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς*, he appears to favour that limitation of the demand of the law to the mere outward conduct. Upon closer reflection, however, we find that he does not here treat of the contrast between outward conduct, and disposition of mind, but of a righteousness constrained from one's own laborious endeavours, contrasted with the righteousness from faith. But when Paul, Phil. iii. 6, says of his earlier life that, touching the righteousness which is in the law, it was blameless, still without permitting himself to be satisfied in it, ver. 7, 8, he evidently by this maintenance assumes the stand-point of human, or more correctly Jewish, judgment, which regards only the external works of the law (*εἴ τις δοκεῖ ἄλλος πεποιθέναι ἐν σαρκὶ ἐγὼ μᾶλλον*, ver. 4), without his ever thinking of boasting on account of a real *fulfilling* of the law in his earlier life, comp. Rom. vii. 8—23.—How far removed Paul was from attributing to the law merely that limited signification, may be seen by his expressly denominating the *νόμος* as *πνευματικός*, Rom. vii. 14, *i.e.*, that, according to its contents, it was in correspondence with the will, and impulses of the Divine Spirit. If the requirements of the law had really no regard to the inward, the disposition of mind, he would not be justified in deducing from the law the deep inward knowledge of sin (*ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας*) spoken of in Rom.

iii. 20. Further, it would be in contradiction with Rom. ii. 13, viii. 7, Gal. v. 22, 23, to be obliged to ascribe to the apostle the opinion, that when one had rendered perfect satisfaction to the demands of the moral law, he were notwithstanding not of necessity δίκαιος, and an object of the divine approbation, because forsooth his disposition of mind, to which the divine judgment has respect, Rom. ii. 29, 1 Cor. iv. 5, might perhaps be very little in correspondence with the outward form of his conduct.[1] It would ultimately follow that the ground of the inability of man to attain to the δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ is not in himself, in his moral condition arising from sin, which first of all makes the law a dead and killing letter, but in the objective nature of the law itself. But this stands opposed not merely to declarations of Holy Scripture, as Rom. vii. 12, 14, viii. 3, (ἐν ᾧ ἠσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός) but to the apostle's entire fundamental conception of the relation of the New Testament economy to that of the Old, which rests upon the recognition, that the law in itself is a way to righteousness and life, provided that man in his natural condition be able to satisfy its demands. Consequently he has no hesitation in representing the work of redemption as having for its object the fulfilment in us of the statute (*Satzung*) of the law, Rom. viii. 4. What he misses in all law, as such, is not the perfect exhibition to our knowledge of moral goodness, but the power to communicate moral life, Gal. iii. 21. The only reason why it cannot help man to the possession of righteousness is

[1] *Schleiermacher* expressly recognises this deduction. "Since every law," he says in a sermon preached in 1830 (*Predigten—in der Ausgabe seiner Sämmtlichen Werke*—Bd. 2, S. 655), "can only require actions, God must, if He judges according to the law, allow even such to be valid which proceed from a mind which is a stranger to every God-pleasing disposition. Therefore, just as one can say on the one hand, no flesh will become just by the deeds of the law, because no one is able to observe the law perfectly, so on the other, the same might be maintained on the ground that one may perfectly fulfil the law and still remain destitute of all claim to praise and approbation before God." But in this *Schleiermacher* contradicts his own better earlier judgment on this matter. For in *der Kritik der Sittenlehre*, p. 181, f., he will not admit, notwithstanding the exclusive relation of the law to external conduct, any action to be legal in an ethical sense which has not also proceeded from moral motives.—*Dr Schmidt* discusses this point in a most thorough manner in his instructive *Weihnachtsprogramm*, v. J., 1832, de notione legis in theologia morali rite constituenda.

because of the preventing σὰρξ, which comes forth in opposition both to his knowledge of law, and the impulse united to the same for its fulfilment, Rom. viii. 3.[1] And precisely in this sense Christ himself refers the young man who asks him what good thing he should do in order to attain eternal life, to the keeping of the commandments, Matt. xix. 17. And who can even doubt that in the sermon on the mount, and in Matt. xxii. 37—40 (here primarily in relation to the Mosaic law) where his express endeavour is to lay bare the true significance of the moral law, but that he speaks of a disposition of mind pervading the entire inward life? How too had he been able to denominate the love of his disciples towards each other, which strives to become like His love to them, as the new *commandment*, if there lay in the very notion of law the exclusive reference to external conduct, John xiii. 34?[2]

If we seek the reason which actuated *Schleiermacher* in the adoption of this limiting conception of the moral law we find it chiefly, according to his own intimation, in that *the inward, the disposition of mind*, could not be determined and measured by any law.[3] That the inward disposition of mind cannot be produced in this way is certain, but one cannot see why its perfect form is not to be denoted by the law. There is no reason in the form of *requirement*, which is of course inseparable from moral law, why perfect morality according to the side of its inwardness, cannot be determined by the law, just as well as its phenomenal side, in the individual action.

But it is just this exhibition of the perfect, which, according to

1 Comp. *Neander* l. l., p. 658, f. That Paul conceives of such an inward impulse as inseparably bound to the knowledge of law, is clear from this very testimony as to the powerlessness of the law. For were the law to us a matter of mere theoretical knowledge, without force or impulse, it would be out of the question to speak of its being *weakened* by means of the flesh, as the ground of its inability to conduct man to the fulfilment of its statutes.

2 To show how that the fundamental conception of the reformers as to the nature of moral law coincides with this, we will only adduce the definition which *Melancthon* places at the head of his treatise *de lege divina*, in his compendium of dogmatics: Lex Dei est doctrina a Deo tradita praecipiens, *quales nos esse* et quae facere, quae omittere oportet.

3 *Glaubenslehre*, § 112, 3.

Schleiermacher's fundamental ethical opinions, the law is not able to give. In ethics there are only laws in so far as they express the *real action (wirkliche Handeln)* of the reason on nature.[1] We can here only just intimate that this idea hangs together with *Schleiermacher's* construction of ethics, which he requires to be in analogy with that of natural science.[2] Just as in the sphere of nature we only regard the determinate ideas which are above the processes of the powers of nature, as her true laws, when, and in so far, as they *embody* themselves in the life of nature, just so *Schleiermacher* will have the law in the moral sphere regarded. With such an opinion, it would be out of keeping, of course, to regard the law as the expression of *moral perfection*, and so make the recognition of its contents, which, as based upon the idea, carries in itself its own truth and necessity, independent of the degree in which it is realised by humanity as a whole, or even in its most exalted and select circles. In fact, according to Schleiermacher's opinion, the category of the idea (*des Sollens*) stands in the same relation to the moral sphere as it does to the sphere of nature.[3] But will not the science which arises from the carrying out of these principles be much rather the philosophy of history than ethics, just bearing the relation to narrative history which speculative natural science bears to empirical physics.[4]

From the same source *Schleiermacher's* treatment of the *notion of freedom* also flows. He conceives freedom to be a potentialized animation of nature, and subordinates the acts of freedom to the universal connection of nature, in a manner essentially similar to

[1] *System der Sittenlehre*, § 95. How this reality is to be understood is seen by comparison with the preceding §§ 92—94.

[2] L. l. § 62, 63. Comp. the conclusion of the dissertation on the distinction between natural and moral law in the writings *der Berliner Academie der Wissensch. Jahrg.* 1825.

[3] L. l. § 63. Here, among other things, it is said—"Idea and reality (*Sollen und Sein*—that which is to be and that which is—Tr.) are therefore in both spheres asymptotes, and (only?) perhaps in the moral sphere the exponent of approximation is the greater." The dissertation on the distinction between natural and moral law, carries out this thought further.

[4] *Twesten*, in his very excellent introduction to *Schleiermacher's Grundriss der philosophischen Ethik*, S. xviii., vgl. S. 48, has similarly expressed himself, without, however, intending thereby to point out a defect *der Schleiermacherschen Behandlung der Sittenlehre*.

that in which the operations of the powers of nature are subordinated.[1]

We dare not here pass over a question of unquestionable ethical interest, and one which quite belongs to the sphere of our present consideration. It is the question concerning the *opus supererogationis*. If there are essential limitations and deficiencies, not merely in the *form* in which moral truth as law comes before us, but if the *contents* of the moral law does not express moral perfection, it is clear that the possibility of moral actions *(Leistungen) transcending* the requirement of the law, cannot de denied; and *vice versa*, if there are such actions the law does not express moral perfection; and it is precisely in this sense that the boldest and best equipped among the modern polemics of the Catholic Church, undertakes the defence of the so-called works of supererogation. *Möhler* maintains[2] that he who is sanctified in Christ, and filled with His spirit, ever feels himself to surpass the law. "It

1 *Glaubenslehre*, § 49, § 81, 2.—It is easy to see how these contrarieties of opinions are intimately inwoven together with the question as to the significance of *evil*, and its influence on human development. The vacillations of opinion respecting the relation of ethics to the contrast of good and evil, which the solicitous care of the editor presents to us in § 91, and the §§ of the ethics therewith connected, are very remarkable. The way in which *Schleiermacher* earlier conceived of this relation, as expressed in the following—the contrast of good and evil denotes the positive and negative factors in the process of their becoming one (the exhibition of this process belongs to ethics); or ethics is the development of the contrast of good and evil, or the exhibition of both good and evil in a state of oneness *(Zusammensein)* is quite in harmony with the fundamental opinion of the moral above alluded to. But in his last revision of his ethics he altogether excludes from its sphere the contrast of good and evil, and will admit into the same no ethical element which does not come under the denomination of the good, and not even this as standing in contrast to evil, but only as denoting the attained state of union between reason and nature, brought about by the efficiency of the former of these. When now in connection with this we find him distinguishing very decidedly the flowing contrast of *perfection and imperfection*, from the contrast of *good and evil*, he thereby breaks away from the sphere of his former opinions, and had he consistently carried out these latter decisions he would have been compelled to make very essential modifications in his doctrines of freedom, law, and evil. Besides, from those alterations in his lectures on ethics delivered in 1832, we may certainly conclude that this noble and deep minded man must have been occupied with the problem of evil in the very last years of his life.

2 *Symbolik* S. 214, (dritte Aufl.)

is the nature of the love which has its origin in God, and which stands far, infinitely, higher than the mere law, that it is never satisfied with its services, and ever becomes more inventive of new ones, so that believers of this kind do not seldom appear to those who are less advanced as visionaries, enthusiasts, and fanatics."

Bellarmin has collected together a *tolerable* number of passages from which it appears that many church Fathers, *Origin*, *Basilius the Great*, *Gregory* of *Nazianzus*, *Chrysostom*, *Cyprian*, *Ambrosius*, *Hyeronymus*, *Gregory the Great*, held, in connection with the early formed distinction between a higher and a lower virtue, as possible, the doctrine of works which more than satisfy the requirement of the law.[1] Still it was not until the middle ages that this notion received its more exact determination, and its appointed place, in the church system of doctrine. The *consilium evangelicum* corresponds to the *opus supererogationis;* in both, the general vows of monasticism, poverty, continence, and obedience, are in an especial manner treated of. Apart from the sacraments, it is principally through these vows that the contents of the evangelical law transcend the commands *(praecepta)* of the Mosaic, and the natural law. But it does not command these vows, only counsels and recommends them, from which it indeed follows that the classification of the statutes, *(Satzungen)*, in which the more than sufficient works are laid down under the notion of a *law (lex evangelica)* can only be meant in a very unliteral manner.[2] For it is essential to all law in the sphere of the will not to recommend, but *unconditionally to demand*; that only is moral law which has in itself the character of an ethical necessity.

However, the scholastic theologians do not treat the notion in question just in the same sense as *Bellarmin* and the modern

[1] *De membris ecclesiae militantis*, lib. ii., *de monachis*, c. xii. (*Disputt. de controvv. chr. fidei tom.* ii.) *Bellarmin* indeed adduces still other witnesses, but in an unjustifiable manner. On the other hand he has omitted to notice the oldest Christian testimony for this representation, viz. that which is found in the *Shepherd of Hermas*, lib. iii. sim 5, 3: Si praeter ea, quae mandavit Dominus, aliquid boni adieceris, maiorem dignitatem tibi conquires etc.

[2] For even *Thomas* thus determines the notion of the lex nova: it is ipsa gratia Spiritus Sancti in corde fidelium scripta. *Summa theol. univ., Prima Secundae*, qu. 106, art. i.

Catholics. *Thomas Aquinas*, who in this matter is the most exact among those theologians, places the evangelical counsels, and the more than sufficient works, entirely in the sphere of *asceticism*. According to him, they are excellent means (*instrumenta*) in order the better and the easier to conduct man to the perfection of moral life and blessedness;"[1] but he is far from considering these renunciations and services in themselves as *essential moments of this perfection*, which he, in accordance with the entire conception of the law in the declaration of Christ, Matt. xxii., defines as the perfection of love. To the question, whether perfection rests upon the commands or upon the counsels, he replies, it consists *principaliter et essentialiter in praeceptis, secundario et instrumentaliter in consiliis*.[2]

Indeed even *Bellarmin* appears to agree with this opinion of *Thomas*. Not only in his judgment on the Konkordien-book does he expressly refer back to it,[3] but also at the commencement of his book *de monachis*, he expresses himself in a similar manner.[4] But the further development of his opinion of the doctrine of more than satisfying works, does not at all observe the limits of the modest conception of *Thomas*. In order not to be at variance with his master, *Bellarmin* lays down a *twofold perfection*, the one necessary, the other useful; the one necessary for being (*ad esse*), the other necessary for well-being (*ad bene esse*); the one necessary for blessedness in general, the other for a higher degree of glory in the kingdom of God. The latter perfection only appertains to those who render services over and above what the *commands* require, by fulfilling the evangelical counsels.[5] But as *Bellarmin* even is obliged to recognize the ἀνακεφαλαίωσις of all divine commands to men in the declaration of Christ, Matt. xxii., to what monstrous consequences is he driven! In order to show that man may still render a service to God beyond that of loving Him with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his

[1] L. l. ii. 1, qu. 108, art. 4. Thus in the writings of *Thomas* the consultative and hypothetical form, under which even by him these moral determinations are laid down, are better established.

[2] II. 2, qu. 184, art. 3.

[3] Judicium de libro Conc., sextum mendacium (*disputt. de controvv.*, tom. iv., p. 1185, ed. Paris.)

[4] Cap. 2.

[5] *De monachis*, cap. vi. vii. ix. xii.

mind, he is obliged to weaken the sense of this demand as much as possible by means of exegetical artifice, or to deduce from it, besides the higher sense, also a lower one; venial sins are said not to contradict this command;[1] and he maintains that whoever loves God with the whole heart, is not bound to do all that God *counsels* but merely what he *commands*.[2]

In these very consequences there is the most convincing refutation of the principle from which they flow. Is that to be denominated genuine love, love truly corresponding to the Divine requirement, which so cautiously measures off what amount of service in the most rigid sense it absolutely owes, in order not to do too much good; which stands up in the very presence of God with the cool declaration: Thou exhortest, it is true, the devotion of the entire life to Thy service, but I am not bound to follow Thy exhortations and counsels, but only Thy commands? If there were really contained in the manner of life which those evangelical counsels recommend, a higher moral perfection, were man therein really more acceptable to God, he would unquestionably be bound to strive after it, and not to strive after it would be sin.[3] It is perfectly absurd that man is to have a moral power which transcends his moral obligation.

On the other hand, it is easy to understand why the Catholic Church has never ventured to make a *general requirement* of that which it so eulogizes, as the true perfection of human life. For in what else indeed does this higher perfection consist, than in the abandonment of certain spheres of life as being *morally-unimpenetrable, (sittlich undurchdringlich)*, but which nevertheless have their necessary place in the entirety of human life, although their occupancy is left to the determination of individual human liberty. Had this abandonment been made a duty obligatory on all, the decided irreconcilability of this one-sided Church ethics with the general moral tasks of human life, would have been brought to light.—However, the avoidance of that extreme does not remedy the evil. Let the withdrawment from these spheres only once pass for a higher holiness, and a shadow of

[1] L. l. c. xiii.

[2] L. l. c. ix.

[3] According to *Bellarmin's* statement, *Peter Martyr*, in his exposition of 1 Cor. ix., made this objection to this opinion, l. l. c. xiii.

insurmountable profanity falls upon the participation in them, which, according to the testimony of history, is not dissipated by attributing to one of these spheres, that of marriage, the dignity of a sacrament, as if forsooth the simple contradiction were a *correcteur*.

As on the one hand this holding aloof from essential moments of our moral obligation, displays a false timidity and anxiety, so on the other, a false confidence, a self-deception, difficult to understand in men of any moral earnestness and experience of life, is manifest in their believing themselves to excel the law. It is true, our surprise is very significantly diminished when we learn from *Bellarmin* that these supererogatory works may be rendered by the same individual, simultaneously with the committing of *sins*, namely, venial sins.[1] But hereby the destructive root of this entire method of consideration, as well as many other errors of Catholic ethics, are brought to light, namely, the *hair-splitting, anatomical treatment of morals* which pervades the entire conception of the doctrines of good works and merit. This moral atomism reaches its climax in Jesuitic morals, the principal heresies of which, spring out of its fundamental principles respecting philosophical sins, moral conduct according to probability, good intentions justifying the worst of means, and mental reservations.

If such be the internal contents and value of the representation of supererogatory works, it will not be able to induce us to give up the ideal of the moral law, according to which the perfect alone can answer to its requirement.[2]—

As *biblical support* for these supererogatory works, no passage has been so often adduced by Catholic theologians as the

[1] *De Monachis* c. xiii. Besides this there is often met with in *Möhler* a confounding of different ideas. "Love stands infinitely higher than the law," may be understood simply in a subjective sense. Then it is said: the free impulse of love produces a much better righteousness than the mere consciousness of law, the express reflexion upon its actual requirement. In this sense the sentence is of undoubted truth, but contains nothing which might not also be fully maintained, of the doctrine of the reformers.

[2] Comp. the striking critique of this representation in *Baur's Gegensatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus, zweite Ausg.*, S. 301, ff. *Bauer* refutes it on the ground of the ideal of the law as compared with other instances of this representation here adduced.

declaration of our Lord, addressed to the rich young man. It was this which first of all incited *Antonius*, the founder of Monachism, and afterwards *Francis* of *Assisi*, to their ascetic resolves. If thou wilt be perfect go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come follow me, Matt. xix. 21. The young man, who, in reply to his inquiry after the way to eternal life, was first of all directed by Christ to the keeping of the Divine commands, expresses his conviction of having observed them all, and this conviction Christ does not represent to be at fault. Therefore to what else can the words of Christ just quoted direct him, than to a higher perfection, transcending the mere fulfilment of the law, which he might attain to by voluntary poverty? This conception of the: εἰ δέ θέλεις τέλειος εἶναι will not stand the test, inasmuch as, according to the words of Christ immediately following ver. 23, 24, the youth has by his noncompliance excluded himself, for the present at least, from a participation in the kingdom of God, and consequently from the possession of eternal life, for certainly no one now-a-day will wish to maintain the arbitrary Pelagian distinction, between kingdom of God and eternal life. The young man's fulfilling of the law cannot therefore, manifestly in the judgment of Christ, have been its proper and perfect fulfilment,[1] and the requirement of Christ was not meant to direct him to a perfection which transcends the true fulfilling of the law, but only ought to have discovered to him the idolatry in which he was unconsciously engaged in opposition to the first command of the decalogue. From this it is also clear that the words of Christ were in no sense given as a counsel which the young man might neglect, without injury.

[1] Comp. *Neander's* exposition of the answer of Christ, *Leben Jesu Christi, vierte Ausg.* S. 589—592. That the ἠγάπησεν αὐτὸν, Marc. x. 21, the approval of the Saviour of the honest striving of the young man according to his limited self—and divine—knowledge is in perfect agreement with the above, requires no showing. And just as much is it a matter of course that the missing words in Matt., which are found in Mark and Luke—ἕν σοι ὑστερεῖ—ἔτι ἕν σοι λείπει—supposing them to be authentic, require, according to the connection of the narrative, in order to complete the sense, the addition—for the acquisition of eternal life—which favour the idea of the passage as above given.

In the next place the Catholic theologians appeal to the apostle Paul, in confirmation of the doctrine of more than sufficient works, who, according to 1 Cor. ix. 12—18, makes the ground of his boasting and of his merit that he filled the apostolic office from love to the same, and without pecuniary reward, instead of rendering a mere servile ministry of the gospel. We may here refer to the thorough exposition of this passage by *Neander*.[1] How little the apostle thought to do more than his appointed duty required of him, according to his individual relations and peculiarity, is clear enough, in that he expressly denominates it *an abuse* of his ability in relation to the preaching of the gospel, if he did less (ver. 18).

It is singular that the very passage of the New Testament which the older and more modern Protestants have been accustomed to regard as the most powerful testimony against every *opus supererogationis*, and which has also given the Catholic polemics, in the defence of their doctrine, more trouble than any other,[2] should be one which, when more closely considered, probably contains the most plausible evidence in the New Testament for the possibility of works transcending the requirement of the law. We refer to Luke xvii. 10. If he who has merely done what he was commanded to do, is to consider himself a worthless servant, because he has done nothing more than it was his duty to do, the question arises whether we are to apply this judgment to the *perfection* of moral life? If we answer this question in the affirmative it would follow that Christ himself had been obliged to regard his own holy life under the idea of the δοῦλος ἀχρεῖος. Now if this be quite absurd, how can we consistently escape the inference of the possibility of a virtue arising from the rendering of services which transcend the requirements of the law, therefore an *opus supererogationis*, although clearly in a more spiritual and inward sense than that in which it was generally thought of in the Catholic Church?

The solution of this difficulty lies in this, that the passage

[1] *Geschichte der Pflanzung der Kirche durch die Apostel*, S. 746, f.

[2] *Gerhard* gives an interesting collection of the various objections of Catholic theologians against the use which Protestants make of this passage, *Confessio Catholica* lib. ii. art. xxiii. cap. viii. *de perfect. et meritis opp.* It is only *Salmeron* who in general hits the right point.

entirely refers to the Jewish conception of the law, prevalent at that time, as that of a service according to the outward letter. The idea of a fulfilment of the law according to its full signification is out of the question. Christ wishes to humble the selfish and self-righteous disposition *(Sinn)*, which troubles itself about the law merely on account of reward; which, boasting of rectitude and merit, requires reward for its observance of the law (ver. 9). Christ wishes to teach such that on this stand-point, notwithstanding all their fidelity and exactness in their observance of the individual commands of the law, they remain worthless servants.[1] Their entire stand-point must be surpassed by their becoming children of God.[2]

Modern Catholic theologians, under the very proper feeling of the insufficiency of the biblical support for the evangelical counsels and the over-meritorious works, have sought, by a clever turn, to derive strength for the support of this doctrine out of its weakness, by representing it, and not without much plausibility, as a freer development of Christian ethics in comparison with the older Protestantism. Because, while the latter will not recognise the validity of any ethical decisions, which cannot be reduced to the express words of the law contained in the Holy Scripture,[3]

[1] Ἀχρεῖος in general classic use of language is = aimless, useless, unserviceable. It is used in this sense in Matt. xxv. 30. But in the connection of the passage under consideration this signification of the word does not at all do, in whatever way the whole be conceived of. For the adopted signification of the word in this passage the authority of the Alexandrian translation in 2 Sam. vi. 22, can only with certainty be adduced. There שָׁפַל low, narrow (for which it otherwise commonly uses ταπεινός) is expressed by ἀχρεῖος.

[2] With this idea of the passage, it is we confess more natural to suppose that Christ may have perhaps addressed these words to the Pharisees, and not to his disciples. But the words immediately preceding vers. 7 and 8, both according to external relations as well as the disposition to which they refer, make it very improbable. That Christ converses with his disciples in the first six verses of the chapter cannot decide against it, since an inward connection between the first six verses and those following is very difficult to prove, without the adoption of artifice, which indeed *Neander (Leben Jesu Christi,* S. 624), *De Wette (kurze Erkl. der Ev. des Lukas und Markus z. d. St.)* charge against *Schleiermacher* and *Olshausen.*

[3] Compare, besides numerous declarations of *Luther* and the symbolic books concerning the *mandatum Dei* as conditioning every good work, *Chemnitz's Examen Conc. Trid. de bonis operibus* qu. 2., *Gerhard's*

the Catholic Church appears to afford freer scope for the developing impulse of the Christian moral spirit, inasmuch as it regards moral regulations as capable of being justified, although they go beyond the letter of Scripture, if they only in a proper manner tend to the end of perfection therein pointed out.[1] However, more closely considered, this apparent freer development is only another form of legislation *(Satzung)*, which makes itself valid by the authority of the church, although it is at first always in the form of a good counsel; and, when our older theologians, with good right, protested against the same, and required that that which was to be recognised in the Church as a moral regulation, should be tried by the express words of Holy Scripture, they did not thereby deny that the task of the individual Christian, was that of forming his own moral knowledge, and adopting his own mode of conduct upon the foundation of Holy Scripture, yet, so as to develop its contents freely from his own principles.

The discussion of the second question above-stated, naturally follows this investigation of the doctrine of supererogatory works, which has convinced us of its untenability. The moral law, regarded in its true light, requires of us nothing less than perfection; is then everything which is *less* than this *perfection* required by the law, to be regarded as moral evil? If we look at the question generally it is manifestly the same as when we ask, are the notions *purity from evil* (moral integrity) and *moral perfection* identical? In this we of course presuppose that we can only speak of moral integrity in relation to creatures possessing a moral nature *(Bestimmtheit)*. To the mere creatures of nature, as possessed of no moral being, one can just as little ascribe virtue as vice.

Belarmin and other older polemics of the Catholic Church reply to the above question in the *negative*. They admit that the law

confessio catholica, lib. II., art. xxiii., cap. 7, *de norma bonorum opp.*, *Quenstedt's theol. didactico-polemica*, p. iv., c. ix., sect. ii., qu. 2. *quae sit norma bonorum operum directrix.*

[1] *Bellarmin de monachis*, c. ix.

may require moral perfection, but they will not allow that when one strives with all his powers to render satisfaction to the law, his short-coming, arising from natural weaknesses, is to be regarded as transgression of the law. For this reason *Bellarmin*, following the opinion of *Thomas*,[1] distinguishes between *obligatio ad finem* and *obligatio ad media;* the former is the obligation to be perfect, the latter the obligation zealously and indefatigably to strive after perfection; only those who do not answer to the latter obligation become transgressors of the law.[2]

The older theologians of our Church, on the contrary, answer this question in the *affirmative*, and consider every action, and state of being, which does not fully express moral perfection as *sin* and *transgression* of the law.[3]—The interest which the Catholic

[1] *Thomas* lays down respecting this in the *Sec. Secundae*, qu. 186, art. 2., the ground principle, Quilibet tenetur tendere ad perfectionem, non autem tenetur esse perfectus.

[2] *De monachis*, cap. xiii. *De amissione gratiae et statu pecc.*, lib. v. c. x. comp. *Andradius orthodoxae explicationes* (1564), lib. v. p. 396, ff. *Bellarmin* supports himself for the most part on *Augustine*, who avows very decidedly this distinction between moral perfection and sinlessness, *e.g.*, *de libero arbitrio* lib. iii., cap. 22: non propterea Deus animam malam creavit quia nondum tanta est, quanta ut proficiendo esse posset accepit; in the same way later, *de spiritu et littera* c. 36, where he distinguishes from the completed righteousness of the blessed who see God, a minor justitia, and proceeds to remark as follows: Neque enim si esse nondum potest tanta dilectio Dei, quanta illi cognitioni plenae perfectaequae debeter, iam culpae deputandum est. Aliud est enim totam assequi carritatem, aliud nullam sequi cupiditatem. Still *Augustine* does not everywhere remain true to this correct opinion. Already *de moribus Manichaeorum*, c. 6, he had made the mutari in melius one with the reverti a pervertendo in peius, which, if consistently carried out, would make evil the negative condition of all moral development. In the same sense, but still more plainly, he says, ep. 167 (according to the arrangement of the *Benedictines*), *ad Hyeronymum:* plenissima (caritas), quae iam non possit augeri, quamdiu hîc homo vivit, est in nemine; quamdiu autem augeri potest, profecto illud, quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est (Opp. tom. ii., p. 897.) Among the ancients, the Stoics have treated upon the question and because they did not wish to distinguish between a virtue, which was not yet perfect, and vice, they were then even so consistent as to deny the possibility of growth in virtue. Comp. *die Nachweisungen bei Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie*, Bd. 4, S. 104, 105.

[3] For instance *Chemnitz, Ex. Conc. Trid.* p. 1, *de reliquiis pecc. orig. post bapt.* (S. 243. Ausg. v. 1590); *de bonis operibus* qu. 3, *Gerhard, loci theol. de pecc. act.* c. 10. § 42—45; *de lege Dei*, c. 4, sect. 10. § 183; *de bonis operibus* c. 10, sect. 1. *Quenstedt* finds fault with that

theologians take in the distinction between moral perfection and freedom from evil, rests chiefly upon the endeavour to support the possibility of a satisfying fulfilment of the law, and the acquisition of merit from God. Wherefore *Bellarmin* makes especial use of the above distinction, by maintaining that the command to be free from *concupiscentia* only belongs to the *obligatio ad finem.* From this it is easy to understand how the Protestant theologians mistrusted a distinction which appeared to them to be fabricated merely for the support of erroneous doctrine, —still more so, since they saw their opponents immediately deduce from this distinction, assertions so destructive as the *Bellarmenian*, namely: venial sins are committed not so much *contra legem* as much rather *praeter legem*, and are not sins absolutely, but only relatively;[1] or that of *Stapelton :* the command of perfect love towards God is not *obligatorium*, but only *doctrinale et informatorium.*[2] Still when we examine the matter more closely, we find that it was by no means the mere misuse and sad misrepresentation, which made the older theologians of our church disaffected towards this distinction, but doubtless there was also a certain foreboding that it stood opposed to their conception of the original condition of man, and many tenets dependent upon it.

And can we indeed hesitate to attach ourselves, in this contrariety of opinion, to that of our older theologians, which, by virtue of its more formal ethical character, stands in such advantageous contrast with the yielding, pliable, theories of Catholic theologians? The law demands moral perfection ; with the consciousness of this demand there is inseparably united an impulse urging to its fulfilment; if now notwithstanding this, the individual, once awakened to moral consciousness, should in any way come short of its requirement, in what else can this short-coming have its ground, than in a tendency of mind which opposes the law and its impulse to obedience, therefore in the power of *evil ?* If

account with the definition of sin formed according to *Melancthon :* inclinatio, appetitus, cogitatem, dictum, factum pugnans cum lege Dei, because of pugnans being too limited a term, a. a., O. P. ii., cap. ii., sect. ii., qu. 3, dist. 4.

1 *De iustif.* lib. iv., c. 12, 14. Truly, according to *Thomas, Prima Secundae,* qu. 88, art. 1. Comp. with this *Melancthon's Loci theol. de pecc. actualibus,* S. 117. *Der Ausgabe von* 1569.

2 *De iustific,* lib. vi., c. 10.

he, for example, loves his neighbour less than himself, what else can this deficiency, in the face of the command to love him as himself, be owing to, than to the existence in some degree or other of the power of selfishness?

Thus the old canon: *omne minus bonum habet rationem mali*, appears to hold perfectly good. Otherwise should we not be obliged to say—the law indeed requires the perfect, nevertheless does not reject the imperfect, but allows it also to pass, consequently it cannot be absolutely in earnest in its requirement of the perfect? And from this would it not immediately follow, that between such a state of mind, and course of conduct (*Wollen und Handeln*), which are in correspondence with the law, and an opposite state of mind, and course of conduct, which are in contradiction with the same, there must be a *middle sphere*? *Schleiermacher* has victoriously driven the notion of *the allowed*, from its original seat, into the sphere of a certain class of human actions, and modes of action, which are said to be merely naturally conditioned;[1] since an objective ethical significance cannot in any sense be ascribed to this notion of the allowed, without making impossible every moral opinion connecting, and embracing, the entire conscious life of man. But if it be admitted that there is such a middle sphere under the determinations of the will, which, without perfectly answering to the requirements of the law, does not nevertheless contradict them, will not the notion expressed by the old canon, above mentioned, re-appear in revivified form, in order to take possession of the same?

Still, the price we must pay is no trifling one, if we reject that distinction between moral integrity, and moral perfection, and maintain that there is no difference between opposition to law and non-conformity to law.

With the rejection of this distinction, it of course follows that we must also reject every gradational distinction of moral goodness, which were otherwise conditioned than by some participation in evil in the lower stages of its development, and consequently every *gradational distinction of morally pure* being, and states of being. Of course this must then also be applied to Christ, the

[1] *Kritik der Sittenlehre*, S. 185, ff. *Ueber den Begriff des Erlaubten, in den Schriften der Berliner Academie der Wissenschaften Jahrg.* 1826.

Holy; and however great may be the Holy love which fills Him, it has its bound where the evil commences so close upon it, that were it only in the very least degree less strong, that bound would immediately be overstepped.

However, this consequence presents no obstacle to those who regard the sublimity of the moral law to consist in its determining absolutely only one condition of human conduct, to the exclusion of every other; together with its equally condemning everything which comes short of its requirements, with that which is contradictory with the same, and which arises from a principle of opposition. But will they also be willing to accept the still further consequences, namely, to explain the idea of a *pure moral development* as one contradictory, henceforth to look upon evil as the negative condition of all moral development, and to admit the necessity of the immediate cessation of this development so soon as there is no remaining evil in the subject of the same to be overcome, and that the certainty of a perpetual progress in good involves the certainty of a perpetual continuance in sin? For undoubtedly all this strictly follows from the rejection of the distinction between integrity and perfection. For if all moral development, which has its end still before it, as not yet attained, essentially includes a progress from the imperfect to the more perfect, it must necessarily possess, and at every point of its progress, although in an ever diminishing ratio, an element of evil, if this distinction be sacrified to the canon, *omne minus bonum habet rationem mali.* Neither upon this stand-point is the possibility of a sinless development to be saved, by supposing it in its beginning to be *internally* absolutely perfect, and making its progressive development strictly to consist in the *outward extension* of the moral principle, over the different spheres of life. Since, especially in this sphere, the internal and external do not at all allow of their being so abstractly separated, an extensive growth in the good cannot at all be conceived of, apart from a co-existent intensive amplification and concentration in the same. Then, again, the holy principle of human life cannot have attained to its full inward strength and steadfastness, so long as its essential spheres remain unapprehended and unpervaded by it. Further, if there is to be no distinction between moral perfection and moral integrity, between imperfection and sin,

then it must ever remain, that progress in good is necessarily equally the rejection of an evil inseparably associated with the progressing life.

But does one object to us from quite another point of view: is not that just the application of the notion of living, to moral development? Is there not always contained in this notion the constantly repeating detachment from a condition inadequate to the idea of the developing existence? A powerful development does not make its way merely through tame contrasts whose mutual repulsions make it no earnest matter, but is driven onward by means of the strongest antagonisms. The *variance* between the *idea* of the existence, and the degree of its *empirical reality*, is the only goad which is able to drive on the development. Without this, the requisite tension (*Spannung*), which is the condition of energetic progress, is wanting. The development ceases, and therewith the existence itself, which, as finite, has only therein its life.

Notwithstanding the confident manner in which this notion of development has been set up by some philosophers of the present day, it only requires a very little attention to perceive how perfectly self-contradictory it is. The developing impulse is said to be the striving of the being to liberate itself from its inadequate condition. Now this striving is manifestly only the negative expression for the endeavour of the being to obtain for itself adequate conditions. And yet it cannot realize this end without thereby putting an end to its development, therefore its life, its real existence. But if it cannot attain this end without self-destruction, that is to say, cannot absolutely attain it, it cannot be said *really to strive after it.* This is the contradiction of modern nihilism, that it is obliged to explain the development in which life is alone said to consist as that of a constant disease, and its cessation of being (*Nichtmehrsein*), as the adequate condition of being. Moreover, this unimaginable notion of development is not at all new; from a different starting-point, *Fichte's* principles necessarily lead to the well known *progressus in infinitum*, to that perpetual movement of the Ego toward the end, which however never brings it nearer to it, because it is said to be infinitely removed. And this infinitely removed goal to which that perpetual movement sustains quite as much the relation of a

perpetual retrogression, as of a perpetual approximation, is nothing else than the entire destruction of the individual by its becoming resolved into the absolute pure form of reason, or God.[1]

Nevertheless, we dare not deny all truth to this fundamental representation of human development. It expresses in a significant manner its *present form*, in which every step of progress has to overcome the general hindrance occasioned by the presence of evil, and to cast out every disturbing element. But only a slavish dependence upon a limited empiricism, the inductions of which are no longer congruous in the sphere of nature, can give out this as the general form for the idea of development. A true development were much rather one which did not lose anything, at any step of its progress, from its actual contents, and simply because it needed not to lose anything, since at no point did there appear anything disturbing of, or contradictory to, the determination *(Bestimmung)* of the developing being.

However, by distinguishing normal from abnormal development, in the latter of which the disturbing and perplexing element is found, the question is by no means set at rest, for in the sphere of the normal development we may not overlook the *different stages*. As long as its impulses lie in the pressure of progress from imperfection to perfection, so long has it a *teleological* character. Its endeavour is towards a prospective end, and to the developing subject there is no satisfaction until it is reached. There lies in the very idea of a teleological development, the supposition that at every step of progress, short of the end, the condition of the subject developing, *does not yet perfectly correspond to* the idea of its being, and of course that the beginning of the development must be a state furthest removed from the perfection of the end. But it lies just as much in the idea of this normal development, in so far as it is normal, that there is never in it anywhere, anything existing, which is *contradictory to the idea* of the being. Consequently moral integrity cannot be wanting at the very commencement,—for were it in any way

1 *System der Sittenlehre* S. 194, and the preceding pages. "The entire destruction of the individual is of course the ultimate end of finite reason: only it is not possible in time." With this ends this philosophy, with the Tantalian snatching after a never attainable highest good, and this highest good is destruction.

tainted with evil it would not in this respect, and in so far, lie in the same line with the end of completion, therefore could not belong to the development towards that end; but the unimpeded ability progressively to realise that positive commensurability of condition with the idea, essentially belongs to this integrity, and *in so far* the very beginning is adequate to the idea, although it must be surmounted in order that it attain to the condition absolutely correspondent with the idea. If we proceed from this starting-point of a development, whose end is that of moral perfection, we shall find, in so far as it is normal, the condition of the developing subject always answering to the requirement which the moral idea imposes upon it for its progressive realization; and yet this condition is not that absolutely willed by the idea. In every activity conditioned by conscious self-determination, the moral motive is present and efficient, although perhaps sometimes only in the form of an instinct for measure and order; but in proportion to the comprehensive clearness of the moral consciousness, the power of the moral impulse is susceptible of manifold degrees. Therefore, if progress from the imperfect to the perfect be absolutely inseparable from the normal development, it is clear that we cannot reduce the notion of evil to the mere difference between the imperfect and the perfect, nor to the necessary difference between the idea and the empirical reality.[1] Herewith the question above proposed

[1] *Schleiermacher*, notwithstanding his singular conception of evil, recognises this, *System der Sittenlehre*, § 109: "In the critical procedure the contrast of good and evil is such, that the latter is regarded as something positive, namely as an activity of nature, to which there is a corresponding passivity of the reason. Only where the activity of nature ceases does there arise in its place the flowing contrast of perfect and imperfect. The imperfect can only be where there is something which is not evil, and then from the imperfect may the transformation into the perfect take place." But if now it is quite out of place to speak of an *activity of nature* in the moral sphere on the non-evanishment *(Nochnichtverschwundensein)* of which the contrast of good and evil, in distinction from the contrast of the perfect and imperfect, is said entirely to depend, we need not wonder if we run against very opposite assertions from *Schleiermacher*, in connection with that vacillation in the conception of § 91 of the *Sittenlehre*—comp. above § 65. Thus in the *Glaubenslehre*, § 63, 3 (Bd. 1, S. 387) it is said—"As the energy of the Divine consciousness is never an absolutely greatest:—so there is a limiting co-conditioned impotency of

is of itself answered, viz. upon what can such a minus, in relation to the perfection required by the law, depend, unless it be upon some co-conditioned power of the antagonistic principle? The necessity of this minus at the beginning of human development rests simply on the fact, that the realization of moral perfection is a *task* assigned to man, which, by virtue of his creaturehood, he can only accomplish in a succession of moments of time. It follows therefore, not merely on account of the interposition of sin, that it is beyond the power of man, at the very outset absolutely to correspond with the demand of the moral law in its entire breadth and fulness; and therefore this coming short of the requirement of the law is moral *imperfection*, but not *sin*. If it were sin, sin would of necessity result from the finite creaturely nature of man. To make the moral imperfection of the very beginning, which unavoidably results from the metaphysical nature of man—to make this sin would be at once not to sharpen and deepen the consciousness of sin, but to dissipate it. But of course we can only speak of a *teleological* development in so far as it is really destined to reach its end, the moral perfection of the being. When it has reached this end it passes of itself into a development of a purely *exhibitive* character. The teleological development includes in itself at every point an energetic negation of itself, the declaration of the already attained as unsatisfying; the exhibitive development ever proceeds in a purely affirmative manner. If any one will not allow us the name of *development* for such a form of humanity, in which there is only the manifestation of the internal inexhaustible fulness of life in perfect fellowship with God, we readily abandon it; we are only concerned to maintain, and retain, for man in the state of progress, that living activity *(Bewegung)* in rest, which we have termed the development of manifestation. Doubtless the form of this living activity will be quite different from that which we experience in the imperfection of our present condition.—

the same, which is certainly sinful :" With this may be compared *System der Sittenl.* S. 62: "The contrast of reason and nature can never by ethical activity entirely disappear; for it is its condition and presupposition :"—a sentence the significance of which first of all becomes clear, when we consider that in the connection of this opinion with the contrast of reason and nature, there is a passivity of the former from the latter, but this very passivity is evil.

But if there be a moral development which progresses not from the evil to the good, but from the good to the better,—just as the Holy Scripture says of Christ in relation to the life of his youth, that he became strong in spirit, and increased in wisdom, and in favour with God and men, Luke ii. 40, 52,—there can be no doubt of there being a moral integrity which is not identical with moral perfection; and that there may be a condition which does *not yet perfectly correspond* to the law, without being in *contradiction* to it, and that the notion of *evil* cannot be defined as difference with the perfection required by the law, but only as positive *opposition against the law*.—

In order to exclude the very serious consequences of this result, just above alluded to, we must more narrowly scrutinize the distinction spoken of at page 34 between the notions *law* and *duty*.

The remark that the ethical use of language very properly places the notion of duty, but not that of law, in immediate relation to the individual *subject*, will put us upon the right track. One says: my duty requires this or that of me, but not: my law, but: *the* law commands me. In the notion of duty the moment of subjectivity comes as prominently into the foreground, as in the notion of law it retreats into the background. The very derivation of the German word—*Pflicht from pflegen*—indicates this subjective moment in the idea of duty.

An indefinite use of language includes under the idea of duty all the contents of the law, and without farther determining the word than that by it the contents of the law is denoted as *obligation of the subject*. Thus conceived of, duty is the simple transference of the moral law into the subject, as its determination, in the light of an imperative obligation (*Sollen*). It is duty to respect the freedom, the property, the honour, of personality—in this, and similar assertions, nothing more than just the moral necessitating relation of the law to man, is expressly made manifest, the obligation of the latter to the former, which is already *implicite* contained in the notion of law. In this broader sense it is said: it is the duty of man to obey the moral law, to procure for himself a definite knowledge of the requirements of the law, and the like. The notion of duty thus treated wears

unmistakeably a merely formal character; individual moments of ethical truth cannot thus be deduced from it.

But besides this use of the word, since the time of the reformation, still more definitely since the influence of a philosophical treatment of the ideas of right, on the moral—by *Grotius* and *Pufendorf*—a more exact conception of the idea of duty has been formed in which it is of more definite significance. According to this latter conception, duty is the *determinate moral requirement made upon a given individual at a given moment of time.* Duty in this sense is always the immediately present, in opposition to the self-chosen, far-fetched moral activities, as opposed to what *Fichte* has so aptly denominated a virtue which seeks adventures (*Abenteuer*).[1] The moral conduct which the requirement of this determinate duty indicates, may be of course that which is purely inward, or it may be a mere endurance and omission; since however in any case it must consist in a movement of the will, otherwise the duty of referring to a determinate moment would in fact demand nothing, we may say that duty has for its contents, conduct. Duty is the individualized requirement of the law; it takes into consideration individual peculiarities and relations, makes them its presupposition, while the moral law, as such, does not at all enter into these individualizing moments.

The moral necessitating power of duty, by reason of the perfectly definite claim which it makes on man, in immediate reference to his conduct, incloses the will within the very narrowest limits. There is no room here for the distinction between perfection and integrity. That moment in which the act of the will comes short of the duty is it in opposition to duty. On the contrary, if it corresponds to every present duty, we cannot therefore conclude that the entire moral state of the individual is equally in absolute correspondence with the norm of the law, *i.e.* that it is perfect. But it does follow, from what we have just said, that this middle sphere, which, according to the opinion here developed, lies between a state of life perfectly reflecting the law, and therefore the moral idea, and one which is contradictory to it,—that this middle sphere is absolutely determined by the notion of duty.—

[1] *System der Sittenlehre*, S. 391.

Accordingly if the idea of duty is that it is the immediate presence of the moral requirement in every moment of life and conduct, there is of course in this immediate presence a certain lowering in the requirement made. The requirement of duty, as such, pays no regard to *perfection*, which is the end of all moral development, but only to the pure and uninterrupted exercise of the moral activities, (in the widest sense of the word,) which form the way to this end. If after the moral consciousness has been awakened, there be any deficiency in yielding to the requirement of duty, or in the zeal executing it, the reason of the same can only be looked for in the restraining power of a positively opposing principle.—In this sense we can subscribe to the above mentioned distinction, by *Thomas von Aquino* and *Bellarmin*, between *obligatio ad finem* and *obligation ad medium*; the idea of law relates to the former, that of duty to the latter.

Upon the ground of the results won by these discussions, it will be easy for us now to answer the third of the questions above proposed (p. 42) namely: Is not the consciousness of a moral law in man much rather to be regarded as *resulting from his deviation from good*, than as *preceding* it?—A more thoughtful consideration of moral subjects in modern times has often answered this question in the affirmative. As we everywhere see that law is only to bring the refractory to order, so the moral law presupposes the entrance of disturbance into the moral life. That which was originally the very life of the creature in the strictest sense, pursues him now that he has fallen from his original condition, as the consciousness of the requiring law. This is the opinion of *Baader*,[1] *Steffens*,[2] and from another point of view *Schleiermacher* inclines to it.[3] If this be the relation, sin were at

[1] *Philosoph. Schriften*, Bd. 1, S. 17 u. öfter.

[2] *Besonders in der Anthropologie*, Bd. 1, S. 391. Bd. 2, S. 357, f., vgl. *Karikaturen des Heiligsten*, Bd. 1, S. 45, f.

[3] In the first edition *der Glaubenslehre* the following sentence is found, Bd. 2, S. 378—"A law can only there arise where there is division between the whole and the part." Vgl. 2 Ausg. Bd. 2, S. 147.—*Rothe* is also of the opinion, a. a. O. Th. 3. § 817, that the imperative of the law presupposes in the subject opposition against its requirement.

least a *ὕστερον πρότερον* and to be defined as opposition to the law.

It does not become us here, to enter upon the consideration of the particular relations into which the moral law enters with the inward course of human development, at the different stages of its progress, as disclosed in the history of divine revelation. We must therefore take up the notion of this law in broader generality. Wherever a rule determining the will presents itself to the personal creature with the genuine claim of unconditional validity, *there is law.*

It has been intimated above (page 28) that the moral law, as such, loses its significance for man, when in his moral development he has attained to the end, perfect holiness. The expression *δικαίῳ νόμος οὐ κεῖται* can, in the place where it stands, 1 Tim. i. 9, hardily be said to have any other sense than this, that the Mosaic law, according to the peculiar character of its contents, was not appointed for those who in Christ have become righteous, but for the unrighteous and profane, for a people hard of heart, and of iron neck. But if one will take the idea of *δίκαιος* absolutely, therefore regard it as referring to the completion of holiness, he must also understand the superseding of the law in its strict and full sense. Thus the law undoubtedly refers to an *imperfect* condition of man, and only under this presupposition can the moral order appear in the consciousness as an imperative, as an objective rule. But after our previous investigations we cannot again confound this condition of incompleteness, from which man must surely of necessity make his beginning, with the positive disturbance of life, which first of all originates in sin. Why should only the disturbed moral development, which has to overcome the contradiction,—why should not also the undisturbed as well, which ascends from the imperfect to the perfect,—be able to be regulated by the law and its consciousness?[1] The imperative

1 *Harless in seiner christlichen Ethik*, S. 26, lays down the position—"The connection (of the human life with God) must be then destroyed when one becomes so sensible of conscience as to hear, thou *oughtest* to live in God." The reasoning by which this sentence is sought to be established is contained in the following—"So little man can be otherwise conscious of his physical life than as he becomes conscious of it as living *existence*, just as little according to the notion of the matter can that life, which furnishes the conscience, appear to him as imperative

of the law, objectively considered, expresses no more than that the moral in relation to man, although it is not brought about in the manner of a physical necessity, not by a Must (*Muss*), is nevertheless by no means a *self-discretionary matter*, but an unconditional necessity, which he is absolutely bound to realize. So little is there in this notion of an entire abstraction from the reality, that much rather, while deriving its contents from the idea, its entire reference is to the reality; the imperative of the law is just its determination to pass over into reality. Therefore it cannot at all be shown that this imperative pre-supposes a contradiction of being against the same, by virtue of which one might perhaps be able to argue: man is required to be righteous, therefore he is unrighteous. Those who maintain this appear to confound the imperative of the law with the requirement of duty (the *Soll* with the *Sollte.*)[1] Placed in the consciousness, this imperative most certainly expresses some existing difference between it and the state of the being in which it is placed, a not yet realized state of perfection; for if the state of being perfectly corresponds with the imperative, the consciousness cannot of itself come to refer this contents as an imperative, a requirement made upon itself.[2] But

of life (*Lebensollen.*) The pulsation of the heart, in answer to which the living motion of the blood announces itself, is absolutely there; there the motion had ceased from some stagnation where one was able to say, I am conscious that my heart *ought* to beat." But it is quite a failure in such a case to wish to prove any thing by analogies drawn from the *unconscious life of nature.* It is in the nature of everything ethical that with respect to it man comes out of the shadowy sphere of nature into the clear day of self-consciousness. Or is it to belong to the idea of pure (undisturbed by sin) development, that man is only conscious of his moral task in the form of operative unconscious instinct?

1 "*Die das behaupten scheinen das Soll mit dem Sollte zu verwechseln.*" It is impossible to render this into English just as it stands in the German. More fully to express the idea we may thus paraphrase it. Those who maintain this, appear to confound the objective requirement of the idea with the subjective, *i.e.* with the requirement made of a given individual in a given case. —Tr.

One must here not allow himself to be confused by another use of language, which does not understand the imperative (*das Sollen*) in an ethical sense, but in the signification: to be valid for, passed off for something. Just so it is sometimes used as peculiarly denoting the merely subjective ideal.

2 Only against the temptation coming upon him from without, which directly makes manifest the possibility—in itself present—of sinning, of the Divine law, does the Holy One of God present the: Thou shalt! (Matth. iv. 6—10).

neither from this does there follow any *contradiction* of the reality against the (moral) necessity as pre-supposition of the imperative. In a normal development every determinate imperative, so soon as it appeared in the consciousness, would immediately call forth the moral activity, by which it realized itself. The law would govern until the perfect were attained, and yet there would be no slavery of the law.

The incomplete state of being at the commencement involves assuredly, as we shall by and by see, the possibility of evil; we must therefore admit that the *possibility* of evil is pre-supposed by the existence of the law in the consciousness; but one can only then regard this possibility as a *germ* of evil, that is to say, deny its qualitative distinction from the reality, when he is prepared to abandon the freedom of the human will, and to allow evil to be a necessary moment in the development of human nature.

SECOND CHAPTER.

SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE AGAINST GOD.

The practical philosophy of criticism, as is well known, makes the nature of true morality solely to consist in the obedience of the will to its own law, and will not allow the origin of the law to be anywhere else sought for than in our own practical reason. The "autonomy of the will," according to the moral formalism of *Kant*, is originally directed against every determination of the will by the character of its object; however, on the stand-point of this philosophy, which does not allow the essential distinction of that which comes to the human spirit from above, and out of its own origin (from God), and that which comes to it from below (out of nature), but holds to the abstract notion of the ἕτερον, *of the outward and foreign* to the will—upon this stand-point, we say, it further follows of itself that the derivation of the moral law from the will of a Being, Most High, and perfectly Holy, must also be rejected as a heteronomy, corruptive of all morality.[1]

In the first place, this autonomy of the human will appears to be perfectly self-contradictory. For a law, it is clear, must stand *over* the nature to which it is a law, and which is subject to it. And that it is not otherwise with the moral law, appears from a sentence which *Kant* lays down as the basis of his ethical system.[2]

[1] *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, S. 73, 79, 92. *Kritik der prakt. Vernunft, sechste Aufl.* S. 184. *Metaphys. Aufangsgründe der Rechtslehre, zweite Aufl., Einleitung*, S. xvi. It is the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of *Kant's* theoretical and practical philosophy, that he every where regards God as foreign to the human spirit. It is in this way he has become the real father, strictly speaking, of modern deistical theology. On the other hand it is perfectly in keeping with this theory, that man, ethically considered, has in reality everything from himself, (1) the law, (2) evil, (3) liberation from evil—of which, indeed, the one for ever destroys the possibility of the other, the second that of the first, the third that of the second.

[2] *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.* i. *Th.* i. *Buch.* 3. *Hauptstuck, von den Triebfedern der reinen practischen Vernunft.*

He says that so long as we have nothing higher than the law, our relation to it is not that of an inclination to its contents, arising of itself out of our inmost life, not that of an immediate oneness with it, but that of a *subjection* under its commanding authority, of a *self-compulsion* to obedience. He has energetically maintained this against the contradiction in *Schiller's* treatise on Grace and Dignity *(Anmuth und Würde)*—and undoubtedly with the preponderance of truth on his side, if it treats of the factual condition of the human race, apart from what it may become by the redemption of Christ.[1] By this then *Kant* imputes to man, since he will make him entirely his own lawgiver, the contradictory task of separating himself from himself in order to subject himself to himself.—

Nevertheless there appears to be a simple solution of this

[1] *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, erstes Stuck,* S. 10, f. It will assuredly ever remain a remarkable aberration of a noble mind, that *Kant* could maintain that true virtue had nothing at all to do with sympathising benevolence toward man, nothing to do with the interest of mind in its well-being, and could only there manifest itself in its purity where it is unaccompanied by any pleasure in the object of the will. Nevertheless these consequences were not to be repudiated, if the nature of morality is for one moment to consist in acting entirely from respect to the moral law, and that, too, because it bears the formal character of universal validity. *Schiller's* treatise on *grace and dignity* gives utterance to deep forebodings of Christian truths in its controversion of this freezing rigorism of the moral life; but since it does not relinquish the general principles of the *Kantian* moral, with respect to law, it is neither able firmly to retain these truths, nor to avoid being at variance with itself: for instance—in the singular difficulty with respect to that moral, that by the imperative form of the moral law (to which indeed, just because it is law in relation to freedom, the imperative form essentially belongs), humanity becomes accused and degraded. Besides this, *Schiller* was on quite a false track when he thought to elevate the slaves to children of the house, not as Christ, John viii. 35, 36, by the redemption through the Son, but by an aesthetic culture, and when too he ascribes to *beautiful souls*, what the Holy Spirit is alone able to produce, compare the conclusion of the ninth letter on the aesthetic culture of man. Ignorant of the positive solution of the problem found in the gospel, he endeavours to soften down the principle of the Old Testament service of the law by marrying it to the artistic religion of Greece. But as certain as it is that from the amalgamation of Judaism with Helenistic heathenism no Christianity was produced, but only a Judaic Alexandrian culture, from which we know very well the world has not been regenerated, so certain is it that the union of the idea of the beautiful with the idea of the moral law, can only produce a weak surrogate for the Divine principle of redeeming love.

difficulty of *Kant's* lying close at hand, namely in the dualism of the *rational and sensational nature.* If we only make with him the proper distinction between man as subject of this legislative function—his rational nature—and man as object of this legislation—his sensational nature, we shall then be able to say without contradiction, that man, as his own lawgiver, subjects himself to himself. But it is only in appearance, for this solution leads us to consequences still stranger than those from which we would thereby escape. For if it be the reason of sensational nature, which prescribes the moral law, the feeling of reverence for duty, the root of all virtue, must reside there,[1] and the ideas of morality and virtue, whose nature is surely not to *give*, but to *observe*, laws, express conditions (*Beschaffenheiten*), not of our spiritual life, but of our sensational nature—what no one in earnest ought to wish to maintain, *Kant* least of all, otherwise he must relinquish, not merely his fundamental principles respecting the method by which the sensational, in distinction from rational nature, is brought into activity, but the very ground work of his system.[2]

So much is certain: that it is not the sensational nature which primarily receives the requirement to submit itself to the moral law, but the spirit, more strictly still, the *will*, consequently it must be in the different tendencies of the will that the notions of good and evil have their roots.[3] However there appears to be still another outlet by which to save this autonomy from the reproach of being self-contradictory. The spirit gives the law in

[1] *Schiller* expressly admits this too in the treatise just referred to. According to him this reverence for duty entirely refers to the relation of the sensational nature to the requirements of pure practical reason—*its object* is the reason, its *subject* the sensational nature. But then this reverence for duty is never any more than a *sensational perception*, and virtue in its entirety is based upon sensationalism.

[2] Not even *Aristotle*, to whom *Thomas von Aquino* ascribes this opinion in relation to the virtues of *ἀνδρία* and *σωφροσύνη*, because he says of them—*Ethica Nicom.* lib. iii. c. 10—*δοκοῦσι τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὖται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί.* That this expression is otherwise to be understood, is seen by comparing it with lib. i. c. 13, lib. ii. c. 1.

[3] What *Kant* himself most distinctly admits in *seiner Lehre vom radikalen Bösen*, in that he requires for the evil an intelligible ground, and expressly makes the imputation of evil dependent on its originating from freedom, which only belongs to man as *noumenon.*

so far as it is *cognitive (erkennender)*, and has to submit itself to the law in so far as it is *determinative (wollender.)*—But whither shall we be driven by this expedient? The representation according to which the spirit of man gives the law to his sense-nature, rests upon the presupposition of a certain relatively outward relation between spirit and sensational nature, which, within its proper bounds must be admitted with respect to the *beginning* of *human development* (1 Cor. xv. 45—47); but this opinion places a principle of separation in the very inmost life of the spirit itself. The reason reveals its exalted nature in the laying down of a law which comes to the will entirely as from without, as from another being, and because it is its *law*, as such —requires subjection from it. We are far from denying that such a dualism of cognition and determination really exists, in consequence of the divided state of human nature, resulting from the entering in of sin. But here it is regarded as *originally grounded in the nature of the human spirit*, and in this form the representation is absolutely *unendurable*.—And then too—if indeed the *giving* of law must be distinguished from the mere *recognition* of law, this distinction will mainly consist, in denoting the legislative activity as an act of the will, a powerful operative *determination*, possessing the authority of law. It is on this ground that *Kant*, and very properly too, has never separated from his idea of the will, the pretended power of the human spirit to prescribe moral laws to itself. Accordingly, if after all, we should not be able to avoid the formula that it is the rational will of man which *prescribes* the moral law *to himself*, he himself being equally the commanding agent and the commanded subject, that inward contradiction remains exposed in all its harshness.[1]

Zeller, who in his treatises on the freedom of the human will, moral evil, the moral disposition of the world *(theol. Jahrbücher von Baur und Zeller*, 1846, H. 3, 1847, H. 1, 2), makes repeated reference to this work, here throws out this objection, to what we have said, against the autonomy of the will, as being self-contradictory—that

[1] For another purpose *Schleiermacher* treats this question in the treatise *über den Unterschied zwischen Naturgesetz und Sittengesetz, Abhandl. der Berliner Akademie*, v. J. 1825, S. 18—20. Comp. *Romang. über Willensfreiheit und Determinismus*, S. 139, f.

this same contradiction is to be found in every existing creature; in so far as it is an example of its species, it bears the law of its species, and yet as a single individual it does not absolutely correspond to that law.—As now in the creatures of nature this contradiction is solved by the idea of individuality, which, as representation of its species, at the same time represents and does not represent the same, *i.e.* renders an imperfect representation; so here the contradiction is solved by the notion of personality, which expresses this, that the nature of the spirit, in itself considered, is that which is common and universal; and at the same time possesses an individuality which is peculiar to the given person; consequently in the consciousness of the imperfect individual creature, there is at the same time the consciousness of the idea of humanity, which transcends the consciousness of the individual, a. a. O. *Jahrg.* 1847, S. 32, 33.—This objection, strictly speaking, anticipates the course of our investigation, for we have not argued against the autonomy of the will, on the ground of its actual incommensurableness in relation to its law, since the inadmissibility of such a line of argument is manifest in the very determinations contained in the idea of the moral law. However, we may overlook this, for if it is a fact of experience that the human will often places itself in opposition to the moral law, and if we add, that when it thus opposes itself, the law still remains in the consciousness, it assuredly becomes, in this way, still more obvious, that our will cannot derive this law from itself. That the same contradiction of the individual, with its idea (the idea of its species) may be shown in the existences of nature, and that by this very contradiction the individual perishes, is, we are aware, a familiar postulate of the Hegelian Logic, but one which is as indemonstrable as it is familiar. If one will regard the ideas of species as laws of nature, he can of course only attribute to them *those* determinations characteristic of the higher genus, and which denote the specific difference of the given species, distinguishing it from every other, in short, only those characteristic determinations, which every individual of

the species must possess, if it is to be regarded as belonging to the same. But from this it is evident that the individuals in the sphere of nature—apart from malformations, which, by the by, are also entirely, according to the laws of nature, and commonly found by the encroachment of the law of another species—do *entirely correspond* to the law of the species to which they belong. It is true, if this corresponding relation of the individual, to the idea of its species, be made to consist, in the necessity of the idea of the species, as such, consequently, the idea common to each of its members being represented in every single example of the same, and yet the individual not represented in any one example, that the individual existence is in contradiction with this requirement, and in so far, of course, with the idea of its species—but only because the requirement itself is contradictory. After the above remarks with respect to the idea of the species, one cannot maintain: that in nature, every such idea requires an absolutely perfect example as its adequate expression; and because such a representation is not to be found in reality, the individual existences of nature are in contradiction to the ideas of their respective species. The species-idea does not at all contain such a requirement; it has in this sphere only the value of a subjective aesthetic ideal, which otherwise would hardly be able perfectly to determine itself. Its elevation to a law of nature is an inadmissible transference, of the analogy of ethical norms for free beings, to the sphere of nature, where there is no freedom.—Therefore nature knows nothing of this supposed contradiction between the individual existence and the species-idea; but if there really were such a contradiction, one does not at all see how it is to be solved, by setting up the very idea, to which it is said to be attached, the notion of individuality.

What *Zeller* otherwise adduces in defence of the autonomy of the human will meets with its refutation in a more advanced connection of our consideration. To this connection he can have paid no attention, if he, for instance, supposes, that by rejecting this autonomy of the

will, there is nothing left us but the adoption of the supposition, that what appears to us now as immoral, had been able by the Divine will not only to have been allowed, but even commanded; nay, further, that one rejecting this autonomy could not consistently contradict the assertion, that even now in individual instances, morally detestable deeds, such as murder, theft, lying, violence, and the like may become praiseworthy, and committed to the glory of God. But the relation of these matters to our position is the express subject of investigation in the first section of the following chapter.

One is accustomed to consider the general nature of *personality* to consist in the two moments of *self-consciousness* and *self-determination*—and very properly so, in as far as it is only meant thereby to denote the simple constituent functions in the idea of personality. There are, accordingly, two radical tendencies in human personality, a theoretical, and a practical, knowing and doing. If we conceive of these as they are in the innermost sphere of self-hood, we find the one to be, self-consciousness, *(Fürsichsein)*, the other, self-determination *(Durchsichsein)*. In the one, the subject, self, and the given determination of its own being, are objects to self; in the other the subject, self, is the power which conditions this determination of its own being. The fineness of the distinction between these two radical directions of self-hood shows how intimately they are one. The self-determination is truly what its name denotes, only on the ground of its being a self-conscious determination; but if man in his real being were absolutely determined by the world, if he had not the power to determine himself, he would never be able in self-consciousness, with clearness, and certainty, to distinguish himself from the entire world, and securely to retain the identity of the Ego amid all the endless variety of change.

If we more closely consider the first of these two moments, human self-consciousness, we shall perceive in it manifold *limitations*. The internal deduction of the same we reserve for investigation by and by, (in the fourth chapter of the first division

of the third book.) Here we shall be content by designating it as we find it.

Man, in order to become conscious of himself, must distinguish himself from an outward world, must *exclude* from himself another being which is not himself. He cannot become self-conscious without at the same time becoming conscious of another than self. In his endeavour to know himself, in the absolute exclusion of every other, he discovers the necessity of another than himself being *included with himself* in his self-consciousness. For the determinate being which forms the contents of his real self-consciousness is never an absolutely independent being, but is always in some way or other co-determined by another. This relativeness of the human self-consciousness partly depends upon its essential relation to a nature relatively external to it, and partly upon its having no reality save in the personal individual which finds himself set over against other individuals.

Therefore, just because the human self-consciousness, however it may bring about the act of its self-comprehension, can never escape the influence of another than self, co-determining its *contents*,—since thought of as mere *form* (as pure, *i.e.* abstract self-consciousness), it were no real self-consciousness,—it cannot be an absolutely original, but must in some way be a *conditioned* and *derived* one. Were it possible to regard those limitations, which are attached to human self-consciousness as accidental, we might perhaps still maintain its originality, in the strict sense of the word, by the assumption, that it had itself, by its own act, placed those limitations, or that they had arisen as (unforeseen) consequences of its own act, of its own free self-perversion. But indeed these limitations are essential to human self-consiousness; it is not merely never in experience to be met with without them, but they are so inseparable from its very notion, that supposing them away, we should no more think of human self-consciousness. From this it follows, with rigid necessity, that human self-consciousness has not the principle of its essence (*Wesenheit*) and existence in itself, but *in another*.

This other cannot be *nature;* nature cannot give what it does not possess; it cannot produce what is *toto genere* different from itself, so certain is it that in the sphere of nature the full import of the canon: like only comes from like, holds good.

Self-consciousness can assuredly only be explained from self-consciousness, from unconsciousness, never; this new beginning above itself is beyond the power of nature: *personal power*, the creative principle of new beginnings, which, originally absolutely exalted above nature, sits, and preserves the entire development in motion, is only adequate to its production. If then self-consciousness at all exist, there must also exist an absolutely *original*, therefore *unconditional self-consciousness*.—Human self-consciousness, in its temporal self-actualization presupposes nature, has it for its real ground-basis, upon which it elevates itself, just as daily experience teaches us with respect to beginnings of individuals, and just as science (the scientific history of the earth) teaches us with respect to the beginning of the human race. But this is only possible on the ground that an Eternal Self-consciousness rules above this temporal process of nature, and sinks the Divine spark of the personal spirit into the dark stuff of naturalness, and preserves it there in still concealment, until it is able to realize itself in the light-flame of human self-consciousness. The Mosaic history of the creation does not overlook, that nature temporally precedes the primitive origin of this self-consciousness, just as the darkness precedes the light; but also according to it, the original light of the *Divine Self-consciousness* is eternally and absolutely first and before all.

Thus in the deep of our own *self-consciousness*, as its concealed back-ground, the *God-consciousness* reveals itself to us; the descent into our own inmost is at the same time an ascent to God; every deep reflection on ourselves breaks through the crust of the mere world-consciousness, which separates us from the inmost truth of our existence, and leads us up to Him in whom we live, and move, and are. We know nothing of any finite object in an absolutely original manner; as finite objects according to their nature are derived, our knowledge of them must also be derivative; in an absolutely original and immediate manner we are only conscious of God.

It is a thought often met with in *Hegel*, that the spirit, in order to recognise a limitation, as such, must, somehow or other, be already beyond it.[1] From what we have already said, it will

[1] *Hegel (Werke*, Bd. 3, S. 143) *Logik*, Bd. 1, S. 143.—His words run

be clear, in what way we are able to appropriate this thought. The knowledge of the limitation which essentially attaches to our self-consciousness, is only the reflex of the reality of an unlimited self-consciousness. We should not be able to presage from a distance that our personality, just that in us by which we know ourselves to be elevated, not merely in degree, but in nature, above every other being, is a limited one, if the consciousness of the absolute personality, however dark and effaced the lines of the same may often be, were not to our spirit an original inbirth. Unlimited self-consciousness then we have not in ourselves, but in Him, with whom we may become one by knowledge and love.—

Self-determination, the second moment in human personality, is just as little as self-consciousness an *unlimited* one. The original limitation by which it is bound by a holy necessity we have already, in a former part of our discussion, seen to be the *moral law* in the consciousness of man. Just as we cannot become truly conscious of ourselves without becoming conscious of God, so we cannot radically investigate the nature of our self-determination without discovering the conscience as norm for the movements of our will. We have also seen, in the first chapter, how this entirely formal conception of the moral law, as that of a limitation for self-determination, of itself passes over into a higher and more real one. The will only finds out its truth by its becoming one with the contents of the law, and making it the constant germ of its own manifold and changing contents.—

If these two fundamental activities, constituting human personality, exist in indissoluble unity, how can the principles which determine them be indifferent towards each other? Experience testifies to their inward mutual relation. Every excitation of the God-consciousness becomes, in the pious, immediately an impulse for the conscience, and every admonition proceeding from the conscience, directly excites the consciousness of God. Whoever explains the God-consciousness in the human spirit as a delusion, will, of consequence, soon come to regard the law as

thus—" In dieser Behauptung: es könne über die Schranke nicht hinausgegangen werden, liegt die Bewusstlosigkeit, dass darin selbst, dass etwas als Schranke bestimmt ist, darüber bereits hinausgegangen ist."—TR.

a well-meant weakness, or a cunning device; the degeneracy or death of religion in a people, is everywhere connected with the deepest degradation of moral life; and no man can smother the voice of his conscience, without thereby perverting his religious consciousness into infidelity or superstition.

Now, the first way in which man becomes conscious of a higher oneness of the moral and the religious, is by his recognising God as *the author of the moral law*, the guarantee for its validity, and the moral law itself as an arrangement by which the Divine will rules his life.—*Leibnitz* says in his *nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain*,[1] God is the only direct outward object of the soul *(i.e.*, apart from itself)—the outward objects of sense are only indirect. With *Leibnitz* the thought manifestly hangs together with his system of pre-established harmony; but as Genius has often hit upon the truth, when the premises from which it was thought to be deduced were false, so this word remains a deep truth, even when its subjective presupposition has long since gone to the ground. What was said above, respecting the relation of our self-consciousness, and world-consciousness, to the God-consciousness, rests upon the fundamental basis of this thought of *Leibnitz*.—If *Leibnitz* be right, God is also the *only immediate object of our obligation*, the ground of all other obligation; every moral duty which truly binds us in our conscience, becomes obligation to God, is Divine will; the observance of the law deepens itself into obedience to the living God, from whom, in whom, and to whom, we are. The relation of the rational creature to God, is, where it is genuine, the first and inmost, from which all moral life of the creature proceeds, on which, at every point of its development, it remains dependent, and to which it ever again returns, from its manifold determinations, as to its fixed centre ("from Him—in Him—to Him.") In this relation we become conscious of the moral legislation, not as autonomy, neither as heteronomy, but as *theonomy*.[2] As here all morality becomes regarded as unconscious religion, so true religion appears as the consciousness of morality.

[1] II. 1, § 1, comp. *Leibnitii epistolae ed. Kortholt.* vol. iii. p. 67.

[2] If indeed to many theonomy be nothing more than heteronomy, Christianity is not to blame, but only its rejection, only the obstinate seclusiveness of the finite Ego.

Accordingly, it cannot be said, that the Divine origin of the moral law in us, is only an especial form of expression, for the general dependence of all created being on God. Much rather it serves to point out the threads, in the contents of our consciousness, where these contents do not relate directly to God, which lead out of its mazes into the free and the wide—namely, to God; to point out the undeniable manifestations of a higher power within us, and of a ruling power over us. If this proof of the Divine origin of the moral law within us, had *only* the above sense, everything which has very properly been objected to the so-called proofs for the existence of God, which are based upon the law of causality, would be perfectly valid against it.—

But in order to perceive still more fully in the *moral sphere*, this necessity which conducts us from the law to God, we must investigate how the matter stands in the sphere of *nature*.

Kant relates in his treatise, on the only possible ground of proof for the demonstration of the existence of God, that he has explained to an intelligent pupil the remarkable property of the circle, which makes this figure the basis of the simple solution of an apparently difficult and confused mechanical problem, and that, after he has thoroughly understood it, he has been not less affected than by a wonder of nature.[1] Similar to this is the deep joy we experience when the simple and infinitely productive laws of nature are presented to us for the first time, as, for example, *Kepler's* laws of the revolution of the planets round the sun, or the laws which govern the metamorphosis of plants and animals. What is the ground of this joy? First of all, simply, that the spirit finds itself again in the sphere of nature, which, according to the first appearance, seemed foreign to it. *The law* in nature, the fixed rule in the varied, perplexing, change of phenomena, the harmonious connection of a manifold diversity, the immanent design, by which the apparently individual and isolated are related to each other—these are *agreeable to the spirit;* it perceives in this design a power of thought, of intelligence above mere working forces, just as it was to Plato a testimony in favour of the origin of nature from ideas. But the law is not the only

[1] *Kant's Sämmliche Kleine Schriften* (1797), Bd. 2, S. 194.

thing in nature which is the ground of this joy; living, individual development meets us everywhere, welling forth from depths inexhaustibly rich and manifold; it is only by this means that nature possesses her wonderful dominion over mind and fantasy. Nevertheless, this still enchantment by which nature holds us in charmed bonds, is *conditioned* by the dominion of the law resident in her, although it does not manifest itself in reflections on the laws of nature, but in an immediate nature-feeling; for if we suppose this dominion of law to be absent, there remains to us only a waste, chaotic, whirling and driving. Nature is only able to produce particular, individual life, in so far as order and proportion prevail in her.

But if the law is a power of thought over the being subject to it, it cannot be *there* in an *original* manner, where it is in an *unconscious* manner, since a thinking in nature, without a thinking subject, is only an empty scheme of thought. The laws of nature, as a real power of thought, over the working powers of nature, must have their ground, and origin, in a conscious determining Being. Only a *real will* can be legislative; but the self-conscious will is the only real will, and thought must be in union with the will in order to become a real power. Indisputably there is nothing contradictory, in an unconscious, instinctive sort of, working of nature, according to the laws of immanent design, such as the idea of organism contains; but such a working points to a *consciousness* above itself, as the original seat of this thought, as the determining author of its determining power, whereby it is law of nature. If the unity, of the working powers of nature, with their law, be an unconscious one, its very unconsciousness proves it to be a determined or legislated one; real self-determination, and unconsciousness, mutually exclude each other.[1]

[1] In another train of consideration, *J. H. Fichte*, in his treatise, rich in thought—"*Zur speculativen Theologie*"—(*Zeitschrift für Philosophie und speculative Theologie, neue Folge, Band* 1, *Heft* 2, S. 200, ff.)—has, in a very obvious manner, shown that this unconscious, active wisdom of nature, requires explanation, and that it is only arbitrary or indolent thinking which continues to regard it as the absolute. Comp. from the same author, *Speculative Theologie* § 33—44, and also the excellent representation of this theology immanent in nature in *Trendelenburgs logischen Untersuchungen, Thl.* 2, *Abschn.* viii. *Der Zweck* Tr. also says of unconscious design, S. 24, it is indeed the fact of the plastic power of nature, but if one imagines in saying so

But what necessity is there for supposing that consciousness, regarded as *the original seat of law*, is *out* of the sphere of *nature*? What is there to prevent our considering nature itself, as the subject of this consciousness, and from seeking in her for the spirit which animates, and gives soul, to this entire visible phenomenal world, as its own body? Is it perhaps that this is contradictory to the idea of nature, to which, dependency, and self-lessness, belong, as integrating moments? That this idea of nature again has the support of all experience, and of all observation of nature, which teach us to regard nature, in its entirety, as well as in its parts, merely as an object which we determine, without acting upon us, otherwise than in the character of an impersonal law, and only reacting against our determinations, with blind, planless necessity?—But how limited the sphere of this experience is, in comparison with the immeasurable sphere of the whole! Why should it be inconceivable, that the Great Spirit be-souling nature, magnanimously permitted man to carry on his uninjurious pursuits upon the surface of one of His smallest organs? And what were the appealing to a presupposed idea, or one based upon such limited experience, other than manifestly a *petitio principii*?

And supposing it were so, if this intelligence conscious of her self, the inventress of the laws of nature, the mighty will which guarantees their validity, supposing we say this were *nature herself*, herewith regarded as a *personal subject*, what would follow? She could not, even as spirit and personality, have given herself these laws, but only their developing manifestation *(Offenbarwerden)*, as nature. By this legitimacy in nature, her life is not only designedly ordered with respect to herself, but also in her relation to the human spirit. In both respects the arranging intelligence proves herself to be, although immanent in

much, that he has already solved the difficulty, it is a deception, for he has only increased the difficulty. Just so, by *Schwarz*, *Wesen der Religion*, I. S. 175 ff., the contradiction—in representing a world-design, without a conscious designing principle, is conclusively exhibited; but it is inconsistent, from this point of view, to decline the idea of the Divine personality. For that God must then as individual be separate from other individuals, S. 191, is not at all contained in the idea of personality, but only in that of personal individuality, in so far as its correlative is the idea of species.

nature, distinct from nature; and as one free from, and sovereign over nature, subordinates the same to her own control. Should the idea of a blind-working, teleological conformity of nature, with which this method of representation begins, unaided, elevate itself to a more spiritual opinion, whatever its value might otherwise be, the result were, the necessitating the acknowledgment of an intelligent author of the laws of nature, out of, and above, the sphere which they regulate. Moreover, those who, in avowing the teleological conformity of the order of nature, go no further, than the acknowledgment of an unconscious, plastic, and organizing, power of nature, involuntarily contradict themselves, since in speaking of this order, they continually ascribe to its plastic power predicates, which only belong to such an intelligence.

Strauss only doubles this contradiction instead of solving it, when he makes the spirit, as *unconscious nature-spirit*, to have ordered the relations of the heavens, to have formed the earths and metals, to have established the organic structure of plants and animals, so that now he has only to animate by investigation, reflection, and knowledge, the remembrance of how he himself established them all.[1] The first contradiction is that the human spirit is said to have once been unconscious nature-spirit, the second, that as unconscious nature-spirit it is said to have produced just that which, if it were its work, could only be ascribed to it as possessing consciousness, and supposing it were compatible with the idea of the finite spirit, according to both its ground determinations (finite—spirit), to ascribe to it such a creative, but unconscious efficiency, still, it could only have been in the same the organ of a higher spirit working by, and through it, just on the ground of its unconsciousness.—

But as we are about to apply these determinations respecting the laws of nature to *the law of the will*, we are admonished to bear in mind that every thing in this sphere is very differently related, from the relation of things in the sphere of nature. In nature, as the sphere of unconsciousness, the thought of law could not have its original seat; but why are we obliged to go up out of the sphere of the self-conscious human spirit, to seek a higher consciousness, as the original seat of the law of the will?—

[1] *Dogmatik*, Bd. 1, S. 351.

No one will wish to maintain that the moral law is to have its origin in the consciousness and wills of human *individuals*, as such; and did any one maintain it, he would thereby deny, but not explain, the subject of this investigation, namely the law as *universal power authorizing the will*, by which man feels himself to be *bound*. And does not the moral idea, distinctly enough, manifest itself as a power which makes itself valid in human life, independently of the human will, nay, in spite of its resistance? It does this in a twofold manner: In the first place it does this in the individual himself, even when he in disposition, and in the principle of his conduct, has decidedly separated himself from it, by reacting, if not always strictly as consciousness of guilt, still at least as a dark feeling of the nothingness of his pursuits. Then again, in the different spheres of society, by conducting its affairs according to its laws, even by means of agents who, in their entire disposition of mind, have estranged themselves from it. But why are not these laws, and their power, to have their origin in the *universal will of humanity*, which, being one with the true *essentia* (Wesen) of man, determines from out this unity the individual will? Then it becomes quite natural, and we are not necessitated to ascend to a super-human causality of the law, to account for the appearance to the individual of this universal will, as *a law standing over him*. Be it so; nevertheless we dare not forget, that we have shown already the necessity in any case for seeking the origin of the law in a self-conscious will. Besides, universal will without a willing subject, is just as empty, unsubstantial an abstraction, as thinking without a thinking subject; and he who wishes to feed us upon such formulæ gives us truly "stones instead of bread." Thus then, there remains nothing more for us to do, than to refer this universal will to a *personal subject*, to the real and hypostatic idea of the human species, which behind, and above, personal individuals, in whom it continually makes itself empirically real, is itself at the same time a particular personal Individual. That were much the same as that attempt to help the modern speculative christology out of the dilemma between the ideas,—species and individual, by calling in the aid of scholastic realism; by which, theology, apart from its misunderstanding of this realism, had to take an entirely new sort of polytheism into the bargain. Besides, it would ever

remain a perfectly vain endeavour—not of speculative thinking, to which we may not attribute this undertaking, but of fantasy, to represent to itself a universal will, in which the individual wills are all contained, and which nevertheless has a personal existence separated from them, by virtue of which it gives them laws.

We can manifestly only seek for the origin of the moral law, whose requirements we inwardly feel, in a Being for whom the law of the will is not a *given* one, therefore not *law* at all, because He has its contents in Himself, in a perfect and immediate manner, since being in Himself the absolutely Good: requiring for Himself no law, and subjected to no law, His will is able to legislate for all other beings, inasmuch as He is the principle of their existence.

Herein the *universal significance* and *necessity of the law* reveal themselves to us. It only belongs to God to have in Himself the ground of His life; every other being has it not in himself, but in God, and therefore receives also from Him the rule for the development and manifestation of its life. If it be unconscious nature, we find the rule immediately appointing and executing itself, in the working of its powers. If it be free, self-conscious spirit, the divine rule becomes *command*, which as such, does not exclude the physical possibility of a determination in opposition to it. The idea of law is essentially of religious significance. If the idea of the autonomy of the human spirit were not self-contradictory, it were still in contradiction with the idea of the creature. As creature, he only has the truth of his being in his constant attachment to the Creator; it is just this truth of his being, in so far as it is conditioned by his will, which is revealed to him by the moral law.

It becomes now still clearer, what we have already said in the previous chapter, that this rule for the life of created personality, does not possess its origin in the perversion of its relation to God. Much rather, it is dependant on the nature of this relation, so long as the same is not yet glorified in its perfect union with God, in which God will be all in all. 1 Cor. xv. 28.

It is only in this *origin* of the moral law, that the *unconditionality*, with which its requirement makes good its validity in the consciousness, notwithstanding the arbitrariness and contradictoriness of human lust and passion, meets with its

satisfactory explanation. The unconditional :—Thou shalt! remains in the presence of the will, which will not will; by its imperative form, it points up to the real existence of a higher contrary will, which appoints the law; and by the unconditionality of its requirement it testifies that this contrary will, is the will of God. *Εἷς ἐστιν ὁ νομοθέτης*, James iv. 12. Man can adopt any rules and maxims, for the regulation of his conduct, which he pleases, and regard the same with unvarying consistency, so long as the stronger power of passion does not come in the way; but a law which is to stand above the mutable arbitrariness of his intentions and determinations, immutably fixed, necessiting his respect, even in his opposition, such a rule of his being he is not able to originate.

And this is true in such a rigid exclusive sense, that even in the arrangements of civil society, every true law originates with God; and as such, is to be honoured, as not being of human invention, and in the faithful observance of which, the individual neither subordinates himself to himself, nor to his equals, but to God. (Rom. xiii. 2.)[1] On this account a so called lawgiver among men (properly, law-proclaimer), fulfils his function so much the more perfectly, the less he, in this capacity, assumes himself arbitrarily to make, or invent, anything; and feels himself everywhere to be bound by a higher necessity, and only strives to be the purest organ possible, through which the divine world-arrangements announce themselves; and, therefore, the more solicitously he observes, and allows himself to be guided, by the real revelations of the thoughts of God, in the eternal moral laws, in the peculiar spirit of nations, in the course of their historical development. Human legislation, were we able to trace back its acts to the beginnings, which coincide with the formation of a political

[1] The perception of this origin of civil arrangements and laws, transcending human arbitrariness, which a great part of our contemporaries have lost, we find already in *Augustine, de libero arbitrio*, lib. i., cap. 6, still earlier in *Cicero, de legibus*, lib. ii., c. 4, 5, compare the passage which *Lactantius, div. institt.* lib. vi., c. 8, quotes, and very justly praises, from *Cicero* third book *de republica*; further comp. in *Sophocles*, although only in relation to a given class of those arrangements, in the beautiful words of *Antigone* concerning the "unwritten and unchangeable decrees of the gods, none of which is of to-day or yesterday, but which live on evermore, and no one knows the period of their birth." *Antigone*, v. 455—457, comp. *Oedipus Rex* v. 863—872.

constitution, can never have the task of making the right, but stands itself under higher rules of right, whether they be eternal and immutable, or historically developing. It is the most fearful error, when the will of a people, expressing itself perhaps in a representative assembly, regards itself as the ultimate and absolutely independent source, of what is to be valid among them as right and law. As if the coarse *power* of determining what it pleased—by which, it is true, it is exposed to the danger of making itself the reproach of history—could also bestow the right!—

As now the moral law receives a higher sanction where it is regarded as a revelation of the Divine will, to the finite spirit, so the enormity of evil is equally augmented when it appears in the consciousness not merely as transgression of the law, but equally therewith as *disobedience against God*, as violation of the relation of dependence, essential to the creature.

Paul hints at this *enhancement* of evil in its progress from violation of the moral law as such, to disobedience against God, the author of the law, Rom. ii. 9, (Ἰουδαίου τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλληνος.) Accordingly, in the Holy Scripture, where the heinousness of evil is to be brought forward in the strongest light, it is in manifold places denoted as offence against God. For the same purpose, in the Old Testament, besides individual passages which expressly say so, such as Gen. xiii. 13, xx. 6, xxxix. 9; Exod. xxxii. 33; Deut. i. 41, (also Ps. li. 6, where the words: *against Thee alone* have I sinned, are to be explained, according to *De Wette*, from the inwardness of the feeling, which, forgetting the other relations of the transgression, adheres to the one highest relation, to God), we must regard the frequent denomination of sin by פֶּשַׁע, פָּשַׁע, apostacy from God, breach of the covenant with Him, of which Gesenius remarks, appealing to Job xxxiv. 37, that it is a stronger term than חַטָּאָה.[1] Just so we find in the Old Testament, for criminal conduct, the expression, sinning against God, מָעַל מַעַל בַּיהוָה and similar. In the New Testament this idea of evil, as that of disobedience, of infidelity towards God, is particularly expressed by the frequently used *παράπτωμα*, Matth. vi. 14, 15; Rom. v. 15—20;

[1] *Thesaur.* vol. ii. S. v.

2 Cor. v. 19; Eph. ii. 1, 5; and other places. It is true that at the first blush, stumbling and falling over an obstacle in the way, appears to be the leading fundamental representation. But sometimes the epistle to the Hebrews uses the words ἅπαξ λεγόμενον παραπίπτειν for, falling away from God, from Christ, Heb. vi. 6. Sometimes, especially by the Alexandrians, the word corresponds to the Hebrew פֶּשַׁע or מַעַל, of the signification of which we have just above spoken (they translate פֶּשַׁע מַעַל by παραπεσεῖν παραπτώματι). If we compare Heb. ii. 2, παράβασις and παρακοή, the former, expresses the idea of moral transgression in relation to the law, the latter, in its relation to the author of the same.

And it is just this relation of moral transgression to God, as felt in the human consciousness, by which evil first becomes sin. For whatever the true etymology of this German word may be,[1] whose origin is as dark as the subject-matter itself, so much is certain, that according to universal usage, it is the *religious* term of moral evil.

[1] Comp. *Jak. Grimm Abstammung des Wortes Sünde, Stud. u. Krit.* 1839, *Hft.* 3, S. 747, ff. *Grimm* thinks it probable that it is derived from the old northern *syn*, inasmuch as it signifies the prevention of an appearance in court, still he does not maintain the absolute impossibility of its derivation from the old high German *Suona* (*Sühne*) by means of the Gothic *saun*.—Not less enigmatical is the etymology of ἁμαρτία. *Buttmann*, in the *Lexilogus*, Bd. 1, p. 1, 137, in that he therewith places the Homeric ἀβροτάζειν, to miss (Il. 10, 65.), by means of ἀμβροτεῖν, in connection with the epic collateral form of ἀμαρτεῖν (*e. g.*, Il. 5, 287.), lays down only as supposition the derivation from μέρος, in which the first syllable was originally the *a privativum*, and the signification of the verb, to be frustrated, not to attain, to miss. And so much appears certain, that the original signification is that of missing the end, as *Homer* often uses it for the not hitting of the arrow or spear, for ex. Il. 4, 491. 8, 302. 311. 10, 372. Comp. also *C. Fr. A. Fritzsche Pauli ad Romanos epist.* Note to 5, 12. Bd. 1, S. 289—292.—Then also, nothing is less clear than the derivation of *peccatum*. The older derivations, manifestly wrong, we pass over. *Döderlein* (*Latein. Synonyme und Etymologien*, Bd. 1, S. 140) believes the root of *peccatum*, as also of *peior, perperam, pravus*, to be in the preposition *per*, in which case *perversion* were the ground-idea (as in Hebrew עָוֹן and עָוֶל.) *Grimm* a. a. O. thinks it not impossible to trace *pecco* to the root *pio*, thus to the idea of expiation.

THIRD CHAPTER.

SIN AS SELFISHNESS.

SECTION I.

THE REAL PRINCIPLE OF THE MORAL LAW.

The evil presupposes the good, just as affirmation supposes denial, and the antithesis the thesis: it is only as contrast overgainst the good, as departure from it. But if evil has no independency in itself, the knowledge of evil is never primary and original, but essentially secondary, and derived. It is impossible to understand anything of evil, and its root in man, without first of all having a notion of the good.

There are, it is true, keen-sighted observers of all the intricacies of the human heart, to whom nevertheless we cannot give credit for a deep knowledge of good, since they themselves doubt the reality of a will truly bent to the good. Few with a surer eye have traced out the evil beneath the manifold concealments, under which it loves to hide itself, especially in the spheres of the polite and cultivated world, than *Rochefoucault*, who maintains in his "maxims," among other things, not of the non-virtues, but of the virtues of man, that they lose themselves in interest, as streams in the ocean. But is not that which has been said of *Voltaire*, applicable to him, viz. that without believing in the devil, he sees him everywhere, even where he is not? Nevertheless, the idea of a *pure will* manifestly guided even *Rochefoucault*, in his shrewd reflections on the weaknesses and artfulnesses of man, although he may ever have looked upon its realization as a mere chimaera.

If this be the relation between our knowledge of the good and of the evil, we must begin our search after the inward unity, which binds together the different forms of sin, by looking for the *inward unity of the good*. First of all the good, and still more the

evil, is seen as manifold and possessed of many forms, which appear entirely to defy their reduction to an inward unity. Nevertheless, we do presuppose such a unity, a determinate fundamental bias in each of the two sides, and it rests upon this presupposition that we place together the one class of these determinations of human life, which are conditioned by the will, under the notion of the good: the other under the notion of the evil.[1] This one fundamental tendency, and how the phenomenal variety issues out of it, is that which we seek, first of all in the sphere of the good, in order to its discovery afterwards in the sphere of the evil. We name this central fundamental tendency, both in the good and in the evil, the *real principle;* but with perfect readiness, to exchange this term for any other better one, which any one may be able to suggest to us. After this explanation no one can well misunderstand the term, as if it were meant to denote some particular form of good or of evil, which first of all makes its own individual appearance, in order then to generate other different forms. It may also perhaps be shown that in the empirical course of moral development, in its normal and abnormal directions, the principles which we have to establish are not to be found in the consciousness, quite at the beginning, but only in a later period of the development; nor indeed that a distinct *consciousness* of the perverted tendency ever appears in the case of very many. But from this it would not in the least follow, that we had not hit upon the right points, in which all the individual moments of good and evil severally unite; it is quite possible for a determinate principle entirely to govern the moral life of a man, without his ever being conscious of it, as such, in the form of a distinct thought.—

[1] In the contrast between the phenomenal variety, and the fundamental unity, the moral philosophy of the Greeks and Romans found the ground of the question so variously treated, viz. whether there be only one, or many virtues. Both are true.—*Plato* seems absolutely to deny the various directions of evil every kind of unity, when in the fourth book of the republic, 445. (*Bekkersche, Ausg.* III., i., S. 213.), he lays down the sentence—ἓν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἄπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας. If this conception of the contrast were, without limitation, correct, it would doubtless be absurd to speak, as Christ has done, Matt. xii. 26, Parall., of a kingdom of evil. Besides, *Plato* himself seems to come to such a limitation, when, in the *Sophists*, p. 256. (*Bekker.* II. i. S. 214), he says:—περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρον δὲ πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν.

It is first of all a *scientific* want, which originates the endeavour to discover the contents of the moral in its entirety, and then from this unity to understand the inward necessity of the different moments of its contents. For what *Anselm* says at the beginning of his treatise: *Cur Deus homo*, holds good, viz. *negligentiæ mihi esse videtur, si, postquam conformati sumus in fide, id quod credimus, non studemus intelligere.* What we seek for is nothing less than an *à priori* construction of this contents, which proposes to form the same by its own method, independently of all empirical presuppositions and conditions. That such an *à priori* construction cannot be given us, is clear from the introductory discussion, respecting the speculative moment of our investigations. Our thinking in so far as it is directed to an object of positive contents, is not at all an independent production, but a *reproduction* in relation to an original production and revelation of God. Consequently it is thus essentially a thinking *after*, a following after, in the course which the creative primitive thinking and determining have previously marked out for us, but it is a thinking, going after, consequently not an individualizing, isolating conception—which indeed were not really, faithfully to follow even the conception of the individual, for in the thoughts and works of God, there is nothing isolated—but a seeking out the real connection in the arrangements of God.

Or is it perhaps just with respect to the knowledge of the *moral law*, that we are not entitled to hope for the discovery of its inward ground and connection, but have to rest satisfied with the fact that it is so, that God has so ordered it, according to the fundamental words: *Hoc volo sic iubeo; sit pro ratione voluntas?* Is perhaps the sentence of *Evodius* in *Augustine's* treatise *de libero arbitrio* (lib. i. c. 3): *peccatum non ideo malum est, quia vetatur lege, sed ideo lege vetatur, quia malum est*, only true in its inverted form? This is undoubtedly the opinion of not a few who have investigated the relation of the moral law to God. So early as the time of the scholastics, some of the most celebrated teachers dissented from the otherwise generally prevalent opinion, by maintaining that the primary ground in the disposition, as well as in the contents of the law, was to be sought for in the *merum arbitrium Dei. Duns Scotus* may be especially mentioned as belonging to those who expressly denied the origin of the

moral law to be in the Divine understanding, and based it upon nothing else than the will of God.[1] Then later among the Nominalists, *Occam*,[2] disciple of *Scotus*, together with his epitomist *Gabriel Biel* and *Peter d'Ailly*,[3] maintained the same opinion. Still this opinion becomes greatly modified by the latter, by its resting upon the supposition—as later by *Cartesius*[4]—of the undistinguishable identity of the Divine determination and thinking. It was especially the doctrine of predestination, which, in the dispute of the Protestant Church with the Remonstrants, led the more rigid of the reformed theologians (the *Supra-lapsarians*) to similar maintenances. At the same time, by the Fathers of modern philosophy, this ground sentence, which appeared to be the end of all philosophy, obtained great authority in the very sphere of philosophy. And *Cartesius* deduced from an indifferent will of God,[5] not merely the moral law, but also the theoretical truths, even mathematics; on the contrary, the *Theodicee* defended the ground-principle, that the world-arranging will of

[1] Lib. I. *Sententt. dist.* 44. "Ideo—potest aliam legem statuere, rectam, quae, si statueretur a Deo, recta esset, quia nulla lex est recta nisi quatenus a Dei voluntate acceptatur." Still *Scotus*, in the third book of his *Sententiarum*, allows an unconditional necessity for the ground-law of love to God, as well as for everything which rigidly follows from the same. His divine arbitrariness is said only to refer to the sphere of finite creatures and their relations; the necessity for the human will, being referred back to God himself as its highest end, by the Divine command cannot be thereby superseded. This agrees very well together with his fundamental doctrine: *omne aliud a Deo ideo est bonum, quia a Deo dilectum, et non e contrario* (lib. iii. *sentt. dist.* 19.) That which follows from the ground-law of love is so very narrowly conceived of as to exclude love to our neighbour, lib. iii. dist. 28. and 37. Comp. respecting this moment in the system of *Scotus* the investigations in *Baur's* Christian doctrine of the Trinity, and the Divine assumption of human nature, Bd. 2, S. 642 ff. *und Ritters Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie*, Bd. 4. S. 393 ff. 399 ff. *sowie über die verwandten Lehren in der Arabischen Philosophenschule der Motakhallim* Bd. 3, S. 737 ff.

[2] *Sententt.* lib. II., qu. 19. "Ea est boni et mali moralis natura, ut, cum a liberrima Dei voluntate sancita sit et definita, ab eadem facile possit amoveri et refigi, adeo ut mutata ea voluntate, quod sanctum et iustum est, possit evadere iniustum."

[3] In *Mag. Sententt. prooem.* I. lit. q.

[4] *Principia philos.* p. 1, § 23.

[5] *Responsio ad sextas obiectiones*, § 6, comp. *Princ. phil.* I. § 29, 30.

God is determined by the ideas of the divine understanding.[1] This subject, in exclusive relation to moral truth, became a matter of discussion among the founders of the science of the right of nature (*Naturrecht, jus naturae s. naturale*—Tr.) *Pufendorf* has been vehemently attacked, although somewhat unjustly, by his theological and philosophical opponents, and, among them, by *Leibnitz*,[2] as a disciple to the doctrine, that the contents of our ideas of right and duty rests entirely upon the groundless will of God. Neither in our time is the interest of this question lost, and as, on the one hand, a wide-spread opinion does not hesitate to reduce the contents of the moral law entirely to a metaphysical necessity, independent of the will of God, and to resolve it into the same, so, on the other hand, there are not wanting those who believe that the absolute freedom of God, in His world-ordering activity, cannot otherwise be maintained than by supposing good and evil to be appointed by *a groundless act of the Divine will*.[3]

One thing is clear, that such an opinion in relation to the

[1] *Th.* 2, § 176 f. Besides *Leibnitz*, singularly enough, thinks the maintenance of *Cartesius* was not meant in earnest, comp. § 186.

[2] *Observationes de principio iuris*, § 13. *Monita quaedam ad Pufendorfii principia*, § 4. Further on § 5 *Leibnitz* himself says, that expressions of an opposite nature are to be bound in *Puf.*, the apparent contradiction of which, with the above quoted from *L.*, may be very well solved.

[3] This opinion is not to be confounded with the *division* of moral laws, often met with, into such as originate in the nature of man, and such as rest simply on the *arbitrium Dei*. In the philosophy of right (*Recht's Philosophie*) *Thomas* at first opposed the *leges naturales* to the *leges universales positivae (arbitriae)*. But afterwards, in his *fundamm. iuris naturae et gentium*, he has preferred to regard the latter kind of the Divine arrangements as merely counsels of God. Then *Ernesti* has renewed this discussion in the theological sphere, by his supposing to have found in the Holy Scripture some moral arrangements of universal binding authority, which nevertheless have their ground entirely in the divine arbitrariness, comp. the treatise, *Vindiciae arbitrii divini in religione constituenda*, especially § 48 ff. In opposition to this, *Töllner* defends the recognizability by human reason of the necessity of the divine laws, in his *disquis. utrum Deus ex mero arbitrio potestatem suam legislatoriam exerceat etc.*; and in a second treatise, *de potestate Dei legislatoria non mere arbitraria*; comp. moreover *Velthusen.* However, as *Ernesti*, in the third part of his treatise, limits the idea of the *arbitrium Dei*, the controversy ran into a mere verbal dispute, since no one of the theologians mentioned, pursued the matter to its very root.

solution of the problem before us, would cut off the hope of our ever arriving at, from any point of view, the entire contents of the moral law in its internal necessity, and therewith would be cut off the further question dependent on this one, viz. the internal ground of the manifold phenomena of evil in human life. Nothing more would be required in the dogmatic investigation of sin than to adhere to the individual phenomena of sin, and then to arrange them according to their known relation to each other, without any further endeavour to find out their common root.

The philosophic labours of our time to bring about a recognition of *the idea of the freedom of God*, as contrasted with the deduction of things from God, by means of a logical necessity "which we would not endure in our own conduct, to say nothing of God,"[1] can only be regarded with joy, by a theology which understands its own true principle. But while we escape the Charybdis of this all-devouring necessity, we must be careful not to be swallowed up by the Scylla of a groundless arbitrariness. And we have already turned the idea of the *Divine freedom* into that of arbitrariness if we seek the origin of the given contents of the moral law in an act of the Divine will, for which absolutely no further ground can be given; but in which we must rest as in the absolute *ultimatum*. Such a determination were a *mere constituting, thesis (Setzen)*, and not at the same time, what indeed every Divine determination is, and whereby it can alone be recognized as Divine, a *self-revelation of God*. By such a determination, the contents of the moral law would become for God Himself, although the product of His will, a foreign, an external one, because it would have no relation whatever to His nature. The idea of God would for us become, by the carrying out of this principle, an empty abstraction; the world, no more than our own consciousness, would be able to give us any information whatever of God Himself; the only answer it would have to all our questions would be, to direct our attention to the representation of this arbitrariness, appointing all, and indifferent to all. In this case, it is of course quite consistent to say, of theoretical truth, for instance, of the simple laws of logic and mathematics,—that its validity absolutely depends upon the

[1] *Schelling's* words in his treatise on the nature of human freedom. *Philosophische Schriften*, Bd. i., S. 483.

Divine *arbitrium*, without having any necessary ground in the Divine understanding. It is evident how such an isolating conception of the world-arranging will of God, separating it from the entire idea of Divine perfection, and only regarding it as all-mighty, must break down every barrier against an unbridled scepticism, which even the reference to the historical revelation of God would no longer be able to lay again.

This view of the creative determination of God, as one, having no other ground than itself, is to be regarded as one of many results arising from a misunderstanding of the idea of freedom, against which we may, even in the present day, read with advantage the *Theodicee* of *Leibnitz*,[1] however otherwise deficient it may be in its treatment of this idea in relation to God and the creature. The representation is this, that the freedom of an act of the will is limited in the proportion in which the subject may have been determined in the said act of his will, by motives which intelligence presented to him. On the contrary, we must maintain that a human action, whether it be good or evil, is so much *the more free*, the more clearly the agent knows what he wills, and wherefore he wills it; and so much the less free, when he merely wills in order to will: an act of the will is so much the more free, the more the entire spiritual life of the agent, whatever its condition may be, is concentrated in that act. On the contrary, an *arbitrary* action, in the merely formal and indifferent sense of the word, is one in which the agent yields to the blind power of chance, and therefore to that which is external to him. When an individual decides upon any action, arbitrarily, therefore groundlessly, indifferently as to the contents of the same, strictly speaking, he does not determine himself at all, but *allows* himself to be determined, and driven to it by that which is external to him, perhaps by the impressions which the outer world, happening to surround him in the moment of decision, made upon him, and thus gave just this particular direction to the action originating within, or in whatever other way this unconscious development of an action may be brought about. But similar

[1] *Th.* 2, § 175 f. § 191 f. § 225 f. *Th.* 3, § 319 f. u. a. St.—Attention has already (p. 17) been directed to the permanent value of the sagacious distinction between a *metaphysical* and a *moral necessity*, which *Leibnitz* terms, not however without danger of a misunderstanding, the necessity dependent upon the so-called moral attributes of God.

petty externalities may usurp dominion over the arising action, since at its very birth it is destitute of powerful, conscious determination. But if this is the nature of an arbitrary action, in so far as such an one at all deserves the name, it follows that its possibility (a positive ability it is not, strictly speaking, but merely a negation) can only be attributed to the personal creature, but never to God. Since in the former the bond between its knowledge and its determination, is *dissoluble*, but in God this bond is *indissoluble;* the perfection of the Divine will pre-eminently consists in this, that in its contents the absolute perfection of the Divine thoughts, their truth, wisdom, and rectitude, is mirrored in an eternally equal manner.

The idea of an eternal law, existing independently of God, and revealing itself to man in the moral consciousness as natural moral law, and as such continuing to reveal itself, as *Wolf*[1] expresses it, *although there were no God*, is not only entirely false but quite absurd. But where have the Scholastics, on whom this opinion has often been palmed, taught it? *Alexander von Hales*, *Thomas von Aquino*, the *Florentine Archbishop Antoninus*, to whom this imputation must especially refer, know it is true, after the precedence of *Augustine*,[2] of a *lex externa* which contained the eternal rule for all movement and activity of created beings; but they did not regard the same as something existing independently of God, and standing as it were over Him, but placed it *in the Divine understanding itself*—and in so doing were without doubt perfectly right, although in carrying it out into detail they often fell into error. They speak of natural moral law, just as of everything which is found in human laws, truly upright and legitimate, as a *participatio legis aeternae;* and when they maintain that there is for man *a per se honestatem vel turpe antecedenter ad* VOLUNTATEM *divinum*, there is nothing from which they are further removed than the advocacy of a God-less grounding of ethics; they simply wish to avoid the representation of the contents of our notions of good and evil having their origin in an act of Divine arbitrariness,

[1] *Vernünftige Gedanken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen. Th.* 1, *Kap.* 1, § 20.

[2] *De libero arbitrio* lib. 1, cap. 6. (15.) C. *Faust. Manich.* ib. xxii., c. 27, 28, u. v. a. St.

in the will of God, as distinct from the *mens divina*.[1] What we have to find fault with here is, that the eternal ground of the law in the Divine understanding—in which are the ideas of creaturely existences (*Welt-wesen*) as eternally existing, in accordance with which God has given the world its law—that this is denominated a *law*, when it can only become so by the will of God, and in *relation to real existence out of God*:—an inexactness which however has not escaped the keen eye of *Thomas von Aquino*, and which he did not venture to correct,[2] simply from his respect for the authority of *Augustine*, who had once introduced the expression into the language of Church dogmatics. If however in *Thomas*, as later in *Grotius*, and *Leibnitz*, the expression is occasionally met with, that the moral law would not cease to obligate man to obedience, *etsi daretur Deum non esse*, it is to be well distinguished from the above rejected maintenance, similar in its form, since he does not mean to say anything more than that our *moral* consciousness would not be *at once* destroyed, with the loss of our *religious* consciousness.[3] It is an oft-repeated fact, that unbelievers in the existence of a Personal God, are not able to rid themselves of the warnings of that law which God has written in their consciences; and may we not see in this a holy and merciful arrangement, by which, when man

[1] *Alexander v. Hales, Summa theol. univers.* p. 1, qu. 35, membr. 3. qu. 27, membr. 2, 3. *Thomas v. Aquino, Prima Secundae*, quaest. 91, art. 1. 2. quaest. 93. *Antoninus, Summa theologica*, p. 1, tit. 11—20.—It belongs to the real deficiencies of the Scholastic treatment of the doctrine of the law, that notwithstanding all its diffuseness, it nevertheless deals too much in generalities, and does not sufficiently take into consideration the relation of the law to the present fallen condition of the human race.—Closely allied to the conception of the relation between the moral law and the Divine understanding and will, which *Thomas* lays down, is the opinion developed by *Leibnitz* in the *Theodicee*, especially *Th.* 2, § 175—192; only that he here also brings out the idea of a *dependence* of the Divine will upon the Divine perception, which *Thomas* endeavours to avoid, without however giving up the *distinction* between the two.

[2] A. a. O. quaest. 91, art. 1.

[3] *Rothe*, in his *Ethik*, Bd. i. S. 191, censures me that I only explain the possibility of morality upon the ground of the religious relation. But the proof which he adduces for his maintenance is taken from the first edition of this work, which had already been intentionally omitted in the second edition. That I do not thus determine the relation, my honoured friend will see from the significance which I award to the conscience,

has entirely sundered the bond of communion with his Maker, another bond should still remain by which it may be possible, by awakening in him the consciousness of inward variance with himself, to bring the wanderer back again to allegiance?—

This opinion, that the ground for the determinate contents of the moral law is entirely to be sought for in a groundless determination of God, has an apparent support in a few *Pauline* expressions, in which he appears to ascribe to sin a blameable volition, *simply on the ground of there being a law.* For if that which is condemned by the law, were not *in itself*, and *prior* to the law, evil, it is plain that what the law approves could not be good in itself, and good prior to the law.

But that *Paul* should make the law first of all to constitute sin, (and therewith also moral goodness), does not, even previously to examination, appear to us to be very likely, since, as we have already seen (p. 70), the very opposite error, that of making sin the origin of the law, was thought, no less than this, to have its guarantee in Paul.

Nevertheless this does appear from the words of the apostle, Rom. iv. 15: *ὁ νόμος ὀργὴν κατεργάζεται· οὗ γὰρ (δὲ) οὐκ ἔσται νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις*—distinctly to follow, that the entrance of the Divine law makes a *distinction*, not made before, between human actions which in themselves are equal and indifferent, by means of which, some represent themselves to the human consciousness as in conformity to this law, and in the form of the good and the necessary, whilst others appear as transgression of the law, in the form of evil, and as blameworthy, and therefore drawing down upon the subject the *ὀργή*, the displeasure and punishment of God. And with this Rom. v. 13 appears very well to agree, provided the word *ἐλλογεῖται* is to be here understood of the *Divine* imputation. For then the words: *ἄχρι γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ· ἁμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται μὴ*

even for the non-religious life—according to my conception of this notion, which, it is true, differs from his conception of the same. I can entirely subscribe to what he says about this relation in the passage adduced, since indeed *Rothe* himself admits that the idea of the moral cannot be truly apprehended and understood, without the idea of God; that morality necessarily involves relation to God, and that it, *ceteris paribus*, is so much the more perfect, the more completely this relation is co-conditioned in it.

ὄντος νόμου—are thus to be understood: even before the law (the Mosaic) that which we now become conscious of as sin, was already in the world, but so long as there was no law, it was neither imputed to us, nor regarded by God as sin—consequently, since God sees things as they really are, it cannot in reality be sin. Further, Rom. v. 20 stands in harmony with this, according to which the law is for this purpose come in between (παρεισῆλθε) the promise and its fulfilment, that sin may abound. And all this appears to hold firmly together in the ground-thought, that just because God had resolved upon the conducting of man to his destiny by means of his redemption, therefore by the overcoming of his enmity, He was obliged first of all to bring about in him, by means of the law, a condition of inward disunion, variance with himself, making in this way the law, by its awakening the want of salvation, the guide and instructor leading to Christ. And must not this be regarded as the doctrine of Paul in Gal. iii. 22 sqq.; and Rom. iii. 19, 20?—Then too, when we remember that the law here everywhere spoken of, even in the principal passage, Rom. iv. 15, is the *Mosaic* law, it can only favour the deduction that it is strictly the Divine law which *produces* the distinction of good and evil. For if, in the wide sphere of all those actions which happen without any knowledge of the contents of the law, there were in no sense whatever any sin, with how much greater emphasis could the same be said of the far narrower sphere of those actions which are committed without a consciousness of law, in the breast of the subject!—

It cannot be denied that this opinion wears much the appearance of truth. Let us, however, pay a little closer attention to the connection of the principal passage, Rom. iv. 15. The apostle has previously shown that Abraham had not received the promised inheritance of the world, through the law, but by the righteousness of faith. For, he continues, if those who have the law (and fulfil it, Rom. ii. 13), are to be heirs, the importance of faith is made void, therefore the promise is made of none effect. Wherefore? Because it were then attached to conditions which man is not able to fulfil. For it is a universal fact of experience that the law, instead of leading man to righteousness, produces within him the consciousness of the anger, of the holy displeasure, of God, with his entire state of being. Now, *Paul* gives the

general ground of this fact, since by the omission of the article he generalizes the idea of the νόμος: for where there is absolutely no law in the consciousness of the sinning individual, there the sin will not be conceived of by him as transgression—and therefore cannot awaken in him the consciousness of the Divine anger. If this be the meaning of ver. 15, if κατεργάζεσθαι ὀργὴν and παράβασις are to denote *precedents in the consciousness*, we have no necessity to understand κατεργάζεσθαι ὀργὴν merely of an *enhancement* of merited Divine punishment, nor as standing in contradiction with Eph. ii. 3, where even the heathen—οἱ λοιποί—are universally denominated τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς, nor with Joh. iii. 36, according to which the wrath of God *remains* on him who is not a believer on the Son.—But in Rom. v. 13, οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται is only to be understood of the self-imputation of sin, as sin in the consciousness of the individual. For the apostle in Rom. v. 13, 14, wishes much rather in contrast with the idea given above, to show, that although men beyond the sphere of positive Divine law are not accustomed, from the universal dominion of death even over those who transgress no such law, to bring home to their consciousness, and impute to themselves sin, as that which it is, the existence of sin may nevertheless be deduced prior to the Mosaic legislation.[1]—It follows then, of course, that Rom. v. 20 makes no allusion to an original production of the offence, and that we cannot admit the above conception of the ground-thought of Paul.

But the apostle has not only not taught this representation of the origin of sin from the law,—if his words are to be thus understood, namely, that the great mass of human actions, which in themselves are indifferent, are in part constituted evil by the prohibition of the law, nor that the law by its prohibition necessarily impels the will, pure in itself, to resistance,—but on the very contrary he expressly refutes it. Rom. vii. 5 gives to this representation, more than any other passage, the seemingness of truth, where the apostle has denoted the lusts of sin as τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου. Therefore Paul makes it his express task, Rom. vii. 7—16, to show that the law is not chargeable with the condition of inward variance and unblessedness (*Unseligkeit*, θάνατος) to

[1] Comp. the further grounding of this idea of the passage in *Tholuck's Kommentar*, S. 265 f.

which man becomes subject at the entrance of the law into his consciousness. For as it is in itself holy, and righteous, and good, ver. 12, it ought, in itself considered, to conduct man to life, ver. 10; and it is only the indwelling sin in man, still latent and slumbering, which takes occasion by the law to slay him. For not only does man become conscious of sin by the law, and with it, of the inward variance hereby made objective, but also becomes irritated by the restraining re-action of the law,—since it is too weak to effectuate a correspondence in the will with itself,—to burst forth with increased violence in individual sins and divers lusts (ver. 8).—By this it is perfectly clear, that the apostle here, everywhere,—not merely Rom. vii. 7—23, but also vii. 5, iv. 15, v. 13, 20,—has in view the relation of the law, not to a pure original condition of personal creatures, but to a condition, in which sin already exists as an inward inclination and bias.—From another point of view, Paul, by Rom. viii. 7, refutes the above representation. We must defer for the present our investigation of the idea of *σὰρξ;* but so much is certain, that the apostle uses it in a twofold sense, namely, he uses *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς* as a general designation of the sinful nature, and then too he understands by it a bias determinate in itself of the human life, a train, connection, of lusts and strivings, all of which are governed by one and the same ground-tendency. Now, of this *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς* the apostle says: it is enmity against God, for it does not submit itself to the law of God, for it is not able to do this, manifestly according to its inward nature and condition of being *(Beschaffenheit)*. If now it is the work of the law, not to reveal a striving which is to be condemned in itself as such, but first of all to constitute a striving which in itself is indifferent, neither good nor bad, a condemnatory one,—if this is the work of the law, then *οὐδὲ δύναται* loses all significance as an aggravation in relation to the *οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται.*

Accordingly, it is a pure misunderstanding when the opinion, that the moral law has only a groundless arbitrariness of God, to thank for its determinate contents, appeals to the authority of Paul.—

However, the advice may be given us not to trouble ourselves in seeking the inward ground and connection of the moral law, but simply to confine ourselves to the facts of our moral

consciousness and of historical revelation, just because it is that which is divinely ordered. This advice could hardly have any other than the subjective signification, that this internal unity of ethical law, exhibiting itself in a variety of commands, although doubtlessly existing in the Divine understanding, is nevertheless *not to be discovered by us.* Thus *Augustine*, with reference to the doctrine of *predestination*, thought to represent the Divine will, as absolutely wise and good, but in the grounds of its decisions undiscoverable by the human mind. And that *Calvin* in his *decretum absolutum*, did not by any means understand a divine arbitrariness, but only an incomprehensibleness on the part of man, from his present stand-point, of the certainly wise and righteous decrees of God, *Amyraut*[1] and *Schleiermacher*[2] have satisfactorily proved. Now whether these Church Fathers were right in this decision we need not determine; the only question for us, is, whether we dare lay aside our task on the ground of such a renunciation of a thorough understanding of the Divine plan? If we have anywhere to presuppose the possibility of such an understanding of the Divine arrangement, most certainly it is there where a Divine order prevails, which we ourselves are called upon to realize by our freedom of will and action, in the sphere appointed us. It is then no longer merely the interest of scientific thinking, but at the same time a practical interest, which urges us to become conscious of the generating middle-point of the moral, the ground-disposition from which the entire Christian moral life is developed, for this ground-disposition appears in all the manifoldness of human relations, conditions and activities, and thoroughly pervades the same. How, if this consciousness of the real central principle of the moral law were really denied us, how could it ever cease to be for our knowledge anything more than a dead external letter, whose individual precepts we had only to conceive of, and observe, in an entirely isolated manner? But if the Christian, by the operation of *the Holy Spirit* on his heart, which begins from

[1] *Defensio doctrinae Io. Calvini de absoluto reprobationis decreto.*

[2] In the treatise on the doctrine of election, *theologische Zeitshrift, erstes Heft*, S. 78. Undoubtedly *Calvin*, on the other hand, has positively maintained so much concerning the grounds and design of the *decretum absolutum*, that every attempt to reconcile it with the Divine righteousness must run off, not into concealed secrets, but into open contradictions.

within, to create the true fulfilling of the law, is freed from the yoke of the law, Gal. v. 18, 22, it must be possible for him by looking into the generating principle of the moral requirements, of which his own living experience now gives him information, to penetrate into, and thus again from within outwards, the Divine will, and in so far as it is legislative for free created beings, truly to understand it in its connection.—

This generating principle of the *contents* of the moral law we can never elsewhere look for than there, where the true *form* of the fulfilling of the law, the general motive of the same, originates. It is the real relation of man to God, which, so soon as it becomes a matter of consciousness, transforms our respect of the unconditional, commanding authority of the law, into obedience to the personal God; the entire contents of the moral law must have its root in the full truth of this relation. That which cannot here be employed as *objective principle*, can neither be sufficient to be inmost and all-comprehending *motive*. To separate these from each other, must, from the Christian stand-point, be regarded as a false accommodation of science to the imperfect form of emperical reality. In the subordinate steps of the moral life according to its development as disturbed by sin, both these, the objective principle, and the highest subjective motive of morality, are in disunion, so long as the contents of law remain *to the subject*, more or less foreign and external; that which in this state of moral development holds good as universal motive, whether it be that dark respect for the unconditional requirement of the law, whether it be the subjection of the creature to the Creator, of the servant to the master, is not of course qualified to be at the same time the real principle of the moral law. Only when this estrangement of the subject from the contents of the law has been overcome, do objective principle and subjective motive, become identical.

Still, this essential identity of contents in principle and motive does not remove a distinction between them, in their relation to *the consciousness of the subject*. In so far as the objective principle of morality is the true relation of man to God, it stands at a certain removed distance from the individual moral determinations;

in order to ascend from the latter to the former, it requires many interpositions. In so far as the highest subjective motive is contained in that relation, it is immediately present in every individual moment of moral life, carrying it in its bosom, and pervading it with its Divine power.—

To the pharasaical scribe, who asked Christ, which is the greatest commandment in the law? He announces to him as such, the requirement of the deepest *love to God*, pervading the entire being of man; and as the second command, similar to the first in *dignity*, the requirement of loving our neighbour equally with ourselves, Matt. xxii. 36—39; Mark xii. 29—31. And to prevent the misconception, that these commandments were only the greatest among others, which, as from without, might be added to them, and to lead the inquirer to perceive that in them *the living unity of all moral commandaments* is contained, Christ adds: *ἐν ταύταις ταῖς δυσὶν ἐντολαῖς ὅλος ὁ νόμος κρέμαται καὶ οἱ προφῆται.* On a purely exegetical stand-point, we cannot ascribe to many other declarations of Holy Scripture, as for instance: Be ye holy for I am holy, 1 Pet. i. 16; Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect, Matt. v. 48; What ye will that men do unto you, that do you unto them, Matt. vii. 12; or the requirements made upon the followers of Christ often occurring; to such we cannot apply the same significance as to the above.[1] It would also be easy to show that those other exhortations are either only of a formal nature, therefore not capable of denoting the real unity, the centre of the contents of the moral law, or that they do not embrace the whole of moral life.

In that answer of Christ the highest unity seems still to be concealed behind duality of ground-requirements, love to God, and love to our neighbour. But the manner in which Christ denotes the first of these commandments (*αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μεγάλη*— the absolutely first command—*καὶ πρώτη ἐντολή*) shows clearly enough, that we have to look for the real unity of the whole in it, and this appears still more clearly if we ask why man in

[1] *Rothe* attributes to them an equality of Dignity, a. a. O. Bd. 1, S. 196.—A similar addition to Matt. xxii. 39 is found in the admonition, What ye would that men should do unto you, that also do ye unto them. But it is clear that here Christ has only one side of the moral life in view, even that which in Matt. xxii. is denoted by the command of love to our neighbour.

distinction from all other creatures should be singled out for us as the object of a love, which never allows us in any way to use him as means for our own ends, but seeks everywhere to demand on his behalf, the recognition of him as self-purpose *(Selbstzweck.)* If one points us to the mere unity of the species, it is true we find therein the declaration of the natural basis of universal philanthropy, but not the ground of its ethical worth and necessity. This much rather is esssentially contained in the fact, that as the *image of God* shines in the spiritual nature of man, he must of necessity share in the love to the Original. Consequently the principle of the second ground-law is to be found in the first, and the external relation of the co—or super—or sub-ordination of the two on which the common division of the doctrine of human duty, into duties toward God, and duties toward our neighbour, is elevated to true unity. God is not only the chief object of human love—which could only be denied by the negative doctrines of our times concerning God, which have either lost every right idea of God, or at least the notion of His personality, and therewith of course that of the living relation between God and man—but *the absolute* and *all-embracing object of this love*, so that every other love is holy and imperishable, only by being taken up into love to God. Strictly regarded, this is already distinctly declared in the requirement of a love to God with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength. A love which lays claim to the entire inward life, can no longer love the external relation of a co—or super-ordination in relation to other moral requirments, but only the inward relation of embracing and pervading them.—The Old Testament bases the commandment to respect the life of man, Gen. ix. 6, on the image of God in man, and from the same, James deduces the admonition not to curse man, and indeed so deduces it, that he represents it as self-contradictory to praise God as Father, and at the sametime to cherish hatred towards men who are made after the similitude of God (Jas. iii. 9—11). The demonstration too of 1 John iv. 20, according to the most natural conception, rests upon the same thought; love to the original is not genuine, unless it is seen in love to the image; so much the less so, we may add, since we are only able to know the nature of God by means of His revelations; but man is already in himself, and according to his nature, a revelation of God.

However, there is another essential side of this revelation, which we must ever bear in mind—that a revelation of God is only such to us when it leads us to Him.

Moreover, it is not one text alone in which love to God is regarded as the productive principle of all true fulfilling of the law, but this recognition pervades the whole of the New Testament. It appears in the most varied relations and forms, and may often even there be pointed out, as a suppressed presupposition, and the connecting ground of thought, where love and the fulfilling of the law are not at all the immediate subject. We will here only mention how often Christ Himself represents love to His Father and to men, as the soul of His life; *e.g.* John xiv. 31, xv. 10, how He requires love to Himself, which is identical with love to the Father, John xiv. 9, as the living ground on the part of His disciples, of the fulfilment of His commandments; *e.g.* John xiv. 15, 21; xv. 10, and in such a manner as expressly to deny the possibility of fulfilling His commandments, where love to Himself is wanting, John xiv. 24. In like manner, love to God, to Christ, or even love in general, is set forth by the apostles as the inmost nature of all Christian virtue, and as the end of all law; *e.g.* Eph. iii. 18, iv. 15; 1 Cor. viii. 2, 3, xiii. 1—7; Rom. xiv. 7, 8; 2 Cor. v. 14, 15; Gal. ii. 20; 1 Tim. i. 5; 1 John iv. 19—21, v. 1—3.[1] It is the same thought, only differently expressed, when the apostle Paul requires of the Christian that all that he does, be done to the glory of God, 1 Cor. x. 31; comp. Matt. v. 16; for this endeavour to glorify God, is just the necessary activity of love. Also there where *the Scripture* reduces the contents of the law directly to love to our neighbour as the royal command, as the sum of the law, as the bond of all the individual elements of perfect life, as the source of individual virtues, Jas. ii. 8; Rom. xiii. 8—10; Col. iii. 14; John xiii. 34, 35, love to God, according to what we have above said, is at the same time thought of, as the essential presupposition, and living root, of all true fellowship among each other (1 John i. 3).

From this point of view we may understand the deep passage

[1] Comp. respecting the place which love has in the entirety of Christian virtue, the remarks of *Neander, Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche Durch die Apostle, S.* 768.

Matt. xix. 17. The *externally* more genuine reading which *Griesbach* and *Lachmann* have introduced into the text: τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; εἷς ἐστιν ὁ ἀγαθός — may indeed at the first blush appear to have to thank a dogmatic scruple for its origination, which perhaps some copyists have taken with respect to the form of the declaration, found in the other Synoptics: τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν; οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ εἷς, ὁ θεός, Mark x. 18; Luke xviii. 19. But after closer consideration one will hardly be able to make it clear that a reading, which, in its paradoxicalness, gives to the abrupt enigmatically allusive character of the answer, such a depth of meaning, is to be regarded as a correction of a copyist, wanton in making alterations. On the other hand, the origin of the reading in the received text may be explained from the endeavour to conform the passage in Matthew to the parallel passages in Mark and Luke. But the deviating form in which these relate the words of Christ may have originated in a very early inexact conception, directing its especial attention to the affirmative part of the declaration, and completing the preceding question of Christ according to probability drawn from the question of the youth. Accordingly, we venture to hold ourselves justified in regarding the above reading as the original form of the declaration, without calling to our aid modern investigations, which, as is well known, make the Apostolic authority of the first gospel a matter of dispute.[1]— The young man, as is seen in the form of his question, expected to hear of some individual good act, by which he might be able to obtain eternal life. When now Christ replies to him: τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; εἷς ἐστιν ὁ ἀγαθός, He turns away his attention from the individual and the outward, which were present in his mind, and in which he supposed himself to have already rendered respectable service, to the one and all comprehending good, and from the abstract notion of good in the neutral form, to the personal God as the alone good, thus to living fellowship with Him as the primary source of everything good and holy for the personal creature. What then follows stands

[1] It is also well to observe that, according to *Lachmann's* fixation of the text, ἀγαθέ fails in the address of the young man to Christ, on which alone the words: τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν; attach themselves. Is now this too to be regarded as an intentional rejection? This is here all

thus in connection with this declaration; Christ points the young man to the revelation of the will of this absolute good in the collective contents of the Divine commands, and then as exercise of his imagined purity and virtue, requires of him the giving up of that on which his heart was set, still manifestly only in order to bring him back by the unsatisfactory result, to the point from which Christ set out, to the necessity of seeking before everything else, true fellowship with God Himself, comp. v. 26.[1]

Thus according to the teachings of Holy Scripture we are to regard *love to God* as the proper essence of moral good, as the absolutely, and on its own account, good and necessary; and every other disposition of mind, or mode of action, only becomes truly moral, by its having its root in this. Of other human virtues we are able to show that their notion is essentially attached to the peculiar type of the present stage of human development, and that they must lose their significance for the same, when its development is complete. But of love we know with the most doubtless certainty, that its signification avails, not only for the earthly development of our race up to its completion—just as Christ says this of the law with an emphasis upon its appointed boundary, which it is well to mark (Matt. v. 18, 19)—but that it is *absolutely eternal* (1 Cor. xiii. 8), and that it is also able alone, in every future circumstance of man, however different he may be in his conditions and relations, from the present, to be the productive principle of holy life. God Himself is only thereby the Good (ὁ ἀγαθός), that He is love (1 John iv. 8, 16), and

the more improbable since this epithet is not at all prejudicial to the other reading: τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

[1] *De Wette*, in his "*Kurzen Erklärung des Ev. Matthäus*" (short comments on the Gosp. of Matthew), likewise adopts *Lachmann's* text as being the original reading; but his interpretation appears to me entirely to miss the true sense and connection of the words of Christ. Christ does not wish to represent by His question in reply, and by His declaration: εἷς ἐστιν ὁ ἀγαθός, the question addressed to Him as being mysterious, but just the opposite, as one to which the answer was close at hand. But the δὲ in the immediately following words, on which *De Wette* lays especial importance as supporting his interpretation, contains the intimation, that it is not enough to know, ὅτι εἷς ἐστιν ὁ ἀγαθός, but that it is only of avail when the individual will is *actually one* with the will of the εἷς ἀγαθὸς.—Also in Rom. v. 7, it appears to me without doubt that τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is to be understood as the genitive of ὁ ἀγαθός, God, and δίκαιος (without the article) for any (relatively) religious man.

His holiness and righteousness are based entirely upon His love. If now on the one hand love to God is not of course mere *gratitude* for benefits received, but also essentially love of *adoration*, worshipful of His perfection; so this very perfection, apprehended in its inmost essence, is nothing else than self-imparting love. Hereby the contrast into which the historical development of Christian Ethics has more than once brought these two kinds of love to God, is removed, and their inseparable unity realized.

But love only there exists, where a being which might be self-devoted, and yet does not choose to be so, but in a spirit of self-sacrifice comes out of itself, to live in and for another. Hence love can only be realized in the sphere of *personal* beings, which possess in themselves a centre of independent, individual existence, and therefore only in the absolute negation of an absolute separateness; and just because this becoming oneness of personal beings in love, includes the most distinct and perfect individuality,—the antithesis of I and Thou,—does it show itself to be the *highest form of unity*. The resemblances to love which we meet with in the sphere of mere animal nature, where the impulse which unites two creatures together, acts as instinct and physical necessity, are deeply ominous foreshadowings of love, standing partly in connection with the wonderful gleam of the twilight dawn of personality and self-consciousness, everywhere confronting us in this lower sphere; but manifestations of real love, they are not. Indeed not merely in this lower sphere, but everywhere in nature we meet with these far-off shadows; from the metamorphosis of the smallest plants up to the far-reaching cosmical relations of the heavenly bodies, we trace the course of the all-disposing law of love; we see how all life, and every formation, spring from the union and co-operation of diversified forces,—to which the beautiful mythus of Hesiod's theogeny so early bore testimony, by representing Eros, the healer of discords, as the world-fashioning principle. But that which unconcious nature, by virtue of the Divine order giving her this deep significance, prophesies, only becomes elevated to consciousness in the region of personal beings, and first of all receives its full truth as fundamental law of the moral world.

Indeed even here love in its beginnings is *concealed from itself*; it first of all appears in another form, and one apparently strange

to it. The awakening of the inward sense of *justice* in human intercourse, even where it demands of us self-denial, what is it but the entrance of other personalities, with their interests, into the sphere of our own personality? The recognition of the moral necessity to set bounds to one's individual being and its claims, and to subject it to the law of the whole community, is not this the first act of self-liberation from that selfish solitude in which the Ego makes its own life its all and in all? The fine distinction and separation of the spheres by which *the right* of each individual personality is secured, is doubtless not the highest revelation of love; nevertheless it arises from this principle: while the uncultured selfish impulse of personality only gives to its own claims unlimited validity, here it limits them by the co-ordination with self of other personalities. And how were a living community, namely, a living and working of the individual for the whole, possible, if he did not possess a particular sphere of his personal rights and liberties, as the basis of a common connected activity? It is not merely the lying hatred against all strong order which restrains the egotistic arbitrariness, but often also a good-intentioned fanaticism, which now-a-days requires, in the name of love, the resolution of all distinctions, and separate interests,—a resolution of all individual being into an abstract universal; but this idea is much further removed from the true nature of love, than the stand point of rigidly dividing justice.[1]—Thus we perceive the soul of all moral order to be none other than love; and the deep reverence for law, obedience to a higher will, these holy powers, which powerfully control human life, and assign to it the determinate, and well bounded spheres of its activity, are nothing but *love in disguise*,[2] and for this reason,

[1] From this, in passing, we may observe, what a madness it is to wish to further the kingdom of love, among men, by the extinction of all individual property and possessions. It is the bitterest satire upon our much prized modern culture that untold numbers of our cotemporaries still require to be taught these first letters of all moral knowledge.

[2] This holds good, too, of *Kant's* rigorism of law, however far he thought himself to be removed from it in his endeavour to be absolutely formal. *De Wette*, in his critique of the moral system of *Kant*, (*theolog. Zeitschrift von Schleiermacher, De Wette und Lücke, Heft* 2, S. 3), has clearly shewn, that the categorical imperative has the recognition, for its hypothesis, of the duty of man to cultivate and promote fellowship

just as was the Old Testament dispensation in the history of the human race, they are now in the life of the individual appointed and qualified to be παιδαγωγοὶ for the kingdom of *manifested love.* It is only in the soil of rigid earnestness that love can be strongly rooted; only within the close-wrapping shell of self-limitation, and subjection, that true freedom germinates.

But love can only then become the creative principle of a higher life, when it stands out fully revealed in its true nature. But the revelation of its true nature only then takes place, when it has become conscious of its absolute object, of God, and of all other objects in their essential relation to him. Here it is that the heavenly magnet is first of all found, which is able to sustain human life, not merely for the passing moments of an enthusiastic excitement, but for ever to hold it above the dark depth, into which the powers of the abyss, and the load of its own weight, incessantly strive to drag it down.

An able opponent of this work, in its first edition, makes here the objection, that this love, regarded merely in a moral light, as the inward relation of the subject to God, is only a *form without determinate contents.*[1] From another point of view it has been maintained, that love to God commonly signifies in the New Testament writings, the pious disposition, and tone of mind in general.[2] The latter is perfectly true, only in a different sense from that here meant. Love to God in the full determinateness of its notion, is in fact the beginning and end of the pious disposition of mind, so that if this love, regarded as internal relation of man to God, is said to be an empty form, therewith is denied to religion, in general, its essential significance. All true

with his fellows. But this recognition is nothing other than *the will of love.*

[1] *Vatke, die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verhältniss zur Sünde und Gnade,* S. 427, (human freedom in its relation to sin and grace, p. 427), *Vgl. Vatke's Recension dieser Lehre von der Sünde, Hallische Jahrb.* 1840, S. 1039. 40. When *Vatke* moreover places the principle of freedom, in opposition to the opinion here developed, as the end of all moral life, we can only say that we do not feel ourselves to be thereby placed in contradiction to the same, but that we know of no freedom save that found in the love of God. In its beginning, as *implicitum*, it is the creative principle: in its completion, as *explicitum*, it is the end and result of moral life.

[2] *Baumgarten-Crusius, Lehrbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre,* S. 169.

relations of man to God brought about by freedom, childlike reverence, humility, self-denying obedience, resignation, trust, confiding hope, are united in this love, and are only more exact determinations of the same. *Faith* too, in the peculiarly Christian, namely, Pauline sense of the word, must be looked upon as a moment in the idea of *love* to God (just as both words have in our language probably the same root[1]); for it is a self-assurance of the mind in relation to Divine love and grace, which is itself clearly a kind of love to God. Indeed it is just this deeply inward life-breath of love, which distinguishes living faith from the mere holding a thing to be true—the objective basis of true faith, but which without that breath of love is πίστις νεκρὰ.—Nevertheless we must regard the scholastic notion of *fides caritate formata* with its correlative of *fides informis* as a complete failure; it is so in that it adds the living power of love to faith, instead of recognising it in the very nature of faith.[2]

This love to God realises itself, in an original manner, as an internal radical act of the mind; on the one hand as a voluntary reception of the Divine grace,[3] on the other as a simple resignation of the entire life to God, as no longer belonging to itself, but as consecrated to Him, and His service. Where this principle once exists, so certainly do all virtues proceed from it, which therefore are germinally contained in it, as it is certain that it is not in the first place brought into being by them. This resignation to God is necessarily at the same time resignation to *His purpose*, or in other words, the development of the Divine kingdom in man; how possibly could it be the principle of an entirety of moral determinations, if it were absolutely restricted to the self-life? But only that is true resignation to the purpose of God, which arises from the factual commencement of a living *personal* relation to Him.—There is contained in this ground-act of love to God,—as it becomes ratified and completed in the

[1] *Glaube* and *Liebe*.—Tr.

[2] Comp. *Neander's* exposition of this relation between faith and love, an exposition as deep as it is simple—*Apost. Zeitalter* (4 *Ausg.*) a. a. O. p. 747, f. 758.

[3] That this reception is here placed under the idea of an *act* requires no justification, for those who know how properly to distinguish between receptivity and passivity, between a living appropriation and a mere *ratio patientis*. Appropriation is essentially activity.

all-silent Holy of Holies of immediate intercourse with God, by the soul, who is at once the priest and the sacrifice,—a negative and an affirmative moment, the death of the natural life, and the resurrection of a new one; and whoever from his own experience is conscious of this turning-point, and of its most real significance, must think it strange, when any philosophy disputes the reality of the same, and declares love to God in its simple, primitive form, to be an empty abstraction, void of contents. But however, it is easy to understand how a philosophic theory, which is only able to distinguish God from man as being a person-forming principle,[1] not as being self-personal, can have no place for that love to God which is a living fellowship between personalities. In such a theory, love between God and man can of course be nothing more than the religious expression for that process, in which the idea incessantly enters into the finite, the real, and returns from the same as conscious spirit. We are hereby able to understand how this doctrine comes to maintain that it is only through love that God and man become personal,[2] a maintenance which we must reject as preposterous on any stand-point, if real love is meant; for this manifestly has personality,—the distinction of Thou and I, which become one in love,—for its presupposition.

The love of man in relation to its absolute Object, God, does not appear able to show itself to be just as much a *giving* as a *receiving*, as it does among his equals, but as simply consisting in the latter. The Divine love to man is absolute spontaneity, for it first of all gives being to the object of its love. But when the creature becomes united, by most holy love, with its Creator, what is it on the part of the creature, more than that it opens itself up to the Divine communication, in order that his entire life may be pervaded by it, and that he may be consecrated to the service of God? That is to say, his love to God consists in his allowing himself to be absolutely determined by God, and in his finding, in the consciousness of this absolute, determined

[1] Comp. a. a. O., S. 122, 125, 210. Here we learn that God, as the pure notion of personality, first of all becomes real person in the union with his reality, the subjective human side. And for the support of this representation, running in the very teeth of Christianity, recourse must be had to the fundamental doctrine of Christianity, to the Son of God becoming man.

[2] A. a. O. S. 210.

state of being, his perfect satisfaction. Most assuredly; and yet this deepest resignation to God, as the very word *(Hingebung)* expresses, is most certainly a real gift on the part of man, and consequently a real reception on the part of God.[1] This is just the unfathomable, and yet to every simple Christian, revealed mystery of this love, that not even God can compel that which is the absolutely highest in the life of the creature, no not by the Almightiness of His will, but must receive it as a free gift; that he is only able, by His infinite love, to charm man to give it to Him of his own free act, 1 John iv. 19.[2] If the elder church Fathers have already, as *Hamann* in modern time, termed the creation of the world a work of Divine condescension and humility, it deserves this name, however paradoxical it may appear, especially in so far as it calls into existence the highest and noblest among creatures, which are self-conscious, and free.—

Fervent love among men has not seldom been vexed at the personal distinction of those thus united, as at a restraining limitation; in moments of extatic elevation it has wished to remove this distinction in order to become immediately one with

[1] I am not able to perceive an insurmountable difficulty for the application of this notion to God, because that in human relations everywhere the reception implies the previous non-possession (*Ritter über das Böse*, S. 38). We must here, just as in many similar cases, cancel the limitation of time for God, to whom all succession of events in time, is eternally present, without therefore losing the matter itself. Our gift is an event happening in time, God's acceptance is eternal, but on that account none the less truly an acceptance, so certain is it that eternity is not merely the negative omission of time, but contains its entire fulness.

[2] The reader will here perhaps remember some sentences corresponding in sentiment, from the cherubic wanderer of *Ang. Silesius*, namely the well-known verses:

God is as concerned for me, as I for Him;
I help Him to His being, He helps me to cherish mine.

But these apparently parallel lines only need to be quoted in order to be rejected; the mode of thought of this wanderer in its strange intermixture of pantheistic speculation, and mystic religion, is entirely different from that here presented to us. The above verses are much rather the mystico-poetic expression for the first article in the anti-religious credo of the philosophy of the time, that God only realizes Himself in the world, and in man.—On the contrary, *Raymund von Sabunde* in his *theologia naturalis*, cap. 109 and 111, develops similar thoughts on the love of man to God, as that alone which man is able to give God.

its beloved object, one self. It is a noble feeling from which this wish originates; but that which is thereby meant is something different to what is said. For if one could take it at its word, the end of love would be its destruction, since love is not a relation of the subject to itself, but is a fellowship of different subjects. What that desire means, is the *ability of unlimited communication*, the ability to make its own being perfectly transparent to the beloved one, and similarly to possess the being of the beloved in return; and thus understood, we regard this wish as prophetic of the power of more perfect union, which love will manifest in the completion of the Divine kingdom.

In analogy with this desire of love in human relations, love to God has often been conceived of by the Mystics, both of the east and west. That only is to be regarded as perfect love, when the creature desires to lose himself in God, as the drop in the ocean, to have his being and consciousness entirely resolved into the being and consciousness of God.[1] If this were true, man

[1] *Tholuck's* excellent *Blüthensammlung aus der morgenländischen Mystik*, furnishes abundant evidence of these aberrations of the Mystics in the east, especially in the communications from *Saadis Baumgarten* (*arboretum*), and from *Feridoddin Attars Kleinod der Substanz* (treasury of substance), as well as from the *Vogelgesprächen* (converse of birds) by the same poet. In *Saddi* the representation of these drunken mystic desires of self-absorption in God is sometimes dipt in the most glowing colours of oriental poesie. Comp., too, *Tholuck's Ssuismus*, p. 76, 130 f., and especially the representation of Buddhism in *Stuhr's Religionsystem n der Völker des Orients*, p. 163, 167. This tendency one finds in the occidental Mystics, especially in *Meister Eckart* (comp. respecting him the thorough article by *Schmidt, Studien und Kritiken*, 1839, H. 3, S. 633 f., and *Martensen, Meister Eckart* 1842), and in the brothers and sisters of free spirit, to which family most probably those Mystics belong which *Ruysbroech* battles with, on account of antinomistico-pantheistic extravagancies; comp. *Engelhardt's Richard von St. Victor* and *Joh. Ruysbroech*, S. 231. Nevertheless *Tauler* and *Ruysbroech* do not always know how to avoid this absorbing abyss, although they have forebodings that not only humanity, but also Godhead, becomes swallowed up by this horrible darkness, comp. *e. g.* what the latter says concerning the 4th step of love, l. l. p. 246, 259, and concerning *Tauler's*, in this respect, evasive representations, comp. *Schmidt's Johannes Tauler*, p. 126, ff. The paths of Mysticism heedlessly pursued, all conduct to this abyss, and when many Mystics of the middle-ages, as *Liebner* very properly observes of *Bernard* and *Hugo*, *Hugo v. St. Victor*, p. 346. 47, hold fast to the distinction between this mystic union with God and the union of essence (*Wesenseinheit*), it only shows practical discretion of

would only be able to attain the end, after which he is destined to strive, by his ceasing to exist as man, *i. e.* he would not be at all able to reach it; the idea of man, of the personal creature in general, could not become realized, because it were an absolutely self-contradictory idea. It can make no essential distinction whether the Mystic places this absorption of his being in God, which he considers the highest, at the end of human life, or allows this completion to take place within the same, by the ideal death of mystic ecstasy.—Thus we see a religious tendency of mind which has elevated its subjects above others to the most inward presentiments of being, and to the infinite significance of love, wrecked in the very haven, on the cliffs of Pantheism, to which an excess of feeling is as much exposed, as that unrestrained speculation, which despises every immediate certitude of mind.

The deeply seated misunderstanding which lies at the bottom of this is apparent from what we have above observed. Personal existence is *indivisible (in-dividual) existence*, firmly bound to an inner central-point, and therefore incapable of mingling with any other. Resolution of being can only there take place where there is no individuality, the existence of which, as compared with that of individual being, is a flowing one. But the essential condition of love is individuality elevated to personality; it is only possible between the separate individualities of two Egos; with the absence of personal distinction living unity vanishes. If love to God were thus in its completion self-destructive, and were therefore according to its essential nature destined to strive after its own destruction, it would be the most perfect contradiction, "equally mysterious for wise-men and fools."

There is therefore nothing we should be more anxious to protect, from every presumptuous attempt to disturb the holy boundary between God and the creature, than just the opinion of the imperishable nature of love which binds both together. Instead of the self-hood of the personal creature being destroyed in the perfection of its love to God, it is much rather thereby

spirit, but not at all consistency in the carrying out of their principle. *Gerson's* well known attack upon *Ruysbroech* is principally directed against this inconsistency, comp. *Engelhardt's Rich v. St. V. u. J. Ruysbroech*, 265 f. Still later we meet the same tendency, especially in the quietistic Mystics, and in their doctrine of quietistic death.

elevated to its full truth, and revealed in its eternal significance, as the subject and object of a love between God and the creature; then does man first of all come into the true possession of himself when he gives himself to God; whoever loses his life shall find it. What true love to God desires is not at all abstract identity, not a resolution into the Divine being, but perfect and undisturbed *fellowship with God*,[1] just as is promised in the Scripture as its highest end, not that it shall *become* God, but shall *see* God face to face, 1 Cor. xiii. 12; comp. 2 Cor. v. 7; 1 John iii. 2; Matt. v. 8. When in support of this final resolution of all personal being in God, the words of the apostle Paul are often adduced, with which he denotes the finality of the Divine development of the human race: *ἵνα ᾖ ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*, 1 Cor. xv. 28, it is a wanton confounding of the idea of living, voluntary, union, with that of identity of being. These words of the apostle much rather prove the very opposite; for how indeed could God be all in all, entirely penetrating them and filling them with His spirit, so that every act of their self-determination is at the same time a becoming determined by God, if this all, were not something more than He Himself, but only He alone, and besides Him, (*praeter* Deum) nothing? And what else then were this Divine development of our race, in the history of the world, than a mere play, just as cruel as purposeless, the most fearful irony of God against his own creation? Can there be a worse misunderstanding of the Divine philanthropy than when one makes it, instead of establishing its object in its own peculiar being, consume and destroy the same? For the perfectly dark, nay more, in itself senseless expression, of a resolution *(Aufgehen)* of individual personality into the Divine essence, and

[1] A prayer of some Vishnuites, quoted by *Tholuck* from *Ward's* book on the Religion of the Hindoos, confesses this in a perfectly naive manner: "O Vishnu, we wish not to be absorbed, but, a condition in which we shall eternally see thee and serve thee as our Lord,—in which Thou remainest our dear Lord, we thy servants." *Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner*, S. 249 *in der zewiten Ausg.* According to the use of language of those morning-land Mystics, this prayer expresses the desire to remain under the yoke of the law and the letter; wherewith indeed without more ado the power is denied to God to constitute out of Himself, spirit and freedom; inasmuch as every separate existence out of God is represented as slavery.

the like, can signify nothing else than simple destruction, if one for a moment attempts to reflect upon it.—

If love to God were something involuntary on the part of man, a determination of his inclination independent of the direction of his will, it could not, inasmuch as the moral proceeds from the will, be the principle of the same. However, if in these intimations respecting the nature of love to God, we have not quite missed the mark, we do not need first of all to prove, that we are justified in regarding this love as a *disposition* of mind conditioned by freedom. We can never think of denying that in this love, the more perfect it is, so much the more do we find it in conjunction with the deepest motion and penetration of mind, *(Gemüth)*, and the most inward inclination of heart. Just as little should we think of maintaining that the origin of this love may be regarded as the work of an individual resolve. But it can clearly only be a matter of command, and exhortation, in so far as its production, and progressive development in the soul, are conditioned by a constant desire and endeavour on the part of man. And if in sinful man, alienated from God, this holy love can only arise by an operation of the spirit of God, we must nevertheless in every Divine working in man, conceive of it together with a yielding, giving in, to the same, on the part of man, and this as proceeding from the inmost centre of the will.—We are here too spared the necessity of entering into detail on the question, which, in relation to our subject, would arise from the Kantian division of love into *pathological* and *practical*. A pathological love to God is said to be impossible, because he is not an object of sense; but the practical love to God is said to signify nothing beyond cheerful obedience to His commands, *i.e.* the duties presented as *(instar)* Divine commands,[1] in which case indeed it would be the purest tautology to make this love the principle of morality. The entire division is erroneously conceived of; not only does it not exhaust the subject, but leaves the essential nature of love altogether out of the question. That love to God is not a

[1] *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* S. 13 *(Ausg.* v. 1791*)*. *Kirtik der praktischen Vernunft,* S. 121 f. (*6te Ausg.*) Moreover *Kant* admits in the second passage what he appears to deny in the first, that such a practical love to God, according to its fundamental postulates, could not be a matter of command.

pathological love in the sense of *Kant*, is a matter of course; for it has its origin not in the natural, but in the spiritual life, and the spirit is here so little in a condition of suffering from the world of sense, that it becomes much rather in this love, and in it alone, conscious of its true freedom. But just as certain is it, that this love is something, without comparison, more real, more living, than this abstract, practical love, in which no real relation of person to person is supposed, and which can only therefore in a very unreal sense be called love. Who could doubt but that Christ meant something more than this so-called practical love, when He commanded us to love God, with the whole heart, and with the whole soul, and with the whole mind? And with respect to love to other men, Paul says of such a practical love, though it go so far as to offer up the body in sacrifice for others, that if the inward love, the inward sympathy in the true well-being of its object, be wanting, it is useless, 1 Cor. xiii. 3.—

Our development at this point essentially coincides with the results of a highly-esteemed Theologian, who, in his dogmatic, lays down among others, the following, concerning love to God: Man in the most real sense is Eternally distinct from God, his love binds him ideally with God, in a unity which is only possible by means of the diversity of subjects.—The relinquishment of free personality would destroy love, the unity of which consists in the duality of persons. Therefore in our love to God, is contained the belief of our non-annihilation in the Absolute, but of our remaining free and personal, in order to our being eternally able to love God. Compare *Hase's Lehrbuch der evangelischen Dogmatik zweite Ausg.* § 59 *and* 101. But as I am not able to adopt the manner in which these sentences are there deduced, a short remark on the same, is all the more due from me, since a polemical observation respecting *Hase's* notion of religion in the first elaboration of this doctrine of sin, occasioned a reply from him (*vgl. Jenaische Litteraturzeitung* 1842, *num.* 109, 110). The nature of humanity is defined § 52 *as the infinite to be created from the finite* (*die aus dem Endlichen zu erschaffende Unendlichkeit*), *i.e.* according to the explanatory remarks of the following §§, the striving of

the spirit to realize the infinite, to be itself infinite. The infinite lies in the endeavour, in the end of the same, the finite in the starting-point, in respect of which the nature of humanity is a power proceeding from, and limited by, a foreign might, therefore only relatively free. But according to § 54 the finite is the absolute negation of the infinite, and consequently would be its own destruction, if it should become infinite. (This ground-opinion is thus expressed and applied in the Christology § 170: God and man are only quantitatively separated, inasmuch as man strives after the infinite, while God is the infinite; wherefore the union of both is an unconditional contradiction; for each of the two natures, is only different from the other, by the negation of what it must take up into itself in the union, as possessing which, it would thus of necessity become the nature of the other.) The solution of this mutually destructive contradiction is said, according to § 55, 56, 57, to lie in the nature of religion, which *is the love of man to God*, therefore in man's appropriation, by means of love, of the infinite, without taking up the same into himself, or without losing his own independency. But is the contradiction thereby solved, that this endeavour constituting the nature of man, and from which the contradiction originates, be given up according to its real significance; that man resolves, since he is conscious of the vanity of this endeavour to be infinite, to be contented with something less than infinity, since he *cannot be* God, to be content *to love* God? By no means, so certain is it that the solution of a contradiction can never be achieved by the reduction or cancelling of one of its terms. And therefore we see that even according to *Hase* himself, in the following §§, the unsolved contradiction maintains its ground, even after love has made its appearance. In conjunction with love, this human striving for the infinite, again puts forth its claim, to realize in itself, the object of its endeavour, and of course seeks yet another solution of its inward contradiction, which § 61 becomes co-ordinated with that solution by means of love, as a second kind of progress from the finite to the infinite. This

is the way of becoming Godlike, of *assimilation to God in a never-ending approximation.* But by this another contradiction is added to the former one, and we find now not only that it is essential to the nature of man to strive for a given end, the attainment of which would be the destruction of his being, but that he is engaged in an infinite approximation, *i.e.* an approximation which is destined ever to remain at the same, namely at an infinite distance from its end, which is in fact no approximation at all; this is corroborated by this infinite approximation, whose reverse side is just that of an infinite distance of man from his destination, being said to be, according to § 78, at every point of the entire duration of the development of his existence, a condition of sinfulness. Indeed, so entirely does *Hase* forget the principle laid down by himself for the solution of the former contradiction, that he opens his philosophical investigation of the doctrine of immortality, § 98, with the following sentence: The contradiction, that the infinite is said to be striven for in finite life, can only therein, *(only therein)* seek its solution, that the duration of this finite be infinitely prolonged, in which the reality of life can never attain the actualization of its own ideal, but may ever approach the same.—If there be something perfectly absurd in the thought of the nature of man, consisting in his being destined to the creation of the infinite from the finite, or in the striving of the finite to become infinite, and therefore leading to purely contradictory results, which this keen-eyed theologian so distinctly acknowledges; if, on the other hand, the principle of love to God is one not merely void of contradiction in itself, but proving itself, from every point of view, to be the key to the riddles of human existence—the only consistent procedure appears to be this, to leave this thought of *Hase's* to its fate, and in the philosophico-theological consideration, most decidedly to set out from this principle of love, and therefore according to the same, to modify the determinations as to the nature of man in his relation to God. But in order to explain the love of man to God, we do not at all require, if only the consciousness of God as the really existing conscious-

ness, and as it really is, as the consciousness revealing itself to man, his creature, be presupposed—that strange contradiction between a desire of being himself infinite, and of his inability to become so; but only then should we be in need of the same if we had the task to show, how the human spirit *of itself, produced* the thought of a God, of an object of his perfect love. But the result of such a task could be nothing else than ideal humanity, the thought of perfect man. But *Hase's* dogmatics appears in real earnest, vehemently to drive its author to identify this with God, if however it does not, much rather, already contain as much; and still, a theologian will never be able so to determine the matter, who finds that the incarnation of the Logos is impossible, because the dwelling place of man is only a subordinate planet, a vanishing point in the universe (*Jenaische Litteraturzeitung*, a. a. O. S. 459.)—

If now we had to present the truth of our statement, that love to God is the principle of unity in the moral law, according to its entire contents, in the most perfect form possible, we should be obliged to demonstrate it scientifically, *i.e.* we must, at least, delineate, an ethical system according to its fundamental features, in which all moral determinations should be embraced under the dominating union of love. For although the laying down of this principle, instead of being new, is much rather the very primitive in the Christian Church, we are not able to call to mind any development of the same through all its moments.[1] But as we have absolutely no room for such a development here, we must limit ourselves to a few general intimations, as to the possibility of an ethical system being constructed from this radical notion of love.

It is characteristic of the *mystic* tendency, in the development of Christian consciousness, that it,—not contented in making the relation of man to God the absolutely highest and all-determining one, makes it in fact the absolutely only one, in which it takes a positive interest. In this respect it stands in direct contrast with

[1] Something excellent is to be expected in this respect from the completion of *Sartorius'* work: *Die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe, oder Grundzüge der evangelisch-kirchlichen Moraltheologie. Erste und zweite Abtheilung.* 1840, 1844.

the philosophy of the present day; while it belongs to this, to make that which it regards as the immediate being of man merely to serve as means to an end, Religion the means to Philosophy, Feeling the means to Dialectic; Mysticism withdraws itself from the means, and holds fast the relation to God, strictly in its immediacy: while to the former the religious determinateness of the consciousness is only the first undeveloped beginning of the spirit, which must be overcome, in order to its attaining reality in knowledge and action; to the latter, the immediate relation to God is the one and all. Towards the manifoldness of human relations to the world; towards all endeavours morally to form, and develop these relations; towards the great forms of society, in which these endeavours realize themselves; the mystic tendency, where it develops itself with regardless consistency, holds only a negativing position. To it, all this, in so far as it has essentially a worldly side, is a nonentity, and again to negative the reality which itself assumes by sinking down into the pure Being of God, is the task of mystical contemplation.[1] But in as much as it cannot

[1] Logically regarded, the error of this mysticism, consists mainly in making whatever is not God Himself, immediately the negation of God, just as it expressly happens in one of the remarkable sentences of *Meister Eckart*, which the *Bulle Johnns* xxii., condemns. There it is said: Petens hoc aut hoc malum petit et male, quia negationem boni et *negationem Dei* petit et orat Deum sibi negari. *S. Gieseler's Text Book of Church History*, B. 2, Abth. 2, S. 630, (*Dritte Ausgabe.*) *Martensen* terms this negation of the finite in the mystic consciousness, making use of the well-known epithet introduced by *Hegel* for the system of *Spinoza*, the *Acosmism* of mystic theology, *Meister Eckart*, S. 34. But he endeavours to show that this acosmism looked at from another point of view is atheism, S. 40; and, with respect to *Eckart*, we must allow that he is quite right; for his God is nothing else than the absolutely predicateless Being, "a pure nothing." Notwithstanding it is easy to perceive, from the similarity of *Martensen's* opinion to that of *Eckart's*, how he comes to find in this monotonous crossing, and recrossing, from nothing to nothing, in the act of which transition, there arises merely a strange shadow of reality, something especially deep, genuinely speculative. For when *Martensen, e.g.* S. 100, says: Knowledge is the soul of all religious speculative ethics; "that the requiring of man to do the Divine will, properly understood, is not different from the requiring him to realize God, to bring His Being to actual reality," it is easy to see that God can only become realized, from this unreality, in which he is absolutely as a logical idea, by man's transporting Him into the kingdom of the finite, in which Being is perpetually swallowed up of nothing. To the result of this philosophical opinion, speculative

in active life withdraw from its occupations, it endures them rather as necessary evils, than enters upon them with a true living sympathy. The moral disposition of mind, in the more noble men of this tendency of spirit, appears here in the condition of the most extreme contraction, in which the tender inwardness of life, in communion with God, timidly shrinks back from every contact with the world, and in this habit of mind forgets the determination of the religious principles, namely, in spiritual combat and unwearying labour to take possession of the world for the kingdom of God, to form and shape all relations with the same by a mind consecrated to God; the moral life here, instead of sending forth from the bosom of Divine love a plant of thousand-fold blossoms and fruits well-pleasing to God, entirely remains sunk down in the root. For this reason, the development of a comprehensive, essentially complete system of ethics, is never to be expected from real mysticism, although it distinguishes itself from speculative philosophy, by its having for the inward life, in the constant *relation* of God to the Ego, a practical determining impulse; strickly speaking, it excludes the *possibility* of such a system.—

The development of a system of Christian ethics requires a *motive* of *progression*, in order from its central point of love to God in its simple ground-determination, to arrive at the manifold variety of individual ethical determinations. It is quite natural that this motive of progression cannot be conditioned from without, but must come forth from that very middle point;—only in this way is it moral *principle* of the same. If now love to God is an unconditional resignation to Him, if God is for our Ego the original and only unconditional source of obligation, it is clear it can only attain that progress by the knowledge of, how God Himself created another being, and placed it in such an essential relation to Himself, that it participates in the power to obligate the Ego. This motive of progression accordingly is nowhere else to be found than in the *Divine acts*. They are the motive powers, and the impulse of development, in the forming organism of ethics, which, as every science thoroughly pervaded by the spirit of

mysticism arrives from very opposite points of setting out. Just as this dialectic, so Eckart's mysticism, makes all out of nothing, in order then again to make nothing out of everything (all).

Christianity, has to follow the course of the Divine footsteps; they are they which condition the origin of every further obligation. Ethics can only, by the way in which its further determinations hang together with its principle, reflect the real connection in which the original obligating Being stands with beings and communities of being, in relation to which there is an ethical obligation for the Ego; but this connection is not that of substantial immanence, as pantheism wishes to make out.

If God, by his creative will, has called a world into existence, if this world—simply because God has created it, for God cannot create nothing, or mere beingless shine, void of all essence—has a derived reality, just as distinct from the Being of God as it is dependent upon His will, it cannot be our task to negative for ourselves as much as possible, this world and the inexhaustible fulness of relations in which it stands to us, by means of the free direction of our will, but only that of morally forming all these relations from the principle of love to God. Therefore the first of the middle-terms by means of which the motive or principle of this progress arrives at the determinations of Christian ethics, is that of the *creation*. By virtue of the true signification of this notion, the origin of the world from God is not indeed on the one hand a necessary consequence from the Being of God, but a free act of God, in which alone the existence of other, finite beings besides the infinite spirit, absolutely satisfied in Himself, can have their ground; but neither on the other hand is it an arbitrary calling into being of existences, entirely foreign to the Being of God, and destitute of all inward relation to Him, but rather true self-revelations of God in His works,—works in which the Divine ideas are constantly immanent and manifest. Therefore all worldly existence, as such, in so far as it is a creation of God, has a certain dignity, which is the condition of a moral relation to Him, and constitutes it an object of obligations for us. It is here much worthy of observation, that genuine mysticism is everywhere wanting in a proper understanding of the notion of creation; it has commonly in its stead, in so far as the world in its distinction from God is not degraded to a simple nonentity,[1] to a

[1] As in the 26th of those *Eckartschen Sätze:* omnes creaturae sunt unum purum nihil; non dico, quod sint quid modicum vel aliquid,

mere shine-existence, misty, emanative representations, sometimes mixed up with a dualistic element. In its practice we often see, as remarked above, the contradictory determinations of this relation of the world to God in conflict with each other; while, in its anxious disgust of the world, it thought to resolve it to a pure nonentity, it establishes it in a dualistic manner over against God, as that which is absolutely impenetrable.—That the existence of the world, in the religion of revelation is regarded as well-pleasing to God (Gen. i. 13), is of incalculable importance for ethics.

The second middle-term is the Divine act of the creation of beings, which, as personal, bear the *image of their Creator*. This idea in the development of Christian ethics is fruitful to the last degree; a rich extensive sphere of moral relations *(Beziehungen und Verhältnisse)* is dependant upon it; in this we have the ground for the specific dignity which belongs to man, as such, the most comprehensive basis for the moral formation of human life in the relation of single individuals to each other, and in the different forms of society in general.

This second middle-term is also the presupposition of the third, namely, the highest act of the Divine love, revealed to us *in the Incarnation of the Logos*, in the completed *redemption* of fallen humanity by the Son of God, in the *founding of a Divine kingdom* on earth. Here the idea of the Divine kingdom is especially of the most interpenetrating significance for the ethical system; but the founding of a kingdom of God in a sinful race is only possible by means of redemption, just as redemption is again only possible by the Incarnation of the Son of God.—

It is quite natural that from the *Hegelian* stand-point the objection of formalism will be made against these transitions. One must only make it clear to himself that such an objection from this point of view every *religious* ethic must experience; for every such ethic is theistic, and rests upon the notion of creation; but that speculation thinks to obtain real transitions by so constituting the world that it becomes a self-realization of God, and the moral determinations of human life, moments in the

sed quod sint unum purum nihil, *v. Gieseler* l. l. p. 633 *Schmidt* l. l. S. 675.

process of the same. Therefore in order to satisfy these claims, we must pay nothing less than that which is alone able truly to elevate us above the perishable nature of the world, viz. fellowship with the personal God.

SECTION II.

THE REAL PRINCIPLE OF SIN.

If we have discovered by our previous investigations, love to God, to be the real principle of moral goodness, it follows that the evil, as the opposite of good, must have its central principle in the *estrangement of man from God*, in the want of love to Him. Indisputably is sin also a perversion of our relation to the world; but as the truth of man's relation to the world, can only become understood from his true relation to God, so the disturbance of the former can only be understood by that of the latter.

That this estrangement of man from God is the real *primitive sin*, and the *source of all other moral depravity*, is testified by the apostle Paul, since he, Rom. i. 21—23, derives the deep degradation of the heathen in every kind of vice, from their departure from the service of the true God, to the idolizing of the creature; and by his representing it as a righteous world-arrangement of God, that those who withdraw themselves from His fellowship, are now no longer able to retain superiority of spirit over nature, but become subject to the vilest and most outrageous slavery of sensual lusts. The most immediate punishment of their perverted *conduct*,—by which they have drawn down the Divine into the contrasts and contradictions of natural and human life, ver. 25,—they receive in their becoming a prey to degrading passions (πάθη ἀτιμίας), ver. 26, and that which man has in superior distinction from the beast, freedom of will, and power of reflection, freed from natural impulse, is just that which he misuses in this condition to degrade himself below the beast, by the distortion of the sensual desires into that which is unnatural, and by the invention of sensual lusts in contradiction to their natural order, and their natural purpose, ver. 26, 27.

Thus the apostle considers the *inward falling away* of the human race *from God*, as their deepest fall; their not honouring and thanking God, their exchanging the Divine truth for falsehood, their forgetting the Creator and giving their homage to the created, natural, and human life; these constitute their deepest fall, and those moral vices appear to him simply to be the natural out-births of this ground-sin, as the manifestation of their inmost perversion. The entire development of the apostle rests upon the presupposition of a deep bias to God implanted in the human spirit, Acts xvii. 27. It is this presupposition of the original nobility of human nature, which one cannot more effectually degrade than by the opinion, that it has been from the beginning natural to man to do homage to the powers of nature. Much rather, man is only able to rest in God, as God first of all rested, from his work of creation, in man as in His Image, Gen. ii. 2; according to a beautiful remark of *Hugo von St. Victor*, the dignity of man consists in his not being satisfied with a less, than the highest good, namely God. And indeed this Divine bias of the Spirit, is itself inseparable from the notion of Divinely created human nature; and that which has been complained of in the doctrine of the Reformers, respecting the original condition of man, as naturalism, is just the very decided superiority of this teaching over that of Catholicism.—When the individual destroys in himself this bias, the religious fundamental basis of society, with its moral powers, very often keeps him from more degraded degradation; but when *society* breaks away from this basis, the most simple fundamental determinations of ethical truth lose their binding authority, and universal moral anarchy inevitably prevails.

Here however the important distinction between the developed, and undeveloped, consciousness of the individual must not be overlooked. As we have already seen with respect to the good, that its true significance, to the individual who feels himself bound to the same, is *not from the beginning manifested*, so the same holds good with respect to the evil. When the Divine consciousness is in a weakened and oppressed condition, it expresses itself in numberless cases, as an indefinite impulse, to seek something higher, something absolutely satisfying, as a dark presentiment of an eternal destiny of the human spirit, transcending the

perishable nature of the world. So long as man is not absolutely hardened, he can never escape from the feeling, that by sin he has put himself at variance with all these higher emotions and impulses. But that he is therewith estranged from God, of this he is not conscious, just because his consciousness of God is still concealed in the dim twilight of general, indefinite representations.

Sin then, first of all, reveals itself in its real character, when the requirement of holiness in the conscience, reveals itself to man as a requirement of *loving resignation to God*, and is rejected by him with aversion. Here sin first of all becomes directly seen what it really is, namely a turning away from God; and as an augmented degree of personal guilt is attached to this turning point, there is also connected with the same a benumbing of the heart, in which those higher emotions and impulses perish. This is the ultimate basis of all that is said, in so many passages of the New Testament, of the state of rejection of those who reject Christ, and do not believe his gospel; this unbelief is nothing else than the heart's shutting itself up against the highest love. For this reason the appearance of Christ in the history of humanity, and of the individual, brings with it a κρίσις, the result of which is not merely a contrasted one, in that it operates savingly in one, and not so in another, but also in that in whomsoever it does not bring about a "rising again," in him it prepares a deeper fall, Luke ii. 34, and whoever will not make Christ the corner-stone of his building, to him he becomes a stone of stumbling on which he shall be broken, Matt. xxi. 42, 44; 1 Pet. ii. 6—8.—

But sin is not merely the absence of love to God, but with this negation of the true relation between man and God, there is, in immediate connection, the *affirmation of a false one.* All unbelief in the True God, and His holy revelations, has ever some superstition for its never failing reverse side, if it be only the belief in the all-sufficiency of one's own critical and sceptical understanding: the departure of the Divine principle of life, is immediately connected with the arrival of a principle in opposition to the Divine, according to the declaration of Christ, he who is not for me is against me. Man cannot dethrone the true God without putting an idol in His place. What now is this idol? To this question, the Christian consideration of sin has often

answered: *the creature in general.* It has made the nature of sin to consist in the turning away from the love of the Creator to the love of the creature, in the perversion of the true relation between the objects of our inclinations and desires, by virtue of which the relative, is preferred to the absolute Good. This conception of evil as that of a *conversio a bono majori ad minus bonum, a bono incommutabili ad bona commutabilia, defectio ab eo quod summe est ad id quod minus est, perversitas voluntatis a summa substantia detortae in infimam* is found in ancient Christianity, especially in Augustine,[1] also in many of the Church Fathers besides, and still oftener in the Scholastics and Mystics of the middle ages: in more modern time it has often been maintained,[2] *e. g.* by *Leibnitz* in the *Theodicee.*[3]

Let us call to mind the results of our investigations hitherto, in order to put this positive definition of the nature of sin, to the test. We have seen that the inmost nature of the good, is love to God. The true signification of love was, the self-resignation of man, felt as a primary obligation, the obligation of coming out of his self-life *(Insichsein)* in order to live in, and for, God. Now, according to the above quoted opinion, love to the created, assumes to itself the place of love to the Creator. This created, embraces a very manifold variety of creatures, but no distinction running through the entire sphere of the creature, is more thorough than that of personal and impersonal existence. Corresponding to this distinction, there appears to be a twofold radical tendency of the sinful inclination and lust. By this division the first class of perverted inclinations may perhaps be termed the sins of vanity,

[1] *C. Julianum Pel.* lib. i., cap. 3. *De lib. arbitrio* lib. i., c. 15, 16. lib. iii., c. 1. *De civit. Dei* lib. xii., c. 7, 8. *Confess.* lib. vii., c. 16. The definition of all human perversity found in *Augustine* has a similar sense: est uti fruendis et frui utendis. *August. de civit. Dei* lib. xi. c. 25. *De doctr. christ.* lib. 1, c. 3, 4, explains; frui is said to refer to the bona aeterna, uti to the bona temporalia.

[2] If the radical notion of the old high German *bôsi* (*böse*) really were, as *Graff* in the *althochdeutschen Sprachschatz*, Th. 3. S. 216 appears to think, weakness, narrowness, nothingness, the derivation of the German word would favour this conception.

[3] *E.g.* Th. 1, § 33. With *Leibnitz* this conception of sin hangs strictly together with its reduction to a privation, and still further with his abstract derivation of moral good from mere metaphysical determinations.

love of human approbation, ambition; the second class, love of sensual pleasure in its manifold branches, covetousness and the like.—However, more closely considered, the radical tendency of sinful inclinations and lust for impersonal existence, does not hold good, if our object is to discover the real nature of sin. Things, impersonal existences, are essentially regarded as only *means* in relation to personality, they remain too only means in the *perversion of their use.* If man loves things instead of God, he only loves himself in them, only seeks in them his own gratification. Of course it can go so far with him as that the objects on which his heart has been set by sin, may provide him least of all what he seeks in them, viz. his selfish gratification, and instead, cause him nothing but unquiet, want, and suffering, without his being able to forsake them. But this phenomenon belongs to a greater degree of moral degradation in some one given direction; as it is only seen in a more limited sphere, its significance is not sufficiently thorough to allow of its forming the basis for a definition of the ground tendency of sin.

Are we then, perhaps, to say that this perverted inclination, which has assumed the place of the true, namely, of love to God, is the *inclination towards other personalities;* that sin according to its positive side is inordinate and unmeasured love to man, and that the inordinateness consists in his elevation to the highest place in our affection, and as the first object of our pursuit, whose fellowship is nevertheless nothing more than a *bonum commutabile et minus?* How were this possible? The only bond which unites men together, in a true and imperishable union, is their common relation to God; all true fellowship of men among each other consists in God (1 John i. 3, iv. 7, 12, 16); the peculiar dignity of man, the recognition of which in each other is the ground-condition of all genuine love, rests, as we have seen, in the first section of this chapter, the essential relation of man to God; and whoever shuts his heart against Him who is love itself, what self-denial were such an one capable of in favour of his equals, who stand over against his own seclusiveness. Man, in departing from God, and becoming estranged from His fellowship, negatives at the same time true fellowship with his species, and existing absolutely for himself, sets himself up in opposition to them. It is true, sin appears in many of its forms just to be *formative* of

fellowship; vanity, seeks a circle in which it may become admired; voluptuousness, forms alliances for the gratification of passionate propensity; and the love of rule, cannot carry out its plans without entering into close union with others. But it is self-evident that such fellowship is only so in appearance, and is inwardly untrue; that in these forms too the sinner only seeks *himself.* When sin impels him to unite himself with others, it is only in order to use them as means to his own peculiar purposes, consequently without his ever truly coming out of his selfish isolation. Neither can the well known experience deceive us, namely that sometimes those alliances based entirely upon the lusts of sense create a tender attachment, *(Anhänglichkeit.)* Still probably only on the part of woman, which does not shun the greatest dangers and sacrifices, in order to protect the object of its desire from ill-usage and other suffering. These facts, from their decidedly physical impress, betray much too distinctly, their similarity with phenomena of mere animal life, for us to be able at all to regard in them real human fellowship.—If sin should form true fellowship, it must be able to teach man to live in and for others; but that, Holy love alone is able to teach, which, wherever it is found, is found to have its origin in God. If any one has the power to deny himself, and in sincere resignation to live for others, he has it from God, and lives in God, however undeveloped perhaps his knowledge of God may be.

The idol therefore which man, in his sin, puts in the place of God, can be no other than *his own self.* This individual self, and its gratification, he makes the highest end of his life. His striving, in all the different forms and directions of sin, ever has self ultimately in view; the inmost nature of sin, the principle determining, and pervading it, in all its forms, is *selfishness.*[1]

In order that man might be cabable of holy love, it was necessary for him to be a self—a personal being; if he excludes holy love from his inward life, his self-hood degenerates into selfishness, the disease of self-hood *(Selbstsucht = Seuche der Selbstheit).* Life, according to its notion, requires purposes and interests, which give to it tension and occupation; even the most quiet mind is not able

[1] Among modern elaborators of the doctrine of sin, *Tholuck*, especially, determines its essential nature to be selfishness, comp. *von der Sünde und vom Versöhner,* S. 32 (*Aufl.* 2.)

to endure the weight of perfectly empty, indifferent, existence——existence devoid of all changes, of wants and satisfactions, endeavours and attainments,—the will which wills nothing,—action directed to no end. If now that love, and the individual purposes and interests, which spring out of it, is not the determining principle of life, the felt necessity to fill its void, becomes the most powerful stimulus for the progressive development and strengthening of the selfish principle, and the most natural conductor of its extension over the entire life.—We may not here overlook a relation, which in a certain measure modifies this pressure to decision between opposed moral principles, this necessitating the subordination of the entire moral life, to the one or the other, of these two classes of principles. As if in the very middle of these two spheres of principles, a neutral sphere forms itself, a collective embodiment of activities and occupations, in which the individual is actuated neither by the striving of selfishness, nor from the impulse of love, but perhaps immediately from the endeavour faithfully to serve a higher whole. But the power of these activities to keep life in movement, is much rather contained in the very infinite manifold variety of the individual tasks themselves, which these activities present to the individual in every given case, and which become executed in the same manner, both by the good and the bad, the pious and the godless. This middle sphere of life, the individual elements of which possess in themselves the impulse to their proper actualization, independently of the moral disposition of the subject, appears so much the more to extend itself, and so much the more to limit the spheres of such activities in which the relation to the one or the other moral fundamental tendency expresses itself, in proportion to the greater manifoldness, and the more extensive culture, of the organisation of human society.—Nevertheless, it is only the surface of life which bears this appearance of moral characterlessness, and only a consideration isolating its individual moments can be deceived by the same. There can never be wanting to a mind which is not altogether sunk down into inanimate moral obtuseness, inward moments in which the one or the other moral fundamental motive does not assert itself in the consciousness, and consequently morally determines those series of activities, by taking them up into a normal, or perverted, moral connection of life.

If now, the practical relation of the subject to himself, to his own separated individual interests, to the central point of his being—is that in which the desires and endeavours of sin, going forth in every direction, gather themselves together, then sin is not merely *non-order*, but positive *dis-order*, not merely the dissolution of unity, but a false concentration of human existence, —a perverted all, of the same. The true unity is dissolved, in order to set up a false one in its place. If sin had merely the negative signification of ataxy, its individuation, its self-separation into different sinful directions, would remain immediately dependent upon the self-development of good; this individuation could only take place by the constant negation of the moments of good which appear in this self-development. That the matter does not take place in this way, but that sin, as we shall presently see, much rather develops itself from its own principle in a manifold variety of individual directions, is a powerful testimony for *the position in the negativity of evil*, that is to say, for a positive element lying in the very bosom of the negativity.

If this be only admitted, then sin cannot be regarded merely as disorder in the outward sphere of life, as it were a slight impurity of the same, which might be shaken off as the dust from our feet, nor as a clog, which hinders the endeavour of the Ego, ever in itself pure, from realizing itself in the phenomenal sphere in a manner quite corresponding with itself, but must be looked upon as a positive disturbance, which has penetrated down into the very core of our life.

Therefore, that which makes sin sin, and evil evil, is the *selfish isolation of the creature* active in the same. There are conditions of life,—in many they form the rule of life,—in which one keeps himself free from wild and unrestrained passions, and on the whole only seldom commits individual acts which appear to him as sins. But in his soul, "the I, the dark despot" reigns; in the midst of the world he stands alone, estranged from God, sunk down into himself, in a chaos of selfish strivings, likes and dislikes, without any true sympathy with the sorrows and joys of the human family, or with its individual members. Where there is a mind which has for a time stood under the dominion of such a condition, but has now learnt to know from its own experience the life of fellowship with God, it will, thus awakened to a higher

consciousness, impute the same to itself, as the deepest obscuration of mind, as the very worst self-degradation, although perhaps the outward life may have been thoroughly upright. And with perfect right, just because in such a condition the real principle of sin, although drawn entirely back into the background, rules with no less unlimited sway, than there, where its dominion expresses itself, in palpable, visible, vices and crimes, in a wild disturbance of the outward life.—

It has not merely been objected to this reduction of sin to the principle of selfishness, that, notwithstanding its claim to be more real than the definitions of sin previously discussed, it is still merely *formal*,[1] but also that this notion, while it is said to express just what is positive in the nature of sin, nevertheless only contains *a disguised negation*.[2]

We must *first of all* in a certain measure admit the first objection. What we have here laid down as the perverted ground-direction in all sinful being, appears in contrast with the manifold variety of individual interests, and endeavourings, desires, and enjoyments, in which it ever individualizes itself as a formal, abstract, universal one. And is not this always, and everywhere, the relation of the principle to the totality which developes itself out of it? But on the other hand we most decidedly maintain that this self which makes itself unconditionally prevalent, in selfishness, is not merely the formal basis underlying every other *ulterior* contents, but has also for itself a reality, in other words, that this self, empirically speaking, besides the changeable, diversified, determinable contents, has also a contents which is of necessity permanently abiding, and in all, essentially equal, namely, the striving after a condition of self-satisfaction, and the desire to remain in such a condition, when it has attained it. Man is able, with a distinct consciousness, to make the interests of this self of his, still quite apart from every individual determination of the same—axiomatically the unconditional rule of his conduct. We say: he is able to do so, because life teaches us that he in innumerable instances actually does it. And if he does it, we may say of him that he is therein entirely given up

[1] *Vatke, Hall. Jahrbücher*, 1840, *No.* 132, S. 1049.
[2] *Ritter, über das Böse*, S. 11, *vgl.* S. 4, 5.

to evil, when perhaps he places this boundless selfish interest in a *contents* which in itself is of a *a higher, more spiritual* nature. —The conscious, definitely marked, in this direction, teaches us of course to understand, the unconscious, and indefinite.

And herewith we may believe ourselves to have repelled the *second* objection, so far as it is allowed us in this part of our investigation to enter upon the examination of the opinion lying at the foundation of the same. When man makes the satisfaction of self, of this his own individual being, the highest unconditional end of his life, so that to him every other, whatever name it may bear, is only means to this end, it is most assuredly no mere negative, but something very *positive*, a perverted, self-affirmation.

After this, it scarcely requires any protestation on our part against the misunderstanding, as if this opinion of the nature of sin, was meant to apply to the desire for our own satisfaction in general, and that such desire is to be regarded as sinful. Much rather it is a necessary result of confidence in the reality of the Divine Order in the world, in its power to prove itself to be such in real conditions, that man presupposes, that in the life of truth there must necessarily be *for him the deepest and most lasting satisfaction.* From our justification of this presupposition, it by no means follows that the end which one sets before him in good and in evil is *identical;* the contrast between the two brings us back to the distinction between a correct insight into the true nature, and a correct discernment of the right means, of our individual satisfaction, and that of a false conception of the same. We may first of all remark that it is an arbitrary misplacing of this question, to affix the desire for true satisfaction, which of course is inseparable from the striving after holiness, to the category *of design.* But apart from this, there is an immeasurable distinction, between seeking a satisfaction of which the subject is conscious that it is the absolutely universal, according to its determination, and that in which *this individual subject as such,* is made its own highest end. It is certainly always an easy matter, by dropping one determination after another, ultimately to arrive at a point where the sharpest contrasts meet; one should only bear in mind that nothing has thereby been determined.

By our last remarks, we have already touched upon a prevalent ethical notion, which, from the results of our investigations of the nature of sin, seems to have become a great difficulty. We refer to the notion of *self-love*. In so far as it is said to be an ethical notion, it must be well distinguished from the merely natural impulse of self-preservation, which man has in common with other animal creatures. The relations of the subject to himself, contained in self-love, are said to *possess moral obligation;* but that every living thing strives to preserve itself in existence, and in the condition conformable to its being, is surely a matter of *necessity of nature*. If now, the selfishness in which the I places himself as the highest and ultimate end of his efforts and actions, be the essence of *sin*, can any endeavour and action be *morally good*, in which the subject makes himself the object of them? If there be, must we not regard evil as only consisting in *the excess of that which is good in itself (nimius amor sui)?* But in this way the qualitative contrast between good and evil would be resolved into one merely of *degree*, and sanctification would only be a limitation, and moderation, of a propensity in itself justifiable. It is evident, how floating and insecure the boundary between good and evil thus becomes, especially, when we remember that only the smaller portion of those governed by this principle of selfishness are distinctly conscious of the principle of their life, in the manner above specified, that the greater number blindly obey it, by sacrificing the claim of morality in cases of collision, to some particular end, making the claim for it, without tracing the individual act to the general ruling principle, which lies at its basis.

These considerations appear significantly to hint at the banishment of the idea of self-love, entirely from Christian Ethics, as an impure, and in its descent, suspicious notion. And it can be of little value to plead on its behalf that we find it every where, in every day life, spoken of as that which every one owes to himself. For how many conceptions of duty, which in the light of strict morality are more than doubtful, are tenaciously handed down from generation to generation as fundamental axioms?! And how for instance do the spheres, of civil right, and that of strictly moral right, lay one another waste according to the common opinion of these relations!—actions which are committed in relation to the subject himself, and which in morality are

commonly placed under the notion of moral self-love, such as, dutiful concern for one's own culture and development, life and health, the duty of the spirit to preserve the dominion over sensational nature, to protect his own personality from arbitrary injuries, &c., &c., how, we may ask, can this entire class of actions have any place in the ethical system, unless their moral value may be shown from some other point of view, perhaps because the moral activity of the subject in, and for, society is conditioned by the same? Thus *e.g. Fichte* deduces these duties, and in consequence, quite consistently requires that to each individual, every other is to be regarded as self-means, but he himself only as means and instrument of the moral law.[1]

Still, supposing all requirements, which the moral consciousness developed by Christianity, makes in the conduct of man upon himself, were without violence capable of being reduced to *Fichte's*, or some similar, principle, we could not even then rest in this result. For it is in the first place very evident, that the moral requirement of self-denial would pass over into that of an *ideal self-negation*, just as we find it in Mysticism, in its doctrine of pure love. Further, since this moral fundamental tenet makes of course the same requirement of every one, it therefore develops itself into an open *contradiction;* personal individuals ought continually to deny themselves a dignity of which they are conscious that every one else is morally bound to pay to them.

But we cannot for a moment admit that this deduction is *sufficient*, everywhere, to form the ground of the above mentioned duties. Much rather may it be shown that there are cases where the so-called self-duties, from this point of view, would release the individuals from their requirements—*e.g.* where such an activity as is directed to society, as its end, is for ever cut off by imprisonment for life, or any other involuntary solitude.

Then too we find in the Holy Scripture self-love recognized as morally justifiable and obligatory, Matt. xxii. 39; Rom. xiii. 9; Gal. v. 14; James ii. 8. For if in these passages it is not expressly commanded, this recognition is nevertheless contained in them, by their requiring the co-ordination of love to our neighbour with love to ourselves.[2]

[1] *System der Sittenlehre*, S. 341 f.

[2] *Sartorius, Lehre von der heiligen Liebe*, observes on this command,

After what we have already said about the real nature of love, we need not stop to prove that the notion of self-love has always something in it improper, because unreal—even the New Testament, only employs it in citations from the Old, and even then only in a passing and presuppositional manner. If we keep close to the matter, this notion declares that the personal subject on its own account is a real *object of a moral obligation.*

What is the ground of this obligation?

It is impossible that it can rest upon the individual I, in its independent existence *(Fürsichsein)*, as it is found in experience, —upon self in its sinful naturalness, in which it is separated from God. If even this individual Ego, as such, becomes conscious of itself as being a reality which has the right, in its natural wants and endeavours, to make good its claims by the side of, and before others, it has still no moral significance whatever, but is nothing more than the natural impulse of *self-preservation in the form of Reflection.*

As all moral relations and obligations in truth have their root in the primitive obligation towards God, in love to Him, man can only be the object of an obligation to himself, in reference to his relation to God, and his moral dignity arising from the same. This moral dignity of the personal individual rests, *in itself* considered, on this, that he is created in the image of God, and in his individual peculiarity destined to realize an eternal thought of God; since the intervening of restraining, captivating sin, this destination of man can only become realized by means of redemption. This being the case, it is no longer his merely natural self, but his self as taken up into communion with

S. 65: it is not said: as thou lovest thyself, so love thy neighbour, but it much rather tells us to seek the object of our human love, not in ourselves, but in man including self *(Mitmenschen.)* If I rightly understand this assertion, it maintains that: ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν, is not to be understood in the sense of a co-ordination, but much rather so that the neighbour become placed in the place of self as object of love; in which case we may thus re-express the thought: love henceforward thy neighbour as thou hast hitherto loved thyself. But surely this conception is a very forced one; indeed, from the manner in which Paul, Eph. v. 28—33, explains ἀγαπᾶν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα ὡς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα or ὡς ἑαυτὸν, it is most decidedly excluded. For the completion of the implied sense of ὡς σεαυτὸν, we can only add ἀγαπᾷς.

God and thereby sanctified, whose dignity man has factually to recognize, and to honour in the so-called self-duties. He must first lose himself, renounce self, and yield himself up to God, in order again to receive himself from God, as an object of a well grounded moral obligation. Only in so far, as the conduct of man directed to himself as its end, may be regarded in this light, has it a rightful place in an ethical system.

From this exposition it follows that the practical conduct of the personal individual in relation to himself is a *threefold* one. The first, is the natural, and as it were, pro-moral impulse of self-preservation, but its notion must be regarded in such a wide sense, that the natural desire of man after a satisfactory condition, conformable to himself as a given individual being, is contained in the same. With the awakening of moral consciousness, two diametrically opposite courses present themselves to this fundamental impulse of natural life; the one leading down to the depths, the other up to the heights. He may either in selfishness pursue his destruction, or he may ascend to moral self-love, by means of his self-denying subjection to the law of God, which possesses the germ of love to God.[1]

The Holy Scripture bears testimony in various ways that the deepest root of sin is *selfishness*. As on the one hand our Saviour, when he gives testimony of His perfect holiness, makes it to consist in His seeking not His own will, not His own honour, but the will, the honour of His Father, John v. 30, vii. 18, viii. 50; comp. Matt. xx. 28, xxvi. 39, so the apostle Paul, when he presents Him as an example for us, he does so as of one who did not live for His own pleasure, but entirely for God, Rom. xv. 3. And in accordance with this in several passages, both our Saviour, and Paul, so designate the great *crisis* between the old life, under the governing principle of sin, and the new life, produced by the Holy Spirit, as one at which man ceases to live to himself, to seek his own, to love his own worldly life (Rom. xiv. 7, 8; Gal. ii. 20; 2 Cor. v. 15; Phil. ii. 3—8, 21; 1 Cor. x. 24, 33; Luke xiv. 26; John xii. 25), in one word, as one in which the power of

[1] The question here discussed is touched upon by *Thomas von Aquino*, in two passages of the *Summa*, P. ii., 1 qu. 77, art. 4. P. ii., 2, qu. 25, art. 7, without however his entering upon their further consideration.

selfishness becomes broken. But that, however, which needs first of all to broken before true sanctification is said to begin, can be nothing else than the real principle of sin. Accordingly, Paul in his characterization of the infamously degraded, dissolute race of the last times, places selfishness at the head of the long list of sins and vices. In keeping with the same, the deeply significant parable of the lost son, the fall of the son commences in his first of all desiring the separation of his portion of the inheritance from the Father's possession, and then in separating himself both from his Father, and the home of his Father, Lu. xv. 12, 13; and further the right form of the relation of the son to the Father is hinted at as being that, in which the son remains always in communion with the Father, and in which he regards the possessions of the Father as his own, ver. 31. Further, in perfect agreement with this conception, is the history of the fall, as was to be expected, that the first beginning of sin would definitely reveal its real nature. But the further proof of this matter we must postpone to a later place in our investigations.

In remarkable correspondence with the commencement of human evil at the fall, the Holy Scripture presents the completely developed form in which it shall appear at the end of the history of the world, for judgment, as the culminating point of the development of the God-opposing impulse, as the mystery of iniquity, as the solution of the manifoldly involved enigma, and as the uncovering of its most fearful secret, 2 Thess. ii. 8. When now Paul says of this ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἁμαρτίας, of this ἄνομος and ἀντικείμενος, *that he will sit in the temple of God, as God,* ἀποδεικνὺς ἑαυτὸν ὅτι ἐστὶ θεός, 2 Thessal. ii. 3, 4, he denotes, in the most characteristic manner, the highest possible point of selfishness, in which the creature assumes the unconditioned dignity and independence, and lays claim to the cultus which belonged to God. How near human pride has already reached this point, history affords abundant testimony. No one can fail to observe the correspondence between this *Mysterium iniquitatis* and the words, ye shall be as God, in the history of the fall, as well as with the third moment in the history of the temptation in the gospel of Matthew.—

The Church Fathers, and Scholastics generally, appealing to *Jes. Sirach* 10, 15, are accustomed to represent, (according to

one reading,) *superbia*, ὑπερηφανία as the beginning of the sin of the first parents of mankind, and as the productive root of all sinful nature in their followers. Thus, for instance, *Augustine*[1] and *Thomas von Aquino*[2] denote it—the latter, however, in order to become justified, by his different authorities, does so in a manner in which he distinguishes[3] between the origin *(causa interior, principium)*, the root *(radix)*, and the beginning *(initium)* of sin, and only places the last in *superbia*. The way, however, in which all these teachers of the Church more definitely determine the notion of this *superbia*,—as the assuming desire of unconditional independence, as the arbitrary striving after equality with God,—just shows that they have in their minds the inmost essence of *selfishness*, although under a somewhat one-sided conception, which keeps too much to the especial manner of the origin of the first sin. But besides, *Augustine*, and *Thomas* too, in other passages, expressly place the *amor sui*, in opposition to the *amor Dei*, as that from which all sin originates;[4] and similarly the deep-thinking *Maximus* speaks of the φιλαυτία.[5] It is easily understood, that this correct opinion of the essence of sin, is found among the Theologians of the middle ages, especially among the Mystics;—accordingly we find it, at least the germ of it, in *Hugo* and *Richard a St Victore*, more positively developed, although not without a strange tang, in *Tauler*, and in the *Teutschen Theologie*. When the Reformers, *Luther*,[6] and *Calvin*,[7] and in accordance with their predecessors,

[1] *De civ. Dei* lib. xiv, c. 13, 14. *Enchir.* c. 45. *De Genesi ad litt.* lib. viii. c. 14, lib. xi. c. 30. *De pecc. meritis et rem.* lib. ii. c. 17. *De spiritu et littera*, c. 7, u. a. m. a. St.

[2] *Summa*, P. ii. 1, qu. 84, art. 2. P. ii. 2, qu. 162, art. 6, 7.

[3] Comp. P. ii. 1, qu. 77, art. 4, qu. 84, art. 1 and 2. Moreover that a distinction is to be made between the principle working in all sin and the beginning of human sin, which as an individual temporal phenomenon must ever be some *individuation of this principle*, follows from what we have said at p. 93, and will become still more clearly presented to us in the second part of our investigations.

[4] *E. g. De civ. Dei*, lib. xiv. c. 28. *Summa*, P. ii. 1, qu. 77, art. 4.

[5] Κεφάλαια περὶ τῆς ἀγάπης, c. 4, § 26.

[6] *Commentar zur Genesis*, k. 3, v. i. Still, Luther often elsewhere expressly brings forward selfishness and pride as primitive sins.

[7] *Instit. rel. Christ.* lib. ii., c. 1, sect 4. *Bellarmin* controverts this representation at length, in favour of the theory which maintains that pride is the origin of sin, *de amissione gratiae et statu peccati*, lib. iii.

the oldest Protestant dogmatists, readily represent *unbelief*, as the beginning and root of all human sin, there is scarcely a real difference of opinion, for unbelief, as we have already seen, is co-ordinately contained, in the departure from love to God to selfishness, as one of its most essential and most primitive expressions. Several of the older dogmatists of our Church, have represented *disobedience* against God, as the original sin—very truly; but when this explanation is set over against the derivation of sin from pride or selfishness, there lies at the ground of the same, as clearly follows from our former discussion, a confounding of the form of all sin with its originating principle. —*Baumgarten-Crusius* adopts a twofold source of evil in man, *sensationalism and self-love*,[1] and how easily this mode of representation presents itself to one reflecting on sin, we may already imagine from the knowledge that similar maintenances are often met with in our modern philosophical and theological literature.[2] However, in the further development of this assertion, as to the double source of sin, which, by the by, is not at all distinctly conceived of, nor free from misconceptions in its historical bearings, so much becomes admitted, that every stimulant which excites the one of these two principles, also affects the other, that in the expressions of the one, there is always a certain admixture of the other,[3] therefore the outward co-ordination of both is thereby given up, and the necessity of seeking their unity recognised. And in truth it would make the notion of evil a fluctuating and uncertain one, if the investigation of its nature obliged us to admit two sources which are independent of each other: for in its source it has its unity. Then, further,

c. v. And we must agree with him when he says that unbelief, as the real beginning of sin, cannot be very well conceived of, but that unbelief always presupposes something as its motive, which must already be sin. As such a motive *Bellarmin* makes, and properly so, pride, especially valid.

[1] *Lehrbuch der christ. Sittenlehre*, § 43, S. 219.

[2] Among modern elaborations of our subject, *die Klaibersche Schrift:* The New Testament doctrine of sin and redemption reduces the former to selfishness and sensationalism; still without further developing the idea, as in general this otherwise very serviceable book only sketches the doctrine of sin in its most general outline. More correct is *Krabbe, die Lehre von der Sünde und vom Tode*, S. 84 f.

[3] A. a. O. S. 226.

it is neither to be seen why these two tendencies of human desire become designated by the same name (sin), nor have we any guarantee that this deduction from a duality of principles is concluded, and the possibility excluded of there being still a third, and a fourth principle, possessed of equal claim to be regarded as ground-tendencies of human depravity. But in this result the scientific consideration would be quite unable to rest, if it wished to retain the notion of *evil* at all. If now the adopted reciprocal working of this dualistic conception between sensation and self-love may be shown to be one and the same on both sides, one would then be tempted to seek their unity in some third principle standing over and above both. But every attentive consideration of the manifold forms of sin, shows that wherever we meet with expressions of unbridled sensationalism, selfishness is also there playing its part, but the reverse is by no means true. There is then nothing else left to that theory than to admit with us the validity of self-love, better, *self-seeking, as the source of all sin.*

Nägelsbach's Theology of Homer, in the sixth section: sin and expiation furnishes an interesting parallel to this development. He is of opinion that among the Greeks, in *Homer* for instance, the essence of sin is viewed as *twofold*, on the one hand, delusion—*ἄτη*—on the other hand, self-seeking—*ὕβρις*. Comp. *K. O. Müller Eumenides of Aeschylos*, S. 129, 136. *Nägelsbach* does not appear to understand this of two kinds of sin, but of two different modes of viewing it, wherefore he represents selfishness quite generally as being *Homer's* opinion of the source of sin, p. 284, 288. But in any case the Greek conception of *ὕβρις* is that of a much more limited notion than the selfishness of Christian Ethics.

Among ancient philosophers no one has more earnestly investigated the real nature of evil than *Plato*. In a passage of the Laws, v. 731. (*Bekkers* ed. iii. ii. p. 380), he reduces all sin to vehement *self love: τὸ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ γε πάντων ἁμαρτημάτων διὰ τὴν σφόδρα ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν αἴτιον ἑκάστῳ*

γίγνεται ἑκαστότε. This declaration, however, although it seizes upon *Plato's* fundamental opinion of the real nature of sin, stands too isolated as a definition of the principle of sin, to warrant our appealing to *Plato* as voucher for the idea of sin here developed. More definitely is this fundamental opinion indicated, when *Plato* in *Timæus*, 86, considers evil in the light of ἄνοια, and divides it accordingly into the two kinds of μανία and ἀμαθία (*Bekker* iii., ii., S. 129.) The deduction in the *Sophist*, 228, stands in an analogy with this which is not to be mistaken, and according to which the badness of the soul (κακία περὶ ψυχήν) is one that is twofold. The one γένος, what men call πονηρία, is denoted as *disease* in which the Platonic axiom: κακὸς ἑκὼν οὐδείς, plays its part; comp. concerning the sense in which *Plato* reduces morality to the idea of νόσος, *Timæus* l. c. and connection. Then the identity of this disease with the inward disturbance of the soul (στάσις) is shown, and pusillanimity, lawlessness, and unrighteousness, are reckoned as belonging to it. The other γένος is *ignorance* (ἄγνοια, corresponding to αἶσχρος in the physical sense). We also find the Platonic notion of ἄμετρον, as a term denoting evil; comp. on this point *Ed. Müller Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten* B. 1, S. 64 f. In this passage it is true, Plato only uses it as designating the one kind of evil, the ἄγνοια; for in general these ideas, also that of νόσος in the moral sense, are by no means always used by *Plato* with the same extent of meaning. But how could he have concealed from himself that the other kind, the στάσις which in *Timæus* corresponds to μανία, is also essentially immoderation? As he designates the good as the observance of temperance, ἔμμετρον, he often uses ἀμετρία as designating evil in general, so that we may regard this idea as the ground thought of the Platonic Ponerology; comp. *Ritter's Geschichte der Philosophie*, B. 2, S. 466. (*erste Ausg.*). The *rudis (Roheit)* of the uncultured spirit, the ἀμαθία or ἄγνοια, is the *defectus* in this intemperance, the wild and untamed violence of the πάθη, the μανία or στάσις is the *excessus*. But

because where this deficiency exists, this immoderateness will not easily remain absent, *Plato* often denotes the real nature of evil in general, as *ἀμαθία*, *e. g. Protagoras*, 359, 360, *Laws* iii. 689, although *ἀμαθία* is just as often to be met with as a particular kind of evil. The general presupposition is contained in the dualistic opinion of the primitive *ἀταξία* from which the present order of the world (*ὁ νῦν κόσμος*) has proceeded, from the old nature (*ἡ πάλαι ποτὲ φύσις, ἡ ἔμπροσθεν ἕξις*), from which the soul and all living creatures derive everything perverse and improper, *Timæus* 30, (*Bekker* iii., ii., S. 25), *Statesman* 273, (*Bekker* ii., ii., 281). Concerning the Platonic theory of evil in general, comp. the thorough and judicious treatment of the subject in *Ritter*, a. a. O. 303, and fol. 387 f. 401 f.; further, comp. *Ackermann, das Christliche im Plato*, S. 51, 59 f. 302 f.; *Kern, über die Lehre von der Sünde* (*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1832, H. 3, S. 100 f.). *Märker* treats this subject more at length than any one else, but not at all in an impartial manner, *das Princip des Bösen nach den Begriffen der Griechen*, S. 319—330, and often elsewhere.

Rothe controverts, *Theologische Ethik*, Bd. 2, S. 181—187, the reduction of sin to selfishness, by setting up a theory opposed to it, but which stands related to the well known derivation of sin from the predominance of sensationalism. It is true, he first of all lays down *two* fundamental forms of abnormal self-determination, sensational—and selfish—sins, and thereby admits selfishness to be the fundamental propensity, which determines the one side of sinful devolopment, and its individual phenomena. But for our part, we can never even superficially have observed the form of human depravity, if we are able to overlook the great significance, which the elevation of sensationalism to the determining power has in this question; if we would deny that the broadest stream of this depravity flows directly from this source. Accordingly, it may appear

as if this very variance of our opinions, on which *Rothe* lays so much emphasis were capable of being brought into agreement. But it is not so, for while we regard the deeper root for this assumptive elevation of sensationalism to the determining principle to be selfishness, *Rothe*, in a directly opposite manner, ultimately derives selfish sins, from the materiality or sensationalism of the human creature—whereby our method of consideration is of course placed directly in a contrast of principles. The manner in which sins of selfishness are reduced to the preponderating power of material nature over personality, is clearly exhibited in the following sentences (a. a. O. S. 175 f.): "In sins of selfishness the human individual refers the whole to his individual person, instead of referring his individual person to the whole. Selfishness is *natural* to the human individual being *in his mere naturalness*. The personality of the human individual being, as purely natural, *i.e.* just what it strictly is, the product of the material human nature-organism (of the be-souled body) is that of a *mere* individual, and strictly *as individual*, its tendency and bent of nature is inward and towards self.—For the material nature-organism even of the human individual has no other object, in its living activity, in going out of *itself*, than the completion of a perfect centrality of life in the *complex of natural elements constituting it*,—*i.e.* its only object is the perfect completion of the *absolute individual* Ego."

We do not overlook that *Rothe* obtains a deep and comprehensive significance of meaning in his uniting the autonomy of sensational nature, to the root of selfishness, for the reduction of sin; neither do we overlook the ingenuity which he well knows how to apply in exhibiting, from his point of view, in a new light many phenomena of human sin. But as to the tenability of the opinion itself, we must first of all observe, that it has for its immediate premiss the Rothian conception of moral goodness, the nature of which is found to consist in the determination of material nature by personality; and in its more remote connection the presumptuous, allied Gnostico-theosophic

theory, by means of which *Rothe*, in laying the basis of his Ethics, derives the different spheres of worldly being, up to the very highest, that of personality, from God. A speculative doctrine which makes this process begin with matter, namely, "with that which by God is definitely undetermined, the pure contrast of God, to the overcoming of which in the creature, the Creative efficiency of God is constantly, from the primitive Creative act, directed," a. a. O. S. 179, can truly only make sin ultimately to consist in the determination of the will for the material principle, as "the principle standing in contrast overagainst God." A critique of the Rothian theory of evil would therefore have to put this basis more closely to the test, for which we have of course no room here. Nevertheless *Rothe* will allow me to make a candid remark, controverting the very nucleus of his deduction, and so much the more, since he is perfectly agreed with me, in the manner in which he explains the absoluteness of the Divine personality, according to its fundamental determinations.

I consider this nucleus-point to be the derivation of the non-ego in general from God, Bd. 1, p. 85. For if this contraposition is only made intelligible in its necessity, it comes to this, that God, with the *positio* of matter, makes the beginning with that which, so to speak, is the furthest removed from the Divine Ego as absolute spirit, a. a. O. S. 126. Assuredly one would have expected that the author of the theological ethics would have avoided at any cost making matter in this dualistic sense a very *ἀντίθεος*, a principle "against which the Being of God *can only* be *absolutely negativing, antithetic, and repelling*," Bd. 2, p. 194. In the above connection, matter appears to be regarded more in the new Platonic-sense, in the sense of *Plotinus*, according to whom it is also the ground of evil, and would become determined by deprivation (*στέρησις*) as the last, the furthest removed from the *ἀρχὴ*, as that which has the least reality. But in reality it is just the very derivation of evil from matter, which necessitated *Rothe* to the adoption of this dualistic mode of representation; for the earnest moral conception of sin as a positive

antithesis against God was only then possible under this condition. But as to the derivation of the non-ego from God, it is said not to be indeed conditioning, but absolute, necessary consequence of the Divine self-conception, by which God is personal." Since God, thinking and positioning in one and the same act, determines Himself as personality, that is to say, as Ego, He equally thinks and positions *eo ipso* His *non-ego*, Bd. 1, S. 85. But since *Rothe* himself admits that the negation of the absoluteness of God is herewith directly connected, p. 86, it follows that God can only be really absolute *in abstracto;* but must first of all obtain it in reality by vanquishing *(Aufhebung)* this non-ego as such, which negatives His absoluteness, the vanquishing of which is the very task of the entire world-process, including pre-eminently the moral process. And then what guarantee is there from a purely speculative stand-point, that this negation or vanquishment will be successful, since God is necessitated to the positioning of the non-ego, and this non-ego is primitive matter—but matter as the pure "contrast of God," necessarily resists its negation by God? In matter of fact, indeed, it is not successful; for with respect to the re-establishment of the Divine *absoluteness* by this process, incomplete success is non-success; but the success is imperfect, if this antithetic determination of the non-ego against God can only at last be negatived in a portion of personal beings, by the destruction of this portion itself, Bd. 2, S. 332 f. And as to the degree of success in its positive vanquishment, is it not *we*, who by our moral doing,—although assisted by Divine grace,—must make that good again, which God, although determined to the same by an inevitable necessity, has made evil? It is just this very production of *matter* which makes this fatal necessity, the production of something, which only is, in order to become vanquished, but which, being such a contrast, becomes with necessity, hardened in itself, to a principle inimical to God,—to the most diametrical contradiction against the idea of Divine freedom, therefore against the Divine absoluteness. In such a case God is

in truth in a worse condition than any human workman, who has it at least in his power, rather entirely to refuse to begin a work, when he foresees that he cannot set the requisite powers in motion for its accomplishment, without at the same time calling into being a disturbing efficiency of the same.—*Rothe* will perceive from this that I cannot exclude his theory from the class of dualistic opinions, because matter, the principle of which is "in itself absolutely opposed to God," "is absolutely set by God," Bd. 2, S. 221. Indeed it may appear as a heavier fate of God to be *obliged* Himself to position such a dismal contrast against Himself, the nightly shadow which now places all His works in gloom, than to meet with it as original:—just as in *Plato*, whose above quoted thoughts, especially as they are presented in the *Statesman*, the theory of *Rothe* very strongly reminds us.[1]

As to the given question concerning the reduction of sin to the *autonomy of sensational nature*, I am quite agreed with *Rothe* when he says, "the material nature-organism, even of the human individual being, in its life-motion proceeds out of itself for no other purpose than for the completion of a complete centrality of life in the complex of natural elements constituting it." But how it is said to follow from this, that selfishness—which only there can be spoken of where there is already a personal will—is natural to the human individual being, not in the sense of the *altera natura*, which is itself that which is depraved by sin, but in the sense of the *natura prima et integra*, how this follows I confess I am not able to see. The truly natural, were most assuredly, that, wherever this tendency of the individual being to self-centralization, by an impulse proceeding from itself, came into collision with moral order, that this conflict should immediately betray itself in the consciousness, and also in the same moment subside again by the will revoking such an impulse. The

[1] Comp. the keen-sighted remarks which from another point of view *Dr Kym* makes against this contraposition, in his treatise: "*Bewegung Zweck und die Erkennbarkeit des Absoluten.*" S. 46, ff.

questions how far the development of this consciousness may be essentially conditioned by educational influences, and the peculiar difficulties arising from the absence of such influences, do not belong to the present stage of our discussion, since we have not here to do with the primeval origin of sin. Therefore for these reasons I cannot regard the deduction of selfishness, from the essential determinations of sensational naturalness, as at all proved, by the above quoted train of thought.—

According to *Rothe's* judgment the deficiency in a proper distinction between the questions as to the *essence*, and the principle of sin, stands pre-eminently in the way of *this* investigation of the notion of evil, a. a. O. Bd. 2, S. 184. But whatever may prove the hindrance in our investigation, its ground cannot be in this. *Rothe* understands by the principle of sin, that which conditions and occasions the origin of sin. In *this* entire sphere of our inquiry, this is not at all the question; the *origin* of sin becomes there first of all a question, when the nature of human *freedom* has been the subject of inquiry. But here in this doctrine of sin, the principle of sin is taken in another sense, which the second edition had already expressly explained, as the central-determination in the essence of sin, the ground tendency to which all others may be reduced. With *Rothe*, principle means idea of existence (*Existenzbegriff* determining-ground of existence), here idea of essence (*Wesensbegriff*), for which reason the question concerning the principle of sin *could* not become separated from that concerning the essence of the same.

With the other strictures of *Rothe*, both in this and in other places, I am quite agreed, as is evident in that the ground of such is only to be found in the first edition, in the second it had been already withdrawn, or more exactly determined.

The peculiar conditions, under which the empirical development of sin stands in single individuals, according to the nature of our present being and becoming, can only there come under

consideration, where in the course of our investigations we meet with the notion of original sin. Therefore when we now attempt to show the manifoldness of sinful nature in its dependence upon the principle of selfishness, our representation has of course only to keep in view the *inward and essential connection*, in which the different sinful propensities stand with this principle, and so to furnish the proof, as it were, that the principle of sin has been correctly determined. We can make no use of the customary divisions of actual sins found in the theological text-books, and for the most part derived from the patristic age. These divisions are very suitable to direct attention to the multiplied ways in which man can defile himself with sin; some of them, to which we must hereafter again refer, express a difference in degree of guilt, partly conditioned by the different amount of sin, partly by the different manner in which it was committed; but every one sees in a moment that these divisions are not formed according to that genetic point of view. For our present task, namely, to make clear the different fundamental directions, by means of which everything partaking of the nature of sin proceeds from the known principle, the starting-point of all these divisions is too narrow, and for this reason, because they only have respect to *actual* sins.

If the principle of selfishness, separating man from God, is the ground determination in the notion of sin, it is not, of course, so to be understood, as if man had of necessity in the committal of sin, everywhere the *express intention*, of making good the claims of his formal Ego to the extent of his ability. There can be no doubt that in human life such an express appropriation of the principle of selfishness in the form of a general axiom is often to be met with; but then this bare assumption of the selfish principle, stripped of every particular determination of individual existence, requires at any rate a consciousness deeply sunk in sin and an augmented energy in its determination, which cannot at least be regarded as the first activity of this principle. For in the first place the Ego furnishes the enjoyment of its self-hood, by means of a *determinate contents of life*, in which it finds its satisfaction, and just in relation to this given contents of life, it assumes to itself that unlimited importance, by which self-hood becomes self-seeking, yet manifestly because this given contents of life

created for him this self-enjoyment, this augmented feeling of his own existence.

We must more closely investigate this relation, in order to recognise the particular forms of sin, which in this direction proceed from selfishness.

Our life, as all organic self-developing existence, becomes incessantly stimulated and urged forward by a variety of *impulses*. The still forming, as it were, vegetable impulses which condition the entire development of our bodily existence, but have their laboratoria in its dark ground on the other side of our consciousness, do not belong to the sphere of our present considerations. We have only to keep in view those impulses which fall within the sphere of our conscious perception,[1] and the satisfaction of which results from a conduct directed to the same as its end.

It is a false, and, in its consequences, ruinous representation to make disturbance and variance of the existence the essential pre-supposition in the idea of impulse. But of course every impulse presupposes *a deficiency*, an entirely or partially *undeveloped state of being, (Nochnichtsein)* of that on which its satisfaction is in some way conditioned; as the impulse expresses itself in passion or inclination, it is its self-revelation of its want. Impulses are the living excitants of the progressing development of man, in which self-development from within outwards, and constant reception and appropriation of that which is without, mutually condition and supplement each other. If man be destined to a development, and can only, by virtue of the same, truly realize the idea of his nature, his life cannot fail, in excitation and movement, by means of manifold impulses.

[1] In so far as an impulse directed to the object of its gratification enters into the consciousness, it becomes desire, passion; in another respect (not so consciously directed to the object of its satisfaction) tendency, propensity – according to *Spinoza's* correct definition: Cupiditas est appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia, Ethic, p. iii. prop. 1 Schol. Therefore the sentence is also quite correct: ignoti nulla cupido, while the same judgment in reference to the impulse were decidedly incorrect. Impulse is desire, passion, in so far as its motions are in a given activity of the sensational perception or feeling occupying a given moment of time (in its practical tendency); as an abiding condition, realizing itself either in the one sphere or the other, it is tendency, propensity. *Passion* is distinguished from desire, and *propensity* from tendency, by the former of each pair of ideas containing the idea of *immoderateness*.

These impulses belong *partly to the sensational*, partly to the *spiritual*, sphere of life. The spirit, as created, becomes excited to self-development by impulses; if it were without impulse, it were also without want, resting in itself as its Creator. When one imagines that it is only possible to raise the spirit of man above the sphere of nature by identifying him with the nature of God, it may pass very well, and quite consistently in the sense of an ideal pantheism, but it absolutely contradicts the radical principle of theism. By the finite spirit being raised above nature it is not at all taken out of its creaturehood. The created spirit, because it is spirit, is distinct from nature qualitatively and infinitely; in that it is created, it is just as distinct from God. If the human spirit, as such, has not its beginning in itself, but in God, and is also gradually self-developing—and not merely in the individual, but also in the species—he will also become excited to development by original indwelling impulses.

The human impulses divide themselves into a *twofold ground-tendency*. In those of the one, the individual existence makes good its full claims; his all-sided satisfaction is its natural end which it keeps in view and pursues; it endeavours to appropriate everything which heightens his self-feeling. The vitality of these impulses is the energetic, self-affirmation of man in his individual being. Accordingly the tendency of all these impulses is *egotistic (selbstish.)* To these belong not merely the sensational impulses, which man, according to his fundamental determinations, has in common with animal life, but also some impulses of spiritual nature, as the impulse to know, in so far as it is nothing else than an impulse to spiritual nourishment,[1] just so the corresponding impulse to activity of spirit.

[1] By this more exact definition, one is already prevented from supposing that the thirst for the knowledge of the truth is to be reckoned among these egotistic impulses. In this thirst there is much rather a religious element contained; for if it does not arise from the diseased non-nature of that empty logical enthusiasm which proceeds from nothing, and is indifferent towards every contents, it manifestly depends upon faith in an essential truth, be the inquiring mind ever so indefinitely conscious of the same, which contains the guarantee that sense and intelligence dwell in every other reality. The germs of religion are not at all so sparingly scattered in human life, that we may only venture to recognise them there, where we meet with definite thoughts of a personal God, as resident in the human self-consciousness.

However, only a very inexact use of language can reconcile itself to ascribe, with *Daub*[1] and others, *selfishness* to the natural impulses as such. This notion points out a perversion, a disease of self-hood, which is only possible in the *moral* sphere, in the sphere both of self-consciousness, and of the will. If all these impulses are essentially directed to the satisfaction of one's own self, such impulses are of course necessary if there is to be individual existence at all. This self-hood which asserts its validity in them, is the indispensable basis of all higher life, without it love itself loses all its worth, nay more, without such an individualizing, concentrating tendency, there could be no love in the mutual relation of created personalities.

Accordingly, we may reduce the impulses of this tendency collectively to the ground-impulse of *self preservation*,—to the *conatus quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur* in *Spinoza*,[2]—as its modification. For its notion in relation to living creatures, cannot be so narrowly conceived of, as not to include the natural endeavour after the furtherance of life. Every thing living, which exists in time, only *is*, in that it perpetually *becomes*; it can only preserve itself in life, in so far, and for so long, as it further unfolds its life. And indeed it is a matter self-evident that everything living strives to promote its life, not merely as life in general, but in its individual determinateness, according to the individual endeavours which are contained in the peculiarity of the individual being.—Even the destructive propensity, often met with in children, is nothing more than a form of the impulse of self-preservation; in many of its phenomena it originates from curiosity, and consequently is to be referred to the impulse to know; but commonly it has its root in the child's endeavour to become conscious of the things, as standing over against its independence and superior power.

The impulse of self-preservation drives man to a given activity *in relation to the world*, if it be in part only an antithetic activity;

[1] *Vorlesungen über die philosophische Anthropologie*, S. 117, accordingly *Daub* calls the animals selfish. *Vgl. auch System der theologischen Moral, Th.* 2, *Abth.* 2 (1843), S. 216. But where there is still no self-hood bent in upon itself we cannot talk of selfishness.

[2] *Ethic.* P. iii. *prop.* vi. vii. Just so *Thomas v. Aquino Secundæ Secundæ*, qu. 64, art. 5. Quaelibet res naturaliter conservat se in esse et corrumpentibus resistit quantum potest.

and his entire active relation to the world develops itself first of all out of these excitants. The individual in his impulse only seeks himself, his satisfaction; and nevertheless the impulse urges him outward, out of himself. For in himself as individual being he does not find those things, in pursuit of which he is set by the impulse; therefore he turns his eyes without, in order to procure the objects which furnish him with the satisfaction of his impulses, in order to put the world in such a relation to himself, as is agreeble to them. Thus there arises from those impulses, a restless striving in man, to subordinate and appropriate the things of the world to himself; the impulse of self-preservation becomes the impulse to the world's conquest. In this endeavour of man to appropriate the world, he at the sametime unfolds his own being; his hidden powers, and latent gifts, cannot otherwise become elevated to real contents of life than by their activities on the varied materials which the world presents to them.

The principles of *moral consciousness*, and of *God-consciousness*, raise themselves above the entre sphere of these impulses. Both these, in themselves, are in the human spirit, not merely in the form of abstract thought, and feeling shut up in themselves, but as living impulses; a moral and religious impulse, are essentially bound to the moral and religious consciousness, which is directed towards some act, be it in the first place only a purely inward one.

If we direct a little close attention to the moral impulse, merely as a fact of the inward life, we perceive in it a threefold ground direction, namely, the impulse to procure on every hand *dominion over nature*,[1] the impulse righteously to *separate* the spheres of individual personalities and to preserve the claims of each, and the impulse *unite* to these spheres by benevolence and love.[2] The

[1] This dominion is to be understood in such a comprehensive sense, that, *e.g.* of the four Cardinal virtues of ancient Ethics, three, σωφροσύνη, φρόνησις and ἀνδρία would fall within this sphere.

[2] *Spinoza* indeed *im dritten Theile seiner Ethik* quite differently reduces, not merely the *perturbationes animi*, in anger, revenge, jealousy, ambition, sensuality and coveteousness, &c., but also those in love, benevolence, compassion, nay more the different kinds of the two active emotions, *animositas* and *generositas*, to one and the same ground-impulse, to the *appetitus uniuscujusque rei in suo esse perseverandi*. The simple-minded reader, who has not yet learnt to venerate the Medusan-head as the primitive image of scientific austerity, will not

distinction of this threefold tendency of moral impulse is not a matter of mere abstract consideration, but is so strongly impressed upon life itself, as experience teaches us, that we very often meet with the impulse of one direction, where the other two are almost entirely absent. But naturally enough, the unity of the moral impulse hereby violated avenges itself, in every such separated tendency, by a deficiency in its fundamentality and purity.

The two higher impulses found in union with the moral, and God-consciousness, are essentially distinct from all these impulses, in that they are not directed to the satisfaction of individual existence, but much rather to the subordination of self to a general order, to the sacrificing of the individual to other personalities. One must not allow himself to be here misled by the consideration, that these impulses receive their subjective satisfaction, and indeed have in themselves a higher, more inward satisfaction than those egotistic impulses;—they conduct, it is true, to an inward satisfaction, but this is not their *end*.—

The impulse of the animal drives it with an involuntary force to the object in which it finds its satisfaction; it produces in an immediate manner the activity by which it puts itself in possession of this object. If the efficiency of human impulses were similarly related, we could only conceive, by virtue of their manifold variety and complex character, a confused mixture of the most diverse kinds of elements and tendencies, chaotic and void, without a fixed point of union. But it is self-contradictory to suppose that in a personal being, who conceives of himself as Ego, the impulse should *immediately produce* its corresponding activity. Here the relation of impulse to action is one brought about through the medium of the will. The stimuli to action proceeding from the impulses, must descend into the deep ground of the will, for their certification, having which, they again ascend, as

overlook the formal, in part, unendurably tautological character, of the means by which *Spinoza*, "more geometrico," obtains his result.—The striving to preserve one's own being becomes also the first and only fundamental basis of virtue, P. iv., *prop.* xviii. *schol.*—*prop.* xxii. *coroll.*, the more one strives and is able to seek his interest, *i.e.*, strives and is able to preserve his being, so much the more virtuous is he, *prop.* xx. For virtue is defined to be the power of man P. iv. *defin.* viii.; but the power of man is dependent on his being, *i.e.* on the striving of man to preserve himself in being.

motives, to real conduct, whose *producing cause* is the *will* itself. It is the band of the will which holds together these impulses and imparts to their working a certain consistency, whether in good or evil. It is only with respect to those men who appear to go through life aimless, and characterless, that this seems inapplicable,—to those, who, to use *Fichte's* language, do not in fact really determine, but ever allow themselves to be goaded, and driven along, by blind propensities, who, just for this reason, are possessed of no real consciousness, since their mental representations are never produced by their own self-activity, consequently never determine and judge, but merely dream a long dream, determined by the obscure course of idea-association.[1] Nevertheless no one can fall into this pulpy condition of soul, without, by his own act, sacrificing his will, and this dreamy, floating, existence, must be regarded, as its consequence and continuation.

It is a false negation of Morality which, rigidly followed, must inevitably lead to Manicheism, when an ascetic tendency towards the same, has often reckoned as belonging to perfection, the *weakening and suppression* as much as possible, of all human impulses which are not of a direct religious-moral significance.[2] We are much rather able to recognize the healthfulness of human life, then, when with those highest impulses of unconditional significance, the remaining impulses conditioned according to their true vitality are so together, that both classes of impulses stand with each other, in undivided harmonious union. Now to this harmonious union, it is of course requisite that the latter impulses, and those endeavours, proceeding from them, first of all, unconditionally subordinate themselves to these impulses, which originate in the conscience, and God-consciousness, in order then in progressive development, to attain to a more inward positive union with those powers comprehending all, and sanctifying all,—as it is presented to us in 1 Cor. x. 31 and elsewhere. Here, it is absolutely, not the question of a mere subordination of the less to the greater, however such a subordination may be

[1] *Sittenlehre* S. 175.

[2] The relative right which the predominating negative manner of treating these impulses, in relation to the diseased condition of man, will be made clear in the second volume.

adapted to bring about the co-operation of the selfish impulses directed to finite objects: between the unconditional and the conditional there is never a relation of degree. Or, are we to believe ourselves able, with these poor categories, to make manifest, with respect to Christ, the relation of these relative impulses to His unbroken fellowship with the Father? The consciousness of this fellowship, and the thirsting of holy love to introduce the human race to the same, is the absolutely determining principle of His life, so that no natural impulse was able to excite Him to activity, without being apprehended, penetrated, by that Divine principle, and by it appropriated as an organ. In this we have the designation of the highest task which is given to man.—

If the essential relations of man to the different objects of the world, are contained in the entirety of these impulses, it follows from the result of our consideration on the order of these impulses, what the true and perfect order is, of our *relation to the world*, both in the sphere of spiritual, and sensational life. The perfection of this relation cannot of course *liberate* him from the world, and estrange him from its manifold interests; but can alone consist in the fulfilment, in the highest sense of the calling given at the beginning, Gen. i. 26, 27—that since he participates in the image of God, and is thereby destined to self-conscious fellowship with God, he should have dominion over the world, and appropriate it to himself.

In order to this dominion over the world, nothing is more necessary than that he himself be inwardly *free from the world*. But man can only be free from the world in so far as he finds his true home not in the world, but in a region above it, in communion with God. Here too the Archimedian δός μοι ποῦ στῶ holds good; in order to have dominion over the things of the world, one needs a position out of it independent of and free from its motion.[1] With such a position he has won the true regulating principle for his manifold relations to the world, the firm ground, from which the other positive moment in this dominion and appropriation of the world arises—on the one hand the theoretical

[1] *Voltaire* in one of his tragedies simply and beautifully expresses the beginning of this dominion of the world by means of inward freedom from the world—Je crains Dieu et n'ai point d'autre crainte.

moment, that the world becomes perfectly transparent to the human consciousness, in order everywhere to recognize the prevalent self-revealing Deity therein, on the other hand the practical, that he builds by his own activity the real form of the world, so far as it is conditional by his working in unison with the Divine arrangements and purposes. That alone is the true dominion of the human spirit over the world, when, as priest of God, he is able to be King of Nature.[1] That which, on the contrary, now-a-days makes the loudest claims to the dominion of nature, its external subjugation by railways, steam-machinery, and the like, is not only quite compatible with slavish dependence on nature, but leads directly to the very acme of this dependency, if it lays claim to be the proper and entire dominion of nature.

If man sunders himself from the Eternal Source of his life, in order to possess and enjoy himself in his independent existence, he sinks down to the contradiction of being obliged to lose himself in the things of this world.[2] That which he in freedom should appropriate to himself, that which he in unison with the absolute determination of his existence should use and enjoy, without allowing himself thereby to be brought into bondage, 1 Cor. vi. 12, vii. 31; Phil. iv. 12, is just what now becomes lord over him; the natural impulses of his soul, robbed of their true centre, become torn away from the true adjustment of their harmonious working, and inflamed to wild passions and lusts. Language denotes by the word *Passion (Leidenschaft)*[3] these disturbed conditions, since it presents to us the life of man, in a more or less striking form, and significantly intimates thereby that man has in sin exchanged his *free, active* relation to the world for a passive, for an oppressing dependence on the things of the world as

[1] Comp. the beautiful remarks on this connection in *Sartorius*, a. a. O. 45 f. *Neander apost. Zeitalter*, S. 675 f.

[2] *Apol. Conf. Aug. art. de peccato orig.*: aegra natura, qui non potest Deum timere et diligere, Deo credere, quaerit et amat carnalia (p. 54, *ed. Richenb*). But carnalia in the sense of the apology are not merely the objects of sensual passions, but all worldly and egotistic striving.—It is a significant feature in the parable of the lost son, that separated from his Father, whose servants have bread enough and to spare, he seeks his satisfaction in wild world-life, and at length in animal enjoyments; and only in hunger discovers his destitution.

[3] Passion, from passio, patior.—Tr.

objects of his passions.[1] By the departure of man from God the things of the world, as such, separated from their essential relation to God, and therefore no longer revealing His holy love and wisdom—*κόσμος* in the sense in which it is used, 1 John ii. 15,[2] become the objects of his endeavours, and in them his striving spends and hardens itself, and instead of his obtaining the mastery over them, they obtain the mastery over him.

With the excitation of selfishness there always arises some particular form of sensuality, worldly lust (*ἐπιθυμία τοῦ κόσμου*, 1 John ii. 17, comp. the *ἐπιθυμίαι κοσμικαί*, with *ἀσέβεια*, as the negativing side of selfishness which propagates itself in them, Tit. ii. 12), the very contrast to true freedom in the appropriation and use of worldly things. Also the origin of individual acts of sin, appears almost universally to be brought about by some particular tendency of the *ἐπιθυμία*, which first of all making its appearance in the lower sphere of life, external to the determining Ego, excites and charms it to unite itself with it, or rather to yield to it, so that from this concession of the Ego, *i.e.* of the will in the *ἐπιθυμία* sin is brought forth (*ἕκαστος πειράζεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος. εἶτα ἡ ἐπιθυμία συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν.* Jak. i. 14, 15; comp. Rom. vii. 7, 8). This idea of sin as worldly lust, by which man is ever driven restlessly about, and by which new passions are ever

[1] We learn from *Cicero—Tus. Quæs.*, Bk. iv. cap. 17—21, which, as a whole, contains many beautiful remarks on the subject here treated of —that the Stoics and Peripatetics have disputed, whether the perturbationes animi—with which *Cicero* translates the *πάθη* of the Greek Ethics, comp. cap. 5—were to be entirely *extirpated* or only *moderated*. Thereby if the definition of *πάθος*, quoted from *Zeno*, be laid down—aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio—the question is of itself answered in favour of the Stoics, to which too we must agree if we applied the same in reference to our notion of passion. But if we confine the question to the motus animi as essential expression of excited impulse, it follows from what has gone before, that true Ethics in the peripatetic demand of the mere observance of moderation cannot of course maintain its ground. If the Ethic had nothing else to lay down respecting the natural impulses besides this negation, it were not upon their own showing to be seen, why the negation should not be carried so far as to require the endeavour to subject and extirpate these impulses as much as possible.

[2] Comp. the excellent exposition of the passage in *Lücke's Kommentar*, S. 176, 177.

excited in him, the Hebrew language expresses by the terms רֶשַׁע and רַע, derivatives from רָשַׁע and רָעַע, both of which have the ground-notion: to be boisterous, unquiet.—

For the progressive development of sin from its own principle, it is essentially indifferent *in what particular form* of worldly lust selfishness embodies itself; every earthly relation, every interest directed towards finite objects, may serve that principle as material for its actualization; the world blessedness is in all its boughs and branches the very contrast of God-blessedness, Jas. iv. 4; 1 John ii. 15—17.[1] However, in the peculiar position assigned to man in the scale of existences, uniting in himself a spirit related to God, and earthly naturalness, it is easy to understand that amid the different forms of selfish *worldly passions*, that of *sensual lust* would be especially dangerous to him, and would extend itself the furthest in the life, under its dominion. This double, united nature, this duality in unity of the human creature, whereby it—as *Theodor of Mopsuestia* already recognized[2] —represents itself both as the bond of the created universe, and its different existences, and at the same time as the most vulnerable point, standing out as most of all exposed to the attack of the unity-dissolving power of sin. Thus the *variance* of man with God, in sin, appears everywhere, although in very different

[1] The difficult expressions of this passage, which, at the first glance, appear more than merely to touch upon Manicheism, may be quite strictly taken, according to the above fixation of the notion of κόσμος. The apostle himself explains what he means by the words πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κοσμῷ by the examples immediately following; namely, the different directions of the ἐπιθυμία, as they all relate themselves to the κόσμος, belong to it. Of this impulse collectively the apostle says, that it does not spring from the Father, but from the world, in so far as it has lost, by the fall of man, from God, to selfishness, for his disturbed consciousness, its abiding connection with God, in so far as it has ceased to be for him, what it is in itself, *manifesting organ of God*, Rom. i. 20. This subjective severance of the connection of the world with God is according to its notion *the preceding*; first of all now, in their state of separation from God do the things of the world excite in man the false passionate desires in their manifold directions. Comp., besides *Lücke*, a. a. O., *Frommanns Johanneischen Lehrbegriff*, S. 262 ff.—The comparison of the passage with James cap. iv. vers. 1—4 also well serves to explain it.

[2] In a passage quoted by *Nitzsch, System der christl. Lehre*, § 89, from *Theodoret Quaest* xx., *ad. Genes.* *Augustine* has a similar thought, *ad Orosium contra Priscill. et Origen*, c. 10.

degrees and relations, equally as *variance between the two sides of his own nature.* If the spirit of man falls away from God, so falls nature away from his spirit; if the former will no longer be in voluntary resignation, an organ for God, so the latter refuses to serve the spirit of man as organ. Whereas before, the human sensational nature willingly took up every motion proceeding from the intelligent and determining spirit, and with readiness promoted the outbirth of the same, so now, it has become an independent power over against the spirit, with its own law of efficiency (with the *νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι*, Rom. vii. 23), with its own independent connection of impulses and their expressions; so that very often the highest moments of spiritual life, the noblest resolves, have no longer the power to bring about their external development to appropriate to themselves the sensational side of life, or to break through its bad habits.

In the further progress of this disturbance of sin, we find in the place of this variance between spirit and sense, *unity* again; but it is a *false* and inverted unity, since the will and the understanding degrade themselves to the character of constant, willing, executive organs, for the demands of the sensational impulses and passions. As however the will and understanding constantly urge to a certain connection, of the moments of life, while the sensational passions on the contrary claim immediate gratification, frequent collisions between them cannot be wanting even in this inverted order, which from time to time make man more sensible of his miserable slavery in this condition, nevertheless the unbridled sensational impulse usually maintains its ground.

In this assumed dominion of the sensational impulse, a *twofold tendency* is easily discoverable. We denote the one as a *positive* thirsting for pleasure, as manifested in voluptuousness, and rioting of every kind, in the never satiated pursuit of the fleeting gratifications of sensational lust. The gratification of the passions is one of momentary duration, and therefore those who are under their dominion are excited to restless driving, and dissolute immoderation. The convulsive, wearying, endeavours of the service of lust, are to retain the sensational enjoyment, which is one vanishing in the moment, but the labour is vanity, since the provocation of the enjoyment is conditioned by the passion, which is immediately extinguished in the gratification. The second ground tendency is the *negative* thirst for pleasure, which finds its

gratification in giving itself up to an absolutely passive condition. From this condition arise, especially, the sins of slothful inactivity, of effeminate pusillanimity, and general torpor.

If now accordingly, this multiform world-lust supplies to selfishness the manifold material in which it progressively unfolds itself, it is nevertheless just this very relation between selfishness and world-lust which restrains, and prevents human evil from its development into devilish evil,—to conscious self-idolatry, and further, to burning hatred against God and all created existence. Since the principle of selfishness realizes itself by means of the world-lust, in its manifold directions, this variety of form becomes, at the same time, the *concealment* of its common principle;[1] in this ceaseless hunting, and driving, after the individual objects of the passions, the Ego becomes only seldom properly conscious that it has made self its idol. *This relative unconsciousness* of the children of this world, of the real principle of their life, of course constitutes a mitigation of their guilt, which only reaches its maximum, when man looks through the veils of worldly impulse, and perceives the horrible principle of sin, namely selfishness dominant within him, without resolving upon its extermination. And here under the different forms of the world-lust the dominion of those passions which are directed to immediate sensational enjoyment is pre-eminently adapted to maintain that unconsciousness; while the passions of coveteousness, despotism, ambition, and pride, unlike the above, are only thin disguises slightly concealing the dark form of selfishness. Since the former live entirely in the moment, pursue only their own gratification, they do not necessarily come into immediate conflict with the rights or even with similar strivings of others, so long as they do not fail in the means of enjoyment, but rather exult at their common endeavours.[2] The latter, on the contrary, regard

[1] Also the theological consideration of evil has not seldom permitted itself to be deceived by this concealment, and taken it for the nature of the thing itself, *e. g.* in the discussed conception of sin as conversio a majori bono ad minus bonum, in so far as it does not understand by the latter the creaturely self-hood, but the outward objects of the passion.

[2] The passions of the sensational are generally social; those of despotism, ambition, covetousness, pride, and hatred are unsocial. But in all sociality, even in its very worst forms, there is ever an opposing power to the enhancement of moral depravity to its very maximum. Sociality exercises an equalizing, levelling power against the highest moral exaltations, as against the deepest degradations. It strives after

themselves as necessitated to negative the similar possession in others, and to work in opposition to them, so that they pursue not merely the impulses of the moment, but choose a higher and firmer stand-point, for the more systematic comprehension, and dominion of a greater whole. If selfishness operates as the centre of a wide circle, it must use a greater variety of means, in order to accomplish its intentions; thus it definitely becomes apparent to the consciousness as a determining principle of the life, since the relation of the egotistic purpose to these means is in this case a matter of reflection.[1]

This remarkable relation shows itself especially in *covetousness*, and the allied passions. Avarice is first of all dependence upon the determining power of sensationalism; but this determining power has here become indirect; the avaricious do not make the sensational pleasure itself, but rather the *means* of gratifying the wants of sensational life in general, the object of their passionate attachment. It is the dependence of a pusillanimous and fearful soul, which has not the courage to seize the present moment, but only thinks of the future, and by the sacrifice of the present, with anxious assiduity labours to secure this. Since now they never venture in this anxious busying, to take possession of their real end, but more and more spend themselves upon the means, as if they were their end—so that just that against which they desire to protect themselves in the future, deficiency and want of sensational life, they bring upon themselves in the present—their

the average and mediocrity; man, the few exceptions of fully fixed and independent characters omitted, is ever better or worse in solitude than in company.—*Bellarmin* stretches the distinction so far as to maintain: by the former of these passions man becomes similar to the beast, by the latter to the Demons, lib. ii. *de statu peccati*, cap. 2. A similar thought is found in *Kant's Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, S. 16—18 *(zweite Aufl.)*

[1] Still, according to the undoubted testimony of experience, men turn themselves to a kind of repentance more easily from the sins of sensational lust, than from the sins of thirsting after honour, possessions, and dominion.—But this has its ground in that by the great multitude, at all times, the pursuit of selfishness, so long as it observes the limitations of a certain reputableness and outward legality, has not at all been regarded strictly as sin. The common method of thought allows itself to be determined by the appearance; it is then natural, that the sins in which man immediately degrades himself, should more easily humble him than those in which he exalts himself.

end keeps itself concealed from the consciousness; the immediate power of sensationalism, the material covering of egoism withdraws, and therewith selfishness reveals itself in avarice in disgusting nakedness.

From the relation here exhibited, we may understand, the not seldom phenomenon, that men, who in other respects are entirely under the dominion of a raw sensationalism, often take a lively sympathy not merely in the general weal and woe of others, but under certain circumstances, show themselves capable of noble sacrifices even of their own interests.—A deep truth is contained, in *Hamann's* naively expressed thought, that the sensational wants of our nature have preserved us, while higher and lighter spirits have irrecoverably fallen.[1] In fact, the principle of selfishness finds in the heavy, earthy corporality, a *restraining limitation*, by which it is prevented from wholly discovering its dark demoniacal depth, in the present life of man. If we represent selfishness as a fine spiritual poison, it receives here, as it were, an alloy of coarser, earthy material, which retards, and makes difficult, the process of its diffusion through every vein and nerve of the inward life. By virtue of his sensational nature, man finds himself in the midst of a manifoldly varied dependence on his fellows, and on external nature, and this very dependence does not allow the principle of inward isolation, to arrive at the all-pervading resoluteness, which it is capable of manifesting, in otherwise formed grades of existences. The power of evil which, in more energetic, and perfectly conscious concentration, would plunge the man who yielded himself to it down into the abyss of irretrievable destruction, becomes compelled, by the perpetual urgency of the many wants of sensational life, to distribute itself into the infinite variety of perverted and perishable endeavours. And thus the same weak sensationalism, which restrainingly opposes the constant, ever equal tendency, to unite all the powers of man in the good, no less restrains him from the energetic self-concentration in evil.

It rests upon the same ground, that men, whose entire life presents an image of the deepest moral disturbance, have been sometimes saved by a remnant of good in those very moral

[1] *Werke*, Bd. 1, S. 148.

spheres, which immediately attach themselves to the sensational side of our being, namely, in the sphere of family life. Capable of every unrighteousness, every vice, towards mankind in general, they not seldom manifest towards their own, a self-forgetting love, a sacrificing fidelity. It is true, such phenomena have only a very subordinate moral worth: the family, is here in reality only an extended Ego; but nevertheless there is always to be recognized a moral element, that man is thereby driven to an extension of his Ego (which, be it observed, in order to prevent a misunderstanding, is not contained in the sensational love of the sexes, as such), to such an extension, which moves him in individual actions really to subordinate his selfish interest, to his sympathy with the weal of others. Thus again here, the sensational nature of man, places a barrier against the completion of his moral perversion, which is equally to be regarded as the point of attachment for his restoration.

When the creature, by means of selfishness and lust of the world, separates himself from God, his entire existence becomes a prey to *untruthfulness*. The life of the personal creature, only has *Truth* in the high, real sense of the word, when he unfolds himself in constant fellowship with God; then only is he in unison with himself, *i.e.* his factual reality with the idea of his being:—This is a thought expressed in various forms in the Gospel and Epistles of John, especially as the εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας and the εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ are used as essentially of like signification, comp. John xviii. 37; 1 John iii. 19, with John viii. 47; 1 John iv. 4, 6. It remains something absolutely absurd, although it repeats itself in numberless instances, that a created, therefore according to its existence, absolutely dependent being, seeks in itself, the centre of its life. And however great and powerful a human life may appear, which has exalted the principle of selfishness in itself to the decided dominion, it is, notwithstanding, only a great lie, a being at variance with itself, and self contradictory, assuming the appearance of that which is an established and complete whole. Neither can such a life ever escape the consciousness of its untruthfulness. For the satisfaction which it seeks, in some direction or other of worldly lust, it is never

able to find, and thus the selfish striving becomes a burning Tantalian thirst. Selfishness is equally the deepest *self-deception;* by it man allows himself to be seduced from fellowship with God, whence alone the source of true human contentment flows, by the flattering exhibition of capricious self-satisfaction in separation from God, and therewith sinks down to the painful *destiny,* of being obliged restlessly to hunt after an end, which ever flies before him. In supposing to elevate himself to a perfect independence, and entirely to rest in himself, he finds himself involved in a deep quailing contradiction of his entire existence.—Accordingly, sin is manifoldly represented in the Holy Scripture in the light of deception and delusion, *e.g.* Heb. iii. 13; Rom. vii. 11; Genes. iii. 13; 1 Tim. ii. 14; 2 Cor. xi. 3; Rom. i. 27; Rev. xii. 9, xiii. 14. Most significant in this respect is the declaration of Christ, in which He terms the Devil a liar, and the father of lies, after He had represented him as the originator of evil striving, and murderous hatred in the human race, John viii. 44; comp. 2 Thess. ii. 9, 10; 1 John ii. 22; the characteristic of the ἀντικείμενος, ἀντίχριστος.

When it is herewith recognized that the *deluding shine* essentially belongs to sin, since it incessantly alluringly holds out to man a satisfaction which it can never secure to him,[1] we must expressly preserve ourselves against the representation, as if the guilt of sin was thereby lessened, or at all removed, inasmuch as it only happened by means of an error, unavoidable to a being of limited knowledge.[2] But the deception does not consist, in the evil, being mistaken for the *moral good,* but in man's falsely thinking to find in sin the highest *satisfaction* for himself. But the highest task of man is by no means the seeking of his own satisfaction,

[1] The Hebrew use of language alludes to this side of sin, since it names the sinner, אָוִיל, sin נְבָלָה. *Nägelsbach* compares with the latter term the Greek idea of ἄτη, *Homerische Theologie* S. 271. That the original significance of ἁμαρτάνειν is to be regarded as the missing of the mark was noticed above, p. 92.

[2] This method of regarding sin *Töllner* especially has advocated, *Theol. Untersuchungen, St.* 1, *Abhandl.* iv. Of joy from evil conduct. *St.* 2, *Abhandl.* iv. Of original sin. *Abh.* v. The goodness of human nature. As the opening sentences of the last dissertation present the eudaimonistic *fundamental tenets* of this opinion with the greatest ingenuousness, so the second must make especially clear how destructive the *deductions* of this theory are to the belief in the holiness of God.

but in living in fellowship with God, and in harmony with His holy will.

Herewith is that philanthropic opinion of sin answered, which explains the matter thus—that man prefers the agreeable to the good, which is not very much to be wondered at, when one remembers his indwelling desire for uninterrupted gratification *(Glückseligkeit)*. To this we may simply say, that it is just the nature of Egotism to elevate this self-gratification of the individual Ego to the highest end of life, instead of absolutely subordinating it to the holy necessity of the will of God. Such a perverted principle must have already found some place in the human heart, when man is said to be under the delusion that he may possess in himself perfect satisfaction. Were this not the case he would know that he can only find himself, when he seeks not self, but God. In many individual forms of sin, as in avarice, hatred, envy, revenge, it is already a phenomenon of the most unnatural perversion, that the heart is able to find a passionate satisfaction in its own slavery; thus it becomes very clear that the explanation of sin, as the inclination to agreeable sensations, is only explaining sin by sin.

Accordingly, as selfishness does not arise from merely deluding shine, the hope of those is of course badly based who represent this shine to themselves as if it were in itself a nonentity, indeed as impossible to be of eternal duration, but must sometime become manifest to the befooled man in its nothingness, *i.e.* vanish, and consequently therewith sin. The very convenient theory of redemption, according to which the liberation of man from the thraldom of sin is one of self-accomplishment, owes its origin either to an impoverished and weak conception of sin, or to that altogether superabundant representation of the power of thought over the inclination and the will, by which *Spinoza* was ensnared, and with which many disciples of the logical philosophy of the present day deceive themselves, concerning themselves, and concerning the true want of their nature. A deeper investigation of the essence of sin, and a more thorough consideration of the relation between will and knowledge, convince us that no thinking, and no knowledge whatever, in itself alone, has the *power* to liberate man from the dominion of sin[1]—so that if only there were, first of all,

[1] With which John viii. 32 does not stand in contradiction; for the

correct and definite notions of the nature of good and evil in the understanding, the will followed them of itself,—but least of all such a pure negative knowledge of the nothingness and contradictoriness of all evil, with which indeed the knowledge of positive truth is by no means associated; and whoever does not in disobedience to the delphic oracle: γνῶθε σεαυτόν! fearfully shut his eyes to the deep self-disunion of human life, he will know how often a deep consciousness of the inward misery of sin, and of the nothingness of its glittering shine, is in connection with a continued sinfulness of conduct in a given direction. On the other hand, there is absolutely no existing ground whatever to doubt, that the will turned away from God will maintain the power in all future conditions of human existence to create new forms of self delusion, when at any critical turning-point, *e. g.* in death, one of its given forms becomes necessarily destroyed—1 John ii. 17. For if we do not wish to give our moral consciousness the lie, we must regard this as settled, that the deluding shine in this ethical sphere arises from the perversion of the will, and not inversely the perversion of the will, from the deluding shine. If man has only given himself up to that ground-perverted principle, to make his own personal gratification *(Glückseligkeit)* the unconditional end of all his endeavours, there must grow from this vile root a *multitude* of the most destructive representations of the very nature of human satisfaction *(Glückseligkeit).*—

But if selfishness is directly *self-deception*, it necessarily begets at the same time *untruthfulness towards others*, the conscious violation of the right of those who are in intercourse with us of having to do with *us ourselves*, and not with an arbitrary image which we may choose to present to them. The selfish man who practically recognises nothing higher, and more universal, than the individual interest of his Ego, must soon enough experience that this disposition drives him into perpetual perplexity, not merely with those who practise the same kind of conduct towards

knowledge of the truth which is there denoted as that which makes free, presupposes the μένειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, the ἀληθῶς μαθητὴν αὐτοῦ εἶναι. But the mere thinking of freedom in its rational necessity is still infinitely removed from the really becoming free; for this, something else is required besides human thought.

him, but also with such as strive to order their conduct towards others, according to the fundamental axioms of righteousness; and moreover, it involves him in perplexity with the arrangements of social life. Man in sin isolates himself, and yet requires a thousand-fold fellowship with others. Of this fellowship, and its advantages, he would in numberless cases deprive himself if he everywhere exposed to view that principle of isolation. From this he feels himself compelled to conceal, behind all kinds of masks, the real character of his dispositions and actions, first of all, perhaps, in individual relations, then too as a whole and in general. We may denote this connection as universal; for how often do we see the most decided selfishness boast itself with an open exposure of its despicable dispositions, where it has a well-secured independent condition of the outward life in the back-ground; it nevertheless in reality only stands waiting for the temptation through any endangerment of its end, in order immediately to conceal itself under impenetrable veils.

Thus the process of separation and isolation, which began in selfish worldly pleasures, develops itself in falsehood, in that man will now, not merely not *act*, and *work* for others, but will no longer *exist* for them as an object of their knowledge. Indeed the perverted impulse once awakened, becomes so powerful, that the lie, originally *the child of selfish striving*, often separates itself from its mother, in the more advanced progress of its own development, and is often there to be met with, where there is no connection at all with any particular interest of selfishness, where only the vilest lust of deceiving others could beget it. In this way it becomes a second nature to the liar, to drive a horrible game with the holy gift of language, and by so entirely separating, in his own life, his real nature from its appearance, all reality gradually becomes a nonentity, a mere shine, so that at last, he is no longer able to distinguish, what in his life is false, from what is true.

Falsehood which no longer springs from self-interest, but from pleasure in the deception of others, conducts us to a new impulse of development, out of the root of selfishness, which begins with *pride*, and ends in *hatred*. For where falsehood assumes that

character, it originates in the proud self-satisfaction of the liar, in the consciousness of his superiority over the individual deceived. He creates the consciousness, by making the object of his deception, the mere plaything of his arbitrariness.

Pride is the most naked form of selfishness. The latter lies in concealment, not merely in the lust of the world, and in self-interested falsehoods, but also in the more advanced steps of its development; in unrighteousness and hatred, the conflict of *individual* interests, and the passionate excitability, occasioned by some hindrance proceeding from the object of hatred, serves in a certain measure still to hide it from view. In pride the principle of isolating selfishness, as such, makes itself formally valid. Nevertheless, we therefore denominate it the first step in this development, because an inimical encroachment upon the spheres of other personalities, in which it is clear an augmented energy of selfishness so active, is not immediately contained in it, but much rather a dreamy satisfaction in itself. Here man is not driven out of himself, and bound to some given object by a restless passion and striving, but in solitary seclusion imagines himself self-sufficient. He is absorbed in the enjoyment and admiration of himself, instead of regarding himself as an individual member of a whole entirety; and instead of complementing himself, and others, by his humble attachment to them, he assumes to be himself an absolute whole.

In this it may happen, and in fact does almost always happen, that the proud in this boasting self-hood carry along with them some one particular possession, in order to make good their claim to exclusive worth. If this possession be of the lower kind, belonging to external and natural life, as in the pride of riches, of high rank, pride of station,—so far as such pride becomes the principle of the contemptible exclusion of others, for it is only by this that it is pride,—pride appears here only to be able to hide from itself the poverty and narrowness of the objective basis on which it rests, by the almost absolutely blind infatuation of Egotism. And nevertheless it is easier to understand, from the outward separateness of these possessions, how the individual can come to make them the means of an exclusive self-feeling. On the other hand, the higher and more inward the character of the objects which must serve the proud, for this solitary glorification of their own Ego, so much the deeper is the degradation, because

it stands in more absolute contradiction against the nature of the thing. To this belongs, first of all, *the pride of knowledge*, which, as in the one, the material of erudition, so in the other, the form of knowledge, for the most part constitutes its basis. In opposition to the pride of knowledge, we have the *pride of practical efficiency* of power, and influence in the world. Worse than both is *the pride of virtue, self-righteousness*, that deep delusion of man which misleads him to admire his supposed excellence, and to regard his moral conduct as fully satisfying the requirements of the moral law. The acme of this high-mindedness is seen in *spiritual pride*, which seeks to give to that, which is according to its determination, the absolutely universal, a particular significance, and which is therefore accustomed to attach itself to all kinds of peculiarities, and things which are strange in the sphere of religion, on which it may nourish the imagination of an exclusive pre-eminence. The poison of this high-mindedness must here prove so much the more destructive, as the contradiction is the more glaring between it, and the inmost nature of piety, and the more powerful the impulses are to humility and self-forgetfulness contained in the consciousness of the relation we sustain to God. It is a remarkable proof of the depth of the propensity, to self-esteem, and high-mindedness, in the human heart;—of its ability secretly to keep itself alive in the inmost recesses of the same, when even all its visible buddings are broken off, that even a mind in which true piety germinates, has not escaped the danger of the Satanic seed of spiritual pride again springing up, and gradually choking and destroying the tender germ of piety.

Besides, one would entirely mistake the nature of high-mindedness, if he should look for its ground in an unbounded estimation of the object which he drew into his interest. If this were the case, true piety must lead to pride; for it only exists where the relation to God is recognized in its *unconditional* importance. Pride is not a passionate resignation to the thing, in which selfishnesss becomes, as it were, indirect, and thereby withdraws itself more from the consciousness, but a fixed, immediate holding fast to its own subject, the Ego in which it lives. Pride is definitely distinguished from worldly lust, even where they are both associated in the very objects, in which pride exalts itself. In the lust of the world the Ego identifies itself with the things,

in pride the things are identified with the Ego. The goods of the world are not in themselves of the highest value to the proud man, but only because, and in so far as, *he* has them. The importance to which he lays claim for his subjectivity, does not rest upon the supposition of the excellence and exalted character of the things, in which he places his interest; but inversely, this supposition depends upon the exclusive importance which high-mindedness claims for its subjectivity. The proud man does not condescend to the recognition and admiration of the same things in another; and if he were in no way able to withdraw himself from the other, those very things on the possession of which he is so proud, would only awaken in him inimical feelings of envy.

Therefore it is, that the consistency of pride, in a spirit, energetic in evil, leads him never on any account, to attach himself to a given determinate contents, but easily to relinquish every one according to the necessity of the circumstances, in order merely to give validity everywhere to *his formal arbitrariness*. His Ego, his will, is to govern, and no one is to be able to hold him to any determinate purpose. This *tyrannical love of dominion* springs from pride, and shows itself by coming out of its seclusiveness, and seizing, as it were, upon every thing offending any of the exclusive rights of its own particular sphere. With this tyrannical thirst we must not confound that impulse, agreeable to the nature of a powerful mind, to exercise dominion over men, in the name of a great objective end. This same ground-tendency of the perverted will, shows itself in a more negative form in *self-mindedness*, in which the Ego arrogates to itself the task,—in the face of the requirement to subordinate itself to another will, or to some general arrangement, of maintaining its own formal independence as such.—

There is a delicate inward *righteousness*, which can only originate in the endeavour to carry on intercourse with men, according to the rule of self-denying love. He who has thoroughly learnt to know, how deeply rooted selfishness is in human nature, disturbing not merely the will, but also falsifying the judgment, will also have learnt to know how very much is to be feared in every collision of our own claims, with the claims of others, from the sophists of our own heart, which are lynx-eyed in the perception of our own rights, but purblind in the recognition of

those of others. In order really to be just in those complicated relations, in which we stand to others, we must thoroughly resolve to be more than just. A closer investigation of this delicate righteousness, will convince any one that it presupposes the *Phantasie* of love, which understands the art of placing itself in the position of its object.

But still, when this righteousness, immediately rooted in love, is wanting, one often meets with a feeling of respect for the obvious rights of others, so far as they are discernible by the less cultivated moral mind. Men who in other respects allow themselves to be governed entirely by the impulses of selfishness, nevertheless shun the conscious violation of the duties of righteousness towards their fellows. Even to the proud man a determinate right of one whom he despises, holds often good as a limitation which he feels himself bound to respect. For this reason it is to be regarded as a more advanced development of the selfish principle, when this limitation is broken through, when *unrighteousness* sanctions every attack upon the right of others, so long as it is only prudent.—The undertaking of the French revolution, the dazzling, infatuating delusion of the present day, to place the outward relations of all men upon an equal footing, every healthy mind regards as an insane conception, just as destitute of rational necessity as of practical execution; but there is an equality over and above the inequality arising from the nature of human life, an equality in which every one in his own way participates. Every one may require from every other, that he inviolably regard the given rights, belonging to him as a personal individual of society, equally whether his position in the same be one of small or great influence, and it is this requirement, negatively at least, to respect the essential equality in the practical sphere, which unrighteousness violates. Here the individual sets himself up as unlimitedly justified, in opposition to all others, whom he looks upon as destitute of rights, himself as person, all others as things. This is the maxim which the unrighteous man makes actually valid:—*They* all are to be bound by the law, and woe be to them if they should attempt to infringe upon any one claim, to which *he*, by this order of the life of society, finds himself entitled! but he is to be exempted from law, and under obligation to no one. In consequence, observe the the deep indignation with which one is accustomed to regard the

selfish unrighteousness of another towards him. And assuredly, entirely apart from self-prejudice, is it fully deserving of this moral indignation; indifference towards a foreign right is one of the most atrocious forms of selfishness.—

Proceeding in the same course of development, we shall find selfishness making its appearance under the form of destroying *hatred.* If the principle of selfishness only becomes decidedly prevalent in the life of man, the selfish striving only requires a sufficiently powerful hindrance by the intervention of others, in order to kindle within him the deadly flame of hatred. Hatred is nothing more than selfishness excited, by resistance, to the positive negation of other personalities. The unrighteous disposition does not grudge others the good, if only they do not run counter to its own strivings: hatred, wishes them evil.—In one, the basis of selfishness falls more in the direction of self-enjoyment and self-interest, in another more in that of pride. If every benefactor, according to *Kant's* observation,[1] ought to hold himself prepared for the awakening up of the propensity slumbering in the human heart to hold in aversion the object of its obligations,—we may observe that this aversion is just the positive development of the unthankfulness of selfishness; as hatred in general is the positive development of unrighteousness. Its source is sometimes the one, sometimes the other, of those two directions. To the one the benefactor is hateful, because he brings to his remembrance obligations which are burdensome to his slothfulness or self-interestedness; to the other because he excites the feeling of a certain humiliation.—

The *first step* in this development of selfishness in hatred, includes the different forms of sin in which the selfish excitability of the individual makes its appearance. To these belong irascibleness, quarrelsomeness, revenge, implacability. As the *ultimatum* of this development, hatred reveals itself in fruits which perfectly restore the bitter taste of the root, in envy, malevolence, in malice and cruelty.

But in order to make clear, in its full determinateness, this procedure of hatred from selfishness, we must not lose sight of *the peculiar nature of our earthly life.* Its goods, riches, sensual

[1] *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernuft*, S. 29 *(zweite Aufl.)*

enjoyment, outward honour, power, and influence—have this peculiarity in common, in being made the object of passionate lusting, that their possession, so far as they fall to the lot of one they are excluded from others. By this peculiarity, they present to the selfish disposition the suitable material in which its concealed spark of hatred bursts into a flame, and in which this flame spreads throughout all the spheres of human life. If the passionate lust in one of those directions be once kindled within us, we should find ourselves compelled to suppress others in order to give full possession to this one, and thus we continually involve ourselves in fiercer collisions with other individual claims, in which hatred nourishes and confirms itself in the heart.

Sometimes, however, the most decided selfishness appears to be so far removed from real hatred, even under circumstances of opposition, that it much rather decidedly excludes it. Who has not observed that egotistic love of enjoyment, which, in order not to become disturbed in the comfort of its existence, shuns nothing so much as falling into the perplexities of passionate hatred, and therefore shrewd enough to be aware of the unavoidableness of the mutual restraints in social life, exercises towards such restraints of its interests a certain tolerance under the guiding influence of the ground maxim: Live, and let live? But even where selfishness attains its highest dominion, transforming the entire life into a matter of mathematical calculation, and creating a perfect indifference towards the well-being of others, only recognising in them the instruments of their own self-interested, ambitious, tyrannic plans, we may observe it not seldom to *avoid* the excitations of passionate hatred, as disturbing and misleading it in the steadfast prosecution of these plans; indeed it may be that its calculations are so large, and its strivings so comprehensive, that it does not regard it as worth while to give place to a passionate hatred against an individual personality. But still, even in this last class of individuals, the existence of hatred, according to its real nature, cannot be doubted, and that it only just requires more powerful restraints in order to call it forth from its dark depth. But as to the character of the former class of individuals mentioned in this paragraph, we must admit, what of late has so often been said, that there belongs to hatred, as to love, a certain energy, and intense excitability of soul. Doubtless

there is often a sinking down into sterile indifference, an utter swamping of the entire being, which, although wholly under the governance of selfishness, is nevertheless too sluggish and torpid to be able to hate.

But selfishness is not merely able to burn up into hatred against men, but even to *hatred against God.* Where sin has the mastery, without however altogether suppressing the consciousness of God in the soul, where also the essential connection of the God,—with the moral,—consciousness, is not quite obscured by impure, superstitious, or superficial representations of the conditions to which the possession of the Divine approbation is attached, there, the selfish endeavour finds, in this consciousness of God, its most powerful and most burdensome restraint, and of necessity begets, if it be not overcome by redeeming grace, a deep disinclination towards God, the secret wish that there were no God, in order to be able to yield, undisturbedly, to the impulses of sin, John xv. 24, comp. with cap. iii. 20. There is no contradiction in maintaining that an awe of God may linger in the soul, in connection with the most decided aversion against God, and everything Godlike. It is founded in the very exalted nature of man, created after the likeness of God, that when he has once estranged himself from God, especially if at some earlier period he has experienced something of living fellowship with God, that he more easily lapses into a concealed hatred against God than into dead indifference. He cannot easily, wholly withdraw himself from the silent, gnawing, consciousness of his essential obligation to God, although he incessantly strives to do so, and feels himself driven to re-act against the same. Thus too according to the testimony of history, the development of the Divine kingdom in man, tolerates no neutrality whatever; he who does not turn himself to it, turns himself away from it, Matt. xii. 30; he who here will not love, must hate.—If formerly the prevalent philanthropy was accustomed to deny the possibility of such a hatred against God, the experience of all times, even of the most recent, have, over and above, proved the reality of the same. We, for our part, find the horrible considerations, which well known authors of the present day have laid down on this subject, such as whether man has not more cause to hate, than to love, God, or the horrible vows, by which the members of certain

communistic associations bind themselves, to personal enmity against God, entirely in order, so soon as the principle of egotism has once taken decided possession of the life.

There is another kind of hatred against God to be carefully distinguished from this, which no longer depends upon the consciousness of the moral mis-relation to God (just because that last remnant of awe towards the Holy God has here vanished from the inner life), but merely upon the burdensome consciousness of the creature who feels himself *to be inescapably surrounded by His All-might*, whilst at variance with Him, and still thirsting after unconditional independence. God is then only the limitation of human arbitrariness, and the arbitrariness hates the limit. But this hatred, as, for example, *Byron*, in his Cain, describes it, appears to be impossible in the *earthly* life of man, because, if the consciousness of the moral relations to God are entirely suppressed, there is *here* nothing besides which is able to force man to the recognition of a personal Almighty God. The blind passion for that independence in such a case, thrusts itself merely against the limiting barriers of a *fate*, just as blind; or against an infrangible *necessity of nature*, and fosters against these imagined powers, the anger which would be directed against God, if His existence were believed in.[1]

According to this, we must hesitate, with *Schelling's* treatise on freedom, to ascribe to man (as to all finite life), an insurmountable sadness, *just because* he never receives in his own power the

[1] It may appear strange that we do not here enter upon the consideration of the question, whether upon this culminating point of moral depravity, *hatred of the good, as such*, be possible. We may first of all reply in the words of the Lord: τί με ἐρωτᾷς περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; εἷς ἐστιν ὁ ἀγαθός, Matt. xix. 17. Hatred as love always, strictly speaking, proceeds from person to person. It is so when it is directed to impersonal objects, it involuntarily personifies them. The good is repugnant to many men, so far as it is inconvenient to them, so far as its earnest forms stand in the way of their passions, and disturbs them in their comfortable dreams. The good may become altogether offensive to deeper corruptness and recklessness, although they may require it in certain individual respects, on account of its advantages, because they perceive the hopeless exterminating conflict of the same against the maxims which it wished to make valid. Devilish wickedness is able to hate the good, because it is contents of the Divine will, therefore because it hates God, when it *can* no longer deny Him. James ii. 19.

condition of his existence.[1] For what else were this sadness than the reflex of the striving, to be absolutely only self-conditioned as God is? Such a striving after absoluteness, we are aware, Philosophy has often made fundamentally essential to man, and presumptuously continued to build upon the same, nay has erected entire systems upon this basis, *(e. g.* the *Fichtian)*. But religious considerations cannot otherwise explain this striving, in other respects in agreement with *Schelling*, than as being the real principle of evil. It much rather belongs to the very nature of all true piety, that it finds its deepest, most inward satisfaction in the fact of our existence being conditioned in God, that we stand not in our own, but in the power of God. Therefore is it a tone entirely foreign to, and discordant in, this sphere, when *Rosenkranz* calls *Schleiermacher's* fundamental definition of religion, as the *feeling of dependence*, odious, and disgusting, to every manly feeling.[2] This definition is in other respects unsatisfactory; but just because it is God upon whom man feels himself dependent, *Rosenkranz* does not improve the matter, and must not merely negative the *Schleiermachian*, but every doctrine of faith. When *Rosenkranz* in further confirmation says, God is then only substance, absolute power, Lord, he entirely overlooks, that even in the free, loving fellowship with God, as Father, the relation of man to Him remains ever essentially a relation of dependence, a relation in which man becomes determined by Him. The error of *Schleiermacher's* principle, is, that he conceives of that, which, regarded in its conditionality by freedom, is the deepest and most productive truth, as something immediately given, as a sort of *nature-necessity*. Religion is an act of resignation to God; and the true consciousness of absolute dependence on God, first of all, proceeds from this act of resignation.—

It may be asked whether in human life hatred *for its own sake* is to be met with, separated from the particular basis of a selfish passion, and the perplexity of foreign claims arising there-

[1] *Schelling's Philosophische Schriften*, B. 1, S. 487. It is not to be overlooked, that, according to the opinion developed in this passage, this condition of our existence does not lie in the personal God, but in the *Ground*.

[2] *Kritik der Schleiermacherschen Glaubenslehre*, S. 21. Compare the striking controversial remarks in *Nitzsch's* recension of this work, *Stud. und. Krit.* 1837, H. 2, S. 443 f.

from, and forgetting as it were its own origin; so that the subject negativing himself, turns to other personalities, and finds his pleasure in the destruction of their well-being, without any other purpose than just the satisfaction of this lust which originates in hatred? We will not appeal to the remark of the acute *Rochefoucault*, with which *Kant* appears to agree,[1] that we always find something in the misfortune of our best friends, which is not displeasing to us; for if this phenomenon were as general as it is here assumed to be, it would nevertheless be of ambiguous significance, and in individual instances might arise from nobler motives, *e.g.* from an indefinite feeling of joy that a new opportunity was presented to us of binding our friends afresh to our hearts by this new bond of helpful love. But who can then blot out from daily life, the innumerable expressions of envy, and malicious malevolence,—from the world-history, the frightful phenomena of wild murderous lust, and purposeless cruelty, feasting itself upon the wailings of its victims; who can blot out from his memory the horrors of the thirty years war, or the campaigns of Tamerlane, or exclamations such as that of Caligula: *utinum populus Romanus unum cervicem haberet!?* Alas it cannot be denied, that there is an *inspiration* of hatred, as of holy love, a raging lust, in which man is able to abandon himself to the impulses of negation and destruction;[2] and when popular language speaks of an incarnation of Satan, of incorporated devils, their language embodies the fearful truth, that man, by continued sins of wickedness in the strict sense *(peccata prohaeretica)*, is able to overstep the ordinary limit between human, and diabolic wickedness, and in himself to disclose the deep abyss of a hatred, which, divested of all self-interest, finds its gratification in the mere infliction of pain, and in practices of destruction. Hatred, in the sphere of conscious and responsible life, corresponds to the wild thirst of destruction which sometimes inhabits the bosom of madmen, as a blind force of nature furiously driving them against every thing which comes in their way. Moreover the admission of those facts does not at all

[1] *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, S. 29.

[2] Il y a des heros en mal comme en bien, says the above scrutineer of the human heart, in his *Reflexions et maximes morales.*

invalidate the general significance of the old canon: *nihil appetimus nisi sub ratione boni; nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali.* We may much rather say that this canon has the certainty, and intangibility of every other tautology; for just because we make an object, be it in itself ever so bad and detestable, the aim and end of our passions, it becomes for us, *bonum* in this quite formal sense, just as the truly good, becomes for us *malum* in the same sense, in that we turn away from it with aversion.[1] Therefore even where evil is committed from a diabolical delight in pure mischief and destruction, the latter as object of this lust, and means of its gratification, is desired *sub ratione boni.* Indeed it is just this which is so horrible, that the moral depravity of man is able to find a kind of sensational gratification in the most perverse and malignant outbreaks of sin. Here belongs the frightful connection which subsists between voluptuousness (*Wollust*) and cruelty, by virtue of which, sensuality in its maximum of development, is just as easily able to turn itself into a destructive furiousness against others, and against its own body, as the gratification of the propensity to cruelty, is able to furnish a sensual pleasure. This connection, which has already attracted the attention of *Novalis*,[2] and which contains, for the educator especially, important disclosures and hints, is not merely substantiated by innumerable individual phenomena, *e.g.* from the history of the enormities under the Roman Emperors, from the lives of many criminals,[3] and from the history of the French revolution; but lies also at the ground of the savage self-lacerations, and self-mutila-

[1] One may see how confusing it is to mix up this abstract notion of good and evil with our question, *e. g.* in *Bellarmin*, who allows himself thereby to be led to the result: liberum arbitrium always regards only the good. *De grat. et lib. arbitr.*, lib. III., c. xii. The notion of good, which *e.g.* allows a murder, committed from cruelty or revenge, although a satisfaction of lust, to be denominated something good, has nothing to do with the good, to which the will is determined.—Besides, *Bellarmin* has here too *Thomas, Summa*, P. i. qu. 63, art. 1, and other Scholastics from his school, as well as *Antoninus*, for his predecessors. The same axiom is also to be found in *Leibnitz*. Its origin is indeed to be looked for in *Plato*.

[2] *Schriften*, Bd. 2. 246.—Tr.

[3] Einige Züge dieser Art finden sich in *Feuerbach's Gallerie Merkwürdiger Verbrecher*, B. i.

tions in the orgiastic culture of the natural religions of anterior-Asia.[1] For this relation it is very easy to form a general expression, as perhaps, that the lust of cruelty is the negative development of voluptuousness, but very difficult really to explain the connection. The phenomenon belongs to the veriest night-side of human life, where the moral degradation is lost in the unconscious, involuntary sphere of nature; since it has unmistakable analogies in the animal world.—

Christ adduces *hatred and lying*, especially, as two fundamental directions of evil, in the spiritual sphere, when He denominates the devil on the one hand, as being the murderer from the beginning, and on the other, as the liar and the father of lies, John viii. 44. Lying is the timidity, hatred is the daring of, selfishness. Nevertheless they mutually produce each other; from falsehood springs hatred, from disinclination to the truth, enmity against the person who represents it;[2] and hatred begets falsehood, because it requires it for the execution of its purposes.

We have pursued the fundamental tendencies of sin, to which may easily be reduced, what are denominated its individual forms. In doing so, a certain parallelism with the main branches, (into which, according to what was said, p. 160, the trunk of the moral impulse divides itself), becomes evident.—If we have succeeded in showing, that all these ground-directions have their origin in selfishness, we have solved the problem which we (p. 155) set ourselves. It is not necessary that we enter more in detail into the manifold *discordances* of the *spirit-life (Gemüthsleben)*, which a deeply developed moral consciousness imputes to man as sin—ill-humour, propensity to gloominess, despondency and despair, and that stolid indifference and heedlessness, a bosom sin of Monasticism, which the schoolmen were accustomed to mention in the list of chief vices under the name of *acidia* (ἀκηδία). These disturbances in the sphere of the affections (*Gefühl*) are only in so

[1] Compare, *Stuhr, die Religions-systeme der heidnischen Völker des Orients*, S. 440 f., although this celebrated investigator of the oriental religions forms a somewhat different conception of these phenomena.

[2] Christ Himself instructs us with respect to this side of the connection, in his conversation with the Jews, John viii. 37—47.

far sins, as they have their ultimate ground in a perverted direction of the will. This application to the individual has no difficulty in itself, and only becomes somewhat perplexing by the co-determining influence of individual peculiarities, in virtue of which this perversion of the will begets in the one, this, in the other, that disturbance of mind. In general it can only be said, that these discordances, in so far as they are to be imputed to the individual, arise from the insufficient power of the moral impulse, and ultimately, from the deficiency in the vital consciousness of fellowship with God; but it is the power of the selfish principle which restrains that impulse, and paralyzes this consciousness.

The relation is similar with respect to the imputability of disturbances in the sphere of *knowledge*. After the entire connection of our investigation we can never think of denying that the knowing activity of the spirit is conditioned by the ground-direction of the will and disposition. The answer which an individual receives from the Truth is dependent especially on the way in which he addresses his questions to the truth. The way in which he addresses his questions will be determined by the ruling principles of his inward life. No Dialectic, no method of thinking is able to elevate our knowledge above this dependence upon the inmost ground of our disposition of mind; this dependence necessarily discovers itself together with that which lies concealed in the depth of the heart, and if it is a vessel to honour, where it is made use of by an earnest spirit, with clear consciousness of its significance and its limitations; it is also a vessel to dishonour when it is used by a frivolous mind.

It is true, this moral conditionality of knowledge is not every where equal and the same; it is pre-eminently the case in relation to objects which stand in the inmost centre of spiritual life, and therefore pervade the entire life; while on the surface, in relation to knowledge of a more abstract and formal nature, it vanishes. For example, for the development of *Mathematical* truth it is indifferent whether the disposition of its investigator be moral or immoral, pious or Godless; the results, as well as the methods, are the same among heathen as among Christian people. But the science of Mathematic has no reason to be proud on account of its independence of the great contrasts in the sphere of the moral and religious spirit; its independence is at the same time

its limitation. The lowness of this sphere is also seen if we remember that its truths do not stand opposed to doubt, but only to absurdity. The highest and most powerful objects of our knowledge are those which vanish from the spirit, just in proportion to its withdrawment into its natural self-satisfied reason, and will receive nothing which cannot be demonstrated to it; those are they which can only be appropriated by a *living act*, and can only be retained by the ever repeated elevation of the spirit above itself. Divine truths, says *Pascal*, reach the spirit through the heart. One must love Divine things, in order to know them.[1] If, on the contrary, the heart be estranged from God, and devoted to the empty and vain, it follows quite in order, that in the unity making itself prevalent in the disturbed human condition, the eye of the spirit becomes blinded by the deluding shine.

The recognition and understanding of the *Divine revelation in Christ*, stands more than any other essentially bound to moral conditions. An exclusive theoretical procedure, that pure logical enthusiasm is so little able to discern it, that it much rather shuts the spirit up, making its reception impossible. Such a logical mode of inquiry sets down the practical moral interest as one which is a matter of indifference; but the truth here treated of does not address itself merely to the understanding, but to man in his totality. But its significance in this respect remains unintelligible, unless a deep Divine bias, and an earnest consciousness of the variance of human nature with itself, constitute the inward interpreter of the same. Truth, which forms the contents of Divine revelation, is holy; it does not flatter the sloth and pride of man, nor supply nourishment to his selfishness; it lays low the assumptions and provisos of selfish love, and demands an earnest submission, self-renunciation, and humility; it only makes itself known to a pure desire. The Logos is the light of man, in that He is his life (John i. 4). In order to become conscious that the doctrine of Christ is from God, one must be prepared to do the will of God (John vii. 7). He who is not from God cannot receive the words of God (John viii. 47; 1 Cor. ii. 14.)[2]

[1] *Pensées de Pascal. 'A Berlin* 1836, tom. i. p. 112.

[2] Compare, concerning this connection of the theoretical with the practical, *im N. T. Stirms anthropologisch-exegetische Untersuchungen*,

The words: He that hath, to him will be given, hold good of moral truth in general; one must will them, in order to know them.[1] If this earnest will be absent, the conception of its contents will be more or less perverted. It is inexpressibly difficult for man to endure the contradiction against the holy norm of his life, in all its real severity. Therefore if his inclinations and tendencies of will do not harmoniously accommodate themselves, he endeavours, deceiving himself, to adjust as much as possible the contents of that norm with his inclinations. Selfishness operates to the darkening of the moral consciousness in a sthenic, as in an asthenic, way, the former by the excitation of daring arrogance and proud assumption, which determines to make self the law of life; the latter, by enervation of the spirit drawn down into low spheres, which makes it vitally unconscious of its higher destiny.

If the persuasion of man in general, namely, the whole sum of his convictions, as well as his practical ground-tendency, are reflected upon these inward spheres of real knowledge, it follows, as it appears to us, that we must exhibit the one-sided, and perverted directions of thinking concerning Divine things, in their connection with *the principle of selfishness*. And this too has already in modern times, *since Fichte*, been manifoldly done, in the most comprehensive manner by *Daub*, who in his work: "*die dogmatische Theologie der jetzigen Zeit* (1833) "deduces all theological directions of the present day, of course with one exception, from selfishness, and thus charges upon the conscience of Christian theology the deviation from a philosophy destructive of its foundation. But this precedent is very little adapted to invite imitation; since above all, it requires an extravagant self-opinioned feeling in order to set one's self up as moral judge of the scientific world, without considering how very little of the dialectic art it required to turn this sword of justice against him who wields it.

Also in our time there are not wanting modes of thought, which,

Tübinger Zeitschr. für Theol. 1834, H. 3, S. 70 f.; on the exhibition of this connection by *Paul*, compare *Neander's Geschichte der Pflanzung der Kirche durch die App.* S. 754 f.; by *John*, compare *Frommanns Johanneischen Lehrbegriff*, S. 202 f.

[1] Compare my lecture *über das Verhältniss der dogmatischen Theologie zu den antireligiösen Richtungen der Zeit*, S. 12 ff.

although their adherents satisfy the common requirements of a legal and upright conduct, could nevertheless not have originated, without a deep inward disturbance and undermining of the moral life. Where an atheistic intoxication, where the madness of self-idolatry, takes possession of the mind, there the arrangements of the moral law have lost their authority; and he only in whom the practical consciousness of the essential elevation of man above nature, is lost, can devote himself in his thinking to a materialistic denial of spirit. Still, such perversions carry so manifestly on their very foreheads the brand of Cain, that it is superfluous to discuss their connection with unbridled self-hood. But where this connection is deeply concealed it is according to the above altogether beyond the power of sinful man to decide concerning it. There was only one, Jesus Christ, free from error because free from sin. Since He could ground His requirement of faith in Himself upon His own moral purity, as on one who spoke the truth, John viii. 46. He ventured to consider everything which did not harmonise with Him, as an error of the darkened spirit, and to disclose its connection with the perverted tendency of the will. What *Protagoras*, the sophist, says of man in a subjective sense, that he is the measure of everything, holds good in an objective sense of The Man, who is our Lord and God, John xx. 28. But we, however, as we are never free from sin, are ever in some way or other involved in error, and it is the deepest truth of our existence that we do not rest in ourselves, and make ourselves the measure of things, but that we ceaselessly elevate ourselves above ourselves, and attach ourselves to the alone Holy One, who, as He is The Life, is also The Truth.

The insight into the connection of the disturbances of our knowledge with the principle of selfishness, *in the directly practical sphere*, is more easily, and with more certainty discoverable.

The perfection of this knowledge consists in its possessing the two attributes, of wisdom, as the right determination of the ideal purposes, and keen discernment of the right choice, and use of the means for the realization of this purpose. If folly stands opposed to wisdom as the *perverted* form of the ideal purpose, its very nature consists in this, that it makes the gratification of the various selfish passions the task of life. Let its calculations be ever so intelligently made, let it be ever so circumspect in the

carrying out of the same, the egotistic maxim can never give it the impress of wisdom; and he who is unrivalled in the art both of conducting nations as well as individuals, according to his selfish plans, nevertheless remains still a fool. If one does not look at his impulses in the light of their relation to the world-plans of God, but in that of his own consciousness and strivings, they can never lose the impression of the ludicrous, on account of the strange contrast between the prodigious expenditure of the means and the poverty of the end, to say nothing of their being in this way unattainable.[1]

But as to what concerns, under the presupposition of moral ends, the *unskilfulness* and inconsiderateness in the *choice of the means*, directly appears to the most superficial consideration, to arise from the deficiency in the natural gift of soundness of understanding. Nevertheless it can only so appear to the most superficial consideration. In truth the matter stands thus, that even the more limited understanding—of course we do not here refer to disturbances and insanity of mind and the like—compels no man to be unskilful and unreflecting. If to the individual of a more limited understanding, the consciousness of its limitation be not wanting, it will restrain in him the desire to undertake the management of relations in life which he is not able to conduct and comprehend. But if he be wanting in this consciousness, this deficiency does not depend upon his limited understanding, but upon his slothful indifference, or upon his self-conceit. Accordingly unskilfulness, as moral deficiency, in the use of means, reveals itself in a twofold form: in the one, more as slothful loitering, in the other, more as unreflecting haste of judgment. But it is easy to see how in the former case it depends upon sensational love of ease and spiritual torpor, which make the spirit unable to concentrate itself in more earnest striving;

[1] For example *Machiavell's* notorious book of the Prince must make this impression upon the unprejudiced reader; the violent and restless exertions of power, by the side of the horrible, have something comic in them—in which the Prince is here instructed, not for the restoration of order to the disturbed being of the state, but for the security of his own personal dominion, which at length, as is here the case with *Machiavell's* normal Prince, *Cäsar Borgia*, on a beautiful morning, by means of an accident not calculated on, goes off in smoke.

but in the latter case partly upon assumed self-confidence and conceitedness, and to the troubled force of passions, therefore in both cases according to their real origin, upon the *power of selfishness.*

Sin, universally considered, appears in a two-fold form, either as an *habitual tendency and constitution* of the inward life, or as *individual passing conduct (peccatum habituale—actuale).* Also in the New Testament the notion of sin is not only conceived of in the latter, but equally in the former, sense. It has been recently maintained by many theologians, *e.g.* by *Bretschneider*,[1] *Reiche*,[2] *C. F. A. Fritzsche*,[3] that in the New Testament *ἁμαρτάνω*, *ἁμαρτία* never means the habitual sinful condition of man, but always merely the individual sinful actions. Whether this assertion be correct or not may be of importance for the exegetical grounding of the notion of original sin, but for our question it determines nothing. For supposing that *ἁμαρτία* were only used in this sense, there are still passages such as Matth. xii. 33, 15, 19; 1 John ii. 15; Jas. i. 14, 15, which leave no doubt that the New Testament looks upon sin as perverted constitution, out of which the individual acts of sin originate.—One must unhesitatingly agree with those interpreters, when they maintain that the verb *ἁμαρτάνειν* refers immediately to acts of sin. And as to the substantive, it cannot be denied that the signification of an habitual sinful condition has been often applied to passages, to which it is quite foreign, as John viii. 34, ix. 34; Heb. ix. 28. But in the very passage, where the New Testament gives us the most definite instruction concerning sin, and its development in

[1] *Grundlage des evangelischen Pietismus*, S. 144, 176. Still, *Bretschneider* in the first passage, as also in his *Lexicon*, adopts besides this, the signification of a *guilt* which has arisen by one or more sinful actions.

[2] *Ausführliche Erklärung des Briefes Pauli an die Römer*, Th. 1, S. 359 f. However this learned man admits, although he so animatedly controverts the signification: habitual sins, that *ἁμαρτία* is "condemnable activity of life," not merely in act, but also in disposition and inclination, so far as these are subjected to the free will of man, S. 359. Note. However the matter be with the latter, so much is thereby admitted, that *ἁμαρτία* may also denote habitus—for disposition, inclination of mind (*Gesinnung Neigung*), is indeed so much.

[3] *Pauli ad Romanos epistola*, Tom. i., p. 290 seqq.

man, Rom. vii., it cannot be overlooked that ἁμαρτία is used in the signification of a power *dwelling and working* in man, including in itself a sinful propensity, a perverted constitution. Thus especially, Rom. vii. 8—11. Since sin, which was dead previous to the coming in of the commandment, revives at the same, and takes occasion by the commandment to put man to death, cannot be at all understood, if ἁμαρτία does not speak of power dwelling in man in a concealed manner. The words ἁμαρτία ἐν ἐμοὶ οἰκοῦσα 17—20, and νόμος ἁμαρτίας 23, denote the same thing. This recognition cannot be avoided by having recourse to the idea of a poetical personification of sin, in the passages referred to; for such an extended personification as is contained in cap. v. 12—viii. 3, were not only very uninteresting and entirely without example in the New Testament, but is not at all in agreement with the character of the representation prevalent in this part of the epistle, with the many peculiar epithets, with which the statements concerning the power and efficiency of sin are here everywhere interwoven.[1]

To actual sin, as its name already indicates, there belongs an *action*. If now the notion of the act includes a *determination of the will*, it appears as if we should be obliged to adopt the scholastic axiom: *omne peccatum est voluntarium*, which *Bellarmin*[2] defends just as energetically as it is controverted by the reformers,

[1] Compare the striking controverting remarks in *Tholuck's Kommentar zum Br. an die Röm.* (1842), S. 366 f. *Fritzche* ought not to have adduced as proof against this meaning in the New Testament, the classical use of ἁμαρτία, which does not certainly know the signification of habitual sin, of inward corruptness of disposition; for in the transition of the term from the sphere of heathenism into that of Christianity it must necessarily become possessed of an inward and spiritual sense. The same limitation applies to the parallel, to the Old Testament use of the word חַטָּאת.

[2] *De amissione gratiae et statu pecc.*, lib. i. c. 1, and 8. *De gratia et lib. arbitr.*, lib. ii., c. 7, *and elsewhere.* Moreover *Bellarmin* refers the axiom not merely to sins of deed, but to sin in general, even to peccatum habituale, which he therefore seeks to represent as something quite different from the vitiosus habitus, a. a. O. lib. v. c. 19.—*Bell*, in defence of this axiom, makes manifold use of an expression of *Augustine*, in his treatise *de vera religione*, c. 14: Usque adeo peccatum voluntarius motus est, ut nullo modo peccatum sit, si non sit peccatum voluntarium. *Augustine* explains this maintenance in his *Retractationen* in the following: peccatum quippe illud cogitandum est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod est etiam poena peccati, lib. i., c.

especially by *Melancthon*, in the *Apology*, and elsewhere,[1] in reference to the *peccata actualia*, and thereby give up the old Protestant divisions of these sins into *voluntaria* and *involuntaria*. But the notion of actual sin, in its contrast with the habitual condition of sin, cannot of course be thereby reduced to the outward appearance of sin in word or deed. The act might be a *purely inward* one; even the intentional fostering of condemnable lust, the calling up of, and retention in the mind of representations respecting the same, is, without doubt, actual sin. Then, too, it is actual sin, according to the well known division of sin into *factum, dictum, concupitum (pecc. operis, oris, cordis)*, in the sense of one of its oldest and most celebrated advocates.[2] Also it would be easy to show, that such an inward act in most cases belongs to the *sins of omission*, which, however, are accustomed to be quoted both in the ancient and modern theology, as a class of *peccata actualia*, namely the rejection of a requirement to dutiful conduct, consequently a *voluntarium*. If such an inward act be entirely wanting, where from outward circumstances the requirement to fulfil a given duty is made upon an individual, it will be in general an evidence of a deeply perverted condition, of a complete deadness of the moral impulse; but since nothing has here taken place, either in the outward, or in the inward life of man, there appears to be wanting all ground for a *peccatum actuale*, therefore also for a sin of omission.

If we are to be justified in denoting all actual sins as *peccata voluntaria*, we must show that in every individual expression of life, of a sinful character, which still as such cannot be habitual sin, there is also contained a *determination of the will*. We will not here refer to the involuntary excitations of condemnable lust, the *motus primoprimi*, according to the scholastic terminology.

13, 5. If now this is undoubtedly a very forced self-interpretation, *Augustine* cannot complain of the violence which *Bellarmin* again does it by seeking to reconcile it with his notion of peccatum voluntarium, *de grat. et lib. arb.*, lib. v. c. 27.

[1] *Apol. C. A. art. de pecc. orig.* p. 58, *der Rechenb. Ausg.*—*Loci theol. de pecc. orig.* p. 110, *de discrim pecc. mort. et ven.* p. 335. (*Ausg.* v. 1569). *Melancthon* finds in that axiom an unjustifiable introduction of the juridical conception of sin into the religious sphere. We find the same Polemik in *Chemnitz, Hutter, Gerhard.*

[2] *Augustinus c. Faustum Manich.*, lib. xxii., c. 27. The division is earlier to be found in *Lactanz, div. institt.*, lib. vi. c. 13.

It is respecting these that the dispute about that axiom has always been carried on, and those who maintain that axiom, refuse of course to regard those individual expressions of life as really sinful. But when the passion of sudden anger has become so dominant in any one, that by every exciting cause he is provoked to an irrational fury, and thus further excited to acts of violence, we shall nevertheless not hesitate to denominate as sin, what even the judgment of the civil court would impute to its author. We are obliged to do so from the results furnished us by our investigations of the nature of sin, in the first chapter; for the law has here been transgressed by one, subject to the same. And yet, when we regard the origin of that offence in itself, where are we to find a *determination*, a *resolve* of the will?

Therefore if there are occurrences in the moral sphere of life, which we must regard as sins, without however being connected with any act of the will, where would in this case the canon: *omne peccatum (actuale) est voluntarium*, conduct us? Manifestly, to our being necessitated to regard such occurrences as individual *peccata habitualia*—just as *Bellarmin* does not hesitate to speak of *peccatis originalibus* in relation to those *motus primoprimi*. If this now be absurd, and the above canon to be denied, we must, in essential agreement with the old Lutheran Theologians, *extend* the notion of *peccatum actuale*, and denominate by this name every single inward or outward appearance of sin which occupies, and *passes away* in, a given moment of time,—apart from the guilt involved in the same. Even sins of omission, not merely a majority of them, but all without exception, we may then place under this notion; for even where that inward rejection of a requirement of duty does not take place in them on account of hebetation of the moral impulse, they may still be regarded as individual, although purely negative, manifestations of sin. For to be so insusceptible of the definite summons to a moral activity, which is made upon us by the circumstances in a given moment of time, as not to be even conscious of the same, is—of course under the presupposition of a responsible condition—in itself an especial offence.[1] Sin of omission is not merely a deficiency in the

[1] *Thomas* regards in this light the notion of sins of omission; he does not require for the same any one act, were it only an inward one, and

fulfilment of the moral law, but also a deficiency in the fulfilment of the determinate duty, and thereby a contradiction of the determinate duty, comp. p. 68.

By this discussion, which secures to the notion of actual sin, the extension which it requires, in order to its co-ordination with that of habitual sin, the scruple against the distinction of actual sins into *premeditated*, and *unpremeditated*, is obviated.[1] It has been already shown (p. 39) that in the very notion of opposition against the moral law there is contained this, that all sin ultimately proceeds from the will; but *in its single phenomenon* it by no means necessarily includes in itself a movement of the will. We have not merely to regard as sin the violent outbreaks of untamed passions, but also those involuntary excitations of really condemnable lust. When the lust of revenge, when a feeling of envy at another's good fortune, becomes ascendant in the mind, there is a single expression of the power of the selfish principle in its inward life, and as such an actual sin, in the recently discussed sense of the word, of which the inward reproach will give evidence to a delicate moral consciousness.

The older theologians were accustomed,—if in respect to our investigations hereafter we may dwell a little longer on this subject,—further to divide *unpremeditated sins* into sins of precipitancy, or sins of weakness *(peccata praecipitantiae s. infirmitatis)*, and into sins of ignorance *(peccata ignorantiae)*.[2]— There belongs to the complete notion of *pecc. voluntarium*, not

seeks to harmonize this determination with his axiom: *omne peccatum voluntarium*, by maintaining that it was in the power of man to will something in this case. *Summa* ii., 1, qu. 71, art. 5, comp. ii. 2, qu. 79, art. 3.

[1] Objections of a somewhat different kind, in which superficiality of moral judgment, strangely mixes with moral earnestness, and a candour deserving the utmost respect, are brought against this by *Töllner in seiner Abhandlung über die Eintheilung der Sünden in vorsatzliche und unvorsatzliche—Theol. Untersuchungen*, Bd. 1, St. 2, S. 214—259. According to him, that which one denominates premeditated sin, is said not to be sin, in any sense. The πρῶτον ψεῦδος of his demonstration is the atomistic conception of the subjective moment contained in the idea of sin, which will meet with its refutation partly in the connection of these considerations, and partly in the investigations of the third book.

[2] *Vgl. z. B. Quenstedt* P. ii., c. ii., sect. 1, thes. 75, seq.

merely the resolving on that which is not right, but also the consciousness that that which is resolved, contradicts the Divine law (*perpetratur a sciente et volente*—therefore also *pecc. contra conscientiam*). If this conception be correct, their division of *pecc. involuntarium* is perfectly justifiable. If in the origination of an individual sin, there is no *determination of the will* to be found, it accords with the *sin of precipitancy*, in which, the imperious violence of the impulse will not allow the will to perform its legitimate function. If on the other hand there be wanting that *consciousness it* accords with the *sin of ignorance*.

But when our older theologians denote sins of precipitancy as being also *sins of weakness*, we agree with *Töllner*[1] that it would be better to reserve this name for a class of premeditated sins, which those Dogmatists in their distinction of the other class do not sufficiently recognize. According to this, sins of weakness would be those premeditated sins, which are committed in conflict with the better direction of the will already operative in man, just because of the weakness of this direction as compared with the power of the temptations. Phenomena of this kind are only explicable by the cotemporary existence in the same individual of *two conflicting tendencies of the will*. The one will is directed towards the will of God, and His revelation in conscience and word; the other is in alliance with the vehemently demanding inclinations and passions. The one is the determination of the inmost Ego, of the inward man, which can only be ascribed to the individual in so far as such a higher bias has not vanished from his consciousness, or has already been awakened therein; the other is a state in which man is out of himself, a state in which he loses himself in the things of the world. But the former will is in such a condition, just a mere *velleitas*, a determination and wish, which is not able to carry itself into execution; the latter will, on the contrary, governs as the stronger, the actual reality, and commonly decides respecting the act,—out of which the whole host of the sins of weakness then arise. When Paul in his thrilling description of this condition, in which a better consciousness and striving, wrestle in vain with the firmly established superior power of sin, so places the act over against

[1] A. a. O. S. 239 f.

the determination, that it appears entirely to be brought about without being determined, Rom. vii. 15, 17, 19, 20, he simply means thereby that determination of the inward man, which he describes, as the real Ego.—The other kind of premeditated sins deserves the name of sins of *wickedness* (or licentiousness), which the older theologians gave to premeditated sins in general.—

In our foregoing authentication of the determining centre in all sinful being we have considered sin pre-eminently as an *abiding condition;* the different fundamental tendencies of the perverted disposition which naturally manifest themselves in corresponding actions, we have traced in their development from the principle of selfishmess. If we now consider the *individual activity* of sin as such, the question arises: does every action, which is either immediately denominated immoral by the Word of God, or by the moral consciousness developed upon its basis, of necessity originate in the selfishness of its subject? And if this, in some instances should not be the case, what becomes of our assertion that selfishness is the principle of all human sin? Should we not then be compelled, either to explain such actions as justified, and by so doing not only come into collision with the objective contents of the moral consciousness, but also with our own development of the nature of sin, since the conception of the same as transgression of the law, and its reduction to the principle of selfishness, would not then stand in agreement with the matter; *or* to look about for another root of sin, because of the insufficiency of this?

This problem contains two questions, which must be carefully distinguished: 1. Does all conduct which objectively contradicts the moral law, necessarily arise in the acting subject from *selfish motive-causes?* 2. When conduct does not proceed from these, but from opposite motives, is it thereby morally justified?

As to the first question, it is impossible to be affirmed, without limitation. *Thomas von Aquino* moves it in his *Summa*, and adduces in his negativing answer, that sometimes sins are committed from inordinate love of our neighbours.[1] Who can

[1] *Prima Secundae*, qu. 77, art. *Thomas* gives for this the verily insufficient solution: Dicendum, quod amicus quasi est alter ipse, et ideo quod peccatur propter amorem amici, videtur propter amorem sui peccari.

deny, that the like is met with a thousand times in life, indeed that not merely the impulses of a false humanity, obligingness and pliableness of disposition, not merely the impulses of a perverted zeal for the glory of God, bring man into conflict with a given moral requirement; but even motives, which, regarded in themselves, are noble and honourable? It is this separation of the objective principle, and the subjective motive, which we often meet with even in the sphere of the moral good; can it surprise us that we find it in the sphere of evil? But we have only maintained the *objective connection* of all sin with the principle of selfishness, and in this respect no one indeed will doubt, that *e. g.* stealing necessarily arises from selfishness, although it may ever occur to some one or other to steal from love to his neighbours, perhaps to take leather from the rich in order to make shoes free of cost for the poor. Thus *in the thing* these two conceptions of sin are certainly to be met with, if even *in the subject* they are accidentally separated. Whatever may be laid down as the inmost nature of sin, if it has a determinate contents, if it denotes a given direction of the inward life, it may, by reason of human arbitrariness, and its innumerable combinations, sometimes in the given case sever the individual act from it, which in itself springs from this direction, and otherwise derive it. Only an entirely formal conception of sin, as perhaps its reduction to the notion of moral disorder, could avoid this.

This is the point, against which *Jacobi's* polemic against every attempt to elevate the moral law to a universally valid, rigid, scientific system, is directed.[1] For if an action which contradicts the express command of the moral law, may nevertheless arise from noble impulses, and thereby become morally justified, the letter of every moral system stands in irrational relation to the spirit of moral good, not perhaps merely on account of the limited character of our knowledge at the time, but according to a necessity contained in the very thing itself. The letter is not able absolutely to represent the spirit; the spirit can, according to its true nature, neither move nor stir without disturbing the letter. There appears to be but one means of avoiding this, namely, that the spirit, certain of itself, just makes this, its self-

[1] *Sendschreiben an Fichte*, S. 32 f.

certitude and freedom, its immediate letter, by laying down a system, which has the *will* for its principle, *which wills nothing more than just its own independency.* But this keen attempt has not led to the glorification of the letter into pure spirit, but only to the ossification of the spirit into the letter of an inflexible formalism.

And if this formalism accuses every one, who ventures to reverence that will as being in itself good, of Atheism, of real Godlessness, *Jacobi* pathetically breaks forth against the same, in the renowned words: "Yes, I am the Atheist and Godless one who will lie against the will, which wills nothing, as Desdemona dying lied; will lie and deceive, as Pylades representing himself to be Orestes; murder will I like Timoleon; violate law and oath like Epaminondas—like John de Wit; resolve on self-murder like Otho; rob the temple like David;—ay, rub out ears of corn on the Sabbath, because I am hungry, and because the law was made for man and not man for the law. I am this Godless one, and ridicule philosophy, which on this account calls me Godless, ridicule her and her highest being; for with the holiest certitude which I have in me I know,—that the *privilegium aggratiandi* on account of such offences against the pure letter of the absolute universal law of reason, is the peculiar royal prerogative of man, the seal of his dignity, of his Divine nature."

Notwithstanding, in the very midst of the strong assurances with which Jacobi sets himself up against the universal validity of the individual moral determinations, he involuntarily betrays his own want of confidence. The passage sets out with the demand of a *formal recognition* before the judgment seat of conscience, of actions, in which the moral personality breaks through the letter of the moral law from noble motives, and ends, by claiming on their behalf, *the right of pardon.* This right of pardon, so far as man can here be at all the judge, we will in no wise dispute; the limitedness of human knowledge, and the violence of the moment urging to the decision, forbid us, under the consciousness of our own weakness, every stronger judgment, when one of our fellows, in extraordinarily perplexing moral circumstances, is not able immediately to find the true solution. But for the conscience of man to transgress commands, real precepts of the moral law, appointed duties, in order to attain something *still better* than

their fulfilment, is to assign to the conscience, the maxim, to make the devil the helper of God. And in such a course, where is there a halting-place on the way to the jesuitical axiom, that the good end sanctifies the bad means? Many excuses may subjectively hold good for those who act in this way; but those who do that which is bad with good intention, as well as those who do good from bad motives, are more dangerous enemies to the objective validity of goodness and holiness in the world, than that horde in which bad conduct and bad motives are in correspondence with each other—for this reason more dangerous, because this arbitrarily forced union of contradictories is quite adapted to weaken the consciousness of the war of extermination, which the good incessantly carries on against the evil.[1]—From this troubled fountain continually flows, in an especial manner, that ever increasing stream of pusillanimity and torpidity of the moral judgment, which is no longer susceptible of an earnest abhorrence of the worst vilenesses, so long as they are not perhaps robbery and murder, which, by disturbing and destroying, make violent inroads upon the outward order of life; for who would have any difficulty in finding something to justify even the worst conduct which has the look of a good intention?

In what we have said the answer to the second of those questions is contained. An action in the individual case, proceeding not from selfish, but from noble motives, is not—by an anomaly in the anomaly—thereby justified. Man is to regard the objective connection between those methods of conduct contradicting the law, and the principle of selfishness, as an unconditional Veto, if even he thought to have in the individual case, in itself regarded, the most excellent motives for such a course of conduct. Indeed, in the very fact that he makes good the authority of his own

[1] The moral law has an entirely similar relation to these two classes, as that of religion, toward its heartless friends and its decided enemies. Not in the latter but in the former has Christianity its worst enemies; or much rather these are successful in gradually bringing their principles, which are diametrically opposed to Christianity among the multitude, because they only require to give them utterance with energy and cultivated taste; thus there are a goodly number who associate in themselves this principle with Christianity, and then set about to make the poison, well clothed with a sufficient amount of innocent thoughts and pious expressions, a prevalent article in the market.

subjectivity, as the determining and deciding power, in opposition to the objective contents of the moral law, there is contained an arrogance, with whatever generosity, enthusiasm, and the like, there may be otherwise existing in the same, which in reality has clearly no other source than *selfishness*.—

In the discussion of this problem, we have mainly regarded actual sin, as real *action*, but the same result easily follows in relation to the lawlessness of selfish impulses in their *involuntary outbreaks*, which we, according to the above, have also to regard as *peccata actualia* whether they remain purely within, or make their appearance in the outward world, in precipitate and unreflecting action. The unbridled Egotistic impulse, in so far as a will gives it sanction, is directly selfishness. Had not this will surrendered itself to the principle of selfishness, it would know how securely to keep the impulse within its proper bounds.

SECOND SUBDIVISION.

THE IMPUTATION OF SIN.

FIRST CHAPTER.

GUILT AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT.

After our investigations at the commencement of the first part, we may denote the general antithesis between good and evil as follows: The Good is not merely being, but a being which has in itself the obligation of its being; not only reality, but also necessity applies to it. Evil, on the contrary, while it takes part in *empirical, real being*, it ever remains as *that which ought not to be;* it only exists as a disturbance and contradiction of an ideal demand.

But more strictly considered, sin is not hereby sufficiently distinguished from other remarkable phenomena in the sphere of human life; in the rejecting judgment which our consciousness finds itself obliged to pass upon it, it is not conceived of in its full determinateness. We may say of *the ugly* that it is that *which ought not to be*, for it is not merely that which is not beautiful, the indifferent, aesthetically without character; but is also the perversion of the beautiful, the positive denial of the same, the contradiction of its law.[1]

It is true, the *relation* between the *ugly* and the *evil*, as that between the beautiful and the good, is not at all a matter to be disputed; that which violates the law of the good may in its place in the entire range of artistic representation, even become a negative moment of beauty, but strictly regarded in itself it can never truly express the law of the beautiful. Even language, and not merely that of the Greeks, which more than any other embodies the spirit of its people, but also others, the Roman and

[1] Comp. the more exact development of this idea in *Weisses Æsthetik*, B. 2, p. 173–207.

German languages, point to this relationship, since they use the same terms to denote perversion in both the spheres *(turpis, hässlich.)* To the natural consciousness of man it most certainly appears as a disturbance of order when the sensationally beautiful is not the manifestation of the good, and if the ugly is not the manifestation of the evil; and we cannot wonder that the genius of the Greek language should attach the idea of shame not merely to sin but also to ugliness.[1] How the philosophic spirit of Greece in the very height of its development, maintained this doctrine of the connection of the ugly and the evil, and that of the beautiful and the good—in the *Dialogues* of *Plato*—is too well known for it to be necessary that we should here dwell upon it. Nevertheless scarcely anything more prejudicial could befal the significance of moral truth than the reduction of the ethical, to the aesthetical judgment as its proper root.

The very peculiar manner in which the *moral* idea reveals itself in our consciousness, requires a more comprehensive investigation than it has hitherto received. *Kant* was the first to enter upon this investigation, and if the result does not answer the expectations which his earnest sense of truth warranted, the reason is to be found in the mere logical formalism of his ethic, and in close connection with this, in his idea of the autonomy of the practical reason. Here we must be content to point out in few words this peculiarity of the moral in its distinction from the beautiful. Of course we can only speak of the *beautiful* in so far as its representation is brought about by human action. The requirement to cultivate and exhibit the beautiful by one's own activity is essentially conditioned by individual peculiarity; the person who does not concern himself about it, because the gift and inclination are denied him, is not therefore liable to reproach. On the other hand the requirement of morality is an absolutely *universal* one, independent of an especial gift and inclination. Indeed the moral idea requires from the individual that it be *fully* realized in his life, according to all its ground-determinations; it tolerates no division of the task, by the which an individual may confine himself to the exercise of one virtue to the neglect of others; it is one of the most insolent attacks upon the majesty of the

[2] Αἰσχρός of the same root with αἰσχύνη, αἰσχύνομαι.

moral idea, when its requirement has been referred to a mutual compensation of men, which proposes as an equivalent for the errors of one the virtues of another:[1]—truly this is only a natural product of the old error of the *necessary* deduction of sin from finitude and individuality. To measure the moral idea and to estimate its claims to reality, according to the measure of other ideas, namely, the aesthetic, is nothing less than to deny it. Therefore the perceived violation of the moral idea reacts upon the consciousness of the agent in an entirely different manner, and with an entirely different power, from that of a perceived contradiction to the aesthetic; and if it is otherwise in any individual, if one reproaches himself with greater severity for a violation of good taste, than for the committal of a sin, it is only a sign of more subtle moral disorder. The imperative of the ugly, which declares that it ought not to be, is only a *conditional* one, since the beautiful arising from human conduct may only assume a conditional necessity,—a glance of appearance, which becomes a consuming fire for the true contents of life, if it makes itself the kernel of the same—the imperative of evil, forbidding its existence, is an *unconditional* one, since the necessity of the good is absolutely valid, demanding from every one, without distinction, recognition and obedience.

The peculiar manner in which sin refers itself back to its own subject, belongs to the notion of *guilt*. Even in the aesthetic judgment we immediately censure the unbeautiful without respect to consequences and ends; whereas when the moral judgment censures, it expressly implies the existence of guilt.

The *first* moment in the notion of guilt is this, that the given sin

[1] *Feuerbach, Wesen des Christenthums,* S. 205, f.—*Ullmann* has more recently directed attention to this peculiarity of the moral idea in the most decided manner, so far as I know, *Polemisches im Betreff der Sündlosigkeit Jesu,* S. 70 f. (printed separately from the *Studien und Kritiken* 1842); with respect to which, however, I cannot conceal the conviction that this idea conceived of with precision, does not allow of the use which *Ullmann* makes of it, in order to show in an *à priori* manner, the necessity of a sinless individual, in the midst of history, from whom a new holy development should take its origin. It follows much rather from this thought, if one goes back to the Divine idea and its power, that there will be a kingdom of perfectly holy men at the end of history; but just for this reason, when regarded in itself, the deduction which *Ullmann* makes is too much.

must be *ascribed to the man*, in whom it is, *as to its author*. In the notion of sin lies only the objective, namely, the existence of a fact, whether it be an act or condition, contradictory to the Divine will; with the idea of guilt arises the subjective side,—an author, to whom it can be imputed. However it may be with other disturbances of our life; of sin we have the direct consciousness, that it is not only *in* us, but also *from* us.

Thus the *notion of causality* is the universal basis in the idea of guilt, to which the Greek term for the same—*αἰτία*—is exclusively related.[1] If we consider the relation of the notion of sin to the nature of man, we may call it a suffering of soul, as that which is foreign and contradictory to its true nature; if we look at the way in which sin originates in real life, it is not a suffering, but an *act* of the soul, either immediately an act, or grounded in such an act. *Plato* regards evil as a mere suffering, since in his ethical investigations he makes manifold use of the axiom, that no one voluntarily (*ἑκών*) sins, or is evil.[2] And assuredly, if it be only certain, that the good is the active, the evil the passive, condition of the soul, there would follow, as *Plato* himself shows at the conclusion of the *Hippias Minor*,[3] from the possibility, that any one might sin voluntarily, the strangest antinomy.—But in the consequences which he himself deduces, it is satisfactorily shewn, how destructive this opinion is to the *imputation of sin*. It induces him to seek its cause in some malformation of the body, or unintelligent education, to complain on account of evil, that the evil is evil, and therefore more the producing and educating than the produced and educated.[4] But

[1] When the popular use of language often applies the notion of guilt to the sphere of nature, it does not mean thereby anything more than the causation of some undesirable result. The Latin use of language makes in this respect the decided distinction between imputable, and non-imputable causation, comp. *Döderlein's lateinische Synonyme und Etymologien*, respecting *culpa* and *noxia*, B. 2, S. 152 f.

[2] *E. g. Protagoras* 345, 358 (*Bekkersche, Ausg.* i. 1, S. 217, 241), *Gorgias*, 468 (*Bekker* ii. 1, S. 471), *Timäus* 86 (*Bekker* iii. 2, S. 130), *De Legibus*, lib. v. 731 (*Bekker* iii. 2, S. 380.)

[3] 376 (*Bekker* 1, 2, S. 227 f.) On the genuineness of this dialogue, comp. *K. Fr. Hermann Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie*, B. 1, S. 487 f., and the remarks appended to the same.

[4] *Timaeus*, a. a. O. Here *Plato* expressly says: *ταύτῃ κακοὶ πάντες οἱ κακοὶ διὰ δύο ἀκουσιώτατα γιγνόμεθα.*

the deeper ground of this conception of sin rests in this, that in *Plato* the distinction of the ethical and the physical is not at all purely and clearly kept up and carried out.

The *juridical* treatment of the notion of guilt rests entirely upon the causal relationship. But it first of all in a narrower conception of this notion depends upon the fact of causation by a will, since for the coincidence of its result with the intention of the subject, it forms another notion. An individual or a collection of individuals has suffered a violation of its right, by human conduct. If now the question arises concerning the author of this violation, the distinction holds good between *culpa* and *dolus*. Where there exists nothing more than the outward fact of causation by the activity (or omission) of an individual, proceeding from the will,—it is true this individual knew, or *might* have known, the possible procedure from his conduct of this given result, without however this consequence being the designed object of the action,—there we find, quite in agreement with the prevalent use of the word by classical writers, only *culpa (lata* or *levis)*; where on the contrary the violating act corresponds with the intention to violate, there *dolus* is laid to the charge of the actor. But together with this contracted signification, legal science also employs the notion of guilt in a more comprehensive sense. Where a violation of right comes before us, and a personality, a self-conscious determining being, is given, to whom it is ascribed as author, whether it be in the form of *culpa* or of *dolus*, it designates the same as guilty.

To this extension of the idea the *ethical* treatment of the notion of guilt attaches itself, while at the same time it intensifies it. Before the juridical forum guilt is only established when the violation of right falls in some way in the sphere of outward phenomena, and it is not sin as such, which juridically makes men guilty, but only so far as it invades the judicial arrangements of civil life. On the contrary, before the moral forum everything is found to be guilt which stands in contradiction to the moral law—of course in existences which are under obligation to the law, and in those conditions of their life in which they are so, comp. p. 40—and therefore disturbances and disorders of the inward life, which have their ground in the will.

However this relation to the will, which is expressed by

imputation and guilt, requires still a more exact determination. Indeed, it was not the notion of *peccatum voluntarium* which first of all led us to consider *the will* as its real seat, but the very commencement of our consideration of sin in general; the notion of the moral law, as the contrast of which, sin first of all enters our consciousness, cannot be developed without pointing out its constitutive relation to the will, and therewith representing the will as the *essential place of this contrast.* But the will may be that, and still perhaps only convey an impulse communicated to it by a foreign, superhuman, power. That it is not merely the essential *place* of this contrast in the sphere of human life, but that it is by its self-determining power, the author of real evil in human life, which first of all teaches us the consciousness of guilt. This consciousness of guilt makes our personality, in its inmost centre, answerable for our sin. No one can say: when my conscience rejects my sins, it does not therefore reject me—but he himself, the sinner, is involved indissolubly in his sins, the condemning judgment is directed against himself.[1]

But this *condemning judgment*, which as *second* moment of the notion of guilt, follows from the objective existence of sin under presupposition of a subject, to whom it can be imputed, is in itself again a twofold notion. The first is the *negativing* consequence of sin, that the sinner is excluded from fellowship with God. If we remember that we have already found the nature of sin to consist in turning away from God, this determination may appear to be a tautological one. But its peculiar significance lies in this, that this exclusion in consequence of sin *attaches* itself to the sinner as an abiding unworthiness for fellowship with God. He has *committed* sin; he *is* guilty. So long as the desire after God slumbers, the guilt also slumbers; but when the consciousness of guilt awakes, man finds himself separated from God, unworthy of participation in any revelation of God, save in his wrath. This

[1] If the words of the Apostle appear to be in contradiction: οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ (τὸ κακόν), ἀλλ' ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία, Rom. vii. 17, 20, we must first of all remember that this entire passage does not treat of man in general, but of him in whom longing, and struggling after righteousness has been awakened (οὐκέτι). Moreover, what the οὐκ ἐγὼ signifies for this stage, and how it completes itself by other determinations of the Apostle in the same connection, will be further spoken of below.

conducts us to the second *positive* consequence, which attaches to man by virtue of the guilt arising from sin. It is this, that he therewith has fallen under the holy world-order of God, for the due punishment of his crime. We shall see from a later investigation, how sin as an act produces the sinful condition, from which again manifold actual sins are born. With this real consequence, by which the life is bound to the power of sin, in which it engages, there stands in the most intimate, inward connection, the obligation arising from sin to render satisfaction, to the inviolable majesty of the moral law, which, according to the results obtained in the second chapter of the first division, cannot in any way be separated from the majesty of the Lawgiver.

To the obligation arising from sin, to render satisfaction, the New Testament refers in denoting the notion by *ὀφείλειν, ὀφείλημα, ὀφειλέτης*, Luke xiii. 4; Matt. vi. 12. The expression is here figuratively used; in the ground lies the idea of a debt to God, as to the creditor, having been incurred by sin, Matt. v. 26; Luke vii, 41, 42, which *Anselm*, as is well known, made as the basis of his entire theory of reconciliation. More directly, *apprehension under the law*, arising from sin, is denoted by *ἔνοχον εἶναι*, so that the dependent genitive sometimes refers to the law itself, Ja. ii. 10, sometimes to the punishment appointed by the law, Matt. xxvi. 66; Mark iii. 29, sometimes to the object which has been sinned against, 1 Cor. xi. 27, but the dative refers to the administrating power of the law, Matt. v. 21, 22. The expression *ὑπόδικον γενέσθαι τῷ θεῷ*, Rom. iii. 19, more exactly determines the notion of guilt, in its religious signification, to which the epithet *τέκνον ὀργῆς* (*τοῦ θεοῦ*), Eph. ii. 3, denoting the guilty, corresponds.

With the contents of the notion of guilt previously exhibited, the Old Testament use of language, appears to be in little agreement, in which, according to general opinion, this notion is expressed by the singular term אָשָׁם. First of all, the form which is often met with to express apprehension for punishment or expiation, which arises from sin, may strike us with surprise. Here one would expect to find נָשָׂא אַשְׁמוֹ. Nevertheless these forms of expression are nowhere found, but almost always נָשָׂא עֲוֹנוֹ or חָמְאוֹ, either in the sense, that the sin in respect to the theocratic

relation of the sinner has not yet been removed by the expiatory sacrifice, or that it cannot be removed at all.[1] It is similar with the expressions: to cover sin, to take away sin (expiate, forgive), which are denoted by עָוֹן, חַטָּאָה, כִּפֻּר, not by אָשָׁם.

If we look for light on this subject in the much discussed distinction between *sin-offering*, חַטָּאת, and guilt-offering, אָשָׁם, the arrangement in reference to the same (Levit. iii.—vi., xix. 20—22; Num. v.—vii. 15, 28, 29), teach us that not merely did guilt-offerings without sin-offerings take place, but also the sin-offering without the guilt-offering. The union of the sin-offering with that of the guilt-offering, in one and the same propitiation, is only met with in a definite manner, in the purification of the leper and the Nazarite, Levit. xiv. 1—32; Num. vi. 9—12. From this it appears with certainty to follow, that in the terminology of the sacrificial cultus, sin and guilt do not denote different *sides* of the same transgression, but different *kinds* of violation of the theocratic law. If now, in the detailed descriptions of sacrifices, which Lev. cap. viii.—x. contains, the burnt-offering, sin-offering (offering of dedication), thank-offering (meat-offering) is found, but not at all the guilt-offering; if in the exact arrangements concerning the feast-offerings, Num. xxviii. 29, as well as in the detailed account of what the princes of the tribes of Israel brought to the sacrificial service, Num. vii., the guilt-offering is everywhere passed over in silence,[2] we must conclude that אָשָׁם did not belong to the regular practice of the sacrificial service, but was only offered in especial cases of pollution which seldom occurred.

But what now the specific distinction of these transgressions from the rest is, and wherefore the designation: guilt, אָשָׁם, is

[1] In the first sense for example, Lev. v. 1, 17, xxii. 9; Num. xxx. 16; in the latter, Gen. iv. 13; Lev. vii. 18, xxiv. 15; Numb. v. 31, ix. 13, xiv. 34. Just so is the expression for the *vicarious* bearing of sin formed, Isa. liii. 12; Ezek. iv. 4, 6, xviii. 19, 20; Lev. xvi. 22. The signification which *Gesenius im Thesaurus*, s. v. נָשָׂא still further gives, to *expiate* sin, does not appear anywhere to be shown, and only rests upon the confounding of the necessary *consequence* with the direct *contents* of the notion.

[2] Everywhere here the he-goat of the sin-offering is only spoken of, nowhere the ram of the guilt-offering, comp. also Levit. xxiii. 9—20.

ascribed to them *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, this the instances of guilt-offerings found in the Pentateuch leave very dark.[1] To the opinion of *Hengstenberg*, according to which sin in חַטָּאת is conceived of as inward disturbance, as the falling away of man from himself, in אָשָׁם as crime against the Holy God and His law, as robbery against God[2] for which restitution was to be made, stands opposed, that the Hebrew use of language employs לַיהוָה חַטָּאת, *e.g.* Gen. xx. 6, 9, xxxix. 9; 1 Sam. vii. 6, just as well as אָשָׁם לַיהוָה, that a fixed distinction of this kind does not at all correspond with the religious ground representation of the Old Testament, and especially of the ground idea of the sacrificial service,[3] and that among the six or seven instances quoted, only one single one, Lev. v. 15, 16, exhibits it in a *peculiar manner* as robbery against God.—The hypothesis defended by *Winer*, according to the example of *Reland*, that the guilt-offering referred to offerers which had no other witness than the individual's own conscience, the sin-offering to offences of which the offerers had been convicted, or which were supposed to exist according to the general constitution of human life,[4] has, it is true, in the similar conception of Josephus,[5] a strong support. But the nature of the

[1] The guilt-offering may be more easily explained in the case of the violation of that which had been consecrated to Jehovah. Lev. v. 14—16. In the detention of that which was entrusted to one to keep, or that which had been taken away by violence, &c. &c. Lev. vi. 1—7. In sexual intercourse with a betrothed slave. Lev. xix. 20—22. In the purification of the leprous. Lev. xiv. 10—32. And of the Nazarites, Num. vi. 1—21. But the guilt-offering, Lev. v. 17—19, causes great difficulty on account of the general character of the offence for which it is appointed. For if לֹא־יָדַע, ver. 17, denotes the *differentia specifica* of the transgressions by which the guilt-offering is conditioned, the immediately following case, ver. 21 and following (according to the received version, vi. 2 and following), does not allow of the same, where such an ignorance cannot be thought of.

[2] *Die Authentie des Pentateuchs*, B. 2, S. 214 f.

[3] How indeed *Hengstenberg* makes this distinction, as different conception of the same transgression, in connection with his opinion, that with every sin-offering there was also a guilt-offering, may very well be justified, if only that opinion were well grounded.

[4] *Biblisches Realwörterbuch, Art. Schuld-und Sündopfer.*

[5] Comp. the passages cited by *Winer*, a. a. O. Antt. iii. 9, 3. Also *Buddeus* coincides with this opinion, *Hist. eccles.* V. T. tom. i. p. 723, 24.

mutual offences, as the Pentateuch denotes them, stands also in opposition; in most instances among those for which the guilt-offering merely was offered, one must nevertheless presuppose a privity of the offence,[1] while many transgressions to which the guilt-offering was appointed, give no occasion for supposing such a privity.[2] Accordingly, we are obliged to regard, since the older attempts to explain it recommend themselves still less, the clear distinction between sin and guilt-offering as a problem, up to the present time, unsolved.[3]

However, a careful observation of all the passages in reference to the same leaves no doubt, that together with the *narrower* notion of אָשָׁם, guilt, which lies at the ground of the appointment of the *guilt-offering* in distinction from the *sin-offering*, a still *wider* notion must be admitted, according to which אָשָׁם also there is found where a sin-offering without a guilt-offering had to be offered; comp. especially Lev. iv. 3, 13, 22, 27; v. 2—5. The ground-thought in the Mosaic appointments concerning the expiatory offerings (in the narrower sense; for in a wider sense every offering has an expiatory signification) is indeed this:[4] Every sin is sinning against God, an attack upon His prerogative, and carries with it therefore a guilty condition, a condition requiring expiation, which in the one case requires the sin-offering,

[1] *Winer* indeed maintains the contrary; but in the detention of that which was committed to one to keep, in the intercourse with the betrothed slave—must not the injured person in the former, and the slave in the latter case know of the sin? Also sin which was committed with respect to that which was consecrated to Jehovah, could not in general escape the knowledge of the Priests and Levites.

[2] This especially holds good of several of the impurifications mentioned in Lev. v. 1—13, with respect to which *Winer*, with his accustomed candour, admits that the principle which he has laid down cannot be here applied.

[3] *Bähr, in seiner Untersuchung über die Sund-und Schuldopfer, Symbolik des Mosaischen Kultus*, B. 2, S. 410 f., is also of this opinion, since he also very properly declines the opinion of an entire confusion, or of arbitrariness, as well as that of a later origin of this part of the Pentateuch.

[4] The question is only of the שְׁגָגָה *im Opferwesen*, premeditated criminal acts—בְּיָד רָמָה—are excluded, Num. xv. 22—31. But it is true, that according to the instances mentioned in Leviticus, the notion of the שְׁגָגָה must be very widely conceived of.

in another the guilt-offering, and in a third both. In this connection of the notions the being guilty is of course the *result* of sin, as this is expressed in the above citations from Leviticus, and by the position of אָשָׁם, אָשַׁם with respect to חַטָּאָה, *the obligation of the sinner arising from sin to render satisfaction.*[1] אָשַׁם and אָשָׁם are just so used Gen. xxvi. 10, xlii. 21; 1 Chron. xxi. 3; 2 Chron. xxviii. 13; Ezra ix. 6, 7, 13, 15, x. 10. In the recognition resulting from this, that the sin-offering itself may at the same time be denominated אָשָׁם, namely not guilt-offering, but guilt for which compensation to God must be rendered, is contained the key to the apparently confused passage, Lev. v. 1—13.[2] The above mentioned difficulty in the expression נָשָׂא עָוֹן or חִטְּאָה resolves itself by the consideration, that the notion of guilt is here already contained in נָשָׂא. Guilt arises just because the sin does not pass away with the moment in which it is committed, but in that it remains upon the sinner, in his being obliged to bear its load. In this way the forms of expression: עָוֹן כִּסָּה חַטָּאָה כִּפֶּר explain themselves from the strict signification of the verbs, without the lexicographers being justified in giving to the substantives the notion of guilt on account of such and similar combinations.—

This guilt attaching itself to sin becomes embodied in the notion of the latter by the *Melancthonian* definition of sin, which is accustomed to be repeated by the older dogmatists of our Church, when it thus determines the same: *peccatum est defectus vel inclinatio vel actio pugnans cum lege Dei, offendens Deum, damnata*

[1] Comp. the remarks of *Hengstenberg* on the idea of the אָשָׁם a. a. O.

[2] As, on the one hand, in this passsage, the notion of a state of guilt becomes prominently set forth, so, on the other hand, it is not at all doubtful, that according to verses. 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, it treats of the sin-offering. אֶת־אַשְׁמוֹ is neither, ver. 6, to be translated: his guilt-offering *(De Wette)*, nor, ver. 7, for his guilt, on account of his guilt *(De Wette* and *Hengstenberg)*, but in both passages: as his guilt, namely as his guilt to be recompensed for to the Lord, for committed sin (אֲשֶׁר חָטָא), corresponding to the אֶת־קָרְבָּנוֹ אֲשֶׁר חָטָא, ver. 11, as an oblation, which, as it is more exactly defined in the same verse, as surrogate might there appear, where the strict אָשָׁם, namely the regular sin-offering, could not be brought on account of poverty.

a Deo et faciens reos aeternae irae et aeternarum poenarum, nisi sit facta remissio.[1] When now several among those theologians further distinguish in the imputation of sin between *reatus culpae* and *reatus poenae*, the expression may be a somewhat perverted one; but the distinction itself is to be justified, in so far as, according to its true signification, it is to be reduced to the above developed distinction, between the two moments of the idea of guilt.[2]

Melancthon, when he speaks of the distinction of actual sins, in reference to the guilt attaching to them, rejects, with strong disapproval, the stoical assertion, that all sins are of equal magnitude.[3] And this rejection is not merely in perfect agreement with the Old Testament, namely, with the Mosaic arrangements concerning the sin-offering just alluded to, which manifestly depend upon different degrees of guilt in individual sins, but is also distinctly confirmed in the New Testament, by Matt. v. 21, 22, x. 15, xii. 31, 32; Luke xii. 47, 48; John xix. 11; 1 John

[1] *Loci theol. de pecc.* p. 97.

[2] *Baier*, who, among the old Dogmatists, is distinguished for precision in the form of his dogmatic formulae, explains the reatus culpae by: obligatio, qua quis sub peccato, per ipsum peccatum constrictus, tenetur, ut revera sit et dicatur peccator. It is the immediate falling of sin back upon the personality of the transgressor by imputation. Compare his definition of reatus poenae; comp. also *theol. positivae*, P. ii. c. 1, § 15.

[3] A. a. S. 119. Just so the second *Helvetische Konfession*, cap. viii. (*Coll. Conff. ed Niemeyer*, S. 478.) Still *Melancthon* rejects the sentence strictly only in relation to the sins of the regenerate; for those of the unregenerate he allows it validity, at least, in so far as they are to him, as to *Luther*, all deadly sins; on which account a few Catholic polemics ascribe to them the ground-tenet of *Jovinian*: omnia peccata esse paria. The essential connection of their opinion is this: In itself every sin is a mortal-sin, makes the agent of the same deserving of eternal damnation, and it is only in the state of the new-birth by virtue of its principle, of faith, that any sin can become venial sin. Some sins, now in the state of the new-birth, if committed, carry with them the immediate destruction of faith, and thereby negative that state, although not irrestorably—peccata mortalia—others do not destroy faith, and such cannot fail of the Divine forgiveness, because faith indeed seeks it —peccata venialia. Essentially the same determinations werden reformiter Seits aufgestellt, comp. *Calvin's institutio rel. chr.*, lib. ii. c. 8, § 59. *Declar. Thorun. de peccato*, 8, 9.

v. 16. Then too, we are not justified, with *Schleiermacher*, in allowing these different degrees of guilt, to be resolved into the difference between the entire conditions of the acting agents.[1] This procedure rests first of all upon the one-sided opinion of the actual sins being only *effects* in relation to habitual sins; it is thereby overlooked that in this relation they are just as much *causal*, nay more, that sin, if its guilt is to be earnestly maintained at all, must be in an absolutely original respect actual sin. But if the actual sin be in every way causal in relation to the condition, it cannot be seen why the distinctions of degrees in guilt should rest only upon this condition, why they should not also directly be attached to the different qualities of actual sin.—The old division of transgressions into mortal sins and venial sins has become an inexhaustible source of useless, and by its trivial and external character, of destructive, determinations in the entire paraphernalia of penitence in the Catholic Church; and it is only self-deception, when men believe themselves able to decide with certainty, according to fixed tokens, the degree of guilt attaching itself to a given sin; but all these misrepresentations and abuses cannot rob the ground-thought of its truth, that the individual sins carry in them different degrees of guilt.

On what does this difference of degree rest? Guilt is the immediate reaction of sin upon its author, but the power, with which it reacts upon him, depends not merely in its varying degree upon *the energized condition* of the *spiritual powers*, with which it has proceeded from him; but also upon the *objective diversity in the magnitude of sin.* It is not an unhazardous representation, which in its consequential carrying out threatens to resolve sin entirely into that which is subjective, when one wishes to determine the graded distinction of guilt in an absolutely formal manner, by the way in which sin proceeds from the determining of the subject. This distinction of degree has essentially besides its formal root, also a material one. The

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, § 74, 1. (B. I, S. 451.) In relation to the distinction between mortal and venial sins, the Reformers and old Dogmatists of our Church agree with him in so far as the laying down, according to what was said in the previous note, the ground-tenet: peccatum mortale et veniale distinguitur non secundum substantiam facti, sed secundum personam sive propter differentiam peccata admittentium.

latter lies in the stronger or weaker energy of the principle of selfishness, operating in all sin, the former in the more perfect or more imperfect causation of sin by the sinning individual.

For the completeness of this causation it is requisite, that the individual sin be produced by the *will* of the subject, with the *consciousness that it is sin.* Consequently the incompleteness of this origination will consist either in the absence of this consciousness, or in the absence of that determination of the will. Therewith we retain both the forms of unpremeditated sins, sins of ignorance and sins of precipitation. And it is thus that *Melanchthon*,[1] according to his predecessors *Chemnitz*,[2] *Hutter*,[3] and others, reduce the chief distinction in the guilt arising from sin, namely, that division into venial and mortal sins, simply to the distinction between unpremeditated and premeditated sins, (of the regenerate). Although we, according to the above, still condition this distinction of degreee, by the different degrees of energy of the selfish principle, the derivation from this side nevertheless appears to come to the very same result. For if an individual on the point of committing a sin, is conscious of the same as sin, it directly contains a reaction of the conscience, and therefore in the surmounting of this reaction, there is revealed a higher degree of resoluteness, with which the will has surrendered itself to selfishness. And as a rule it is really so. However, sins are nevertheless not seldom committed in which the principle of selfishness puts forth an extraordinary energy, and which are not brought to the consciousness of the transgressor as sins, because of the densely beclouded condition of his soul in the committal of the same. Accordingly we must admit, that the distinction of the degree of guilt of actual sins, and the distinction between premeditated and unpremeditated sins, do not altogether coincide. This especially holds good of sins of infirmity against the conscience, in which, in spite of their more complete causation by the subject committing them, there is nevertheless often revealed a less degree of selfishness than in

[1] A. a. O. S. 117. *De discrimini pecc.* S. 276.

[2] *Loci theol.* P. iii., *loc. de discr. pecc. mort. et venialis*, fol. 122, f. (*Ausg.* v. 1595.)

[3] *Loci comm. De discr. pecc. mortalis et venial.*, S. 356.

sins of transgression (*Uebertretungssünden*) and sins ignorance, the unconsciousness of which has its ground in innumerable instances in a raw, uncouth, disregard of the voice of conscience.

From this point of view, the opinion often met with, according to which the ignorance in the *sins of ignorance* is said to absorb the sin, in so far as it forms the ground of guilt, is to be judged of, since there is here it is true a movement of the will, but not such as is directed to something as known sin. At least moral guilt is said only then to be possible by such an action objectively contradicting the moral law, when it was possible for the individual to have obviated his ignorance in this given respect, consequently when it has its ground in a sin of omission arising from moral indifference, and carelessness of mind.

And assuredly there is a so-called sin of ignorance, in which the ignorance entirely removes the guilt, and therewith altogether the character of real sin. One distinguishes in the ignorance, which is here under consideration, as is well known, ignorance of the obligating law, and unacquaintance with its own action according to its *full determinateness* (*ignorantia juris-facti*). Now the knowledge of one's own conduct refers, according to one of its sides, to the sphere of the external, to the infinite manifoldly conditioned relations, in which every action takes place. But in this sphere confusion and ignorance may very well take place, and therefrom an error in conduct arise without the smallest degree of guilt in the individual acting, through any deficiency of attention or the like. If any one *e.g.* disposes of another's property, in the opinion fully warranted from the circumstances, that it is his own, there exists, it is true, a *violation of right*, although there is only a civil, but *no moral guilt*. Against this, one cannot certainly adduce the determinations of the Mosaic law, according to which guilt arose even from Levitical uncleannesses, even when there was *ignorantia facti*, *e.g.* Levit. v. 2, 3. As the entire notion of Levitical uncleanness, although without a permanent moral religious significance, was nevertheless perfectly adapted under the given historical conditions, to the peculiar design of the moral law, to constitute Israel a people possessed of the consciousness of sin and the want of redemption, it must of course in its being carried out keep to *the fact* of uncleanness, without allowing the distinction between knowing

and not knowing, to determine more than the different *degree* of theocratic guilt arising therefrom.

Therefore this kind of error has no place here; but that which arises from the inordinate selfish endeavour, and thus contradicts the moral law, is guilt, whether the faulty individual be conscious or not conscious of this contradiction. Certainly if it were altogether impossible for any one to become acquainted with the contents of the moral law, and in consequence could not at all become conscious of that inordinate striving as of that which ought not to be, the imputation to such an one of that which may appear in his life as sin would certainly be made void, but equally therewith the completeness of human nature.—The distinction too between the *insurmountable* and *surmountable* ignorance, in the moment of decision, may indeed condition the degree of guilt, but cannot decide concerning the presence or non-presence of guilt. To be in ignorance, or error, in that sphere of the outward, the accidental, the mutable, does not bring reproach to man; but not to know the essential truth, which announces itself in the conscience, and its relation to the individual act, is itself just the consequence of a sinfully disturbed and disordered condition of his inward life. If from the moment in which he first of all perceived the voice of conscience, nothing had occupied, in any following moment of his life, a more prominent place in his heart than the desire accurately to know, what this voice said to him, and obediently to obey it, sins of ignorance, resting upon the *ignorantia juris*, would not in his case be met with. The moral consciousness would then develop itself in him to such a degree of strength, clearness, and certainty, that he would in every individual case possess the requisite knowledge. But the sinfulness of human nature does not allow of this, of which we shall by and by become convinced,—namely that it is by no means able to remove the imputation of individual sins. It is the unrighteousness of man, which prevents the development of truth in his consciousness, Rom. i. 18. Therefore we find that wild savages, when they become converted to Christ from the horrible vices of idolatry, from voluptuousness, murder, and untamed selfish impulses, do not regard themselves in any way freed from guilt by virtue of their ignorance, but in deep penitence feel the reproach of an awakened conscience.

Thus Paul too distinctly recognizes the *alleviation of the guilt of sin*, contained in the ignorance of heathen life, and in this sense speaks of a Divine overlooking of the χρόνοι τῆς ἀγνοίας, Acts xvii. 30, comp. Rom. ii. 9; Matth. xi. 21—24. But he is far from considering on that account the sinning heathen as *free from guilt*. Therefore he refers to the original consciousness of God in the human spirit, and its quickening by the revelation of God in nature, and deduces the disorder of their religious life from a suppression of that consciousness, Acts xvii. 27—29; Rom. i. 19—21, 28. He appeals, no less in a definite moral respect, also to the power of conscience in the consciousness of the heathen, Rom. ii. 15, as well as to the fact, that they in civil life, condemned the crimes as deserving of death, which they themselves committed, and even saw with pleasure practised by others, Rom. i. 32. From both he concludes, that they on no ground whatever could regard themselves as justified, Rom. i. 20, ii. 1, iii. 23. Furthermore, he adduces as motive of the Divine compassion, exercised to himself, the blashpemer, persecutor, injurious, that he did these things in ignorance and in unbelief, nevertheless he calls himself manifestly in relation to the same, the chief of sinners, 1 Tim. i. 13—15.

It is true from the teaching of Paul, Rom. xiv. 23, that that which does not correspond to the moral conviction of the individual acting, is imputed to him as sin, although, objectively considered, it may contain nothing wrong, thus it has often been inferred, that according to Paul's opinion, imputation depends upon the *subjective conviction* of acting justly or unjustly. Thus *e.g. De Wette*, in his ethics, conceives of the passage, and then attaches to the same a doctrine of imputation, of a one-sided subjective character, which misleads him to denominate as false, the division of sins, into sins of knowledge, and sins of ignorance, because the latter are not sins, and only *to allow* of the disquieting of the conscience by the thought of unknown sin (Ps. xix. 13), in the case of the Hebrew bound to an outward law.[1] But this could only be deduced from the words of Paul, if it not merely stood: πᾶν ὃ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως ἁμαρτία ἐστί, but: πᾶν ὃ ἐκ πίστεως δίκαιόν ἐστιν. Or is perhaps this affirmative judgment to be, as a matter of course, deduced from that negative one? By no means. Of

[1] A. a. O. Th. 1, S. 111, vgl. S. 308, ff.

course the erroneous moral conviction has the power to bind man to that which it presents to him as necessary, but not the power to liberate him from the authority of truth, and to set itself up in its place. That is the curse of moral error, that it condemns man, when he acts in opposition to his subjective conviction, and nevertheless does not justify him when in obedience to it he does that which is condemnable. If the persecutors of the apostles had the decided conviction of thereby fulfilling a duty to God, John xvi. 2, they would be worthy of punishment, whether they omitted or carried out the persecution.

When Christ says of these hating Jews: If I had not come, and had not announced it to them, they had not had sin (namely, ὅτι οὐκ οἴδασι τὸν πέμψαντά με), John xv. 22, 24—His words contain, although ἁμαρτίαν ἔχειν in itself, denotes only the actual existence of sin, the ἁμαρτάνειν or ἡμαρτηκέναι, still on account of the antithesis: νῦν δὲ πρόφασιν οὐχ ἔχουσι περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν, of course a negation of *guilt*. But that we are not to understand this negation as absolute, but only *relative*, follows from the fact, that as everywhere in the New Testament, so also in the Gospel of John, *e.g.* i. 29, iii. 36 (ἡ ὀργὴ τοῦ θεοῦ μένει ἐπ' αὐτόν), xx. 23, the sinful nature of the man of the world, arising from his estrangement from God, is considered as one of guilt. Matt. xi. 21—24, expressly with respect to the same distinction, allows only room for a mitigation of the guilt. Then too, John ix. 41 is to be understood as quite opposed to the same, we may paraphrase the passage thus: Had you been absolutely unable to comprehend my announcement, the rejection of it had not been sin; but now you yourselves confess that you have the understanding, therefore the rejection of my word rests upon you as sin.[1]—But Christ lays it down expressly as a universal rule, that the knowledge or ignorance of the Divine law by the sinning individual who violates it, only grounds *a difference in the degree* of guilt and culpability, Luke xii. 47, 48. The same is contained in Christ's prayer upon the cross for the forgiveness of his murderers, because they knew not what they did, Luke xxiii. 34. If this ignorance removed their guilt, they did not require forgiveness; if it did not mitigate their guilt it could not have

[1] Compare, at both passages, *Lücke's* remarks *im Kommentar.*

been used in prayer as a motive ground of forgiveness.—Thus the need of the prayer expressed in Ps. xix. 13, of which the experience of the Christian consciousness gives testimony, finds its full confirmation in the New Testament.

In our investigation hitherto, we have considered guilt independently of its *becoming a reality in the consciousness* of the individual subject stained with sin. And this is no mere empty abstraction; guilt is much rather at first and originally something quite objective, it attaches to the sinner as an unavoidable *second imperative*, in relation to a *first imperative*,[1] still remaining unfulfilled, and demands *expiation*, even when he is not at all conscious of his relation to the offended majesty of the Divine law. The existence of guilt is not at all dependent upon its being recognised in the conscience of the sinful individual. But is it possible for the guilty to be entirely unconscious of their guilt? This could only be by the consciousness of a norm determining his life by means of unconditional requirements, being fully lost. Experience, it is true, makes us acquainted with instances of the most extreme suppression of this consciousness, as of its deepest turbidity and deformation; but does not justify us in absolutely denying its presence in any, even the lowest state of moral degeneracy. Powerful spirits, who suppose themselves first of all to be free, when they are free from God and his holy law, may have wished to persuade themselves and others of the same: in his inward judgment, man never becomes equally indifferent towards the contrast of good and evil; he can never cease to disapprove the act of hatred, of unrighteousness, of lying, nor to approve of the opposite. Even the hardened villain, whose maxim it is only to pursue his own lust, and his own advantage, and not to trouble himself about duty, finds nevertheless some acts of violence, against which the moral feeling within him offers resistance when he becomes tempted to the same.

But from this it is far from following, that the same universality

[1] Language significantly expresses this inseparable connection. Man is in the first place obligated to observe the law; if he disregards this obligation he becomes obligated to the law. The signification of ὀφείλειν, ὀφείλημα contains just this double obligation.

applies to the consciousness of guilt, as to the presence of sin. Only so much may be deduced from these testimonies in favour of the indestructible moral nature of man, that there are outrages which no one is able to commit without exciting the conscience to the secret avenging of the crime. And more than this does not appear to be warranted by experience, as being universally present. Numbers without number allow themselves without let or hindrance, to be governed by the impulses of their self-seeking; but in the uncultivated state of their entire spiritual condition they never think of reproaching themselves on that account. Others pride themselves on account of a cultivated consciousness; but the moral side of the same is so poisoned by the sophistry of passions and lusts, that the customary impulse of their Egotism is no longer able to awaken in them the feeling of guilt. Also Heathenism at the height of its development reveals in those very elements of its religiousness, in which a powerful moral consciousness gives utterance to itself, at the same time the limitation of its moral judgment. The Erinnys who manifest their power in the disquietude of the conscience, exercise their honourable functions only there, where an aggravated violation of the most holy, most primitive right has excited them, where, for example, a crime of blood has been perpetrated.

It must be admitted that *guilt* is of far greater magnitude, and more widely diffused than its *consciousness* in man; guilt is not always a conscious condition of the subject even where he is under both its arrest and responsibility: it sleeps in innumerable cases, and only there can be awakened, not merely as a reprover of individual crimes, but as testimony of an opposition pervading the entire nature of its subject against the holy arrangements of life, where the spirit is no longer fettered by the trammels of moral obtuseness and indifference. But even when there is wanting in the sinner, a real consciousness of guilt, there is nevertheless not wanting to him a feeling which we must regard as the germ of the same. He may be free from appalling wickedness, but so long as he continues to live in the service of his passions, and selfish interests, he is not truly at one with himself; a dark presentiment tells him, that the sphere in which he lives is not his true home; there occur to him moments in which a feeling of insecurity warns him of the fatal ground on which he stands.

The service of sin can never give freedom to the breast, but only confine it in narrower limits.

But when the real consciousness of guilt breaks forth from this dark germinal concealment, then we possess factual proof that sin does not yet pervade the entire moral existence; the self-condemnation in the evil conscience is the efflux of the acquiescence, which man is obliged, involuntarily, nay often in opposition to his will, in his inmost consciousness, to give to the contents of the law. Even when man has resigned himself up to the service of sin, it does not lose for him, so long as it remains short of the climax of its perverted development, the character of a foreign power, which although resident in him only by his own self-determination, nevertheless divides him from himself, and sets him at variance with himself. The consciousness of guilt has this remarkable two-sidedness; on the one hand, it *ascribes sin to the Ego of man*, makes the person responsible for it; on the other hand, immediately on its existence it reveals a *concealed tendency of personality, which attaches to the law of God*, and directs itself condemningly against the endeavours and conduct of the selfish Ego. The true essence of the Ego, which is only able to realize itself in fellowship with God, and distinguishes itself from sin, as from a foreign element,[1] is at variance with the empirical condition of the Ego, according to which it must look upon sin as its own.[2]—Thus the evil conscience is the Divine bond which binds the created spirit, even in deep apostacy, to its Original. In the consciousness of guilt there is revealed, the essential relation of our spirit to God, γένος τοῦ θεοῦ, Acts xvii. 28,—although misunderstood by man until he has something higher than his evil conscience. The trouble and anguish which the remonstrances of this consciousness excites, the inward unrest which sometimes seizes the slave of sin, are proofs that he has not

[1] Εἰ δὲ οὐ θέλω ἐγώ, τοῦτο ποιῶ, οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία, Rom. vii. 20. Comp. v. 9, 10.

[2] Οἴδαμεν, ὅτι ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστιν, ἐγὼ δὲ σαρκικός εἰμι, Rom. vii. 14.—If we compare with this that Platonic doctrine, according to which evil in general is said to be a something which happens to man from without, in which his will has nothing to do, from which he only suffers violence, we shall be obliged to say, that here the empirical truth of the matter, which is the great thing treated of in the question of imputation, is sacrificed to the ideal view of the same.

got quite broken away from God. If sin be a struggle of the creature to tear itself from God, this struggle is not only for ever outwardly fruitless, but inwardly it has failed of its end, so long as the consciousness of guilt is not utterly extinguished.[1]

In this recognition of the moral significance of the consciousness of guilt, we must not, on the other hand, overlook its distinction from *repentance*. The degree of ease, or difficulty, with which that consciousness may be awakened, is of course dependant upon the entire moral condition of the subject. But the appearance of the same in the individual instance, namely, the individual excitation of the evil conscience, is first of all something involuntary. It even there makes itself valid, where its authority is disputed and sought to be suppressed. Man does not possess this consciousness, but it possesses him; it pursues the flying, and lays hold of the resisting; when the Ego in its untamed selfishness thinks to get away beyond every barrier of the Divine laws, it has to be taught by experience, how in its own inmost, the insurmountable power of these laws will only mock its vain attempts. The sense of guilt is a power *over and above* man in this his empirical condition, a power so wonderful, that it often compels the most reckless criminal, as by a charm stupifying the senses, to deliver himself up, with the confession of his deed, to the sword of justice, from which a bare-faced lie would have protected him. Man is only able by persevering, ever-repeated, self-hardening, against the remonstrances of this consciousness, gradually, entirely, to withdraw from its power. But in this gradual stupefaction of the inward voice of accusation, there is so little contained an excuse for the sinner, that much rather this condition of hardening, contains the imputation of long catalogues of guilt, of which it is the fruit.

Then again *Repentance*, on the other hand, is not merely a

[1] When *Goethe* in his *Faust* places in the mouth of the Evil Spirit the reproaches of the awakened conscience, this procedure of the poet, parallels of which may be easily adduced from the writings of the great teachers of the Church, especially from *Luther's*, may be justified by this, that in the consciousness of guilt, although so holy in its origin, an amphiboly nevertheless attaches to it with respect to its effects. If, on the one hand, it promoted salvation in a *Peter*; on the other hand, in a *Cain* and a *Judas*, it tended to destruction.

passive state, but equally an *inward action:* not a mere determinateness of the consciousness, but equally a determination; its notion distinguishes itself from the mere sense of guilt in that it essentially includes free resignation to its own inward punishment. Repentance is one moment in the plan of salvation and of the return to God; even notorious examples of confirmed wickedness, as *Tiberius*,[1] *Nero*,[2] have also been obliged to experience the tormentings of an evil conscience. We cannot require of one that he realize individual excitations of the consciousness of guilt, the reproaches of his conscience, but we may require of him repentance. There is therefore in the idea of repentance the endeavour to desist from sin, and henceforth of being indissolubly bound to do the will of God. Sorrow on account of one's own sins, without the goad of this endeavour to lead a new life, is not godly sorrow, 2 Cor. vii. 9, 10; does not deserve the name of repentance. The New Testament use of language expresses this inward unity by uniting both moments, that of pain on account of sin, and that of a longing for a life well pleasing to God, in the idea: μετάνοια, μετανοεῖν, as is satisfactorily seen in the pregnant constructions of the word on the one hand with ἐκ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν φόνων, ἀπό νεκρῶν ἔργων, ἀπὸ τῆς κακίας, Acts viii. 22; Heb. vi. 1; Rev. ii. 21, 22, ix. 20, 21, xvi. 11; and on the other hand with εἰς τὸν θεόν, Acts xx. 21.

Luther, in the *Smalkaldischen Artikeln* P. iii. art. 3, (p. 320, 322, ed. *Richenb.*) rejects the notion, laid down by the scholastic theologians, of *contritio activa*, and sets up in its place *contritio passiva* as the true repentance. It is easy to understand, how *Luther's* strong spirit,—in which the consciousness of sin as of a damnable enmity against God, was just as strong, as the consciousness of the all-efficacious grace of God,—must resist the Catholic doctrine and practice, respecting repentance, the subtlety and force employed in the production *(elicere)* of the required feeling of repentance, on which account he terms this repentance *factitia et accersita*, the madness of being able to deserve the forgiveness of sin by repentance as *opus meritorium*, which he combats as Pelagianism.[3] But from the above, properly understood, it

[1] *Tacitus Annalen*, B. 6, 6. *Sueton's Tiberius*, 66, 67.
[2] *Sueton's Nero*, 34.
[3] Still later *das Tridentinum* in its 14th *Sitzung de poenit*, c. 4, §

follows that human activity must be regarded as a moment in repentance. The ground on which *Luther*, *Chemnitz*,[1] and others, maintain the opposite, lies first of all in their not distinguishing repentance from the mere consciousness of guilt, from the pain of an awakened conscience, to which *Bellarmin* directs attention.[2] Still this conception of the doctrine of repentance hangs together with that *pati actionem Dei*, with that *capacitas mere passiva*, by which *Luther* and the *Konkordienformel*[3] denote the conduct of the human will in relation to the Divine working in conversion—a representation which one may refuse to accept as an erroneous one, without thereby being in the least degree under the necessity of consenting to the tropus of doctrine of the semi-Pelagians, or to the, in part, somewhat unskilfully formed Formulæ of the Synergists.

3, reduces not merely *contritio* but also *attritio* to the *donum Dei*, and the efficiency of the Holy Ghost. Comp. *Bellarmin de poenit.* lib. ii. c. 3.

[1] *Examen Conc. Trident*, P. ii. *de contritione.* (S. 347 f. *Ausgabe* v. 1590.)

[2] *De poenit.* lib. ii. c. 2. (*De controv. christ. fid*, tom. iii. p. 964.)

[3] *Sol. declar.* art ii. *De lib. arbitrio*, p. 662, ed. *Richenb.* Also here as in some other dogmas the deficiency partly belongs to the distinction between passity and receptivity appertaining thereto, in the insufficient expression of a principle which is essentially just.

SECOND CHAPTER.

THE GUILT OF MAN AND HIS DEPENDENCE UPON GOD.

We will not deny, that the necessity we are under of imputing sin to ourselves, of reproaching ourselves on account of our apostacy from God, and our resistance to His will, is something in the last degree depressing, nay fearful. Before the dark depth of this abyss, into which man must descend unattended and alone;—for if the preventing grace of God already accompanies him, he is still unaware of it,—the grim appalling darkness is not merely terrific to a superficial world-morality, which ever regards sin as coming more from without than from within;—not merely to a pious sentimentality, which may experience sin not as bitterly painful, but only as a mild sadness giving a relish to the joy of redemption;—not merely to a speculation which requires the evil in its world as the constant antithesis of good, in whose mastery, the good is ever to be engaged, but never to be victorious;—not merely to these is the dreadfulness of this abyss terrific, but even the earnest religious consciousness has not seldom felt its terrors, and betrayed the concealed inclination to make room for theories of excuse.

And indeed the difficulties do not appear small which present themselves in the very sphere of *religion*, and lie in the way of a firm maintenance of human guilt in sin. How indeed is this independent causality which is said to be contained in the very nature of guilt, compatible with the *idea of a creature*? Or how, with the all-embracing, all-sustaining *presence of God, in His world*? If man be the creature of God, he has his being and existence by an absolute causality; how then can anything proceed from his will which may not be referred back to this absolute causality? Since God is everywhere present with His mighty will, the will of man can effect nothing, either great or small, useful or pernicious, without the Divine sustaining efficacy taking part in the same. The wide chasm between God and the

world is only to be found in the conception of a piety meagre to the last degree, and in that of a barren rationalistic theology; in truth God is so near to man, that he cannot withdraw himself from His all-sustaining power even although he should wish to do so. Since it is the Divine love which has given to the world its existence, it has no desire to cast it off, but without ceasing, cherishes it in its bosom.—If now these determinations so deeply pervading human life, namely, the resolution and execution of moral evil, are to be referred to the human will as their original cause, how is it conceivable that they should on that account any the less be regarded as having their ground in the Divine causality?

But on the other side, it is no little matter which holds us back from accepting this determination of the origination of sin, without further consideration. How the positive contents of the Christian religion is most thoroughly conditioned by the truthfulness of the consciousness of guilt, will become matter of our subsequent investigation. But is the truthfulness of our consciousness of guilt, the only price we must pay, if we wish to consider God as the author of sin? If we are to regard the conscience *condemning the sinner* as a deception, will the conscience *condemning sin*, continue to be an inviolable truth? And especially when we reflect on whom the guilt of sin falls, if we cast it away from ourselves? If God work the evil by His absolute will, so that when we sin we are only the executive organs of His will, and if God is the Good, how can we then still presume to reject and abhor what comes from God? If God be the author of Evil, that which we have to reject is no longer the evil, but the audacious judgment which rejects the same, presuming to call in question, and to condemn, the Divine arrangement. But in this case, we can no longer truly affirm the good, the contrast of good and evil must give place to the indifference of both, and the moral ground-bases of our existence fall to pieces. Or shall we say that God, according to the words: *nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse*, must have set Himself against Himself, in order to obtain in conflict with Himself a living fountain of life, a restless impulse of development? Will morality allow itself to be supported by the blasphemous thoughts of a pantheism, which knows nothing of the Holiness of God? An antithesis which God Himself makes can

never be regarded as anything else than the play of the absolute with Himself, and is that to become a matter of earnestness in the human consciousness, which has already looked upon this contrast in such a light? If it belongs to the nature of vital religion, as has been maintained (by *Rosenkranz*) to regard God as one who reveals His nature and His will with equal Necessity, in everything which is, and happens, who *produces* the good from Himself, without thereby being honoured, and likewise the evil, without being degraded, religion were, according to its very nature, inimical to morality. Therefore, if the earnestness of the moral consciousness must be sacrificed, in order to save the vitality of religion, most undoubtedly the vitality of religion thus redeemed, would immediately follow in sacrifice, the price of its redemption. For what sort of piety would that be, in which the soul could approach God without becoming conscious that its selfish and worldly determinations and endeavours, were absolutely rejected by Him? Thus, conceptions which in their origin appear to originate from a religious interest, lead ultimately to the complete destruction of all religion.

Still a way of escape appears yet open to us, namely, the opinion, that God has Himself *ordered* the limitation of human existence, which our consciousness conceives of as evil, but no less as its inseparable companion, the *consciousness of guilt*, in order that man might not compose himself in idle resignation in the former, but, incessantly strive after the good, as after the undisturbed harmony and freedom of his being. But what a way of escape! A dark demon-like power which first of all leaves the poor mortal to become guilty, and then gives him over to the reproach of an evil conscience for being so; which orders selfishness, lying, and hatred, as a necessary, perhaps ever vanishing, yet never vanished shadow of good, and which then indeed makes him responsible in his consciousness for this phantom; and thus adds to the burden of sin, the inward torment of remorse. Such a power may perhaps be intelligible from polytheistic and pantheistic points of view;[1] but it stands in insolvable contra-

[1] Thus we find in the epic and tragic poetry of the Greeks, not merely the shuffling off of the guilt of committed sin upon *Jove*, and the Moira, as in the speech of *Agamemnon*, Il. xix. 86 sq., comp. *Naegelsbach*, l. c. p. 273 sq., 295 sq., 66 sq., but also more definitely the above

diction to the principles of Christian Theism, since it does not merely deny the truthfulness and holiness of God, and undermine all confidence in His revelations, but also places in the room of His love, a despotic cruelty towards His creatures.

thought, that the Gods themselves thrust men into heavy guilt, when they have determined on their ruin. Thus *Plato*, in order to ground the banishment of the poet from his state, quotes the following words, from a lost Drama of *Aeschylus* (*de republ.* lib. ii. 380.—*Bekker's* ed., iii. 1. p. 99.) :—

> *θεός μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,*
> *ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ.*

And if, of course, we cannot attach very much importance to this passage, seeing that we are ignorant of its connection, and of the character and situation of the speaker, still, in a similar sense, the most noble poet of Antiquity says, by *Oedipus in Colonus*, of that which he did, or, as he himself often distinguishes, much rather, suffered, ver. 964 :—

> *θεοῖς γὰρ ἦν οὕτω φίλον*
> *τάχ' ἄν τι μηνίουσιν εἰς γένος πάλαι.*

And in the following verses he represents the *θέσφατον* which had befallen his Father, as the irresistibly effectuating cause of his bloody crime, without this judgment finding its justification in the further development of the Drama. The Gods avenge the *πρώταρχος ἄτη* of a house on the remote posterity by means of blind delusion of mind, and crime, which make it again deserving of Divine punishment; but this *πρώταρχος ἄτη*, is, as the mythus, and even the notion of *ἄτη* lead us to anticipate, sent again from the Gods jealous of human greatness. The *πρώτη ἀρχή* of this confounding perplexity proceeds from man only in so far as there is the extraordinary elevation of the individual above the general lot of human weaknesses and limitation, which elevation excites the *φθόνος* of the Gods.

> *Τὰ γὰρ περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα*
> *πίπτειν βαρείαις πρὸς θεῶν δυσπραξίαις*
> *—ὅστις ἀνθρώπου φύσιν*
> *βλαστὼν ἔπειτα μὴ κατ' ἀνθρωπον φρονεῖ—*

is reported in the *Ajax* of *Sophocles*, ver. 745—48, as the declaration of the seer *Calchas*. Grecian piety has also its humility in the presence of the Gods, indeed it is a conspicuous feature in it, in so far as it conceives of evil essentially as *ὕβρις*; but this humility is less of an ethical, than, so to speak, of a metaphysical nature. The *ταπεινοφροσύνη* of Christianity bows us down in the very consciousness of our high nature, of our exalted determination, by the self-guilty, self-occasioned contradiction of the reality, against this determination; the humility of Grecian piety forbade man to think of his destiny as being great. We must add, it is true, that at the same time a moral moment commonly glimmers through the same; but it does not present itself in a definite,

Besides it is clear, that every explanation of the consciousness of guilt, which, because evil has its last ground in the creature himself, will not therefore allow of its being ordered by God, except *to this single end,—that* the creature in the derivation and imputation of evil may be restricted within the limits of his own being;—every such explanation is at the same time the immediate dissipation of the consciousness of guilt. In order to recognize in one's self such a limitation, it must have been already surpassed. Since the subject of moral evil has come thus to consider the matter, he can no longer attribute the origin of the same to himself. The Divine intention is frustrated, so soon as it is seen through by the shrewdness of man. Then too with this discovery the consciousness of guilt, no longer serves as the goad of progress.

In order to sink one's self undisturbed in the feeling of the all conditioning efficacy of God, he may not turn his back upon matters of such importance, as those which lie at stake in the question concerning the credibility of the sense of guilt. But it were just as great a perversion to give the lie to the direct consciousness of this Divine efficiency, belonging to all vital

distinct, form, but remains an obscure, uncertain, back-ground. The just quoted declaration of *Ajax* is very characteristic of the ambiguous vaccillation in which the opinion of the antiquity of Greece, in this respect, moves, since the innocent pre-eminence of *Ajax* and the ὕβρις of his mind (*Sinn*) are naively placed together as causes of his tragical fate; but is it not to be read as if the μὴ κατ' ἄνθρωπον φρονεῖν as a matter of course, was to be found in the περισσοῖς κἀνονήτοις σώμασι? *Schömann*, who, in his work: "*Des Aeschylus gefesselter Prometheus*," (1844) a work rich in deep and sagacious thought, notices the first elaboration *der Lehre von der Sünde* in the kindest, and, for me, most instructive manner, gives expression (p. 133) to the same conviction, namely, that a searching investigation of the *Oedipusfabel* may lead us to regard the moral guilt of *Oedipus* as the ground of his tragical fate. From the contents of the *Oedipusfabel* itself I have no wish whatever to dispute this; but if *Sophocles* had definitely conceived it in this sense, must not one expect that he would have expressed it in the *Oedipus in Colonus*, namely, in the expiatory scenes at the close? But as to the prevailing opinion of the people of Greece at the height of their glory, it is difficult *e.g.* to believe that they would have so quietly listened to the Father of history in Olympia, unless the: πᾶν θεῖον φθονερόν which pervades his work, had possessed a deep root in the faith of the people.—The Grecian Philosophy, on the contrary, expressly controverts the throwing off of the burden of guilt upon the Gods, especially *Plato*, l. c., and elsewhere, later *Plutarch* also, *adv. Stoicos*, c. 19.

piety, and supporting itself by the conception, everywhere met with in the Holy Scripture, in order merely not to be under the necessity of doubting the declaration of the consciousness of guilt. Equal truth and equal justification belong to both; a real solution of the problem is only possible in the union of both. Now as far as this question stands in immediate connection with the *freedom of the human will*, its treatment does not belong to this part of our discussion; according to this side of the question it can, of course, in its deep grounds, only become answered in the third book, where this freedom is the subject of investigation. The question, whether a causality is conceivable, which, although in its existence absolutely conditioned by God, still possessing the power to give to itself, in its working, a direction, which is opposed to the Divine will, and absolutely not capable of being referred to the Divine will, has especially to do with the question of the relation of sin to the *creative efficiency of God*. Here too there will have to be considered the question, whether the efficiency of God in all created being, conditioning the continuance of existence, therefore *the preservation of the world*, does not unavoidably make God the author of evil, and reduce the sense of guilt to a shadow, which is only thrown upon the soul by a dreamt-of independency.

A definition of the Divine preservation of the world, commonly attributed to the Schoolmen, denotes it as *creatio continua*.[1] This form of the notion of preservation has found especial applause among those, who, from their immediate religious experience, had become certain of a near and constant relation of the Divine efficiency to the world; they found therein their defence against deistical separations of the world from God, as of a completed machine from its builder.

[1] Whether the expression is really a scholastic one? In the works of those at hand, in the *Lombarden*, *Thomas von Aquino* in the *Summa totius Theologiæ*, and in the *Summa contra gentiles*, *Bonaventura* in the *Commentary to the Sentences*, and in the *Breviloquium*, it is not to be found, at least not there, where the creation, preservation, and providence are expressly treated of. Nevertheless there is, it is true, this notion, when *Thomas* in the *Summa tot. theol.*, P. i., qu. 104, art. 1, says: Conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis, qua dat esse; comp. the commencement of the following article.

If we are to have any definite conception of this definition, it must clearly be this, that what we denote by *creatio* and *conservatio*, is absolutely one and the same Divine efficiency, and that the distinction between them only exists in our subjective representation of them, therefore that not merely the beginning of created being depends upon this Divine efficiency, but in an absolutely equal manner also its continuance and further development in being, and every movement and change within the same. Those of course maintain this identity, who, with *Schleiermacher*, cannot at all objectively conceive of different kinds of Divine efficiency, since the representations of mutual antitheses, and limitations, appears to them inseparable from such a distinction. But if *Schleiermacher*, in his treatment of these doctrines of creation and conservation, strongly emphasizes the reduction of all dogmatic determinations to the immediate contents of the religious consciousness, this identification of all Divine working is notwithstanding entirely of abstract metaphysical derivation. It originates in the idea of a distinctionless simple world-unity, which is equally, at the same time, the transcendental ground of the world, as of the totality of divided, antithetic being, and, as such, the absolutely conditioning *terminus a quo* of this totality; but is in each of its moments and spheres in an absolutely equal manner. We must postpone for later discussion the proof (to the fourth chapter of the first divison of the third book) of how little this conception, of the idea of God, and of His relation to the world, is able to satisfy the religious interest, with which the true interests of speculation can never develop themselves in irreconcilable contradiction; but in the meantime we cannot, therefore, decline the real distinction between the Divine creation, and conservation, because there is said to be no distinction whatever in the Divine working.—Just as little can it trouble us, that, if that distinction is to be made a matter of earnestness, the different moments of the Divine efficiency appear in succession, in a *relation of time*, that the conservation, since it presupposes the existence of its object, therefore, the creating activity conditioning the origin of the same, is the essentially succeeding efficiency. Truly it is a matter self-evident, to speak with Luther, that the Divine will, and the Divine decree, are to be regarded as altogether independent both of means and time; but it is just as

gross a misunderstanding, as it is common, when one supposes there must immediately and of necessity follow therefrom, that the Divine working also cannot have its commencement in time, *i.e.* in the world, cannot temporally determine itself. The thought of an Eternal Divine, determination of will, to produce at a given time a given working, is, as the Schoolmen have already perceived, no contradiction whatever; but it is a contradiction, to adopt the opinion of a real presence of God in the world, a real governing of the world, imposing a given end, and to reject that thought. If time be only looked upon as the subjective form of our intuition, the idea, that God may give to His working in every way temporal determinateness, is of course coincident with the same; but equally therewith every idea, every presentiment as to what change and development in themselves can be, since without a succession of time, we are no longer able to form the least conception, and our entire representation of the world is reduced to an irritating *Fata morgana*, to an objectless reflection of our own cognitive power and its limitation. On the contrary, if time be the objective form of worldly being, in so far as it is essentially becoming, developing, it is—of course under presupposition of the independent personality of God—nothing less than the severing of every band between God and the world, if His working is to have no possible relation to time.[1]

We shall not therefore be induced by these reasons to renounce the distinction between creation and conservation. On the other side, powerful considerations present themselves against their identification, arising from the idea of the Divine Holiness. The religious consciousness can never allow the thought that God can have *created* man *evil*, because he were otherwise Himself the

[1] That *Luther*, to whose expressions in his commentary on Genesis, *Schleiermacher* especially appeals for the absolute timelessness of the Divine activity, *Glaubenslehre*, § 41 (Bd. 1, S. 215, 217), does not at all wish to maintain such a timelessness, is distinctly seen from the connection of these expressions. Thus he says on this very passage (on Genesis ii. 2): Operatur Deus adhuc, siquidem semel conditam naturam non deseruit, sed gubernat et conservat virtute verbi sui. Cessavit igitur a conditione, sed non cessavit a gubernatione. The words "without all means and opportunity of time," is not said of the Divine efficiency, but of God himself.

author of evil. But still if it is God who *preserves* man, as one infected with sin, and if creation and conservation are identical, how shall He not nevertheless be the author of evil?

The distinction between creation and conservation has manifestly the presumption in its favour, from the general use of language. In the sphere of human operations, we call an activity which effects the origination of something new, creation,—of course with the proviso, that in this sphere there is no such thing as an absolute creation, because this something new is only a modus of being,—on the contrary, an activity which conditions the continuance in being of that which already exists, we call preservation, and under the idea of creation we think of a stronger determining working, which, other things being equal, carries with it a higher degree of responsibility in the agent of the same. How now are we to apply this distinction to the Divine working? If every new production, so far as it is an original one, therefore not capable of being deduced from the efficiency of creaturely powers already in existence, is to be referred to the creating causality of God, the idea of creation cannot be *exclusively* referred to some one *moment* of the beginning of finite being. The being of every new species has its origin in a creative working; for its very notion supposes it to be inexplicable, from all creatures previously existing. Thus, to keep to the most comprehensive of the ideas given us in this sphere, the phenomenon of the plant, is truly a created wonder for the entire inorganic kingdom; just so the besouled animal, endowed with sense and instinct, is for the vegetable kingdom; and most of all, man, for the animal kingdom.—Now it is true upon the stand-point of theistic metaphysics, the common opinion is, that the origination of new species does not take place in the continued development of finite beings, but only at the beginning. But allowing this opinion to hold good, still, owing to the essential relation of the different species, in which the one presupposes the others, the extension of this beginning into a series of successive moments becomes thereby very much favoured, just as the Mosaic history of creation observes this order in its narration. But if such a succession of moments of creation be adopted, it is quite indifferent for the dogmatic notion of creation, whether the intervening space of the moments be days or thousands of years.—Then again within the

human sphere, the new life proceeding from Christ, in its entrance into the history of humanity in general, as of its entrance into the soul of the individual, must be considered as an original production of God, καινὴ κτίσις, 2 Cor. v. 17; Gal. vi. 15. Miracles, and above all the future resurrection of the dead, and the efficiency of God in connection therewith, constituting the world anew, come under this notion.[1] And herewith it is clear that we may most assuredly speak of a *creatio continua* in a sense not to be rejected, but only not as denoting the conserving activity of God.

May we then conclude that we have a *creation in the absolute sense*, in all that we have just mentioned, therefore in that which cannot come under the idea of conservation? If so, then the product must be absolutely new, and original, and independent of the efficiency of creative-powers.—We can only answer the question from the presupposition that the world is at any rate to be considered as one whole, the parts of which are in strict, constant connection, and work into each other. The world as this whole is in constant development, but it does not at first become this whole, as if it had been previously *composed* of different pieces lying disconnectedly together. If it were such a composition, it must just remain the same composite structure throughout all future aeons. The entering in of such a new creative efficiency as that just above denoted, into the development of the world, does not therefore destroy the unity and organic connection of its self-development, first of all, because it is the efficiency of Him in whom the world has its origin, whose understanding begot the primitive image of the world, and whose almighty will embraces and governs it as a whole. Nevertheless this efficiency would have such a destructive consequence, if it did not, previous to its entrance, attract to itself with magnetic power, the operating creature-powers, so that they by their activity might prepare its phenomenon, and make themselves receptive of it; and if it did not in the moment of its entrance attach itself to the operation of these potencies, and receive them into co-operation. Accordingly, a pure creation is

[1] Of *this* working of God, the word of Christ, John v. 17: ὁ πατήρ μου ἕως ἄρτι ἐργάζεται is also to be understood according to the wider connection of the passage, and not as it is commonly taken of the Divine preservation of the world.

not given us in such moments, but a creation, which is equally conservation,—conservation of the co-operating powers. If we consider the world in its continuance, and, what is inseparable from the same, in its development, the efficiency of God therein, is not one and uniform, but sometimes only of a conserving, at others predominantly of a creative nature.

If a creation in the strict sense be ascribed to God, it can clearly only refer to the *pure beginning of the world.* A creation therefore in the absolute sense as of one which did not attach itself to what previously existed, occurring in the midst of the development of the world, would unavoidably be at the same time, destruction. One may refer all these relative moments of creation, and also all generatings of created powers in all times and places of the world, to a primitive act of creation, which is the universal principle of all productions in the entire development of the world, and we appear in it to have that absolute creation. But this primitive creative act is the creating will of God, conceived of as the Divine decree, as absolutely conditioning as its transcendental ground, the entire world-being from its elementary beginnings, to its completion; but it is not creation, as producing cause and working power. For if the creating will, thus conceived of, were directly working power, it would immediately constitute the world, as a whole, in its completion, without any development. Therefore, since we are here speaking of the Divine creation as real working power, we must keep to the above remark, that this creation in the strict sense is only to be thought of as the production of the original beginning of the world.

But is there such a beginning? The well known idea of *an eternal creation of the world,* meets us at this point. The manifestly incorrect expression, inasmuch as there would necessarily follow from it an *eternal* reality of the world, but this would directly cancel the idea of the world—is easily corrected; what is meant is this, that the essential existence of the world *a parte ante,* is of an absolutely unlimited duration of time, consequently without beginning. This duration of the world without beginning, to say nothing of decidedly pantheistic opinions, has been of late zealously adopted by *Rothe.*[1] It is of course only a very crude

[1] *Theologische Ethik.* §. 40 (Bd. 1, S. 101.)

thought, which imagines, with the idea of the beginning of the world, immediately thereby to remove the dependence of the world upon the Divine causality; so much the more crude, since indeed those who maintain a beginning of the world, cannot rationally maintain a *temporal* precedence of God as originator of the world. But so much is clear: if this opinion of the beginningless world has a living, real, operating God, it is nevertheless not able to recognize a pure creative efficiency of God at any one point of the world's development, but everywhere only such an one as at every point actualizes itself in co-operation with the creature-causes already in existence, therefore only an efficiency associated with the conserving activity. On this account this opinion is by no means far from nullifying the distinction between creation and conservation. In order to be able firmly to retain the absolute dependence of the world upon God, it is under the necessity of withdrawing itself *in this respect* from the category of working causes, to that of the transcendental ground, which conditions the existence of the world as this entirety essentially existing in all times and spaces. But therewith arises the false position, that the real causality of God, which by virtue of the beginninglessness of the duration of the world, were in no moment of its working an absolutely constituting causality,[1] but in every moment one which attached itself to the previously existing, does not at all correspond to the transcendental ground, which is said to be absolutely conditioning.—But even setting out from the idea of the world, we must not be surprised at the ease with which *Rothe* can resolve to give up the beginning of its essential existence. It is indeed, notwithstanding, a fundamental idea of his theory to regard the world as one developing itself by degrees. But what intelligible sense is to be attached to a gradation, which *is said* to attain its predetermined end by an ordered progress, and were still without a first grade, but ran off into *a regressus in infinitum*? If this gradation has no beginning, the designed *progress* also for every moment within the same is nullified, and in its place appears

[1] The positioning of pure matter appears here, according to page 131, to constitute the exception, so that we have here a pure creative working of God. However, *Rothe* himself does not venture to drive the existence of this fatal shadow of Godhead, which is absolute nonentity, from a Divine *working* of God, p. 126.

the principle of *undesigned change*, and in that case there were no *grades* of development at all. Nevertheless, *Rothe* himself adopts an original grade of creature-being; he considers pure matter to be such, which he calls the primitive creature of God.[1] But how can the being of mere matter be thought of as a grade in this series, when every other grade is in some way bounded and measured by time, but that primitive one is to be thought of as the essential existence, *a parte ante*, without beginning, and absolutely unlimited?[2] And do not the supposed difficulties respecting the commencement of the world again return, and here indeed as inexplicable, because with the beginninglessness of the creation of the world, is involved at the sametime the necessity of this creation, if hereafter must be adopted, that God is burdened through boundless ages of time with the mere existence of this *materia bruta*, who only begins *in a given point of time* to think and to position it, *i.e.* for the purpose of developing the same into spirit? What conceivable pleasure could God have, in idly, through innumerable aeons, in comparison with which the time of the duration of the world's development up to the present, vanishes to a geometric point, contemplating Himself in His pure contrast, in this abstract, absolutely empty form of thought-being, in this *non ens imaginarium (diesem gedachten Unding)*? And if the commencement of the world is said to include the transition from *non creatio* to *creatio*, which controverts the immutability of God, have we not here a transition from Divine inactivity to activity, which is altogether unendurable, because the revelation of God in an outward efficiency, is here made a necessary determination of the Divine being? It is also a manifest contradiction, when *Rothe*, on the one hand, expressly denominates

[1] A. a. O. §. 44, 45.

[2] Here also it follows, that this matter is something which has absolutely no consequences; for if it had such, since it is of itself of beginningless existence, they must proceed from it in a beginningless manner. As *Rothe* by no means adopts this opinion, the representation of matter, as of the universal maternal bosom, out of which all creature-being is born, a. a. O. S. 129, cannot be really taken in earnest. But then there is only world and time, really first of all from the moment, when matter, by its being conceived of, and positioned, by God, commences to be developed. And thus *Rothe's* negation of the beginning of the world appears unavoidably to end in the affirmation of the same.

pure matter, although constituted by God Himself, as equally with God without beginning (*in any case* a wrong expression), and nevertheless is resolved firmly to maintain, on the other hand, that every creature without exception has a beginning according to time, according to the old canon : *nulla creatura potest esse nisi post non esse.*[1]

Now, whoever maintains a beginning of the world, must of course also adopt a *beginning of time;* for only worldly being, which according to its notion has not its ground in itself, but is an originated being, can at all have time for the form of its existence. For therewith falls away of itself the idea of endless extended time, in which there was absolutely indeed neither any thing developing nor any thing happening. According to the above assertion, it would not be to us at all incomprehensible, if it were so, on the side of God, that he has *not* been *ever* working without, not always lord of another being, since he is not outwardly efficient at all, according to a necessity of His being. Nevertheless, it can never be said, since "ever" is a determination of time ; but a moment of time in which there may not have been creature-being, therefore Divine working without, is inconceivable. The only real difficulty of the opinion, that the essential existence of the world, therefore time, has a beginning, lies in the impossibility of our intuitively representing to ourselves an absolutely first moment of the entire succession of time. In our imagination striving to create such a representation, it falls into the contradiction of setting a boundary, which is to separate the entire succession of time, from that which is on its remote side, and which nevertheless is said to have no remote side, nothing preceding it.[2] This difficulty is solved by the perception, that we cannot have an intuitive representation of the beginning of the entire series of time, *just for the reason,* that we only form intuitive representations at all upon the table of time.—

Accordingly if we are justified, and necessitated to adopt a

[1] A. a. O. S. 102, 103.

[2] *Kant,* as defender of the Transcendental Physiokratic (in the remark to the antithesis of the third antinomy) finds the ground of the opinion, that the series of phenomena in continued succession, has an absolute beginning, in the striving of the imagination to procure a point of rest, but one may confidently appeal to the self-observation of every one as to what interest the *imagination* has in this question.

world-beginning, we have here a creation in the strict sense, which is decidedly distinct from the Divine preservation of the world, an original production of finite substances and powers, by the *excluding* causality of the Divine will. And herewith our opinion above given is confirmed, that, if God had *created* a being, as such, infected with evil, He must Himself be the author of evil, since then there could absolutely be nothing in this creature, which He had not constituted, but that He may *preserve* the creature infected with evil as such, without prejudice to His holiness.—

But in what way have we to conceive of this conserving efficiency of God, in distinction from the creative? For of course it is not enough to say, that the Divine efficiency as conserving, is everywhere in union with the efficiency of created powers; in order to see the very possibility of this union of Divine and creaturely efficiency, we must already have some notion of the character of this conserving efficiency itself.—In *Luther's* earlier writings, an original representation of this Divine working is often met with, most expressly in the book *de servo arbitrio*, which has undoubtedly its occasioning cause in the Old Testament, namely in the Prophets. There, this almighty and immediate working of God in all creatures, appears as a restless impulse, as a powerful onward movement, which does not allow them to rest. In man, namely, in so far as his will has a perverted direction, it is this incessant spurring operation of God, which nullifies his imagined freedom to choose between good and evil, to sin, or not, at pleasure. If the mere will of man were active according to its own power, then it were conceivable that he may be able to turn himself either to this or that side; but now he becomes goaded on by the all-moving efficiency of God, to choose, what to him, just as he is, is natural. From this universal working of God, Luther explains the hardening of the evil will in man. This working of God urges man onwards in the direction which he has marked out, so that he must ever become more wicked. The evil will alone in itself, would not move and harden itself; but since the Almighty mover compels it, by His irresistible movement within, to choose something, it must, according to its evil constitution, throw itself into a violent resistance of the Divine word and command.[1]

[1] *De servo arbitrio, Ausg. von Seb. Schmid,* S. 127—137.

One will not be able to say that this representation of the omnipresent working of God in created existences, makes Him the author of sin; the serious consequences, according to this side, lie in other moments of the doctrine propounded in that treatise (*e.g.* in the necessitating influence of the Divine prescience); but the self-activity of the creature in its outward manifestation becomes here entirely overpowered by the vehement force of the Divine working. Or, this theory appears much rather to conduct us to the conclusion, that God has not created active powers at all, but only passive substances. The prominent fundamental representation in a few passages, is this, that creatures in themselves would remain *inactive;* that they are incessantly active, arises from the indwelling efficiency of God which urges everything forward. This then is not very widely different from the occasionalistic representations, especially in the form which *Malebranche* has given to this system. According to him, God is the only true working cause; all created beings are only so in appearance; their strivings and heavings would produce no working, if God did not take occasion from the same to work correspondingly with them. But according to this representation, not only are the so-called finite causes without real working, but also the infinite cause; for the finite being, which is said to be the product of this infinite cause, has only real existence, when it is in some way a working one. We receive then, as in the denomination of conservation by *creatio continua,* if it is strictly taken, an incessant producing of God without product.

Undoubtedly, more satisfactory that conception of the Divine working appears, which the Schoolmen, and the older orthodox theologians of our Church, have developed, and denominated as the Divine *co-operation (concursus Dei generalis.)* It proposes to itself firmly to hold the true causality of finite causes, but no less the efficiency of God pervading the universe, and indeed such an one which is not always uniform and the same, in the manifold dissimilarity of creaturely causes, but equally separates and individualizes itself, and which does not merely keep the created powers in being, but exercises an immediate influence both upon their efficiency and their product. But against this the objection presents itself, that we have thereby two causes for every individual operation, of which each for itself alone is perfectly sufficient

to explain the same. When now *Thomas von Aquino* pleads for the definition, on the ground that the creaturely causes only work *by virtue of the first cause*,[1] of God, this is to be understood in the sense in which it must first of all be taken as a matter of course; but it is already fully contained in the idea of creation, and affords no help for the solution of the difficulties in the notion of *concursus*. But if it is so understood that the creaturely cause is every where only so far able to work, as it becomes immediately moved by the Divine co-working, it becomes a question how its self-movement, as well as its becoming moved from other finite causes, can stand in agreement with the same. A division of the working, so that one part of every individual result became derived from the Divine *concursus*, another from created causes, is of course not to be thought of; just as the Schoolmen and old Protestant theologians have ever decidedly declined this representation of the question, and therewith every outward co-ordination of Divine and creaturely causality. And if the common use of language appears to adopt that representation, and ascribes, *e. g.*, the product of the yearly fruits of the earth partly to the labour of man, partly to the blessing of God, there is not meant thereby an immediate efficiency of God, but an efficiency exercising itself through finite causes, as favourable weather, and the separation has its ground merely in our immediate consciousness, that in relation to a part of the conditions of that result, it is altogether out of our power. Therefore, if we cannot speak of a division of operation, nothing else remains for the old dogmatic theory than to allow the coincidence of the Divine and the creaturely efficiency.[2] This, however, under the given presuppositions, namely, under the recognition, that in the ordinary course of nature, which alone is here spoken of, every definite result may be perfectly deduced from given finite causes, —is only so to be thought of, that the Divine causality thoroughly works through the finite, therefore inasmuch as this given result is to be just as fully ascribed to the immediate Divine efficiency as to the finite cause, so that the former makes use of the latter

[1] *Summa univ.* p. i. qu. 105, art. 5.

[2] *Quenstedt, Syst. theol. de providentia*, sect. ii. qu. 3, ἐκθ. xiii. (Actio Dei) intime in actione creaturae includitur, imo una eademque est cum illa.

as its perfectly dependent instrument.[1] But therewith this representation unavoidably falls into the shallows of occasionalism, from which, however, it wished to keep itself far removed, in the *alone* true causality of God overpowering all finite causalities. And how powerful the bias of this theory in this direction is, betrays itself by its not knowing how to unite its conception of *concursus*, with the answerableness of man for his sins, in any other way than that marked out by *Malebranche*. For, according to Thomas,—it understands its well known canon: *Deus concurrit ad materiale, non ad formale actionis malae*, so, that the form of the action as evil is nothing real, but only a defect, *ens mere privativum*, in which a co-operation of God could not take place, and which must be ascribed to the human will alone.[2]

If this representation is also involved in insolvable difficulties, the very natural question becomes, on what it strictly depends, that the form of the notion of conservation, to which Arminianism is inclined, and which appears more easily to solve those difficulties, has been regarded with such decided disfavour in the modern development of Protestant theology. According to this form, conservation has only the negative signification, that God does not destroy created being, although he possesses the power to do so. That this is contradictory to the idea of created being, no one, with a correct idea of the notion of *creation*, will be able to maintain. It is a contradiction to suppose that a finite being according to essential existence is grounded in itself; but the power to exist, which it has received, *may* very well be communicated in such a way, that within the bounds of its existence, which are determined by the general arrangements of the world, and apart from violent destruction, it may have in itself the continuation of its essential existence. This may also be said of the world as a whole. But we have not here to do with the mere logical possibility. Truly in the ordinary

[1] This relation is denied by *Quenstedt* at the commencement of the investigation, and yet it lies at the ground of the passage quoted in the foregoing note, which is said to explain the possibility of the union of both causalities.

[2] Comp. *Malebranche, Illustrationes ad librum de inquirenda veritate* (*Ausg. von* 1753 P. ii. S. 325.) Peccatum—a solo homine perpetrari fateor; sed quicquam ab ipso tum agi nego; nam peccatum, error et ipsa concupiscentia nihil sunt. Comp. S. 206 ff.

dogmatic, and popular, religious treatment of the omnipresence of God, many misunderstandings are mixed up with what is true, and there too where it is regarded as dynamical, religious interests are often referred to it, which, correctly understood, rather refer to the Divine omniscience; still we must maintain, that the consciousness of this presence of God embracing and sustaining all worldly being is an essential contents of all vital piety. God has in creating the world thereby given to it its own substantiality, but He has not thereby set it out of real conjunction with Himself, or cast it off from Himself to an infinite distance. If it were otherwise, must we not then conceive of the world-governing activity of God, the Divine guidance of free powers working together, and of those powers working according to necessity of nature to predetermined ends, as an ever recurring apprehension from without?[1] Rest and motion of the world in its own inward being, it can only be in so far as the world at every point of its development does not rest in itself, but in the loving and Omnipresent power of God.—

The notion of the Divine conservation of the world, determined as *concursus*, in the sense of our old Dogmatists, lost itself in the above denoted difficulties, just by supposing this Divine activity as separating and individualizing itself with the separation and individualization of created powers and their efficiencies, and that further, in connection with this, it became thought of as an activity immediately determining and producing (in union with finite causes) the individual effect. This form has first of all for the religious consciousness something about it very interesting, and commends itself to it as the purest conceivable expression of that which it immediately possesses. Nevertheless there lies at the bottom of this a self-deception, not in this immediate consciousness itself, but in the reflection on its contents; religious

[1] If *Rothe* does not hesitate upon his religious standpoint to give up the Divine conservation of the world in its peculiar significance, since he resolves it into the Divine government of the world, but this again in the Divine creating of the world, it is thereby conditioned, that he considers the very development of the world, in so far as it is a constant generation of spirit, as a constant world development of God—in a progressus in infinitum, comp. especially a. a. O. Bd. 1, S. 98, 99, 105. That he believes himself able to dispense with this substantial immanence of the Dynamic is easy to understand.

interests, which find their satisfaction in the knowledge, partly of the Divine government of the world, partly of the efficiency of the Holy Spirit, become erroneously referred to the notion of the conservation of the world. If the above form of the same be firmly held, there unavoidably arises that pleonasm of causes, which essentially carries with it a contradiction, since each of both explanations of the given consequence, in itself alone sufficient, strives to displace the other. Therefore we shall have to withdraw ourselves from this, and conceive of the Divine conservation of the world as the simple, universal, uniform efficiency of God, which sustains the created powers in every moment of their activity, and therewith keeps them bound to Himself. As such it makes itself the basis of all individual efficiencies in the life and movement of the world, without indeed itself—*as such*—giving to the efficiency of creaturely powers any particular determination. In this respect, it much rather entirely refers itself back to the arrangements and measurements appointed by the creative activity of God, and conserves therefore all individual existence, only within the boundaries which are appointed to it by these arrangements, and through the relations of the powers of the world, and their mutual conditioning and limiting efficiencies grounded in the same. As therewith the world conserving activity of God just leaves all creatures as it finds them, and equally embraces irrational, as well as rational beings, the evil as well as the good, Matth. v. 45, it can in no wise remove the answerableness of man for his sins, in deed, purpose, or inclination, or in any way take part in the same. It conditions the activity of created powers also in every moment in which they are directed to an evil end, just in so far as it, as the uniform, universal activity, having respect only to essential existence as such, sustains and embraces the entirety of the world, according to all its parts; but it does not thereby give to that activity any direction whatever, either to good or to evil. Not one iota therefore becomes removed from the guilt of man, in that he remains ever in sin compassed about by the preserving activity of God. The ability of man to act, to resolve, to desire, he receives in every moment from God; that he desires evil, &c., comes from himself. If it be said, that God, if He does not absolutely determine the evil, He need only to refuse His conserv-

ing efficiency to the evil excitations of the will, but this is nothing more than to require God to create no personal existence whatever, in order that He make evil, the possibility of which is inseparable from the existence of created personality, impossible; for that momentary withdrawment of the conserving activity of God from the creature were immediately the annihilation of its existence.

How the Holy Scripture, especially the New Testament, teaches us to judge of the contents of our sense of guilt, and of the relation of evil, to the Divine determination and working, cannot be doubtful to an unprejudiced investigation, which does not allow itself from beforehand, by a few individual points, to withhold its attention from the whole.

It is admitted that nothing so specifically distinguishes the religion of the Old and New Testament, from heathenism, as the decided carrying out of the ethical point of view in the treatment of the relation between God and man; therefore the decided prominence given to the Divine holiness. The Divine revelations in Genesis and Exodus, begin with the endeavour deeply to impress the thought of this holiness upon the human heart, and in the height of their consummation in Jesus Christ, this idea is declared in full clearness: God is the good absolutely, ὁ ἀγαθός, Matth. xix. 17; Rom. v. 7; Christ is only thereby able to exhibit Him in visible Manifestation, by His being Himself the Holy one, John xiv. 6—9; man can only by holiness come to God, Matth. v. 8; Heb. xii. 14; 1 John i. 6, iii. 2, 3; and if it belongs to the fundamental thought of the Old Testament, that God has a deep, living horror of evil,[1] if the entire history of

[1] Also the Old Testament designation of the Divine Holiness—קָדָשׁ, קֹדֶשׁ—proceeds entirely from the negation of evil, since it represents God as one Pure from the uncleanness of evil, separated from all fellowship with it. But it is also fellowship with Him which makes man holy, יְהוָה מְקַדְּשׁוֹ, Lev. xxi. 15, xiii. 22, ix. 32. Even there, where Jehovah appears as the Terrible One, the sight of whose countenance brought death, He Himself even makes preparations, in order to protect the people from being consumed, by His devouring anger, Exod. xxxiii. 1 seq.—Those representations, it is true, at the

Israel is pervaded with the consciousness of being guilty before God on account of sin, the New Testament embodies, in no diminished form, this same moment, namely, in its energizing the Divine anger towards all who cleave to sin. Even those doctrines of Christianity, against which a limited morality has often taken offence, as the doctrines of reconciliation and justification, bear in themselves a decidedly ethical character, by their presupposing the inviolable holiness of God. But with all this the idea that God is Himself the author of evil in the creation, is absolutely irreconcileable; God cannot hate His own works, and man cannot sin against God, with that which comes from God. To recognize sin as *enmity against God*, Rom. viii. 7; Col. i. 21, and still to regard God as its author, were not deep-sense, but non-sense. This idea, therefore, is also expressly excluded from the New Testament writers, in the most definite manner, by James i. 13—17. As God Himself cannot be tempted to evil, and as there is no darkness in Him and no shadow of change, comp. 1 John i. 5, *ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἐστι καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία*, He tempts no man to evil, but from Him, the Father of all spiritual light, man receives only good gifts, and only perfect bestowments;[1] but he is only tempted to his *own* (*ἰδίας*) inordinate desires. The same thought is contained in the passages, which reduce the presence of sin to the efficiency of the devil in oposition to the Divine working, John viii. 44; 1 John iii. 8, 12;

first-glance for the most part appear as if God was not here conceived of ethically, but only physically, only as powerful principle of nature—but it is well to observe, that these manifestations of Jehovah, everywhere, as is well known, presuppose the guilt of the people.

[1] This is indisputably the sense of the passage; strictly James does not wish to express the thought, that everything which is good comes from God, but this, that everything which comes from God is good, that from Him nothing evil can come (similar to the *Platonic*: Deus causa boni in natura, which also has this limiting aim excluding the opposite). The use of *πᾶς* allows of this conception, comp. cap. i. ver. 2, and the connection, especially with ver. 13, upon the thought of which the following, so far as the 17th verse depends, as well as the predicates, which, verse 17, are attributed to God—*παρ᾽ ᾧ οὐκ ἔνι παραλλαγὴ ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα*—require the same. *Neander* also *perceives* in the entire passage an express polemic against the deep-rooted inclination of man to excuse himself on account of his sin by throwing it back upon the Divine causality, *Gesch. der Pflanzung der Kirche durch die App.* S. 872. Comp. *Kern, der Brief Jakobi, zu* K. 1, v. 13 f.

Matth. xiii. 39. Religion cannot more decidedly exclude the origin of sin from God than by deriving it ultimately from a being inimical in all his endeavours to God. When, namely, John viii. 44, it is said of the devil: *ὅταν λαλῇ τὸ ψεῦδος, ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων λαλεῖ· ὅτι ψεύστης ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ*, by this declaration in its connection with ver. 42, 43, every derivation of evil, which seeks the ground of its existence higher than in the finite spirit, is most certainly rejected.

A few modern theologians, *e.g. Olshausen*,[1] find on the contrary, in the Holy Scripture, the representation that God produces also the evil, still without thereby removing the guilt of the agent. That which in the Holy Scriptures refers to the Divine hardening of man, and especially to the Divine punishment of sin by means of sin, as almost all the passages in the New Testament which are usually adduced in support of the above maintenance, will come more directly under discussion when we come to the consideration of the enhancement of sin in its temporal development; here suffice it to say, that such a Divine efficiency, according to its notion, presupposes the existence of human perversion. It cannot surprise us if we find in the books of the Old Testament

[1] *Komment. zum Br. an die Römer, Einleitung zum neunten Kap.* S. 327 f. Besides the author is held far too much in bondage from religious timidity, to be able to bring his discussion of this point in the direction spoken of, to a clear and fixed thought.—Also *Hengstenberg's* remarks on the hardening of *Pharaoh* (*Authentie des Pentateuches*, B. 2, S. 462 f.) can scarcely be reduced to a rigid and harmoniously connected opinion. He very properly controverts the resolution of that which the Holy Scripture teaches respecting a Divine working, even in the evil actions of men, into the notion of mere permissio. But when on the contrary he in an especial manner maintains, that we must first of all learn to regard those who do us evil, as will-less instruments in the hand of God, in order to be able to abandon all revengeful feeling towards them, how is this to be reconciled with his so decided maintenance of the answerableness and punishableness of the sinner before God? Or if it is said to be original sin which has brought man into this condition of a will-less, absolutely dependent instrument, how can it then be said of man, and indeed so universally, as to save the imputability of sin: he could in every moment become free from sin, by means of repentance? To this there would still belong on the part of God the calling to repentance, which does not happen in every moment and everywhere, and on the part of man some power of self-decision, which that representation indeed expressly denies him.

declarations which, in the energetic expressions of the unconditional dependence on God, cross the boundary in question. For at this stage of the religious consciousness developed by Divine revelations, the distinction between the spiritual and the natural spheres, in relation to the Divine working in general, has not yet attained its full prominence, as we see *e.g.* in the doctrine of the Spirit of God; the human spirit has not yet been raised to a clear consciousness of its dignity in the eyes of God, and of its destination to an eternal life, in the fellowship of God; the infinite significance of created personality is still partially concealed from him, as it could only be fully revealed by the manifestation of the incarnate Son of God; therefore it may easily happen, that he, fully possessed by the thought of the efficiency of God pervading everything, refer evil as well as good to the same, without intending thereby in the least to deny the essential contradiction of sin against the Divine will, and the imputation of the same to man. Still it is only one passage in which the unprejudiced interpretation must recognize the antinomy as baffling every attempt at solution, 2 Sam. xxiv. 1 and 10, where the thought of David to be allowed to number the people is represented first of all as excited by Jehovah in anger against Israel, and then heavily punished as the sin of the King.[1] It is true in 2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11, comp. with 1 Kings ii. 44, the matter stands similarly; still we have here only an expression of David, which, even according to the most rigid theory of inspiration, could not possibly be regarded as giving us a rule. But 1 Kings xxii. 22 belongs to a figurative representation chosen by the prophet Micah, the individual lines of which can in no case be regarded as directly dogmatic. The lament of Isai. lxiii. 17 may appear as a more difficult stone of stumbling: O Lord, why hast Thou made us to err from Thy ways, and hardened our hearts from Thy fear? But we read these words in that brilliant apostrophe of mingled lament and longing hope, which the author puts into the mouth of the people, from lxiii. 11—lxiv. 12, the passionate excess of which in

1 It is remarkable that here the Old Testament gives itself a correction: 1 Chron. xxii. 1, that excitation is ascribed to Satan.—Rehoboam's rough procedure, which brought about the division of the kingdom, is also represented as having been according to a message from Jehovah, סִבָּה מֵעִם יְהוָה, 1 Kings xii. 15, still not as an evil course of conduct.

individual expressions cannot of course be regarded as the direct religious teaching of the prophet. In Isai. xlv. 7 we are to understand by the חֹשֶׁךְ which God creates, nothing more than what the word really signifies, darkness, sin in no sense whatever; and רַע does not here denote evil, but as is clear from the contrast of שָׁלוֹם, and from the same use of the word in Isai. xxxi. 2, Jer. ii. 19, xviii. 8, xxiv. 2, 3, 8, and in other passages,[1] physical evil is to be thought of. That we can think of nothing more than this from Amos iii. 6, is in itself clear. A few other passages *somewhat allied*, as Gen. xlv. 8, 2 Sam. xii. 11, express the thought, as if human perversity in its manifestations and results must be serviceable to God in the execution of His will, and the carrying out of His world-plan.[2] This is especially made prominent, where the opposite appearance presents itself, as if the *plans* of God would be suppressed by human wickedness. The holy writers of Scripture declare in opposition to this appearance, that, what arises from such human opposition has its appointed place in the plan of God.[3] The very perversion of the human will, although known by God from eternity, does not nevertheless in any way originate with Him; but God impels the will which has perverted itself, by circumstances conducted by Him, in given places to determined manifestations and activities.[4] Further, when *Olshausen* from biblical evidences of the Divine foreknowledge of evil, directly deduces from the same the Divine causation of evil, it has its ground, as we shall by and

[1] Compare *Gesenius' Lexicon manuale Hebr. et Chald.* S. v.

[2] Jer. xxvii. 14, 15 (comp. ver. 9, 10) throws a significant light upon this connection. The Jews here become admonished in the name of Jehovah not to listen to the false prophets; "for I have not sent them, saith Jehovah, and they prophecy lies in my name, in order that (לְמַעַן) I may drive you out and ye may perish, ye and the prophets." Still this can only mean, *in the sense of the Prophet himself*, that the obedience towards the false prophets which God had not determined, when the people would not be withheld from the same, is said to become in its consequences an instrument of God for the exercise of his punitive righteousness.

[3] From this point of view the passages in the New Testament, Acts ii. 23, iv. 28, are to be conceived of. The same thought lies at the ground of the Pauline education, Rom. ix.

[4] Comp. *Hengstenberg*, a. a. O. S. 466.

by shew, in an incorrect notion of the Divine knowledge.—But such a general maintenance, as is still to be found in *Cölln*,[1] not to mention earlier authors, "that Hebrewism, as it refers the distinguished good, so it also refers the distinguished evil to God," ought to have been prevented by the perception that just in the most glaring sins, and sinful conditions, as in the fall of the first human pair, the murder of his brother by Cain, in the perversion of the race before the sin-flood, as of the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, and in the aggravating depravity of the two kingdoms of Israel and Judah and their kings, not a trace of this reference to God is to be found.

How firmly and deeply the recognition of the truth of the sense of guilt, and therewith the exclusion of sin from the Divine causality, has grown up together with the fundamental principles of Christianity, most incontrovertibly reveals itself in its inseparable connection with some of the chief moments of Christian doctrine, with the doctrine of the *judgment* of God, and that of *redemption*.

As to the first of these, its proper estimation depends entirely upon the perception of the fundamental significance which the *eschatology* in general has for the Christian consciousness. It essentially belongs to the completion of man, that his fellowship with God become freed from the restraints and limitations which everywhere attach to it in his earthly life, and that therewith the outward corresponds to the inward, and the—already in principle—restored harmony in that fellowship of the inward life, purely expresses itself in the entire condition of man. If Christianity recognises the present existence of man as one deeply disturbed and spoiled by sin, so is it, according to its nature, a waiting for a future, made blessed by holiness; indeed, so much so, that even its christology is only truly to be understood from its eschatology. Those who deny themselves this *completion* of their present life in a future state, because they can only enjoy themselves within the limitations and contrasts of their present existence, who therefore prefer annihilation to imperishable life, will ever be

[1] *Biblische Theologie*, B. 1, S. 184. Comp. on the contrary, *Baumgarten-Crusius, Grundzüge der biblischen Theologie*, S. 274.

found to be those who have not experienced the *beginning* of this immortal life. If they have not its beginning, it is easy to understand how the twofold deficiency of a *living God*, who is able to preserve His creatures in death, and to raise them up again from the grave, and of a contents for that future life, causes this completion altogether to appear as an impossible matter.

The necessity of the judgment, first of all, in so far as it is, according to the original signification of κρίσις, *separation*, rests upon the necessity of the at present *concealed* contrast of principle, which exists between men in respect to their relation to that essential contents, becoming *revealed* by the cessation of all intercourse between those obeying God and those in opposition to Him. Those who, according to *the habit of their inmost life*, stand diametrically opposed, when viewed in their relation to God, are thereby so essentially separated from each other, that everything else which may bind them together, as compared with this, recedes into the back ground. The bonds of union among men arising from the relations of this present life must ultimately of themselves part asunder, when the bond which unites the spiritual consciousness and desires of man with his Creator is on the one side completely severed. For these bonds of union have no lasting significance in themselves, but only in so far as they are taken up into the relation of the creature to God, which alone is of eternal import. If this be admitted, the most prominent objections which *Strauss* adduces, partly from *Lessing* and *Schleiermacher*, and partly as originating with himself, fall of themselves to the ground.[1]

However, the *reality* of that contrast is on different sides disputed. One has denominated it a childish conception, thus to separate men according to the simple difference of good and evil; which are themselves only abstractions; in reality, both good and evil are so bound together in the manifold mixed relations, that one would not be able to place any one act, to say nothing of the moral character of a given individual, either on the one side or the other. There is much that is persuasive in this method of consideration: it flatters not merely the human understanding in general, the propensity of which is to resolve

[1] *Dogmatik*, B. 2, § 105.

all contrasts of nature into distinctions of degree, but it also properly expresses a real limitation of our present judgment concerning other persons. But if, as we have convinced ourselves, good and evil are opposed to each other in principle, will then both dwell quietly together in one and the same life, and peacefully associate with each other? Nevermore; but they will carry on conflict so much the more violently, the more consciousness concerning the nature of their contrast develops itself, Matth. vi. 24. Now, it is conceivable that in this conflict decisions may sometimes be delayed for a long period, that many individuals may long waver between two powers; but as a rule that conflict must nevertheless lead to the *dominion* of the one or the other principle. And only when the good principle has become *prevalent* in man can we speak of good dispositions and works in the individual, according to the declaration of Christ: Admit that the tree is good, and you admit that its fruit is good, Matth. xii. 33, which Luther's well-known word explains: It is not good works which make the good man, but the good man makes good works. The denial of this contrast among *persons* necessarily leads to the denial of the essential contrast between *good* and *evil*. It lies so near to the consideration of human conditions to deny the existence of that contrast, because the same is concealed for the present, as indeed the announcement of the future judgment most decidedly teaches.—It is the most beautiful, most human truth, however often it may be denied and ridiculed by an unchildlike race, that just in the highest relations of human life the simple intuition of the spirit of childhood, which by intelligent reflection would be rejected as an uncultivated representation, and resolved into the floating distinction, of a more or less, is restored in a higher sense, by progress and depth of knowledge. Whoever does not receive the kingdom of God as a child will not enter therein.

The Divine judgment, however, is not mere separation, but also *retribution*, *i.e.* the bringing about of unison between the moral contents of life and its condition, so far as it is perceived as pleasure or pain, as blessedness or condemnation (by which, however, it is to be observed, that there is already a moment of retribution for the good, as well as the evil, in the separation itself.) Here we have merely to do with the notion of retribution

according to its negative side, therefore in so far as it is *punishment*. And if we endeavour to look into the necessity of the same, it is not at all our interest to investigate the practical ethics of the question whether the representation of punishment is an *impulse* adapted to restrain the will from evil and to turn it to the good, but only to render intelligible the *objective Divine arrangement of the world*.

When, as is commonly the case, the bad *(Böse)* is taken up into the notion of *evil (Uebel)*, and stands as moral evil, opposed to natural evil, the general notion of evil lying thereby at the bottom, is to be determined as *limitation* of life. But the limitation cannot be a real impediment of life, which is necessarily given with the finiteness or gradual development of life—this were the *malum metaphysicum*, which is only called evil by a misuse of language,—but only that which disturbingly apprehends life and its normal development, as an element contradictory and foreign to it. Moral evil, badness, is that disturbance of life which is a *self-determination*, an action; natural evil, on the contrary, is that which *becomes determined, suffering*. The disturbance of life in physical evil becomes immediately felt, as such, the disturbance of life in moral evil is not thus immediately felt, as such, but much rather presses itself as a requirement, want, if only in the form, sometimes of a mere capricious tittilation; for indeed the disturbance from self-determination is only able to arise, according to that canon: *nihil appetimus nisi sub rationi boni*.[1]

Although these determinations are abstract, and insufficient for the complete understanding of retribution, nevertheless, on the one hand, the separableness of both natural and moral evil, on the other hand, their inseparableness, have been already made evident by them, and therefore the *necessity of punishment*, and therewith the absurdity of rejecting the Divine punitive justice, because, forsooth, it is already a misfortune enough for a man to be wicked. The general notion of punishment is accordingly, that the evil, which is felt by the subject as a requirement, a want, is thrown back upon the subject as that which it really is,

[1] Of course man may also make, that which he is immediately sensible of as limitation of life, as suffering, the contents of his self-determination, but still apart from conditions of a disturbed consciousness only, in so far as he regards it as *as means of a furtherance of life*.

and becomes felt as an impediment and a disturbance. Since punishment unites with moral evil, the physical, it necessitates the reversion of the former upon its author, so that he sufferingly again receives, that which he actively gave out. Thus even in the perversion of principle a certain harmony is established. There is first of all contained in sin a self-enjoyment of unlimited freedom; the reaction of the Divine order of the world is punitive, so that the sinner must receive the consequences of his sin as a condition of bondage. The beginning of this punishment of evil falls entirely in the inward sphere; it consists in the disquietude of conscience concerning the committed sin, and in the experience, that sin is a tyrannical power, and the yielding to it, a slavery.

The friends of the modern "gospel of virtue," to use an expression of *Strauss*, those of them at least, who do not perhaps make this glad message to consist in its not having anything to do with sin, will be well pleased with these sentences on punishment, but for that reason nothing more than well pleased. A future retribution, namely, a divine judgment,—which removes all present variance between the moral state and the outward condition of man, they reject as an unspiritual idea, which is not yet able to distinguish the appearance from the reality.

Of course we cannot stop here quietly to put the opinion of *Strauss* to the test, simply because of the ban-formalism with which he denotes the contradiction of the same.[1] We are therein perfectly agreed, that a spiritual possession of man, is the essential, fundamental basis of his happiness, although it is true, we are obliged to understand by this spiritual possession something widely different from *Strauss'* idea of the same. But does not the Holy Scripture bear the same testimony almost on every page; that those who believe in Christ have eternal life, have passed from death to life, that Christ communicates to those who are His, His own peace, that those who are justified through Him have peace with God, that joy and peace belong to the essential fruits of the Spirit? Only by a wilful misrepresentation of the New Testament doctrine, can the knowledge, that life in the truth, immediately conveys its own reward, be held up in contrast with that doctrine as a new discovery. He who, in the sense of Paul, constantly

[1] *Dogmatik* B. 2. §. 107, S. 712.

works out his salvation, acts so little from egotism, that he much rather works out at the sametime his sanctification (the σωτηρία ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος, 2 Thess. ii. 13.) On the contrary, the New Testament is so far removed from considering sanctification as *means to self-blessedness*, that it knows of neither blessedness nor holiness, otherwise than in fellowship with God, in which both are inseparably one. But certainly the Holy Scripture, just as little as experience, will allow us to deceive ourselves, as to the fact, that this inward peace of the Christian is often prevented from fully developing itself, and pervading his whole being, by powerful hindrances, in those spheres of life, quite independent of his own control.[1]

But as to the other side of this connection, the strict subject of our consideration, it is also not true, that even in the purely inward domain of life, punishment immediately follows in the footsteps of the commission of moral evil. Much rather does the sinner escape it, and so much the more easily, the more decidedly he has given himself over to the service of sin. Indeed, if, according to *Strauss*, self-blessedness *(Glückseligkeit)*, which he makes identical with virtue, consists in the enjoyment of power, which is inseparable from its exercise,[2] a somewhat energetic egotism combined with talent, and favoured by good fortune—but on this account not the less to be condemned—is very well able to create this eudaimonistic enjoyment. But there is a contradiction lying at the bottom of this explanation, for which *Spinoza's* notion of moral good is answerable, viz., that the egotist can be happy, or that happiness can be ascribed to egotism. The oft-quoted youthful saying of the poet: the history of the world is the judgment of the world; if true

[1] If indeed the notion of the blessedness of man, is determined, as possessing a value of which he is himself sensible, and which is cognizable by others (*Strauss' Dogmatik* B. i., § 20, S. 269), it is very easy to show, by virtue of the tautology contained in the same, how that the most fearful fatality which may befal a man, would not be able at all to disturb his blessedness, at least in the first respect.

[2] *Dogmatik*, B. 2, S. 714, comp. B. 1, S. 603. This identification of virtue and self-gratification, and accordingly, of ethical and physical evil, has everywhere the ambiguousness, that it can just as well lead to the degradation of the ethical to the physical, as to the elevation of the physical to the ethical.

of nations, does not admit of, at least, an unlimited application to this inward relation of individual life. It is not so simple with this relation, that the sinner on the commission of sin, must ever immediately experience its nothingness, the vanity of his resistance against God, and his Holy ordinances, with the inward misery into which it plunges him. Also the empirically given state of the present world is in no way adapted to force this consciousness upon him, although a deeper look into its constitution, cannot fail to perceive the power of the Divine laws, pervading all its complications, and overcoming all hindrances. If *Bayle*, in a manner already well known, derived from the present constitution of the world the most powerful weapons for his hypothetical defence of dualism,[1] there must be indeed much in it which furnishes gratification to the unreflecting striving of selfishness, and flatters the perverted desires with representations of power and success. Truly, sin is *nothingness* (as the Hebrew term אָוֶן expresses it) and misery, but it does not immediately manifest itself, as such, at every point of human existence, in its earthly development, but only in its *result*, is this first of all fully seen. But the Divine judgment removes the result to the end of the world's history. There, the disharmony between the outward and the inward sphere will be removed, the continuance of which were a disturbance of order, absolutely irreconcilable with the Divine dominion. The perverted condition of the will, and of the moral contents of life proceeding therefrom, will then, according to the fundamental axiom of righteousness: *suum cuique*, reflect themselves in a corresponding dissolution of the outward circumstances.

But it is easy to see how the Christian faith, in a separative and retributive judgment of God, thoroughly rests upon the presupposition that *man alone*, and not God, is guilty in sin. If man derives moral evil from God as its author, if sin is a necessity inwoven in human nature, and its gradual development, ordered by God, the contrast, of principle, of good and evil, were therewith ultimately resolved into the distinction of end and means, or of unconditional and conditional necessity, and the presupposition,

[1] *Strauss* also recognises this, *Dogmatik*. B. I., S. 407, compare B. 2, S. 300.

on which the *separation* of good and evil depends, were destroyed. If God punished His creature on account of a determination of his will and conduct, which He Himself has occasioned, He would condemn His own work, with which there were placed in our consciousness of God, the most perplexing contradiction. *Peccati ultor non peccati auctor.* One may then introduce as many intervening members, between the creating will of God, and the arising of sin, as he pleases, if no one of them has in any way an independent causality, in relation to God, they can only be absolutely appointed moments of transit of the Divine causality; they are this too, in so far as they produce evil, and the guilt of the same —if the idea of guilt had here still a significance—falls undiminished and undivided back upon God. The Divine judgment concerning sin, necessarily presupposes the existence of a causality of *relative independency*, besides that of God's,—of *independency*, otherwise it could produce nothing which were an object of the Divine judgment—of *relative* independency, otherwise it were not subject to the Divine judgment. It is only by the recognition of this, that it is possible to exclude the causation of sin from God, and to maintain the truthfulness of the consciousness of guilt in man.—

In order, however, more fully to see, how the notion of the judicial, and punitive, activity of God, demands the full contents of the idea of guilt, we must turn our attention to the distinction of the notions: *chastisement* and *punishment*, which is kept up in the New Testament use of language, with great definiteness. The idea of chastisement is expresed by παιδεύειν, παιδεία, 1 Cor. xi. 32; 2 Cor. vi. 9; Eph. vi. 4; Hebr. xii. 5—11; Rev. iii. 19; the idea of punishment by δίκη, 2 Thess. i. 9; Jud. 7; ἐκδίκησις, Rom. xii. 9; 2 Thess. i. 8; Hebr. x. 30; 1 Pet. ii. 14; τιμωρία, τιμωρεῖν, Hebr. x. 29; Acts xxii. 5, xxvi. 11. Also κόλασις, κολάζειν, which in the classical use of language, falls more in the sphere of the idea of chastisement (κολάζειν ὕβριν—the ground-idea: to shorten, to cut), is in the New Testament referred to the punitive activity, although it here appears directly to express only the physical moment of suffering, of pain, but not the ethical idea of retribution, Acts iv. 21; Matth. xxv. 46; 2 Peter ii. 9. Comp. 1 John iv. 18.

If the common opinion were correct, that the design of punish-

ment altogether lay in the *improvement* of the offender, it would indeed make clear the direct connexion of the notion of punishment with that of *sin*, but not with that of *guilt*. The consideration keeps entirely to this, that by the aid of punishment, something which ought not to be—sin—is to be removed from man; the moment, that man is the *responsible author* of this, which is to be removed—the basis of the notion of guilt—does not at all appear. But this opinion of the design of punishment, just rests upon the confounding of the notion of punishment, with that of chastisement. Chastisement has entirely the improvement of the pupil for its object, punishment the actual manifestation that the majesty of the law has not been really injured by rebellion against it. The moral law cannot determine the will, to which it is addressed, in order *immediately* to realize itself, in the form of the necessity of nature; it must according to its notion, in distinction from the law of nature, tolerate the contradiction of this will; but it is only thereby real law that it, over against such contradiction, *mediately* realizes itself by means of punishment. Chastisement, as such, has its end entirely in the individual subject, punishment as such—for it is a matter self-evident that it may unite with itself the element of chastisement—has to maintain the universal against the individual. Just for this reason chastisement, as its name already denotes (*Zucht* from *ziehen*, *παιδεία* from *παῖς*), presupposes a pedagogic relation to the chastised, of which punishment as such knows nothing.[1]

As to the *Divine punishment*, its real design can so much the less be the improvement of the punished, since this indeed is just the end of *redemption*, regarded in the full truth of its notion.—If now punishment were means adapted to this end, redemption would not be requisite, or rather inversely, if this end is to be attained by redemption, what purpose is answered by severe means of punishment? Or are we thus perhaps to conceive of the relation, that, where redemption is not able to effect the improvement of man, he must be brought to this end by means of punishment? But then it would follow that punish-

[1] The Old Testament also, Lev. xix. 20, opposes chastisement בְּקֹרֶת to the punishment of death. In other cases the idea of chastisement is commonly expressed by מוּסַר יִסַּר.

ment is a more powerful means of regeneration than redemption. The conflict between the sphere of punishment, and that of redemption, becomes still more perplexing by this conception of punishment, when we remember that just the removal of punishment in the forgiveness of sins essentially belongs to the idea of redemption. If the punishment renovates, is it a kindness to man to exempt him from it before it has fully accomplished its end? And how is it indeed possible that if punishment renovates, that its removal, redemption, also renovates? And if the most especial sphere for the efficiency of punishment is the sensational side of our being, if redemption on the contrary directs itself primitively to the spirit, is the true renovation perhaps to be accomplished, just as well by operating on the sensational side of our being, as by operating upon the spirit?—

However, by this it is by no means denied that punishment has nothing to do with the preservation and restoration of the power of the good, in those who are the subjects of the same. It is able on the one hand to set up barriers against the desolating outbreaks of sin, by the maintenance of a fixed legislative order, on the other hand to warn the sinner of the crushing power with which evil falls back upon himself, and thereby to cause him to hesitate before he yields himself up to the same, but in both these respects to prepare for the efficiency of redemption. Nevertheless it is not, according to its above intimated character, in itself at all adapted to bring about a true renovation, an inward transformation of the sinner. Much rather the two spheres, that of redemption, which is alone able to produce the true transformation, and that of Divine punishment, mutually exclude each other. As with the commencement of vital participation in redemption, all real punishment—*δίκη, ἐκδίκησις, τιμωρία*—immediately vanishes, so, on the other side, man is so long an object of Divine punitive justice, as he excludes from himself redemption, John iii. 36.

On the contrary, the Divine *chastisement—παιδεία*—is even a moment of the redeeming efficiency of God, Tit. ii. 11, 12. Therefore one must first of all, by experiencing this redeeming efficiency, have become a child of God, and have freely resigned himself up to his paternal guidance, in order to be the object of Divine chastisement, while, in order to become the object of

Divine punishment, the matter of the sinner's consent is out of the question, beyond that actually given in his sins.[1] Accordingly, the Divine chastisement in the Scripture is very distinctly referred only to those who have received the renewing grace of God, and have become His *children* by faith in Christ, comp. especially Heb. xii.; indeed this exclusive reference of chastisement to the redeemed children of God is so strictly regarded, that even those who are deeply sunk in sin are still ever represented as objects of Divine chastisement, the design of which is expressly that of their salvation, 1 Cor. iii. 11—15; Rev. iii. 19. On the contrary, the world which refuses the obedience of faith to the Gospel has become subject to the punitive righteousness of God, just as the apostates from the fellowship of Christ, 2 Thess. i. 8, 9, ii. 12; Heb. x. 29, 30; and elsewhere. Most distinctly, however, this relation of the two notions is seen, 1 Cor. xi. 32: *κρινόμενοι*—the apostle has spoken of the sufferings which the church at Corinth experienced on account of its improper use of the Holy Supper—*ὑπὸ κυρίου παιδευόμεθα, ἵνα μὴ σὺν τῷ κόσμῳ κατακριθῶμεν.* The Lord chastised the Corinthians through suffering, *in order that they might not be punished with the* unbelieving world. The peculiar sphere of the Divine chastisement is within that of fellowship with God, that of Divine punishment without the same.

Therefore chastisement in the New Testament is represented as immediately actuated by love to the chastised, Heb. xii. 6, *ὃν ἀγαπᾷ Κύριος, παιδεύει,* from the Proverbs of Sol. iii. 12, Rev. iii. 19, *ἐγὼ ὅσους ἐὰν φιλῶ, ἐλέγχω καὶ παιδεύω*; on the contrary punishment, as actuated by *ὀργή*, in human relations, Rom. xiii. 4, 5; on the side of God, Matth. iii. 7; John iii. 36; Rom. ii. 5, 8, iii. 5, v. 9, xii. 19; 1 Thess. i. 10; Rev. vi. 16, 17, xi. 18. Just as we have to hold fast the notion of the wrath of God, according to the express warning of the Epis. to the Heb. xii. 29: *καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν* (not merely the God of the old covenant, comp.

[1] In this sense *Clemens* of Alexandria, however little we are otherwise able to find his conception of the notion of punishment, expressed in any thorough manner, says very properly, in grounding an unplatonic thought by a celebrated platonic word: *αἱρεῖται ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τὰς τιμωρίας αὐτὸς, ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων· αἰτία δὲ ἑλουμένου, θεὸς ἀναίτιος. Paedag.* c. viii. § 69 (ed. *Klotz.* vol. i. p. 154.)

ver. 18—27) πῦρ καταναλίσκον, as an essential moment in the entire New Testament doctrine of God: so much must we decidedly recognise the endeavour to reduce all the determinations of the relation of God to the world, to *love*, as to the original source of the same, as a necesssary and truly Christian one. Thus the Divine anger in its deepest ground is love; love becomes consuming fire to every thing which is opposed to it, to the very nature of the good. Love could not be in earnest with itself if it did not negative its negation. Just for this reason heathenism does not know the holy anger of God, because it is not acquainted with the holy love of God, because it imagines in the inmost centre of the universe, behind all contrasts of friendly and inimical Deities, a dark, gloomy power, indifferent to the well-being of man, which only declares the judgment of the nothingness of all being, and of its grandeur and glory.—

In the holy love of God there is contained not merely the exclusion of His causal participation in the origin of sin, but also the strong denial of its existence. The possibility of opposition to the will of God lies in the notion of a personal creature, but if it takes place, it is impossible for that opposition to maintain itself in a world created and governed by God. It must become manifest in a definite external manner, both in society, and to the offender himself, in as much as he is ever to be treated as a rational being even when most depraved and in opposition to his casual wish, that by his evil conduct he has fallen into a destructive contradiction against himself. The punitive justice of God consists in subjecting the individual, who in his *action* offends, to a corresponding *suffering*. By this punitive righteousness the Majesty of God is attested and preserved, on which the authority, and equally so, the inviolability of all law rests, in which again the safety of all creatures consists. The assault upon the Majesty of God, contained in the act of sin, cannot violate it, because it returns in punishment upon the sinner himself. If on the contrary the sinner remained unpunished, sin would retain the right in opposition to the Divine Majesty, and order of the world, but these would be false to themselves. It affirms itself, *i.e.* love, as that which alone has the right to prevail, in that it *punishes* sin, *i.e.* selfishness.

On the other hand, punishment in distinction from chastisement,

recognizes in the most definite manner the *full personality* of the punished, and in this sense, it has already very properly been said, more recently by *Göschel*,[1] that the offender experiences an *honour* in being punished. This is most easily seen in the punishment of the state. If the government allowed offenders to go unnoticed, or merely chastised the party guilty of the offence, in a way most adapted to his improvement, as if this were its only object, without accurately measuring out the degree of punishment by the degree of offence, and thus maintaining the relation between act and suffering, according to an universal canon, it would treat him as an undeveloped, dependent child, the conduct of which could not yet be properly imputed to it. Did it give him over to the citizens of the state to put the disturber of order to death, wherever, and in whatever way, they found opportunity, it would treat him as a wild beast. In visiting him with just punishment, it recognizes his spiritual independency, on which his imputability depends, and therewith the dignity of his developed personality. It is just the same with the Divine punishment. That man *can* become the object of the same, rests upon the same relation to God, in which it is grounded, that he is the object and end of the redeeming love of God; it is conditioned by the dignity conferred upon him, that by virtue of his personality he has in himself an independent central-point of his existence, and for this reason the punishment, and with it the Divine judgment, loses all sense, unless the idea of guilt retain, undiminished, its full reality.

With this it is not in contradiction, that according to the above, the relation of childhood to God, in which chastisement takes the place of punishment, is undoubtedly a higher one than that of this independency, which it honours in the evil doer by its punishment.

[1] *Göschel: Zerstreute Blätter aus den Hand-und Hülfsakten eines Juristen*, Th. 1, S. 434, in modern time, like *Kant* and *Hegel*, has rendered especial service in the thorough investigation of the notion of punishment. But when he wishes to find this thought in *τίμημα*, *τιμωρία*, he furnishes certainly, as the derivations of the sagacious man often are, more a witty play of words than an etymology. Τιμάω means: to appreciate the value of a thing, to determine upon an indemnification as equivalent for that which has been violently torn away, and it is this side of the notion from which the signification: to fix punishment, proceeds from *τιμάω* itself, as the further: to punish (embracing the judicial fixation and execution), proceeds from *τιμωρέω*.

Of course it is a higher one, still indeed only in so far as this relation of childhood is not one of constraint, but arises from free resignation. God treats each one according to his will, according to the ground-relation, in which he places himself to Him. He punishes the sinner, who, through his capricious act, makes good his independence in *opposition* to Him. But the pious, who has learnt *resignation to God* as the highest use of this independency, who finds his blessedness from it in childlike, free, dependence, he treats as His child, and paternally chastises him by suffering, whenever His wisdom deems it necessary, but ever for the salvation of the chastised, Rom. viii. 28 ; Heb. xii. 11 ; Rom. v. 3, 4—an assurance, nowhere in the New Testament given to those, who have drawn down upon themselves the Divine punishment in the more limited sense.[1]—

According to the moral necessity of punishment here recognized, we must regard it as one of the most decided symptoms of a deadly disease which gnaws at the heart of our national life, that our people, at least in so far as it is represented by the prevalent opinions of our educated classes, no longer earnestly believe the *character* of *sin* and *crime*, to be that which *deserves punishment*. Whoever gives his attention to the discussions of our representative assemblies, concerning capital punishment, political crime, civil offence, and the like, will everywhere find this dissipation of the moral consciousness to be the fundamental feature. No one is more sure of the applause of the majority, than he, who discovers some new means, under the protest of humanity, and of the participation of the legislature, and even of the judge, in human weaknesses and the like, of disarming justice, and of making the scoundrel and villain unpunishable before the law, and where possible before public opinion too. The first form which this moral rottenness theoretically assumes, is commonly that of a coarse, or more cultivated, doctrine of determinism. The

[1] *Twesten* also directs attention in a similar interest to the distinction between real punishment and chastisement, *Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik*, B. 2, Abth. 1, S. 145 f. Among the older Dogmatists, *Gerhard* distinguishes between poena satisfactoria and p. castigatoria, *Loci theol.—loc. de morte*, § 199. Comp. *Baier's Compend. Theol. posit.* P. ii., cap. 1, § 15. *Hollaz's Examen. Theo'.* P. ii., cap. ii. qu. 19.

actor is not the author of his act, but the circumstances, or the bad education, or the deficiency in social arrangements, which should make it easy for him to procure, without resorting to crime, the necessary means of subsistence. Crime is misfortune, not guilt, and then of course naturally enough, it appears very unjust to visit him who has been so unfortunate as to assassinate some one, with "the greater evil of his death." Among those who think more deeply, we then meet with the real consequence of this opinion, in a decided moral scepticism, to which the moral law is only matter of arbitrary invention and social agreement. Here too the old rule holds good, that he who has separated himself from God, becomes a traitor to his own conscience.—From the stagnant pool of moral corruption, which the recent revolution discovered to us, there is no outlet for our nation until it has learnt penitentially again to bow down to the earnest Majesty of the Divine law. It is rather genuine humanity to recognize in the moral judgment of one, who, deeply sunk in crime, for example the murderer, who places himself in the hands of justice with the consciousness of having forfeited his life, with respect to both natural and legal rights, that he stands incomparably higher than the legislator or judge, who will not pass the sentence of death upon him, because he is only to be pitied, not to be punished. The former has assaulted the law, but he is readily willing to make, for the greatest violation, the greatest satisfaction, which he, as a member of human society, is able to make; this latter destroys altogether, so far as he is able, the authority of the law.

The *second* moment of Christianity, the true contents of which unavoidably falls to the ground, if the consciousness of guilt has only subjective significance, and becomes absolutely swallowed up, upon the stand-point of the consciousness of a Divinely ordered necessity of sin, is that of *Redemption*. This is without doubt in itself the most important side of our present consideration; it is, to speak more strictly, no mere moment, but the very soul of Christianity which is here called in question; nevertheless we may be all the more brief in its consideration, the more clearly the significance of this central point, and its inward connection with the reality of the sense of guilt, lies exposed to view.

Indeed we are not at once able to recognize what has lately been maintained,[1] that recovery from evil in any sense is inconceivable, if it be not regarded as our own guilt. Were sin ultimately to be regarded merely as a suffering, a malady of the human race, for which man were not guilty, it might indeed be regarded as forming a mere point of transition *(Durchgangspunkt)* in the development of man, whose disappearance, just as well as its appearance, were Divinely provided for. If its disappearance were the result not merely of man's own power, but were brought about by Divine help, by a Divinely conditioned efficiency liberating from the power of evil, it might still be regarded in the light of a Redemption.

But such a deliverance from sin would be indeed very different from the Christian redemption, according to the concrete contents of its notion. The distinction shows itself in the first place in this, that Salvation in the Redemption through Christ is everywhere in the New Testament represented as an operation and manifestation of Divine *grace*, to which man has absolutely no claim, but which is given to him contrary to his deserts. Thus in innumerable passages, especially Luke xvii. 7—10; Acts xv. 11; Rom. iii. 24, v. 15; Eph. ii. 4—8; Tit. iii. 4—7. Indeed placing ourselves upon that stand-point, we could not even say that it were merely an act of Divine justice, if God by Redemption again removed the yoke of sin from man which he had imposed upon him in His plan of the world.[2] For on this ground, what intelligible sense could the Divine attribute of righteousness have, in which nothing could be thought of as tenable, if there were not besides the Divine determination and operation, still another of relative independency, whose self-decision is not one produced by God, but—we do not shrink from the severity of the expression in order sharply to denote the

[1] P. 343, *Ackermann das Christliche im Plato*, S. 247.

[2] From this it is clear in passing, how cautiously the declaration often heard in our time, the true *Theodicee* is the Redemption, must be conceived of, if it is not to lead to a great error, radically perverting the Christian doctrine of salvation. If the plan of Redemption is essentially an act of the righteousness of God, it had been unjust, and a violation of a claim justifiable on the part of man, to leave him without redemption. But it can only so appear to him who denies that man is himself guilty in his sins, and its consequences.

distinction of the opinions—is for God Himself *a given one*, to which again a Divine act refers, the retributing, the rendering to each his own? The elevation, or much rather, the degradation of the Divine Omnipotence to the absolute necessity of all being and all happening, leaves nothing over to an objective contents of the notion of the Divine righteousness, as it must then in the consequential carrying out, dissolve in reality all the so-called moral attributes of God.—But according to this method of consideration, as the merit of man with respect to Redemption is of course out of the question, so neither in any tenable manner can we speak of desert in an opposite sense (demerit in the sense of the Schoolmen); with the notion of the Divine righteousness that too of grace loses all real significance; both sink down into the Abyss of an absolute will, which in relation to man, in its working, is conditioned in no sense whatever, neither positive nor negative, but is only absolutely conditioning.

If we look more closely into the manner in which redemption develops itself from grace, we distinguish two sides, the objective, which completes itself in the *expiatory offering of the Redeemer*, the subjective, which has its principle in the *forgiveness of sins*. If we begin with the latter, nothing is clearer than that with the full reality of the notion of guilt, that also of forgiveness loses its truthfulness, which is just the removal of guilt, and, as necessary consequence, of punishment. For if God removes the guilt of man, He does not thereby declare that no guilt exists, or that evil is not damnable.[1]—The innocent require no forgiveness, where there is no guilt there is also none to remove,—but that the existing guilt, of course under appointed conditions, which essentially stand connected with the renovation of the guilty, is said no longer to exclude him from His fellowship. If now sin were a necessary moment in the world-development, it might nevertheless be conceived of as determination of man not to remain stationary in it, but to ascend up out of it, not to allow it to govern, but to combat with, and overcome it. But as an entirely empty and vain, nay, in its deepest ground, indeed

[1] *Ritter*, for example, appears to conceive of the notion of Divine forgiveness in this way, when he relatively opposes it to the human condemnation of sin, namely, not as a free act of God, but as the manifestation of another side in the notion of sin—*Uber das Böse*, S. 72, 73.

impious act, it must appear, to make ourselves anxious and distressed on account of committed sin, and to seek the Divine forgiveness for an act, for an inward condition, which as a step to be passed over, belonged to the Divine plan of human life. In such a case, undoubtedly the true disposition of mind were, perfectly to keep quiet in the course of one's own development, just as it is, to rejoice at every requirement of good, and willingly yield to the impulse of the same, but without reproach, without repentance, to look back upon the false ways of the past.[1] It cannot surprise us, if many of our readers exclaim: and is this then really not the right disposition of mind? Does it not contain the most beautiful union of moral earnestness, together with a genuine, tranquil wisdom of life? But indeed it is just the *moral earnestness* which we miss in this opinion; for this unconcerned *transport* over the deep of the contrast, this easy, cheap quietude concerning the existence of evil in one's own life, is incompatible with moral earnestness. Such a fundamental disposition of mind must lame the energy of the moral striving, especially in the present form of the moral development of man, where a quiet gradual progress does not hold good, but a hard fight with the power of a perverted principle of

[1] *Romang*, in his sagacious work: *Ueber Willensfreiheit und Determinismus*, S. 160 ff. vgl. *Desselben System der natürlichen Religionslehre*, §99—111, has also sought to reconcile the facts of the consciousness of guilt and repentance, with his theory, which teaches us to regard evil, with everything else, as that which is necessary and Divinely ordered. But we are neither able to admit that the full contents of the same has been perceived in his determinations of these notions, nor that, what is furnished in them, can be brought into living unison with *Determinismus*. This opinion, especially, when as here, it is a religious one, and as such, upon this stand-point of course, an optimistic one, is never able, from its own connection, to make truly intelligible, as indeed in the progress of moral development there may ever arise a contrast of the then present step against the former one which is to be rejected, why this development does not much rather anticipatingly proceed, so that there never appears in the consciousness, and the impulse, anything higher than the will has power to realize, in the every present moment. For what *Romang* here furnishes as proof, S. 142, ff. vgl. S. 166, ff. is in truth only the description of the same fact in another form. Compare besides, the open admissions of the author on this point, in his *Beiträgen zur Lehre von der Freiheit—Fichte's Zeitschrift*, B. 7, H. 2, S. 214, ff. In a similar sense *Sigwart* in his Treatise *über das Problem von der Freheit und Unfreheit des menschlechen Wollens* has sought the moral justification of Determinismus—*Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1839, H. 3, S. 1—222.

life, a conversion, and a new birth. Christianity according to its nature is a new life, which begins with faith in the forgiving grace of God in Christ; it therefore presupposes the inward judgment of conscious guilt, and the self-punishment of repentance.—

The conditionality of Redemption by the real significance of guilt may be still more definitely determined, if we remember, that the forgiveness of sins has for its objective ground-basis, *expiation by the death of the Redeemer.* The necessity of this expiation remains not truly recognized so long as one allows the moral conduct of man entirely to be *resolved* into its external form, its form in time, that he places the disturbance of the communion of man with God only in the evil now *happening*, not in that which has *happened.* From this would of course follow, that the sinner, in order to be taken up into the childlike relation to God, required no expiation, as also neither repentance nor forgiveness, but only the forsaking of sin and turning to God. This method of consideration concerns itself so little about the old proverb: that which is done cannot be undone, that it much rather regards committed evil, just because it is committed and in the past, as if it had not been committed.

Now indeed it is just the Redemption of Jesus, by whose Mediation alone, a true renunciation of evil and turning to God, such a transformation of the inmost principle of life, as was required, can take place. Man is able by perverted self-decision, to plunge himself into moral *dissipation*, but he is not able to raise himself out of the same just when he pleases. Much rather he has thereby resigned himself to a power, which holds dominion over him, and from which he cannot free himself without the help of the Divine Spirit operating in him. Therefore man is never able, so far as concerns his own strength, to make the evil which he has committed a thing merely done, a mere past thing, but his sinful past continues really to produce itself in his sinful present. But suppose that man were able to sunder these bonds of his sinful nature, and from a given moment, henceforward entirely to abstain from every sin by the power of his will, yet he could not thereby annihilate his sinful past as factual existence of innumerable violations of law. Just for this reason it is not to be seen, how committed sin, in that it no longer really continues to perpetuate itself in the moral condition of the agent, should on

that account be immediately destroyed with respect to its *imputability*. Much rather it remains attached to his person as guilt, and he remains responsible for it, and exposed to punishment, so long as it is not expiated.

If then the human race is ever to be restored to communion with God, it requires an *Atonement*, which Christ is alone able to make, because He alone among men is perfectly sinless, and He alone as the incarnate Son of God, and as Founder of a new kingdom, sustains an absolute universal significance in an all embracing relation to humanity. Uniting Himself, by the power of His love, in the closest ties, with the race which needed atonement, He becomes capable as the substitute of man to suffer the death to which on His own account He was not subject. And not until this side of the connection between our present and our sinful past—we may call it the *ideal*—is removed, can the other side of this connexion the *real* be taken away. For the Holy Spirit as a principle of new life could not communicate Himself to the human race, so long as unexpiated sin lay upon it, so long as Christ by His expiatory death had not yet entered into His glory, John vii. 39. On the other hand, had not sins that were past, as well as those that are present, the power to separate man from the fellowship of God, did they not therewith lay upon him the necessity to render satisfaction to the violated law, the death of Christ would have been superfluous. Hence in that *locus classicus* for the doctrine of the atonement, Rom. iii. 24, sq., the atoning death of Christ is expressly referred to the προγεγονότα ἁμαρτήματα. To maintain the authority of the Divine Government in view of innumerable sins being left unpunished (πάρεσις), it was necessary that God, in establishing a new kingdom of love and grace, should manifest His justice in the expiatory death of its Founder and King.[1] Thus the full truth of the consciousness of sin, becomes deductively proved from the work of expiation. The cross of the Son of God, of Him who alone among men was Holy, declares more loudly than all the punitive judgments of God, that sins which are committed are still a reality, a power that separates from God, and with good

[1] Comp. *Neander, Gesch. der Pflanzung der K. durch die*, App. p. 619 seq. *Tholuck Kommentar zum Br. an die Römer*, p. 182, seq.

reason did the primitive Church acknowledge in the cross of Christ, a manifestation of the wrath of God, no less than of His love and grace.

According to this it may be easily conjectured what our opinion is, when, the conscious separation of Israel from God is often now-a-days given out as a proof of the *untrue character of the Old Testament stand-point.* This is much rather the deepest truth of the same, because sin was yet unexpiated. One must only not forget, that the matter in this sphere is not one merely concerning a process in the consciousness, but one of the most real relations, in other words, that the arising of the perfect consciousness of the relation to God, is attached to real factual conditions. — It is true, there was here required a kind of preparatory mediation of the rugged contrast, if the pious of the Old Testament were not to be held fast in the hands of hopeless misery by the knowledge of that truth. And thus in its declarations it expresses, side by side with the consciousness of separation from God, no less powerfully the feeling of the gracious approach of Jehovah. In the earlier time, in the period prior to the Mosaic legislation, it is true, this especially depended upon the religious consciousness not having yet measured the depth of this chasm; but in the period subsequent to the Mosaic legislation it was partly grounded upon the Theocratic institutions, which were given to the more earnest-minded as a provisional support against the disturbing power of this separation—to which especially belong the covenant relation of the people to Jehovah, and the expiatory sacrifice for the manifold sins, not excluding a sincere striving after righteousness—partly upon the deep inmostly penetrating anticipation of the New Testament stand-point by the Messianic hope, as it belongs to a degree of the religious consciousness, which was to be according to its Divine appointment entirely preparatory to, and prophetic of, a higher future consciousness. It was just the fundamental error of heathenism, especially of the Hellenistic, that it recognized this separation from God by sin, not as *one having* respect to the entire life, but only related to the same in a certain isolated and external manner, so that it misled men boldly and confidently to approach the Divinity under the very defilement of all their sins. This can indeed only happen by robbing the Deity of His holiness, and by drawing

Him down into all the contrasts of human life. A celebrated poet has said: When the gods were more human, men were more divine.[1] This sentence is so far true, as it is a mere tautology. If man makes the gods human, by subjecting them to his passions and sins, it becomes very easy for him to be godlike. Christianity has only the true manlikeness of God, the religion of the Son of God descended into humanity. But as Judaism alone could furnish the historical ground upon which the Son of God appeared among men, John iv. 22, it holds still good in a spiritual sense, what the primitive Christian Church up to the turning point denoted in Acts x., enforced in a literal sense, that the royal road from all heathenism to Christianity led *through Judaism*.

The *Church development of doctrine* has never abandoned the zealous endeavour firmly to retain the sense of guilt in its reality, by the exclusion of evil from the Divine causality; but has not always been fortunate in its endeavour to avoid the collision of that notion with that of the causality of God, considered in itself as unlimited.

It was just this endeavour, not the Platonic notion of the μὴ ὄν, which falls in the connection of another method of consideration, which led *Origen*, and *Gregory of Nyssa*, to regard evil as οὐκ ὄν, as ἀπουσία τοῦ κρείττονος; they thought that only in this way was it possible to avoid the production of evil by God, the author of all being. *Basilius*, in a homily well deserving to be read, the 9th, seeks to show that neither physical, nor moral, evil originates from God.[2] *Augustine* too remains everywhere true to his denial of the Divine origination of evil, and when often enough in ancient and modern time the opposite opinion has been attributed to him, on account of his doctrines of the moral inability of human nature, the Divine predetermination, it only just belongs to the unwarrantable freedom taken with respect to this great Church Father to make him every where consistent with himself. *Augustine* expressly distinguishes the Divine predetermination, which refers to what God Himself does, from the Divine foreknowledge, which also extends to that which he does not do,

[1] *Schiller.*—Tr.
[2] *Opp. ed. Benedict.* tom. ii. p. 73—83.

to sin,[1] and clearly thereby excludes the latter from the sphere of the Divine predetermination. This predetermination, according to his system, which here fully coincides with that of the later Infralapsarians,[2] has for its essential presupposition the *free act* of *man*, by which, sin has entered into human nature, namely, Adam's fall, in which every individual of the human species has become guilty. A further occasion of the charge against *Augustine*, of making God the author of sin, is given in the thought often met with in his opponent, *Julian von Eclanum*, that God sometimes punishes the sins of man by means of sin. How ungrounded this inference is our later investigation of this question will show.—The difficulties of this problem were augmented for the scholastic theology, the more rigidly it became extended in the interest of the notion of an absolute causality, the doctrines of the Divine conservation, of the Divine *concursus* with respect to the free actions of man (p. 234 sq.), and of the just as infallible, as all embracing, foreknowledge of God. But apart from a few decidedly pantheistic modifications, it everywhere displays the earnest endeavour to hold the causality of evil far from God. It is true *Thomas von Aquino* and others do

[1] *De prædest. sanctorum*, c. x. comp. *Enchir. ad Laur*, c. 95, 96.

[2] It only rests upon a misunderstanding of the *Infralapsarian* opinion, when *Wiggers, Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus*, S. 309, will not allow this coincidence to be valid. Also the Dordrecht theologians do not at all conceive of the Divine decree as one subsequent to the fall according to time, but they denote it with great emphasis as decretum aeternum, *canones Dordr.* c. 1, art. 6. The priority according to *time*, by no means necessarily follows from priority according to the *notion*. According to the *Supralapsarian* opinion the fall is co-contained in the Divine decree concerning the blessedness and condemnation of men, and dependent thereupon as a means of fulfilling the same. According to the *Infralapsarian* opinion of the corrupt condition of the human race, originating in the fall of Adam, it is a given fact for the eternal decree of God, to which that decree is related as to its presupposition. This is also undoubtedly the opinion of *Augustine*, but if now that presupposition is nevertheless an event resulting at a determined time, but the thereby conditioned Divine decree is an eternal one, the simple mediation upon this stand-point is contained in the certain foreknowledge of God. Truly if one makes the human act to be necessitated by this foreknowledge, and accordingly attributes to the knowledge of God a causal significance, the *Infralapsarian* representation must appear very weak and inconsequent; but one has then forced upon it premises which are perfectly foreign to it. *Augustine* guards himself expressly against such a significance of the Divine

not hesitate to employ in this question the formula on account of which *Calixt* was violently attacked by the orthodox Lutheran theologians: *Deus est causa mali per accidens.* However this offensive formula as used by *Thomas*, has in itself an entirely unprejudicial sense, this, namely, that God has created beings which are able to fall away.[1] But as the scholastic theology in its investigations of the relation of the Divine working to the human, ever lost sight of the practical religious starting points and interests, which in *Augustine* are everywhere so prominently set forth, and sunk itself down with preference into a one-sided metaphysical treatment of this problem, it was necessitated there, where the Antipelagianistic direction decidedly asserted its claims, as is especially the case in the remarkable treatise of *Thomas von Bradwardina: de causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum;* to arrive at results which only concealed the Divine causalty of evil behind artistic formulae.[2]

foreknowledge, *e.g. De civ. D.* lib. 1, c. x., *De anima et ejus origine*, c. vii.

[1] *Summa*, p. 1, qu. 48, art. 2. If one indeed unites with this thought a remark met with in the preceding *quaestio*, art. 2: ipsa natura rerum id habet, ut, quae deficere possunt, quandoque deficiant, he is led to the dilemma either of regarding the Divine creation as an originally limited, therefore not as pure action, but (dualistically) relatively as a suffering of God, or of deducing the origin of evil from the will of God. For it is indeed entirely inconceivable even upon the stand-point of *Thomas*, that what is said to be contained in the natura rerum ordered by God had not been previously seen by Him.—In *Calixt*, and his disciples the sentence: Deus est auctor peccati per accidens relates partly to the Divine permission, and partly to this, that God is the object of sin.—The disputed question finds its solution in the notions of the freedom of the human will and of the Divine omniscience. God could only be Causa mali per accidens if He had produced something in the creature from which, under certain circumstances, not proceeding from Him, evil *must* proceed.

[2] Lib. 1, c. 34 (p. 294—307 *in der Ausg. von Savilius)*; comp. lib. ii. c. 29, 30, lib. iii. c. 1, 2.—*Br.* proceeds in his investigations just from that interest to defend the absolute causality of the Divine will, of the prima causa, and makes it, since it decidedly rejects every dependence as every separation of the same from the working of the creature, absolutely to necessitate all activities of the causae inferiores, even those of the human will (the freedom of which according to him, as according to *Schleiermacher* and *Romang*, is only something in relation to other causae inferiores.) As the above observed change of the stand-point commonly announces itself by the permissive will of God, in its distinction from the efficient will, being either denied or overlooked, so

It cannot surprise us, that the deep inward movement of the religious spirit, from which the Reformation proceeded, was in a certain measure foiled in its first attempts to solve the old problem from the newly founded Christian consciousness. It is an easy matter for a superficial Pelagianistico-deistical opinion of the relation of God to the world in general, and to the moral life of the personal creature in particular, to exclude, by a harmless formula, the derivation of evil from God. Since it distinguishes God from His world, as a workman from his finished machine, and refers especially the rational creature, in relation to the solution of his moral task without regard to the moral conditions, entirely to his own powers, and to the freedom of his will, it can scarcely come into the temptation to make God in any way author of sin, and it especially redounds to its reproach, when in its determinations concerning the origin of evil, it nevertheless often enough runs into the snare, which was never laid for it.[1] But a powerful consciousness of the omnipresent, everywhere efficient God, who is above all, and through all, and in all, (Eph. iv. 6) united with a deep knowledge of the fact that man in his present condition is not able to do anything truly good without the aid of the Divine grace (John xv. 5), has here quite other difficulties to overcome. Not to lose this *numen praesens* of the living God, the deep want of all true piety, in the notion, and still firmly to retain the pure separateness of the Holy God from the evil in created beings—for this, the determinations, that God has indeed created the free will of man, and then has given him over to his own self-determination, are not sufficient.

If now the application by the Schoolmen, of the notion of

here in the case of *Br.* the notion of the Divine permission loses all significance; and although he allows it nominally to stand, out of respect to the authority of his master *Augustine*, he has in truth only one absolute will of God producing and working everything, lib. i., cap. 9, 22, 32, 33. He then easily avoids the real cliffs of our question in the light and convenient barque of the privative notion of evil, lib. i. c. 27 and 34,

[1] It is true, more deeply considered, it has its good ground, that just consistent Deism shows itself unable to avert the causation of evil from God. It necessarily loses with the true notion of the relation of God to the world, that also of the personality of man, and its innate propensity to mechanical representations, leads it almost unavoidably to degrade human action to the sphere of the so-called nature—mechanism, against which indifferent freedom is only a deceptive defence.

privation, to evil, is to solve the knot, it could not remain concealed from a sharp thinking, in so far as this notion was earnestly taken, and therefore distinguished from that of simple negation, that this expedient, with respect to the difficulties in the relation of evil to the Divine omniscience and omnipotence, is only just a make-shift. For if evil be the deficiency of a positive moment, which by the true order is *required* in this place, it belongs in the first place, as far as concerns the Divine knowledge, indisputably to the truth and perfection of the same, to regard this deficiency as that, which it clearly is; unless perhaps one will set up the opinion, destructive of all religion, that the object of the Divine knowledge is not at all the world in this its empirically real constitution, but that of an ideal world absolutely different from it. Corresponding to this privation, to this deficiency in the human will contradicting the order, must there be an equal deficiency in the Divine co-operation, a short-coming of the same, behind its ordinary amount. If one says on the contrary: this deficiency of a Divine working has nevertheless its ground not in God, but in the short-coming of creature efficiency, with which God would co-operate, there had been no need for resorting to the notion of privation in order to exclude evil from the producing agency of God. For if in this question there be at all admitted a determination of self, by the Divine efficiency, which is in any way a permitted one, by the human decision of the will, nothing is gained by this privative conception of sin, which its positive, will not furnish. From this it follows, that that formula: *Deus concurrit ad materiale, non ad formale actionis malae*, in as much as it rests entirely upon the notion of privation, is not at all adapted to solve the problem. If therefore evil is to be excluded from the causality and knowledge of God by the help of the negativing notion of evil, the simple notion of negation unavoidably takes the place of that of privation. Evil is then only the less perfect, as it is given with the necessary limitations of finite beings, with the diversity among each other, and with their gradual development. It is only then of course to a perfectly unjustifiable method of consideration, which isolates the individual, and arbitrarily compares it with another standing upon a higher degree, that evil can appear as deprivation and deficiency; for the proper consideration of the world, embracing the individual in the whole, evil is not at

all existing. Such an entire dissipation of evil is perfectly consistent in *Spinoza;* the Reformers must have most decidedly rejected it, had it once appeared to them as the consequence of this method of removing the causation of evil from God.

Thus pressed, in the most difficult conflict, they have certainly the most righteous claim to a charitable judgment, if in their attempt to unite opposite tendencies of the same Christian consciousness they manifoldly fail, and sometimes in the same connection disclose contradictory determinations. It were ever sounder to have left that contrast unmediated, by the equally firm retention of both its members, than to throw one's self upon the one side, to the exclusion of the other.

Involved in such an insolvable dilemma it is true we see the article of the *Augsburg Confession*, namely, the 19th, which has the express object to deny the Divine causality of sin, and to refute the imputations of the Roman Catholic opponents. Its words are the following: *De causa peccati docent, quod, tametsi Deus creat et conservat naturam, tamen causa peccati est voluntas malorum, videlicet diaboli et impiorum, quae non adjuvante Deo avertit se a Deo* [in the German original it is still more definite: which so soon as God removed His hand, turned itself away from God to evil][1] *sicut Christus ait*, John viii: *Cum loquitur mendacium, ex se ipso loquitur.* One must bear in mind for the understanding of the words printed in italics, that according to the representation prevalent among the Reformers of Saxony, the relation of man to God in his premature state, was thought of as resembling that of the restoration of the fallen race by Redemption, as that of a real work of grace. For instance *Melancthon* has himself expressly taught that from the beginning

[1] The anxious endeavours of the older, and also of the modern, *Lutheran* theologians to make this: non adjuvante Deo, orthodox, by the interpretation, without the turning away from God being promoted by Him, becomes worse than vain with respect to this German text. When *Melancthon* in the *Variata* has placed, instead of: non adjuvante Deo: contra mandata Dei, it is certainly very unnatural to take this only for an "illustration" (*Verdeutlichung*)—as an article in *der Ev. Kirchenzeitung*, 1847, Nr. 46, 47, S. 464 does, which is directed against this expression concerning the 19th article of the *Augustana*, and a similar one in my *Treatise on the General Synod of* 1846—but it is just a testimony that *Melancthon* at a later period recognized the fatal character of that expression.

man has been incited to good by the aid of the Holy Spirit.[1] Undoubtedly that article rests upon the presupposition, that man as such does not possess in himself a sufficient power for good, and for the resistance of temptation, thus is *Schleiermacher* undoubtedly right when he sees in this *withdrawment of God*, a Divine *working* of that which, under that presupposition,

[1] *Loci theol. Augustische Ausg.* S. 19. More cautiously *Melancthon* treats this point in the editions of his *Loci* after the year 1535. Where he earlier spoke of the *auxilium Spiritus Sancti*, there he now speaks with a more general expression of the *lux Dei*.—The above interpretation of the 19th article of *Augustana* is by the above mentioned article of the Ev. K.—Z said to be improper. The Holy Spirit of whom *Melancthon* speaks in this passage of the *Loci*, is said not to have been to him a supernatural gift of grace, but (?) spirit of life, principle of the life of man originally united with God, S. 462. Further, *Melancthon* is said to have already discarded his earlier opinion, according to which the freedom of man appears to be swallowed up by the government of God really working everything, in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Colossians* (1527), S. 459.—As to the second maintenance, the modifications which *Melancthon* here adopts are directly attached to the doctrine of *Luther* respecting the universal efficiency of God, as it is exhibited in his treatise *de servo arbitrio*, compare above, p. 243. This *generalis Dei actio*, *Melancthon* will now have conceived of so that it is not destructive of a certain freedom of the human will, in actions which relate to *civil righteousness*, comp. the 18th article of the *Augustana*. This therefore has nothing to do with the point *here* treated of. The faithful and anxious exhibition in *Galle's Charakteristik Mel. s.* (1840), to which that article appeals, just makes very evident that *Melancthon* first of all in the year 1532, in the 9th edition of his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, began really to break through the charmed sphere of those representations which have for their ultimate premise unconditional predetermination.—But that *Mel.* is said to have conceived of the Holy Spirit in his relation to the original condition in another sense, than in that of the Christian doctrine of salvation, is, as the connection of the passage in the *Loci* in question shows, a maintenance perfectly without foundation. This also becomes clear by comparing the expressions of *Luther* concerning this relation, *De servo arbitrio*, *Ausg. von Seb. Schmid* (*die in* 4), S. 79, 80: Esti primus homo non erat impotens *assistente gratia*, tamen in hoc praecepto satis ostendit ei Deus, quam esset impotens *absente gratia*. Quodsi is homo, cum adesset Spiritus, nova voluntate non potuit velle bonum de novo propositum, *i. e.* obedientiam, *quia Spiritus illam non addebat* (*i. e.* still indeed: Non adjuvante Deo), quid nos sine Spiritu (*Luther* speaks of the natural condition of man) possemus in bono amisso? Ostensum est ergo in isto homine exemplo terribili pro nostra superbia conterenda, *quid possit liberum arbitrium nostrum sibi relictum* ac non continuo magis ac magis actum et auctum Spiritu Dei.—At the ground there lies the well known representation of *Augustine*, of the

necessarily follows from the same.[1] Further, when *Luther* in his controversy with *Erasmus*, *Melancthon* in the earlier editions of the *loci theol.* and of his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, *Zwingli* in the treatise *de providentia*, *Calvin*, and *Beza*, impute to everything that happens an absolute necessity, and intimately ground their doctrine of predestination upon the ever present efficient power of Divine knowledge and determination—whereby the Infralapsarian opinion essentially merges into that of the Supralapsarian—thus primitive sin, just as little as all subsequent, cannot, with any consistency of thought, be excluded from the Divine causation. For to fall back and say, God has not directly produced sin in the inward of man, but only determined by his decree that it shall proceed from his own will and his own arbitrary movement, is only a round-about way which leads to the same point.[2] It is with this as with many formulæ of modern philosophical systems, which are said to ground the notion of guilt; strictly considered, they maintain nothing more than what is self-evident, that sin only exists and

adjutorium gratiae in the original condition, only that the Reformers conceive of this adjutorium more positively than *Augustine*. But when the Ev. K.—Z. S. 461 f. terms it an unjustifiable procedure that I "intentionally separate the *Ausgb. Confession* from the complex of the *Church Symbols*, and give to its articles the exclusively justified interpretation, derived from the—private writings of the Reformers," and on this account denies me the virtue of *historic* interpretation, it is a direct misrepresentation of the matter, since of such an intentional separation and exclusive justification nothing whatever has been said. Had we *e.g.* an explanation of the apology on the disputed point, this would have for me the unconditional prerogative of authentic interpretation. But this reproof can surely mean nothing more than that I ought to have interpreted the 19th article of the *Augustana* according to the 11th article of the *Konkordienformel*, and in this case I must freely confess that my notion of *historic* interpretation stands diametrically opposed to this of the symbolic books.

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, B. 1, S. 496, 497.

[2] Still less does it touch the main thing in the question, when *Calvin* further objects to the above deduction, that the notions of Divine command and Divine will were therein confounded, *Instit. rel. chr.* lib. I., c. xviii. § 4. The subject is that of the causation of the evil decision of the will; therefore the Divine command, which indeed according to *Calvin* is not at all adapted itself to produce the direction in the will which it requires, does not belong to the consideration, but the real question is, how the evil determination and action of man is related to the producing will of God, which, according to *Calvin*, is the absolute necessity of all things.

arises in the creature, but not, that it comes *from* the creature. Nevertheless, all those protest unanimously against the consequence, that God is the author of sin; *Calvin* is especially anxious to ward off this inference from his propositions.[1] But he is only able to do so by simply placing together the directly contradictory expressions, as in the well known position: *Cadit homo Dei providentia sic ordinante* (that the relation here is a causal one, is clear from the words almost immediately preceding: *lapsus est primus homo, quia Dominus ita expedire censuerat*): *sed suo vitio cadit.*[2]—The real meaning of this passage appears more clearly in the further development by *Beza's* sagacious understanding, fearful of no consequence, especially in the following remarkable passage: *Quaerenda est vitii origo in instrumentorum spontaneo motu, quo fit, ut Deus juste decreverit, quod illi (protoplasti) injuste fecerunt. At enim dices: non potuerunt resistere Dei voluntati, id est, decreto. Fateor; sed sicut non potuerunt, ita etiam noluerunt. Verum non poterant aliter velle. Fateor, quoad eventum et ἐνέργειαν; sed voluntas tamen Adami non coacti fuit.*[3] Thus also *Beza* elsewhere attaches the utmost importance to this, that the first man was not compelled, although he has necessarily fallen into sin, and

[1] *Institt. Christ. relig.*, lib. i. c. xviii. § 4, lib. iii. c. xxiii., and especially in the controversial treatise: *ad calumnias nebulonis cujusdam etc. responsio;* also in the *Consensus Genevensis.*

[2] *Institt.* lib. iii., c. xxiii., § 8. In § 7 it is said: Decretum quidem horribile, fateor; infitiari tamen nemo poterit, quin praesciverit Deus, quem exitum habiturus esset homo, antequam ipsum conderet, *et ideo praesciverit, quia decreto suo sic ordinarat.* Similarly *Luther de servo arbitrio,* p. 37: Deus sua voluntate nos necessario *damnabiles* facit. Besides to both it is certain that God has for this decree justissimus rationes, although the human reason may not be in condition to perceive them. Occulta ratio esse potest, injusta non potest, says *Calvin*, in the *Consensus Genevensis* (p. 268 *in der Niemeyerschen Ausg. der symb. BB. der ref. K.*) He rejects in the strongest language the representation of a will of God, which only works according to its absolute power, without any regard to the rule of righteousness, *Institt.* lib. i. c. xvii. § 2, lib. iii. c. xxiii. § 2. But righteousness here, where indeed on the part of man absolutely nothing can be given, whereby the Divine arrangement of his destiny may direct itself, becomes a mere empty word, in which nothing more can be conceived of.

[3] *Resp. ad Sebast. Castellionem de aeterna Dei praedestinatione, in refutatione secundae calumniae.* Comp. the eduction of the same thought in the *Consensus Genevensis*, L. c. p. 267 seq.

requires that one in seeking after the origin of evil, should keep entirely to the instrument, the will of the creature, and its *spontaneus motus*. But *Beza* does not himself keep to the instrument, inasmuch as he directly determines the instrument to be the *instrument* of the will of God, as he expressly teaches in another passage below the text of the quoted treatise: all *causae secundae*, intelligent as well as unintelligent are nothing more than instruments of the *causa prima*. Therefore the requirement that in the derivation of evil, we keep to the instrument and its *spontaneus motus*, in conjunction with the fact, that the consideration extends beyond this sphere, and that too not merely in a negativing manner, since *Beza* ventures with great confidence to determine the Divine purpose in the ordering of sin,[1] can indeed conduct us to nothing else than the adoption of two stand-points, whereby some have more recently sought to find assistance, of a relative, and of an absolute one. On the relative stand-point of the consideration, evil appears entirely as the guilt of the creature, contradicting the revealed will of God, which has here the form of law, on the absolute, it appears as part of the Divine plan, as product of the concealed will of God, which is the unconditioned cause of all existences and events,—conditioning every thing in the same equal and necessary manner,—but which realizes itself in the production of evil, in the form of the self-determination of personal creatures. But such a relative stand-point, on which the subject of consideration appears essentially different from that which it appears upon the absolute stand-point, is directly cancelled, so soon as it is recognized as relative, and the absolute is found; yet so often as it may make good its claim in the intuitive consciousness as an *unavoidable*

[1] *Beza*, after the precedence of *Augustine*, *Zwingli*, and *Calvin* finds these purposes in the requirement of objects in which, as well the Divine attribute of punitive justice, as that of compassion, could reveal themselves, comp. the *abstersio calumniarum Tilem. Hesshusii*, and especially *die Akten des Mümpelgartschen Religionsgesprächs*. But his theory is destructive both of the notion of righteousness and also that of compassion. For the punitive righteousness of God presupposes the imputability of its objects, grounded in free self-determination, which in this theory becomes negatived by the necessitating power of the Divine decree. And the compassion becomes transformed into a cruel trifling of God with man, if he first of all brings him into this condition requiring His help, in order to be able to take him out of the same.

appearance, it will still be of highest interest for scientific consideration, as a remarkable psychological phenomenon, but if it shall assume over against that an objective significance, it immediately becomes a *positive untruth*.[1]—The sixteenth century continued simple and ingenuous in the development of such thoughts, and the most energetic Christian piety was found compatible with it. In the present day, by the augmented consciousness of the presuppositions and consequences of every opinion, they cannot scientifically develop themselves without leading to pantheism. It is evident, therefore, that the modern undertaking of *Al. Schweitzer*, to reduce the old reformed theology to the principle of religious determinism, and therewith to represent it standing in the place of the absolute stand-point, in opposition to the relative method of consideration of the Lutheran theology, can only be regarded as a furtherance of that theology, as it is healthful when the evil virus of disease, in a powerful living organism, concentrates itself, and becomes visible.[2]

An honourable opponent of this work, *Ritter über das Böse*, p. 69, refers the polemic of the last note but one, directed against the placing of the revealed and concealed will of God in opposition to each other, to the opinion advanced in his work: *die Erkenntniss Gottes in der Welt*, p. 531—43. The polemic in question is much rather directed against *Beza* and other older disciples of the *decretum absolutum*, and the remark inserted in a somewhat earlier passage in the text: "whereby some have more recently sought to find assistance," to the proof of which *Ritter*, in a certain

[1] The same relation may be pointed out in the contrast just mentioned between the concealed, and the revealed, will of God. The concealed will is a revealed one, because indeed otherwise nothing could be known of its contents, and of its relation, to the so-called revealed will. The revealed will, on the contrary, reveals nothing, but is only a concealment of the true will of God; therefore, to be regarded as a mere fiction, in so far as it contradicts the so-called concealed will.

[2] One may compare with these remarks the circumspect and sagacious explanations, which *Nitzch* has furnished in his first article against *Möhler* of the reformer's method of teaching with respect to the origin of evil (*Stud. und Krit.* 1834, H. 1, S. 45—55.)

measure, obliges me, since he makes it equally bear the same reference, had simply in view the opinion of an absolute and relative stand-point, in the determination of the relation of sin to God. The ground of this opinion is to be found substantially in *Spinoza*, and then is often enough met with in different forms in the theories which have taken their start from this philosophy.—But concerning the hypothesis of two wills in God, of which the one, the concealed, is said to produce the evil, by the human will, while the other, the revealed will, forbids it to man, therefore the hypothesis of two wills of God contradictorily opposed to each other: I am utterly at a loss to see, even after *Ritter's* remarks, how any one to whom that concealed will has once revealed its contents, is able still firmly to maintain the revealed will in earnest conviction, as the true and revealed will of God. And here I may venture to appeal to my opponent himself. In the discussions, p. 67 and 68, we see that the *revealed* will is said to belong only to the *relative* will of God. Of this relative will of God the author says, p. 67, that of course in God, absolutely, and in, and for Himself, considered, nothing is supposed relative or only conditioned, but everything in Him is unconditioned; but we must conceive of God in relation to His creatures, and especially in relation to ourselves, and in this way such a distinction may very well necessarily appear. Now, if this is meant so to be understood, that God, in determined relations to His creatures, has given to His own will certain conditions, so that it shall only become realized, in so far as they appropriate it by their will, I should, in the matter itself, be in agreement. But *Ritter's* conception of the Divine Almight does not allow him to maintain the distinction in this real sense, otherwise why should he so decidedly reject the thought of a Divine self-limitation? Therefore the relative will can only have the value of a *subjective representation*, of which, however irresistibly it may ever and again force itself upon us, we have indeed learnt that it does not express the real nature of the Divine will, of which we were therefore conscious that it contained no

real knowledge of the Divine will. But if we more closely fix our attention upon the *concealed* will, and bear in mind that the entire distinction is laid down by the author for no other purpose, than to avert the exclusion of any being, or event, from the unconditional causality of the Divine will, we must necessarily be surprised to find that *Ritter*, just in the deciding passage, where it required the use of the most exact expression, denominates this concealed will merely as a will not made known (*Zullassen*) p. 68, 69. If by this there was really only a Divine reservation, in which lay the notion of God as maintaining a negative relation (*Sichnegativverhalten*) towards another causality, I should rejoice to be able to appeal to the assent of one of our first philosophers for an opinion, to which, according to my conviction, every consistent Theism is required somewhere in its system to give place. But the author does not at all allow of this; for, p. 32, he regards the Divine reservation as belonging to evasive distinctions, which are not to be taken in real earnest.—I sincerely honour the motive-ground which has kept him from the maintenance, that the evil which God, according to His revealed will, forbids, He nevertheless wills and works by His concealed will; but I cannot possibly see the solution of this problem in a distinction which the author himself leaves in the lurch at the deciding point.

TRANSITION.

The complete decision of the question, whether the presence of sin may in any way be deduced from the idea, can only be arrived at from the subsequent investigations. But so much must in any case be admitted, that we do not become conscious of evil in this way, but first of all as a *fact of experience*. It is thus that the representation of evil is everywhere presented to us, apart from outward tradition, which we, by the by, should never really understand, without an accompanying perception. Indeed it is so much for us a matter of experience, that the understanding would be truly glad to rid itself of this inconvenient, contumacious element of existence,—were not the experience more powerful than the universal notions separating themselves from it. We may wish to deny it, but it compels its recognition.

It is also thus as a fact of experience that we have regarded sin in our investigations up to the present point, sin itself, and its reaction upon us as guilt. Others prefer the dialectical deduction of evil from the idea of the will as an indicated moment of the same,[1] and have reproached us for deviating from their method.[2] But whoever has followed the course of our investigation, with only a moderate degree of attentiveness, will admit, that we could not have adopted such a course without running into direct contradiction against the fundamental thoughts of our opinion. It may appear as a very reasonable request, when, as a matter of course, it is required of us to admit that sin is just a "moment of the self-determining will;" nevertheless it would require

[1] *E.g. Vatke* in his Treatise: *die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verhältniss zur Sünde und zur göttlichen Gnade.*

[2] The same in his reviews of the first edition of this work, *Hallische Jahrbücher* 1840, S. 1036.

nothing more than the admission of this innocent sentence, for us to see, every determination we have hitherto discovered respecting the nature of sin, gradually consumed.

If now the existence of this variance is not a mere phantom with which a melancholy view of life wishes to awaken our anxiety, but an indubitable fact of experience, we cannot thrust back the question concerning its *origin*, respecting the *conditions of its possibility*. How has such a variance taken place in human life, in which everything points to unity, and harmony, as alone in agreement with its real nature, a variance which fathoms the deepest depth of its nature, and fills it with unutterable disquiet and pain? How could an opposition against God arise in a world, which His Holy and Almighty love has created and preserves, by which the creature is able to incur the penalty of endless punishment in the judgment of his Creator,[1] the expiation of which it behoved the Son of God to make by a death of suffering, which forced from Him the anxious cry: My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?

We will not here decide, whether perhaps it is not contained in the very notion of sin, that a solution is not to be expected which absolutely abolishes the enigma as such; but if the consideration be only able to lead us to see *that*, and *why*, such a solution is impossible, which converts the dark abyss, in which sin is brought forth, into light and clearness, this result must indeed be in the highest degree profitable, for the better understanding of man, his eternal destiny, and the relations of his present conditions to the same.

Thus we find that this great problem has before occupied the reflecting spirits, not merely of the Theologian and Philosopher, on account of their calling, but all, to whom there has been a deep necessity of grounding the true significance of human life. And very properly so; so certain as the religious, ethical interests of the human spirit are the absolutely highest, so certainly must a world-opinion, which seeks entirely to avoid the question

[1] If we already find in Gen. vi. 6: it repented the Lord that He had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at His heart, on account of the evil of the human heart, no one who understands how to read the Holy Scripture, will overlook the deep significance, in this deeply moving feature concerning the anthropopathy of the expression.

concerning the origin of sin, or to put it aside as a subordinate matter, appear nothing more than in the highest degree empty and abstract.

Therefore it were a procedure difficult to be justified, if we were now directly to pass over, without entering upon the opinions of others, to the exhibition of that principle in the nature of man, by which the origination of sin is, in the most decided manner, conditioned. The way to our end we can only so construct, if we do not wish to meet with obstacles at every step of our course from doubts and objections, by first of all critically examining the different Theories for the explanation of evil, which by their inward contents, or by outward extension, require in our time especial examination.[1] The knowledge of the errors or insufficiencies, in those ground views of the origin of sin, separating from each other and proceeding towards opposite sides of the same, will force us to the recognition of the only possible solution of the problem. We are also before hand entitled to the supposition, that we shall not be required to hold ourselves merely negatively, towards that which deep thinking minds have thought on this question; since there cannot be wanting in the same, moments of truth in which the knowledge of sin will become extended and deepened, and even the errors of such spirits will often be more rich in instruction, than the truth of those, who satisfy themselves by repeating the universal declarations of the moral consciousness respecting evil, without being able to bring about their agreement with other no less certain and holy truths, thus without being able to procure a thorough understanding of those declarations themselves.

Does any one ask us by *what* we shall *measure* these theories, since indeed no provision whatever has been made for an appeal to any given philosophical system, as norm of all Truth: our investigations up to the present have furnished us with the ground-basis of judgment, apart from perhaps a few contradictions of opinions to be judged of in themselves. If we find those theories in unison with what we have fixed as the nature and form of sin, if they are able further to explain the results of our inquiry,

[1] In so doing we have still to pass over those of these Thories which exert a positive determining influence in our exhibition of that principle.

without dissipating them, how they support themselves upon the undeniable contents of our moral religious consciousness, and upon the word of God, how should they be otherwise than welcome to us? If they contradict that which we have recognized to be true, from those ground-bases, we must of course reject them. For as on the one hand it were unsatisfactory in the sphere of science, firmly to retain just that fundamental truth without further developing it, so on the other hand we are just as little able to make that the contents of our conviction, which stands in real contradiction to the same.

SECOND BOOK.

EXAMINATION

OF THE

PRINCIPAL THEORIES FOR THE EXPLANATION OF SIN.

FIRST CHAPTER.

DEDUCTION OF SIN FROM THE METAPHYSICAL IMPERFECTION OF MAN.

The first theory which presents itself in the question concerning the origin of sin, is that based upon the notion of *metaphysical imperfection*, attaching itself to man as a created being. An absolute perfection cannot be the possession of the creature, else he were God. God alone is infinite; finiteness and limitation are essential to the creature. Determinate boundaries are set to his power and his knowledge; he has a development in time, and therewith is subject to the change of his conditions; he finds himself manifoldly dependent upon the external world, which sometimes exercises *an exciting*, at other times a *depressing* influence on his life. By virtue of this original imperfection attaching to his being, we find in his understanding, together with truth, error; in his sensibility, beside pleasure, non-pleasure and pain; can it surprise us then that also in the sphere of the will the good does not appear perfect, but deficient, and therefore mixed with sin? Must it not much rather surprise us that a finite being, in the

midst of the pressure of life, and under the perpetual concurrence of manifold excitents, should ever determine upon the right, than that he should often be betrayed into the unright and the false?[1]

In the closer investigation of this opinion we have the advantage of being able to hold fast to a universally recognized representation of the same, to *Leibnitz*, who in his *Theodicee* developes it with the most cautious penetration, and in the most varied manner. From it are taken the fundamental sentences just above quoted.[2]

It is not, of course, *Leibnitz's* opinion, that from the *malum imperfectionis* inseparable from the notion of a creation, in itself alone, the *malum morale* must everywhere arise. This would lead to the necessity of ascribing evil to all finite things, in other words,—if indeed such an exception were wholly without sin,—of entirely nullifying the notion of evil by resolving it into that of the finite. *Leibnitz* does not at all overlook, that moral evil presupposes certain perfections, higher powers, reason, and will.[3] But inasmuch as, in the sphere of these powers, namely of the will, the limitation essential to the creature makes its appearance, *evil* arises. The tendency of the human will is essentially towards the good.[4] But as man becomes determined, by virtue of his limited nature, not merely by adequate, but also by obscure and complicated representations,[5] it happens that he oftener remains standing in the sphere of the lower passions, instead of proceeding to the higher and essential goods, and in this evil consists.[6]

This is now nothing real, but a mere *privation*, as error in the sphere of the spirit, and darkness and cold in the sphere of

[1] Somewhat in this manner *Bockshammer*, in his work on the *Freedom of the Human Will*, p. 115, expresses himself. The same thought is expressed with still greater completeness and precision in *Jacobi's All-will*, where we—according to an expression of *Hamann*—are required, instead of asking the question whence imperfection, nothingness and evil come (for it is characteristic of this stand-point, that it does not even enter upon the distinction of the notions of imperfection and evil) much rather to invert the question, and to wonder that finite creatures are able to inquire after the truth, to require for themselves the good, and so lay claim to blessedness. *Werke*, vol. i. p. 132.

[2] *Theodicee*, Part 1, § 20, 31.

[3] L. c. Part 2, § 119.

[4] Part 1, § 33. Part 2, § 154.

[5] Part 1, § 64.

[6] Part 1, § 33.

nature, or the *inertia corporum naturalis* discovered by *Keppler*.[1] As therefore the question is not after a *principle* or a *causa efficiens* of evil, but only after a *causa deficiens*,[2] the Divine will is not to be complained of as author of the same. For while the perfections or realities of the creature, as they co-operate in every sinful action, its power, its knowledge, must be reduced to the Divine concursus, which is to be thought of as *creatio continua*, it cannot hold good of that which makes the action sin, of its *formale*, because this is mere privation.[3]

But this privation, as every other which attaches itself to the creature, depends upon his *limited receptivity* for the perfections (realities), which God wishes to impart to him in the greatest possible fulness.[4] This limited receptivity has its ultimate ground in the Divine *understanding*, in the region of the eternal truths, of the forms or ideas of the possible, in the only thing which God has not made, since he is not author of His own understanding.[5] This region of ideas as the *ideal cause of evil* (indeed of the good too) one must set in the place which the ancients commonly assigned to matter, in their consideration of this question.[6]—

The thoughts of *Leibnitz* hitherto, admit of (in relation to the

[1] Part 1, § 20, 30, 32. Part 2, § 153. Part 3, § 377, 378. Comp. *Causa Dei asserta per justitiam ejus*, § 69.

[2] Part 1, § 33. Part 2, § 152. In this maintenance the *Theodicee* is not merely preceded by the Schoolmen; comp. especially *Thomas Summa, Prima Secundae*, qu. 75, art. 1. But previously by *Augustine, De Civ. Dei*, lib. xii. c. 7, where moreover the thought is obscured by a verbal quibble as to the double sense of deficere.

[3] Part 1, § 27 seq. Part 3, § 381 seq.

[4] Part 1, § 20, 30, 31. Part 3, § 377, 388.

[5] Part 1, § 20 (of which verités éternelles it is here said: elles sont dans l'entendement de Dieu indépendament de sa volunté). Part 3, § 288, 380, 381, (les formes possibles antérieures aux actes de la volunté de Dieu). Comp. *principia philosophiae*, § 42, 43, 47. In the *causa Dei*, &c., this region of eternal truths is termed the *status purae possibilitatis*, § 69. In the *Theodicee*, part 2, § 149, the remarkable expression against *Bayle's* deductions of the tenet, that the constitution of the world empirically given is very favourable to Dualism: je suis surpris, qu'il n'ait point consideré, que ce roman de la vie humaine, qui fait l'histoire universelle du genre humain, se trouve tout invente dans l'entendement divin avec une infinité d'autres, et que la volonté en a decernée seulement *l'existence*.

[6] Part 1, § 20. Part 2, § 149. *Leibnitz* limits this determination, § 20, by a: pour ainsi dire, since indeed in relation to evil as privation the question is admitted to be one of no real cause whatever.

origin of evil) a double interpretation. They may be *either* so understood as *necessitating* the procedure of sin from this original imperfection of the creature. With this, however, it may be firmly held that it is the self-determining will which first of all brings sin to reality; but this self-determination were in this case only the peculiar form in which, in this sphere, a higher necessity makes itself prevail; while man determined himself in his subjective consciousness he became determined by the limitation of his own nature, which preceded every real act. *Or*, those sentences may have the meaning that this limitation only supplies the ground of the *possibility* of evil.

If the theory of *Leibnitz* be understood in the first manner, we shall be obliged to say, that the *Theodicee* has entirely failed in its purpose, in justifying God on account of the existence of moral (as of physical) evil in the world. For if the evil as *ens privativum*, as *une suite des limitations précédentes, qui sont origineirement dans la créature*, can never have an operating cause, the guilt in the existence of sin would nevertheless fall back absolutely upon God as *causa deficiens* which had not imparted to the creature that which it absolutely required, in order to be able to avoid sin. Against this result, with the distinction between understanding and will in God, nothing can be accomplished unless one conceives of the same in the most decidedly dualistic sense. As this conception is foreign to the spirit of the *Theodicee*, as to the system of the author in general, how could he escape the concession of the Divine *will*, if it resolves to bring beings into existence, from whose nature He in the region of eternal truths sees evil to proceed *with necessity*, being necessarily regarded as author of the same? And supposing even the avoidance of this concession to be possible, would it be much better if we were obliged to seek the source of evil in the essential *understanding* of God? That herewith the peculiar manner in which sin arises in the consciousness of man, as guilt, is not so much explained as destroyed, requires no further development after our previous discussions.

But even that which this very opinion lays down as the objective notion of sin, that it is *privation*, can be no longer really held, as further on will become clear, if it is said to proceed with necessity from the nature of man. Just so those

who maintain this necessary procedure, without denying the imperishable continuance of the personal individual, must make sin for the same *eternal*. If it arises from the limitation, which belongs to the notion of the creature, it can never really be removed throughout all future aeons, but can only perhaps have an endless approximation towards its removal—a representation, which *Leibnitz* really adopted in a more general sense, when he denominated the finite spirit as the *asymptote of the Deity*. But such a so-called infinite approximation, in which the distance from the goal striven for ever remains the same, namely, an infinite distance, were indeed no blessedness, but worse than the tormentings of Sisyphus. If even the *development* should lead to no result, the opinion of a magical *transformation* of human nature perhaps in death, would afford no help. For while on the one hand such a transformation of nature is in reality nothing else than annihilation of the being which should have become complete, and the creation of another, so on the other hand this new being also, would, by virtue of the metaphysical imperfection attaching to it, as created, bear in itself the germ of sin just as much as the old one. It is altogether easy to be understood, how just such theories which weaken the idea of sin, are most in danger of making it an abiding element of human nature.

But are we then justified in this conception of the *Theodicee?* Without doubt there appear to be strong reasons for the same. Everywhere the *Theodicee* has for its object the reconciliation, of not merely the *possibility*, but the *reality* of sin with its doctrine of optimism, and in all earnestness maintains that the world would be less perfect, if sin were wanting in it;[1] from which appears to follow, according to *Leibnitz's* fundamental idea, the necessity of God's bringing about the origin of sin. Even if the

[1] Already, Part i. § 10, and oftener Part i. § 25, *Leibnitz* says of the evil of guilt that it is attached par la suprême necessité des verités éternelles to the best which God could choose.—Among most modern authors *Lamennais* finds satisfaction in this derivation of evil, destructive of itself, from the limitation which has its ground in the finite nature of man, since in his *Esquisse d'une Philosophie* he endeavours to bring some of the notions of *Spinoza* to its aid. This is so much the more to be wondered at since his theory of the two principles in man as in everything created, that of identity, and that of individuality, ought to have led him to at least a deeper conception of evil than this.

original imperfection of the creature as such just contained no more than the ground of the possibility of evil, its origin would be still not really explained. If the realization of evil is to be thought of absolutely only as act of the free will, determined by no necessity whatever, one must expect that the *Theodicee* would consider the relation of the freedom of the will to evil as the very kernel of its investigation. But it does this by no means, and certainly for this reason, because its author perceived, that, with his theory of the will, which with some modifications in detail, still was not able really to break through the ban of determinism, in this way he would not effect much. Indeed in a remarkable passage, where *Leibnitz* denotes the original imperfection of the creature, it is true only as the ground of the possibility of evil *(cela les rend capables de pécher)* he deduces the realization of this possibility not from the free will, but from circumstances in the connection of things *(et il y a des circonstances dans la suite des choses, qui font qui cette puissance est mise en acte.)*[1] This would then indeed of itself lead to this, that under presupposition of determinate finite relations, in which man stands, evil necessarily proceeds from the limitations of his nature.

Nevertheless a just and unbiased judgment of the *Theodicee* will rather recognize here unresolved contradictions, than lay to its charge that attenuation of evil, destructive of its real character, with all its dreadful consequences. When *Leibnitz* terms the original imperfection of the creature, as it exists among the objects of the Divine understanding and its eternal ideas, *cause idéale du mal*, he only means thereby, according to his use of language, to denote that by which evil is conditioned according to its *possibility*. *Leibnitz* expressly says this, evil is not necessary, but is possible by virtue of the eternal truths;[2] the

[1] Part 2, § 156.

[2] Part 1, § 21. *Leibnitz* expresses this in the most decided manner *Causa Dei asserta*, and so on, § 69: Ita fundamentum mali est necessarium, sed ortus tamen contingens, id est, necessarium est ut mala sint possibilia, sed contingens est ut mala sint actualia. It is true he again in a certain measure nullifies this by the immediately following: contingens autem (the reading in the German edition of his work, vol. i. page 485, as well as in the Amsterdam edition of the *Theodicee* of 1734, lib. ii., p. 360, "non contingens," can indeed only have arisen by an error of the press or of transcription) per harmoniam rerum a

real cause of evil is the *free will of creatures*;[1] from which he excludes not merely compulsion, but also necessity.[2] And as he decidedly regards the will alone, as cause of essential existences, but the understanding, in God, only the source of *beings*, of things as possible,[3] more than the possibility of evil can never be deduced from its being contained in the region of eternal truths as a result of that original limitation of the creature; nothing but a *will* can give it real existence, and indeed, since the Divine will is absolutely said not to be the author of evil, only the will of the creature.[4]

Accordingly *Leibnitz* determines the relation of the Divine will to evil, not as an occasion, but as a *permission*, and animatedly defends the permissive will against *Bayle's* and other objections, without however more deeply entering into the matter.[5] *Leibnitz* distinguishes a preceding, and a succeeding, will in God. The preceding, primitive will, has simply the good in view, and excludes the evil. But if now the Divine understanding represents to the Creative will an infinite series of possible worlds, and in the best of these possible worlds evil is contained together with the highest goods, as *conditio sine qua non*—since the Divine will, in as much as it directs itself absolutely according to the rule of wisdom, can only choose the best possible, he resolves as *voluntas subsequens (la volonté finale et décisive)* to *permit* evil *à titre du sine quo non ou de necessité hypothetique, qui le lie avec le meilleur*.[6]

If there were in the moral world, as were to be wished, only *sins* of *infirmity*, in which a determination directed to the good becomes turned aside from its object, by the superior power of an opposing impulse, nothing decided would stand opposed to this

potentia transit ad actum ob convenientiam cum optima rerum serie, cujus partem facit.

[1] Part 2, § 120. Part 3, § 274, 288.

[2] Part 1, § 34. Part 3, § 288 seq.

[3] Part 1, § 7.

[4] Part 1, § 23, 24, 30.

[5] Part 1, § 21, seq. 25. Part 2, § 121, § 127, seq. § 149, 150, 230.

[6] Part 1, § 25, 22. Part 2, § 119 (where an attachment of evil with the best world par concomitance is the subject), § 201.

theory of the origin of sin, at least on the side of experience. But how are we to explain from this notion of mere limitation just as of privation, actions, in which not only a weak, but a *wicked will*, an inimical malicious disposition, a presumptuous lust for the forbidden, a bold, resistless yielding up to crime, announces itself? As a mere standing still of the will in the lesser, instead of proceeding to the greater, good, these phenomena become absolutely unintelligible. *Leibnitz* has not overlooked this difficulty, and occasionally seeks, by the example of cold, which, although only privation, is still able to burst a metal pipe by the freezing of an enclosed mass of water, to show, how the privation in itself is able to appropriate accidentally, and *par concomitance* something positive.[1] But the subject here is, quite apart from the twofold insufficiency of the kind of proof, not of what sometimes appears in conjunction with evil, but of thoroughly pervading phenomena, in which the real consequence of evil reveals itself. Those kinds of sin, in which evil first of all appears as privation, can only become aggravated by limitation and resistance to wickedness, in so far as from the beginning there was efficiently in them, although in a latent manner, a positive principle.—If the sinful action as such, had no working cause, as *Leibnitz* deduces from the notion of privation, it were not at all to be seen, how it, on its part, should be able to work everything in the subject, how it, in order merely to remain in the first inmost sphere, should be able to produce a sinful condition. The undeniable connexion in which the individual, perverted, actions of a man usually stand together, the progressive development, which takes place just as much in evil as in good, the hardening of the will in evil by the repetition of conscious sin—these are the things, which this negativing conception of sin is least of all able to explain.

Further, how comes it to pass, that the evil where it appears in its most decided form, where selfishness with distinct consciousness, and planned execution, is elevated to the principle of life, only seldom appears accompanied by a general decrepitude of the power of the will, and weakening of the understanding, but on the contrary much oftener by a remarkable energy of both ?[2] Not

[1] Part 2, § 153.

[2] Comp. *Schelling's philos. Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 444.

merely in good, but also in evil, is man able to concentrate himself. Does not experience often enough show that even the decided tendency to evil is able to electrify man, to awaken in him a restless activity, and to bring about a powerful tentiginous excitement of the powers of his soul?[1] Even the Holy Scripture knows of a ἐνέργεια πλάνης as the maximum of human perversion, 2 Thess. ii. 11, and speaks not merely of a βάθη τοῦ θεοῦ, but also of a βάθη τοῦ σατανᾶ, Rev. ii. 24. Christ himself says that the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light, Luke xvi. 8. Indeed this energy of the understanding and will in itself, apart from the contents of the latter, is not evil, but also not good in a moral sense, but a natural good to which the evil attaches, and is misused by it for its service. But that the tendency to evil is able so powerfully to concentrate the spiritual life of man, that is, if sin according to its nature is nothing more than weakness and restriction of this spiritual life, is more than unintelligible.

And how in the last place, according to this theory, can the peculiar determinateness of feeling be justified with which evil the more certainly fills us, the more it appears in a distinctly impressed form, and as conscious will? We need not call to mind the monsters which have made themselves a name in history; the decided wickedness, recklessness, unbridled selfishness, which we so often meet with in life; they awaken in us no regret on account of the supposed limitations attaching to man, no compassion for his powerlessness, but we turn away from them with angry detestation and horror.

These are certain phenomena of moral life and judgment; by which every scientific investigation of the nature and origin of

[1] *Plato*, as *Weisse* remarks, *Idee der Gottheit*, p. 110, denotes ἀδικία as τὸν ἔχοντα (τὴν ἀδικίαν) μάλα ζωτικὸν παρέχουσα καὶ πρόσ γ' ἔτι τῷ ζωτικῷ ἄγρυπνον. *De republica* lib. x. (P. iii. vol. 1, p. 495, ed. Bekker. However unsatisfactory his theory of evil in other respects may be, his μὴ ὄν cannot nevertheless be confounded with the manner in which modern philosophers, after the precedence of *Leibnitz*, have applied the notion of negation. Just as little as will appear farther below, can this notion of privation be supported by the fact, that every consideration of evil must ultimately regard the same in some sense, as that which is a nonentity, in so far as it has no place in true being, which is in correspondence with the idea.

sin ought ever and again to ascertain its position, and which it must interpret, if it wishes to boast of having found the solution of the riddle. Indeed, as erroneous theory ultimately betrays the life also into error, if it only possesses continuity enough, so also this opinion of evil, wide-spread in its manifold modifications, has in measure only too well succeeded practically to put aside the feeling of moral horror and disgust, which it cannot explain, and to accustom its followers to a mere lamentation, that this or that one is so unfortunate as to be a villain. Therewith it ever turns away the eye from the inward principle of evil, and at length discovers sin, not really on its own account, to be worthy of detestation, but because it makes man so manifoldly miserable —as *Leibnitz* himself occasionally expresses it.[1] Thus even the insipid eudaimonistic philanthropy of the former century presumed to construct a kind of philosophical support out of individual fragments of the *Theodicee*, *e.g.* in the work of *Villaume* on the origin and intention of evil. But as this effeminate method of consideration of sin in itself is useless, it unavoidably involves us in the deepest and most thoroughly pervading variance with the ethical ground-view of Christianity. For the Holy Scripture, however powerfully it testifies of the compassionating love of God towards our sinful race, everywhere represents sin as an object of Divine anger; it sees in the servant of sin an enemy of God, and an ally of Satan, and announces a punitive righteousness of God, and a condemnation of the godless.[2] In the perfect man, in

[1] Part i. § 26. Nevertheless we meet with elsewhere in the *Theodicee* better fundamental tenets concerning the relation between physical and ethical evil. That opinion of the real ground of our condemning judgment concerning evil is more decidedly exhibited in a work which appeared a few years before the *Theodicee*, and which presents many interesting points of comparison with the latter—we refer to the work of the English Bishop, King, *de origine mali*. King also does not hesitate to express the opinion, which of course necessarily follows from that view, that physical evil is greater than moral evil, cap. 5, sect. 5. It is true upon this stand-point happiness is regarded merely as physical good!

[2] The *Theodicee*, indeed, leaves these doctrines wholly untouched, and seeks to bring the opinion of the eternal duration of condemnation into unison with its principles. Also nothing justifies us in placing this recognition to the account of an accommodation to the popular stand-point which *Leibnitz* is said to have allowed himself in the *Theodicee*, for nothing can be less sufficiently grounded than this opinion of the

Christ, it shews us, as the all-prevailing feeling in relation to sin, not that sadness which one perhaps *feels* at an insurmountable limitation in himself or in others, but a holy anger. And consequently calls us not to weak lamentations over the painful fate of sin, but to a burning hatred and extirpating war against the same. It is superfluous here to quote individual passages; this opinion is the life-pulse which pervades the entire New Testament; on every page there is the Divine detestation of evil, even when not expressly declared, still to be detected as the under-current of thought and feeling; nevertheless one may here be reminded of the eschatology of the Bible, and especially its prophecy of a highest augmentation of evil, prior to the close of history, of an Antichrist diametrically opposed to Christ. *In this sense* it is proper to call the ethical fundamental view of Christianity, *dualistic*. But to be brief: an opinion of the world which regards the deep variance in our existence as mere negation, and seeks its origin in the metaphysical imperfection of the creature, only accounts for a *non-bonum*, but not for evil, not for *positive opposition* to the good; and therewith severs the very nerve of the Christian method of consideration, as this again on its part attaches itself immediately to the real contents of all moral consciousness. In the place of this qualitative contrast we receive

Theodicee expressed by *Hegel*, (*Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. iii. p. 452), which sacrifices the truthful disposition of mind of its great author, in order to secure his speculative knowledge from the reproach of limited representations. The only external support is the well-known letter to *Pfaff*, in which *Leibnitz* unmistakeably satirizes the sagacity of the Theologian and his *naive* confidence in his discovery. There are also a series of other works which fall under the same judgment with the *Theodicee*, those concerning the agreement of faith with reason, the *Causa Dei asserta per justitiam*, those on *Hobbe's* work on freedom, on necessity, and on chance, those on *King's* work on the origin of evil, and no less a goodly number of the letters of *Leibnitz*, in which, as in all those works, the ground-thoughts of the *Theodicee* are to be found.—However, every attentive reader of the *Theodicee* will be obliged to confess how foreign those doctrines appear to the sense, how artistic and forced is their justification on the whole, and to what dangerous consequences they sometimes lead. To these especially belong the overlooking of the Divine estimation of individual personality, the eternal salvation of which is here everywhere sacrificed to the hard-freezing thought of the *best world*. (Comp. *e. g.* Part 2, § 118, 122, 123. Part 3, § 244.)

here the quantitative distinction of a more or a less; according to *Leibnitz* the will is essentially directed to the good, even in every wicked action;[1] and the limitations which attach to the latter on account of the subordinated value of its object will fall into the consciousness as privation or *defectus*, therefore only as sin by the unavoidable comparison with a better, *i. e.* with a determination directed to a higher object. How here everything runs off into a mere difference of degree, is clearly seen by the manner in which *Leibnitz* treats the *naturalis inertia corporum*, which he regards as something merely negativing, a limitation of the susceptibility of the body for the influence of the moving power, as perfect prototype of the original limitation of creatures in so far as it is the ground of evil.[2] He compares the evil and good constitutions and actions of men, with several ships, which, impelled by the same stream (of Divine activity, which co-operates as productive cause of all that is real and positive in the conduct of the creature), nevertheless move onwards with very different degrees of velocity, on account of the different masses in which the retarding power of inertia works by virtue of the lighter or heavier lading of the individual ships. If this analogy, to which *Leibnitz* several times in the *Theodicee*, and elsewhere,[3] adverts, is to be firmly held, evil sinks down entirely to a merely relative and comparative notion.—

We have already (p. 133) hinted at the abstract conception of the moral good from which *Leibnitz*, with other great philosophers and theologians, sets out in the investigation of the nature and origin of sin. It is not possible clearly to recognize moral goodness in its peculiar nature as that which is entirely conditioned by freedom, it is therefore for this reason impossible on the other side correctly to regard the full significance of the free will for the contrast of moral goodness, so long as it is so directly deduced from the metaphysical good, or much rather is resolved into the same, that it is said to consist merely in the superordination of the more perfect (including in itself more reality) above the more imperfect among the objects of our desire. From this method of consideration arises the unintelligible confounding

[1] Part 1, § 33.
[2] Part 1, § 33.
[3] *Causa Dei asserta etc.* § 71.

of the moral and the metaphysical good which so often meets us in the *Theodicee*, expressions such as these: The free will is directed to the good, and if it lights upon the evil, it happens accidentally, and because this evil has concealed itself in the good, and, like a mask, has assumed the same.[1] The notion of the good is in both passages here taken in the metaphysical, that of evil in the ethical, sense.

The matter is similarly related with the proverbial saying of our day, that evil is always attached to *the good*.—It is true this sentence must often have the sense, that the evil never appears in individual deed (external or internal) without bringing up with it out of the ground of the soul some moral good, to which it attaches as the rust to the iron. Thus meant, no one unprejudiced will admit that this holds good of every vile action. Besides, no one scarcely will in earnest wish to maintain, the absolute possibility of proving this sentence from experience and observation, but it ever remains by the mere requirement, that it must be so, because it just so follows from a certain psychological theory. One appeals to the necessary constancy of the moral life and consciousness according to both sides, so long as good and evil, are factors of the same; but the good is in some way still factor of the moral life, even in the vilest villain. But when one immediately deduces from the presence of these conflicting powers in the inward life, that their opposite working must be also found to exist in every moment of the phenomenal conduct, it depends upon a too external conception of a correct thought.—As however this sentence is used by many, *e. g.* in former time by *Augustine*[2] and *Pseudo-Dionysius Ariopagita* (*de div. nominibus*,

1 Part 2, § 154. "Le franc-arbitre va au bien, et s' il rencontre le mal, c' est par accident, c' est que ce mal est caché sous le bien et comme masque." This agrees with the theory of *Plato* developed in the *Gorgias*, 468 (*Bekker*, P. ii., vol. i., p. 46, seq.) According to which the purposes present at the time are alone considered as the objects of the will, and not the contents of the conduct in so far as it stands in relation to such purposes, as means. (—οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται ὁ πράττει, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα πράττει—). But these purposes are ever something which man regards as good (comp. *Mero*, 77 seq.) That the last sentence, as the notion of good contained in the same, is in reality a mere tautology, is clear from what was above remarked, page 186 of this work.— Comp. besides *Ritter's Geschichte der Philosophie*, Part 2, p. 410.

2 *E.g. Op. imperf. c. Jul.* lib. 1, c. 112.

cap. 4.), it is said to denote, that no objective, substantial being belongs to evil, that it is never Nature, in the strict sense of the word, nor can become, but that it is exiled to the sphere of subjectivity, is ever necessitated to attach itself to a, in itself, (in the metaphysical sense) good, which it misuses and perverts, in order, on it as basis, to bring its lie, its unbeing, to essential existence. In this sense the sentence is so indisputably true, that only decided dualism could deny it. But since it does not then distinguish the notion of ethical, from that of metaphysical, good, which absolutely rests upon the notion of *reality*, it contains the germ of serious misunderstandings.[1] Thus, if the cetagory of the substance is only once to be applied to the moral contrast of good and evil, as we must admit, that the evil, so also must we admit that the ethical good, for itself, is nothing substantially existing, but presupposes such as its basis: thus we may also explain the sentence: that the evil is ever attached to the good, by the other: that the good is ever attached to the good, the ethical to the metaphysical good.

In order to understand what sin is, and how it arises, it requires, nevertheless, quite other and more concrete notions than those of

[1] In the not distinguishing between these two notions is *e. g.* also contained the ground that in modern time, thoroughly penetrating investigations of the notion of an absolute evil being, have sometimes wished to find a logical contradiction. For in so far as it has essentia (*Wesenheit*), it is good, therefore the evil is not absolute, but is in some way or other limited by the still existent good. But if the evil in such a being is to be thought of as absolute, it must have destroyed every thing good in it, therefore the essentia (natura), to which it attached; this being therefore does not exist. ("Satan is, therefore he is good, therefore in God, and with God; Satan is evil, therefore he is not.") *Göschel's Fragment über das Böse, im Anhange zu seinem Octavius und Cäcilius*, p. 201. Here again the notions good and evil are taken in two different senses, good in the metaphysical, evil in the ethical. The representation of an absolutely evil being, although it has first of all become so, in which there is no longer present any element of *ethical* good, contains undoubtedly great difficulties; they lie partly in the notion of evil itself, partly in the relation of such a being to the all embracing and sustaining efficiency of God, but a contradiction of evil, heightened to absoluteness, to the good which is in all being as such—according to the canon of *Augustine*: quidquid est, in quantum est, bonum est, does not take place; *this* good cannot limit that evil because it does not at all belong to the same sphere; it can in no way interfere with the complete mastery in evil (which is equally complete slavery), with the pervading and satiating of every moment of life with evil.

affirmation and denial, of Being and non-Being, of reality and privation, with which, this theory of evil, imagines to succeed, just as so many others, both in ancient and modern times, have done—a method of ethical consideration which reached its maximum in *Spinoza*.[1] We do not deny that these universal determinations have their truth and their value in the investigation of evil. But it is erroneous when one limits himself to the same, and thinks therein to have the key to the entire problem. By determining the moral good to be that which is *positive* and *real*, its peculiar idea is absolutely not at all conceived of; for these predicates, if we only speak of what is most obvious, also apply to the sphere of nature, where, indeed, to speak of moral goodness is out of the question. So long as philosophical consideration remains exiled to the sphere of those abstract determinations, the contrast of good and evil is in relation to it *not yet really existent*, and when, notwithstanding this, it wishes, from its stand-point, to determine it, it can only resolve it by explaining it away. In order to find this contrast

[1] *Ethic*, P. iv., propos. xx. Quo magis unusquisque—suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute praeditus est; contra quatenus unusquisque—suum esse conservare negligit, eatenus est impotens; comp. prop. xxii. In the demonstration of xx., the notion of potentia is made equal to that of virtue; comp. the right definition in the fourth part; therefore the deficiency of virtue or evil, is just the inability of man, to preserve his being. But this inability can never have its ground in himself, schol. prop. xx., but it is nothing else than the limitation which every individual thing necessarily experiences from other individual things, prop. iii., iv., the suffering relation of the same, prop. xxix.. xxx., lxiv., therefore nothing else than *the boundary of the reality of individual being*; compare the preface to the fourth part. That this boundary, this negation, attaching to every thing finite as such —omnis determinatio est negatio—appears to us as *privation*, therefore as malum, has its ground strictly in our inadequate mode of knowledge, which considers the individual things onesidedly and out of their connection, compares them with other more perfect things, or the different condition, and stages of development of the same things with each other, or with the universal notions of these things, and thus comes to miss something, prop. lxxiii. Schol. Tract. polit. c. ii., §. 8. Epist. xxxii., xxxiv. In this result *Leibnitz*, as we have seen, coincides with *Spinoza*, only that in *Leibnitz* that comparison, by which the representation of evil arises, is a *necessary* one; in *Spinoza*, on the contrary, it rests entirely upon the *arbitrariness* and *prejudices of imaginative thinking*; the philosopher has banished it, and with the notion of evil, that of good has equally for him lost its reality; comp. also the appendix to the first Book of the *Ethic*.

in its only true place, it must have acquired a notion of the creature, and of personality and will, and of the essential relation of the creature to God.

Nevertheless it were unjust entirely to deny that the *Theodicee* knows nothing of the notion of the creature, and its relation to God. But how abstract, and entirely attaching to the quantitative determinations is the prevalent conception of this notion! God is the infinite Being, uniting in Himself all reality in an absolutely perfect manner; the creature is finite, limited. Were its limitations to be removed, it would immediately be God, therefore the creature must be essentially imperfect, affected with the *malum metaphysicum*, in order that it be distinguished from God. Therefore too, the entirely quantitative conception of the contrast between good and evil just above animadverted upon, must also be imperfect, from which then of course the negativing notion of evil quite consistently follows.[1]

In an especially definite manner the pure quantitative conception of this relation has been more recently expressed in *Dr Bauer's* rejoinder to *Dr Möhler's* last *Polemic*,[2] still with the modification, that (with *Spinoza*), the notions of the *malum morale* and the so-called *malum metaphysicum* became identified, wherewith, the privative notion of evil then immediately passes over from evil to that of simple negation. The extreme to which a keen, penetrating, intellect, regardless of consequences, has there driven the notion which is here controverted, is too instructive to allow us to pass on, without quoting a few of the main sentences from the exposition of the nature and ground of sin. "If liberation from sin," it is said, "is removal of the limitations of finiteness, it is clear, that only an infinite series of gradations can lead up to the point, on which sin is still only as a vanishing *minimum*. If this *minimum* is to be thought of as entirely vanished, the being perfectly free from it, must — — be one with God Himself, because God alone is the absolutely sinless one. But if there are to be, besides God, beings different from God, there must be in them, in so far as they are not absolute, just on that account, a *minimum*

[1] Comp. on *Leibnitz's* doctrine of evil, *Sigwart, das Problem des Bösen oder die Theodicee*, 1840, S. 101—120.

[2] *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1834, *drittes Heft*.

of evil presupposed."[1] Somewhat further on we read: "If one resolves to call everything which is essential to the distinction between God and man, sin (what the opponent does not do, but only the author himself), it is of course quite correct, that sin just as little ceases, as the distinction between Creator and creature can cease; only one must at the same time be honest enough to recognize, that herewith nothing more is said than, what in no case can be denied, that, so long as man is man, the limitation which separates him as creature from the Creator, from the absolute God, can never be conceived of as absent. In this sense the highest of created spirits can just as little be conceived of without a minimum of sin, as the most outcast of fallen spirits without a minimum of good, because indeed just for the reason that he is spirit, as reality, he also is something good[2]—where indeed a distinction of ethical and metaphysical good is not in the least thought of. The result of the entire discussion is ultimately expressed in the following words: "Just therefore (because in every sin that only is to be regarded in it as real evil, which appears in it as negation) is evil also the finite, because the finite is itself negative, the negation of the infinite, and all phenomena of the finite are nothing more than a relative nonentity, a negativity, which appears in the most different forms, according to the constantly changing distinction of plus and minus of reality."[3] Can one, in order to go back to the starting-point of these communications, more decidedly shut up the access to every source of *qualitative distinction* in the world created by God? Besides that, to make the finite as such evil, is only another way of denying the evil, has already been remarked. Also as practical consequence of this extension of the notion, evil will be ever less an object of concern, leading man sorrowfully or hatefully to turn away from all that is finite on account of the evil essentially attached to it; but much rather will one allow himself to find pleasure in evil on account of the finite, from which it is not to be separated.

The derivation of evil from the metaphysical imperfection of the creature, has ever placed in close connection therewith the

[1] L. c. p. 230. [2] L. c. p. 231. [3] L. c. p. 233.

conception of evil as *privation*, as is the case in the *Theodicee* itself as well as in the numerous popular philosophical elaborations of this problem, which set out from the fundamental thoughts of the *Theodicee*.)[1] It is therefore incumbent upon us still to prove, the relation of the notion of privation to the nature of evil, as well as to the derivation of its origin from the so-called *malum imperfectionis*.

In order to see clearly into this question we must above all things direct our rigid attention to the distinction between *simple negation and privation*, as *Thomas von Aquino* has already correctly explained them.)[2] Simple negation denies to a thing some certain realities which do not belong to the nature of the same. Negation in general is inseparable from the notion of finite being; with the peculiar determinateness of the individual there is here everywhere given the distinction from other individuals, and with this distinction, the exclusion of some, or other, realities. This simple negation, since it is essential to all finiteness, cannot possibly be regarded as disturbance, and perversity; disturbance and perversion of a thing are only that which contradicts its nature. Privation on the contrary, is deficiency in some reality which belongs to the notion of the being.

It is now quite self-evident, that every sin equally *includes in itself* a privation. It is only holiness and its constantly progressing development which correspond to the full notion of man. But every sin, when it is not a sign of the entire deficiency of this development, is a hindrance of its progress. It is, however, another question, whether evil in general may be reduced to the notion of privation. If we bear in mind the result of our earlier investigation of the nature of sin, the privative conception of evil appears thereby to be favoured. Self-hood, which makes itself prevalent in evil in a limitless manner, ought truly to be affirmed, but only in such a way, that it unconditionally subordinates itself to unity with the law of God, with love to God. But

[1] *Werdermann* furnishes extracts from the most celebrated of the same, *Versuch einer Geschichte der Meinungen über Schicksal und menschliche Freiheit*, p. 241 f.

[2] *Summa*, P. i. qu. 48, art. 5.

is now this non-progress to the higher of Divine love not a privation? Without doubt; but this non-progression just rests upon this, that that which ought strictly to be a moment, sets itself up as the highest principle, will be the whole. The perverted negation, has here for its presupposition, a *perverted affirmation.* And will not the privative conception of sin, whatever may be the concrete determinations, which it lays down concerning its nature, be obliged at any rate to acknowledge this? If the evil be really privation, it is the disturbance of order, if it be the disturbance of order, the question is, what power and efficiency that is, by which the realization of the order becomes hindered in its place? If this question is not to be evaded, it follows, that the element which order requires in this given place, is wanting just because another perverted element has forced itself into its place; which is then just the perverted affirmation.

However correct it may be to recognize a privation in every sin, *the real nature of sin* is thereby not at all sufficiently denoted and still less its *origin* explained. Much rather the question, what that is which produces this privation, remains in its ultimate relations still unanswered. For that the question is not to be dismissed by the affirmation that there is no *causa efficiens* of evil, but only a *causa deficiens, i.e.* a *defectus causae,* satisfactorily appears from our exposition of the notion of privation. If *Leibnitz* now, according to the above, answers: privation proceeds from the original limitations of the creature, we must further ask: how is a negation to follow, from negations which *are contained in the idea* of man as creature, *which contradicts this idea?* How this is to be possible, *Leibnitz* has nowhere shown, and, still unacquainted with the self-movement of the idea, by which in a purely logical way the negation, the simply being otherwise *(Andersseyn)*, developes itself into contrast and contradiction, was not in any way able to show. The imperfection which necessarily proceeds from the essential limitations of the creature as such, or perhaps from the gradual development of the same, cannot for this reason be considered as sin, as disturbance, therefore also not as real privation. Thus if evil be deduced from the mere limitations of the creature, therewith the notion of privation immediately resolves itself into that of simple negation, *i.e.* into the denial of evil. But to resolve to dismiss a problem on

which for thousands of years the deepest minds have laboured, by summarily—with *Spinoza*—explaining it as a nonentity, as not existing, certainly appears more like a desertion, than a solution, of the same.

Schelling finds it matter of surprise, that already among the Church Fathers several, especially *Augustine*, regard evil as merely privation.[1] And very properly so; for how are we to make this agree with the energetic conception of evil, which pervades the inmost disposition of mind of this great Church Father, and therefore his entire theological system?

Augustine is not the first who seeks to reduce the notion of evil to that of negation. The apparent germ of this opinion in the Platonic Philosophy vanishes by closer consideration; on the contrary, it is found definitely declared by some of the Stoic and new Platonic philosophers.[2] Among the Church Fathers this notion of evil first of all makes its appearance in manifold forms, in *Origen*,[3] then in *Athenasius*,[4] then *Basilius the Great*[5] and *Gregory of Myssa*.[6] We have already seen (page 275) that everywhere

[1] *Philos. Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 445. One finds this opinion of evil in *Augustine, e.g. Contra epist. Manich. quam vocant fundam.*, c. xxxv. seq. *Confess.*, lib. vii., c. 12. *De natura boni, c. Manich*, c. iv. *De civit. Dei.*, lib. xi., c. 9, lib. xii. c. 3. *Enchir.* cap. xi., xii., xiii.

[2] Especially in *Plotin*—in whom this conception of evil stands in connection with emanatistic representations—*Ennead.* iii., lib. ii., c. 5, comp. i., lib. viii., c. 8, where evil becomes denominated στέρησις τοῦ ὄντος. Comp. on the Plotinian doctrine of evil, *Sigwart*, l. c., p. 80 sq. *Vogt. Neoplatonismus und Christenthum*, p. 67, sq.

[3] *De principiis*, lib. ii. c. 9. In *Joann.* t. ii. c. 7 (tom. iv., pag. 65, 66, ed. *De la Rue)*: where among other things we read: πᾶσα ἡ κακία οὐδέν ἐστιν (in relation to the οὐδὲν in John i. 3), ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐκ ὂν τυγχάνει. Further on he denotes evil as an ἐστερῆσθαι τοῦ ὄντος.—*Ritter* also recognizes the ground-error here to be the quantitative conception of the distinction between good and evil. *Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie*, Part i., p. 534.

[4] *Contra gentes*, c. vii. (tom. i., p. ii., p. 7, ed. *Bened.*)

[5] *In hexaëmeron hom.* ii. (Opp. ed. *Garnier*, tom. i., p. 16 seq.) Ὁμιλία, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιος τῶν κακῶν ὁ θεός (tom. ii., p. 72—83, especially p. 78). Still his formula: τὸ κακὸν στέρησις ἀγαθοῦ, since ἀγαθὸν here signifies according to the connection the *moral* good, is not to be identified with the determination of *Augustine*.

[6] Λόγος κατηχητικός, c. v., vi., xxii., xxviii.; comp. the *dial. de anima et resurrectione*.

at the bottom of this lay the genuinely Christian endeavour to bring about the exclusion of evil from the Divine causality, with the consciousness of the living presence of God in all beings and events. With this interest is united that of an emanatistic mysticism in *Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita*, who occupied himself pretty extensively with the grounding of the negative notion of evil,[1] although he thereby sunk down to a very formal and unfruitful play with the categories, being and nothing, good and evil. But this notion, especially the universal diffusion which it found not merely among the Schoolmen, but also among the elder Protestant theologians, is indebted to the authority of *Augustine*, and to the further development which the conception of evil as negation, more strictly as privation, received from him.[2]

Augustine has formed and developed his theory of evil quite in contrast to that of *Manichäism;* the evil substance or nature of which he believed himself only thereby able to ward off, by making the notion of *privation* fundamental. Accordingly he was accustomed to denote the nature of sin as *corruptio*, or *privatio boni*.[3] But since he commonly takes this *bonum* in the metaphysical sense, for he occasionally more nearly determines it as *bonum naturae*,[4] that denomination is essentially of like

[1] *De divinis nominibus*, c. iv., § 18 to the close.

[2] In *Scotus Erigena* the form of the notion is more dependent upon *Pseudo-Dionysius*. From the Schoolmen it is sufficient to adduce *Thomas*, *Summa*, p. 1, qu. 48, art. 1, 2, 3, qu. 49, art. 1. Then most of the later scholastics follow him, also the Catholic theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, *Bellarmin* also especially. Among Protestant dogmatists *Melancthon* in the later editions of his *Loci* makes use of the notion of privation in his employment of the more exact determinations laid down by *Thomas*, *de causa peccati et contingentia*, p. 64 seq.

[3] Comp. in addition to the already adduced passages still, especially in relation to this expression, *De moribus Manich*, c. v. seq. De lib. arb. iii. c. 13, 14.

[4] *C. Jul. Pel.* lib. i. c. 8, 9. *De civit. Dei* l. c. and lib. xi., c. 17. *De nuptiis et concup.* lib. ii. c. 17.—*Cölln*, in his elaboration *des Münscherschen Lehrbuches der Dogmengeschichte*, vol. I, p. 355, finds *Augustine* to be in contradiction with his later mode of thought, when he, in the treatise *de gen. c. Manich.* lib. ii. c. 29, maintains: nullum malum esse naturale, sed omnes naturas bonas esse. But as *Augustine* understands this sentence, it agrees very well with the opinions which he develops in contrast to Pelagianism, as he repeats the same thought in various forms even in his later writings, namely in the *Civitas*, in the

significance with *deprivation of being, diminution of reality* (*Enchir.* c. 12). Evil, according to *Augustine's* fundamental determination, in which he follows *Plato*, is that which does harm; its endeavour tends entirely to consume *(consumere)* the being of the essence to which it attaches *(das Seyn des Wesens)*, to resolve into nonentity *(tendit ad non esse)*; nevertheless he was never able to attain this end, if only for this reason, because evil can only exist at all in this way, that it is attached to the good, to the nature of the subject created by God, but which has become evil; wherefore it would annihilate itself if it really annihilated this nature.[1] The *possibility* of this corruption, as it only belongs to the creature, has its ground in this, that it neither has originated from itself nor from the essential *being (Wesen)* of God *(de Deo)*, but has been made from nothing by the creative *will* of God.[2] In *King's* work, before mentioned, this thought is carried out to a peculiar kind of Dualism, which makes nonentity, as co-generating principle of created existence, take the place of matter among the ancients; he says: *nascitur creatura a Deo patre perfectissimo, at a nihilo quasi matre, quae est ipsa imperfectio.*[3]

If now we add thereto that *Augustine*, as was already observed, denotes the evil from the side of the object, to which it is everywhere related as perverted desire, as *conversio ab eo, quod magis s. summe est, ad id, quod minus est;* the contrast of evil with the good, just as we wish to seize upon it, appears to slip out of our hands. For if we set up the nonentity in the place of the *minus* of reality, there is still indeed no truth in the representation, that nonentity forms a real contrast to absolute being, to God.[4] Were such a contrast to absolute being at all

Enchiridion, in the books *c. Julian.*, especially in the *Opus imperfectum.* Wherefore he does not even once regard that expression as requiring explanation in the *Retractationen.*—If we may judge of the contents from the title, it would appear, according to the above, that the lost work of *Theodorus v. Mopsuestia: πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας, φύσει καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ πταίειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*, against *Augustine*, could not at least have hit the nail just upon the head.

[1] *De Moribus Manichaeorum* c. vi., vii. *Op. imperf. c. Jul.*, lib. i. c. 112. *Enchir.* c. xii.

[2] *De lib. arb.* lib. ii., c. 20, *contra epist. fund.* c. xxxvi. xxxvii. i., *Contra Jul.* lib. i. c. 8. *De nupt. et conc.* lib. ii. c. 29.

[3] *De origine mali* cap. iv., sect. 9, comp. sect. 2. The same thought is not seldom to be met with in the theosophists and theosophic sectarists.

[4] *Contra Secundinum Manich.* c. 10. A. lays down the sentence: non

possible, nonentity could manifestly only form this contrast, in so far as it stood over against absolute being as another being, *i.e.* in so far as it was not nonentity, but something. If now we hold ourselves close to the above determination, according to which man in the evil, as in the good, strives after the real, only after the lesser, instead of, after the greater, and greatest, or indeed *more* after the former than after the latter, the mere *graduated distinction* between a more imperfect and a more perfect, unavoidably assumes the place of the contrast between good and evil.—That fundamental error, in the manner in which the notion of evil arises to *Augustine*, namely the endeavour to deduce it, in its contrast to the notion of good, from the more or less of the reality of the objects sought for therein, pervades especially the books *de libero arbitrio*, and leads here, as in the writings *de ordine de moribus Manichaeorum*, *de natura boni*, among others to very strange results, *e.g.* that it is indeed always better to be evil and miserable, than not to be at all, which is the *summum malum*, that the creature corrupted by sin is nevertheless more perfect than the irrational, just as corrupted gold is more highly valued than pure silver.[1]

Thus then, the fundamental opinion of *Augustine* concerning sin, appears to be in perfect agreement with that of *Leibnitz*. And when indeed in *Augustine's* writings everywhere the deepest consciousness of the positive contrast of evil to the good, and the penetration into the nature of evil, is declared in a manner far transcending that of the *Theodicee*, it appears as if we could only explain it in this way, that his mind was far above his system, the limitations of which, far too narrow to contain the affluence of Christian experiences, and the fulness of deep intuitions in this

esse contrarium Deo, qui summe est, nisi quod omnino non est. From this supposed contrast of nothing to being, *Origen* had already inferred his negativing notion of evil, since he lays down the identity of being with the good.

[1] One meets with the same thought in *Leibnitz* in the *Theodicee*, in *Spinoza* (ep. xxxii.), also in *Hegel's Encyklop.* § 248: "If spiritual casualty, arbitrariness, extends even to evil, this is still infinitely higher than the legitimate procedure of the Heavens, or the innocence of plants." If only between things so dissimilar, as on the one hand the innocence of plants, the legitimate procedure of the stars, and on the other hand the evil will of man, any comparison whatever were possible!

great spirit, had, from his knowledge of sin grounded upon the same, in many points, been broken through.

However, by closer consideration, a very significant and deeply penetrating distinction is revealed of the manner, in which both *Augustine* and *Leibnitz* conceived of the notion of *privatio boni s. naturae* in their theory of evil. While for example the former commonly uses the term privation in an *active* signification of evil, the latter takes it passively; according to *Leibnitz* evil may be explained as a *condition* of deficiency, of deprivation, which he places in essential connection with the metaphysical imperfection of the creature; on the contrary, according to *Augustine*, a depriving *activity* which diminishes the being cannot be explained as mere weakness, but a *tendency* contradictory to being *(malum tendit ad non esse)*, whose existence cannot otherwise be explained than by the freedom of the will. By *Augustine* it is clear, that the created being of man from nothing, and the corruptibility of his nature springing therefrom, furnishes only the ground of the *possibility* for the origination of evil, but the evil *becoming a reality* is said to be alone deduced from the freedom of the creature, since his idea of freedom did not allow him to consider the contents of the act of the will as again the effect of another cause.[1]—Only indeed in this conception could *Augustine* make the notion of *privatio* equal to that of *corruptio* or even *perversio*. To *Augustine* evil is a negation, but in the sense in which *e.g.* fire is a negation, inasmuch as it strives to consume the stuff, in which it kindles itself.

If now this is the true signification of this notion in *Augustine*, it is undeniable that there is therewith furnished a deeper and more fruitful insight into the nature of evil. Evil is now no longer a mere deficiency, but a positive contrast to the being created by God, a principle of disturbance,—whereby it is well besides to observe, that *Augustine*, like his Manichaeistic opponent, in this speculative consideration, is accustomed to comprise moral and

[1] Thus in the third book *de lib. arbitrio*, c. 17, 18, and in different passages of the remaining anti-Manichaestic writings. *Bauer* also recognizes the deciding significance of these determinations for *Augustine's* theory of evil, *die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung*, vol. 1, p. 905 seq.

physical evil together in undistinguished unity under the notion of *malum*, certainly not to the advantage of the investigation. It is essentially the same opinion with respect to evil which is laid down in *Göthe's Faust*.[1]—This conception of evil has undoubtedly a genuinely sound basis; it rests upon the knowledge that the existence of the world, of finite being, is a good in itself, is that which is in agreement with the Divine will and approbation. And that this is the fundamental presupposition of Christianity, every one, who only gives the smallest attention to the notion of the creation of finite being, will be obliged to admit. Should the more modern question of the ascetic Dualism of Christianity be anything more than empty impeachment, it must be proved that it conditions the origin of the world by a *fall*, namely an *estrangement from God*. If however we put that determination more closely to the test, it is easy to see, how

[1] Especially in the confession of *Mephistopheles*:

> " I am the Spirit, I live to destroy;
> 'Tis my task, and 'tis right; for being,—all being
> Is worthy of nought but unbeing again:
> 'Twere far better therefore that nothing had been."

And later, from another point of view, in *Faust's* complaint over him, who—

> " . . . . . to nothing
> With a word-breath all thy gifts transforms."

Tieck developes an opposite opinion of the nature of evil, in his most deeply significant poems, *im Hexensabbat*. Here the reality arises much rather by the falling away of the most powerfully created spirits from God, by their being hurled into the deep, and Lucifer is here the world-constituting plastic principle, " the power which founds the world, infuses the life of nature, gives to matter and spirit their flow and motion, and by apparent destruction, creates, and by apparent creation, destroys." Similar opinions then have often been within the Christian Church since the time of Ophitic Gnosticism among isolated parties. That poetic representation, however, has its root pre-eminently in the speculations of *Solger*, which firmly retain the *Hegelian process;* still however in its embryonic condition, of a uniform crossing, and recrossing, between God and non-entity. God surrenders Himself into non-entity in order that we might be, and sacrifices Himself, destroying His non-entity, in order that we may not remain a mere non-entity, but may return back to Him, and be in Him. But if this non-entity will be without God, besides God, therefore will become a positive non-entity, it is thereby *evil*. This is indeed a Divine Play, which issues in non-entity, and on which *Irony* sarcastically looks destruction. That there are besides other elements in the philosophy of that noble spirit which unconditionally break through that unfruitful principle and its consequences, scarcely needs to be remarked.

one-sided, and how little it corresponds to an unprejudiced observation of human life in its corruption, to reduce the nature of evil entirely to the tendency to non-entity. This indeed we have already before (p. 186) recognized, that there is a *maximum* in the development of evil, where it becomes infuriated hatred of all being, furious of their destruction. In any case, however, conditions, in which we meet with the destroying violence of evil, so severed from every interest of selfishness, are only very isolated phenomena; they may admonish us, that evil bears in itself an element of madness. But in general it by no means shows a tendency to dissolution, to non-entity simply as such.[1] It much rather often arouses in man a boundless striving for possession, for enjoyment, for its own sake, intensely exciting all his powers, and uniting them on one point, so that the individual assumes therein unconditionality, severing himself from the higher unity, to which he ought to belong, and seeking unity in himself. But sin will only destroy that which presents an obstruction in the way of its selfish desires. Thus the negativing tendency in evil has for its ground a perverted position. And this *Augustine* must himself confirm: "when his object is to describe the nature of evil in the individual, or he wishes to point out in general the distinction between good and evil, we ever find something affirmative"[2]—pride, covetousness, selfishness, and the like. We

[1] One might, in order to subordinate evil according to all its elements, to this determination call to his aid the explanation, which *Augustine* gives of the notion of being, *de moribus Manichaeorum*, c. viii: Nihil est esse quam *unum esse*.—Simplicia per se sunt, quia una sunt; quae autem non sunt simplicia, concordia partium imitantur unitatem et in tantem sunt, in quantum assequuntur. Quare ordinatio esse cogit, inordinatio vero non esse; quae perversio etiam nominatur atque corruptio. But apart therefrom that this thought, without detracting from its beauty and relative truth, rests upon an abstract notion of the highest unity, there would not thus be saved the sufficiency of that conception of evil, if it is otherwise correct, which an earlier consideration (p. 138) has taught us, namely that evil is not merely non-order and dissolution of unity, but equally the perversion of order and unity.

[2] Words of *Ritter*, l. c., p. 357. — Moreover, if this excellent investigator, with whom we would always rather agree than disagree, has not sufficiently regarded the peculiar conception of the notion of privation in *Augustine*, as shown above, and in his representation of the Augustinian doctrine of evil in general, arrives at results in a measure too deviating, it appears to have its especial ground in this, that he

have above seen, that this cannot be otherwise, if it be earnestly meant with respect to the notion of privation and its distinction from simple negation. Nevertheless *Augustine* does not always appear to have a definite consciousness of the relations and distinctions of those notions, wherefore he sometimes in his treatment of the notion of privation imperceptibly falls upon the other stand-point.—

When the apology of the Augsburg confession will not have original sin laid down as a mere *defectus*, but sets up as the other side of the same *concupiscentia*,[1] *Melancthon's* intention is hereby manifestly not to enter into opposition against the *Augustinian* determination of evil as privation. This is entirely of metaphysical significance, it refers to sin considered *in abstracto*, as our older theology expressed itself; but *Melancthon* has here to do with a contrast in the empirical psychological conception of innate moral depravity, as it pervades the entire theology of the middle ages, while on the one side he keeps more to the *defectus* or the *carentia (absentia privativa) justitiae originalis*, on the other more to the *positive perversion*, the *vitiosa qualitas*, which, according to the precedence of *Augustine*, is accustomed to be denoted *concupiscentia*. Therefore *Melancthon*, and the old Protestant dogmatists, do not allow themselves to be prevented, by the recognition of this duality in the nature of the original sin, just as little as *e.g. Thomas von Aquino*,[2] in the general determination of evil, from attaching themselves to the *Augustinian* theory of Privation,—comp. p. 134. *In concreto* and *ethice* considered, —which is the prevalent method of teaching in the old Pro-

attributes a more decided and permanent importance to an element in *Augustine's* mode of thought, the derivation of which from the Grecian philosophy he nevertheless recognizes, than I am able to do. I mean the *aesthetic* opinion of sin to be met with, especially in the earlier writings of *Augustine*, that evil by its contrast to the good may be of service to the beauty of the world, and to the revelation of the Divine righteousness, l. c. p. 329 seq. If from this aesthetic point of view, from which it is true, as *Ritter* shows, the conception of the Divine righteousness is determined in those writings, the *necessity* of evil should really be deduced, the idea of holiness were sacrificed to the idea of beauty; which cannot be laid to the charge of the system of *Augustine*.

[1] *Art. de peccato originale*, p. 55, the *Rechenbergschen Ausg.*

[2] *Summa*, P. i. qu. 48, art. 1, 2, 3, qu. 49, art. 1. Comp. with P. ii., i., qu. 82, art. 1.

testant theology on this point,[1] — the original sin is not at all a mere deficiency of original righteousness, but in respect to the other essential side, of *concupiscentia*, a *qualitas positiva; in abstracto* and *metaphysica* considered, it is on the contrary a *mere privation*, — where indeed it is surprising, that the irrational relation of this metaphysical notion of sin to the ethical nature of the same, excited in the theologians no scruple against these determinations. It is at the same time evident, that to apply in this way the notion of privation to evil, the old theologians could not make *that* use of it, on which account it is so especially welcome and of value to many modern ones, namely, in order to adjust the existence of evil with the perfection of the Divine knowledge and determination. For we dare not yield to them the opinion that God recognizes the evil in man only *in abstracto*.

[1] It is sufficient here to refer to *Gerhard's: Confessio Catholica, de peccati originalis natura et quiditate*, p. 1406. And to *Quenstedt*, l. c. P. ii., cap. ii., sect. ii., qu. 11.

SECOND CHAPTER.

DERIVATION OF SIN FROM SENSATIONALISM.

Our investigation of the theory of privation, led us to the result, that the very notion of privation, thoroughly carried out, conducted us to something *positive* in sin, by which this disturbing privation is brought about. If now we enquire, what this positive is, innumerable voices of the present day, and still more from the immediate past, refer us to *sensationalism.*[1] In it the source of sin is said to be found, the nature of which therefore would consist in the dominant power of sensational nature over the spirit. And from this, that man is not merely a spiritual, but also a sensational being, as well as from the more exact determinations of the relation between both these sides, the existence of sin and its universal extension in the human race, is said quite easily and naturally to be explained.

The derivation of sin from sensationalism is undoubtedly to be preferred to the theory of privation, in that therewith the abstract conception of sin and of the notions in connexion with it, pass over into one that is more concrete.

Ritter takes up the defence of the derivation of sin from sensationalism;[2] but he gives to the notion of sensationalism a

[1] If this opinion has found numerous followers at all times, there has not been wanting on the other hand, express protestations against the same, by the greatest teachers of the Church, comp. *e. g. Augustine, de civit. Dei* lib. xiv. c. 2—5. *Luther, de servo arbitrio,* p. 167, seq. (*Ausg. von Seb. Schmidt in* 4.) *Melancthon,* in the *apology art. de pecc. orig.*, p. 55, comp. 52, 53. In the *Konkordienformel (Sol. declar.* art. i. *de peccato orig.)* original sin is shown to have its seat pre-eminently in superioribus et principalibus animae facultatibus. What concerns *Augustine,* it appears so much the less superfluous to be reminded of such passages as the above referred to, since the derivation of evil from sensationalism is not seldom ascribed to him, *e. g.* by *Baumgarten-Crusius, Lehrbuch der Sittenlehre,* p. 230. *Augustine* so little regards concupiscentia as the original *source* of sin, that it was much rather to him its *effect* and *punishment.*

[2] *Ueber das Böse,* p. 5, seq.

meaning, in which we do not attack that theory. He understands by the sensational, the changeable and temporal of our existence, us, our very selves, in so far as our present, is in some way determined by our past, and places over against it, as the supersensuous, the real being of man and of all creatures, as it is supposed to obtain in the eternal understanding of God. From this stand-point he maintains that our reduction of sin to selfishness, passes over of itself into the explanation of the same as being derived from sensationalism. For the Ego, which, by the selfish, becomes loved in a false manner, is still only the *temporal*, not the *eternal* Ego, as it is originally conceived of in the Eternal Being of God. The latter we unconditionally agree to; for as the Ego has its eternal primitive condition in the ideas of the Divine understanding, it is not constituted merely in the perfect purity and truth of its own being, but also in perfect unity with God and the world. If man in this sense loves his own Ego, this love can never be truly *selfishness*. On the contrary, should one make the blessedness of an existence hereafter, the end of his endeavours, recognized by him in its imperishableness, still, if he in his representation did not refer it to fellowship with God, and to life in completed love, but only to his own selfish satisfaction, even in this endeavour he would have entirely fallen into selfishness and sin. But we have not here to do with the philosophical use of language, according to which *Ritter* refers the distinction of the sensuous and of the supersensuous being, to all other creatures, just as well as to man; but with the use of language, which he himself denotes as the common, and which also lies at the basis of the common methods of deducing evil from sensationalism. The sensational is that side of our being in which our *capability rests of being determined by impressions from the external world.*[1]—If one wishes to reduce the determinations with which this theory is allied to universal philosophical notions, one would be obliged to seek these not in the contrast between

[1] Also *Lücke*, since he defends the opinion that sense is an essential factor in the origin of the first and subsequent sins, *Göttinger Gel. Anzeigen* 1839, St. 27, p. 261 seq., expressly declares that sensationalism is to be taken in a more extensive and exact sense, by virtue of which even in spiritual sins the will is still directed to the world.

idea and phenomena, but in the contrast between spirit and matter, between activity and being. The good becomes, according to it, in God pure spirituality, in man, as sensational rational being, unlimited dominion of the spirit over matter. Nevertheless, both forms of the notion of sensationalism appear to many who subscribe to this opinion to be indistinctly confounded together.

On the other side it cannot of course be meant, that the theory to be here judged of, namely, sensationalism, the sensational impulse and its gratification, *in itself*, is to be regarded as evil. For from this it would follow that everywhere, where there is animated *(beseelt)* matter, there evil must also be; but what intelligent person could bring himself to see sin in the impulses of animals and their gratification? And if we determine to do so, we had still only resolved the notion of evil by the immoderate extension of its boundary; he to whom everything is sin, in which sensational life expresses itself, to him nothing is in reality any longer sin; all guilt, all consciousness of an inward variance which ought not to be, has disappeared, and what remains over is only a necessary order of ever innocent nature.

Therefore evil, in the sense of this opinion, cannot have its root in sensational nature, in and for itself, but only in it, in so far as it is found together with the spirit in the personal creature. But if this is not to lead us directly back again to the former point, we dare not even in this sphere make the expressions of sensational nature, directly, and as such, sin, but only in so far as the sensational, instead of being an organ entirely subservient to the spirit, a basis of its earthly existence, furnishing the means of its self-activity and sensibility in relation to the world, strives against the spirit, and immediately assumes independency, and therewith, further, dominion of human life. If we endeavour still to fix more accurately the only conceivable sense of this theory, we must remember, that correctly taken, sensational nature cannot strictly be the subject of real sin, but in an ultimate respect, only the *will*, man, as determining being. It lies already in the notion of the sensational, that no action whatever can be ascribed to it; every opinion must admit this which will not at the very beginning, relinquish the imputation and guilt of sin. Thus according to this mode of consideration, evil can only in this way proceed from sensationalism, unless it is to be developed in manifest absurdity,

that the determining spirit allows itself to be determined by its superior power, instead of following the requirement contained in its own nature.

But how does this theory explain the *possibility* of so strange a phenomenon, that the side of human nature, which according to its notion is the higher, factually represents itself as the lower, serving, and the lower as the higher, governing? Whence comes this disturbance and perversion of the true order, which follows with inevitable necessity from the essential relations of both sides?

We are told that the requirement of the sensational nature is directed to the *agreeable*, to that which *affords pleasure*, whilst that of the rational nature is directed to the *good*, and that both these determinations, naturally enough, often do not coincide in their objects. But if from this we are able to understand, how sometimes, moments of perplexity may arise between the impulses proceeding from both sides, still there is not thereby at all explained the possibility, how in such a collision of these determinations, the agreeable should ever get the mastery over the good, and the requirement of the low sensational nature, which is ever a conditional one, over the unconditional command of the higher spiritual nature, how this is the case, most decidedly, in sins against the conscience, against the demand of the wakeful, self-conscious spirit—(comp. p. 173.) It comes to this, that it is already an abnormal relation, the possibility of which, from this stand point, is incomprehensible, that the good should not be directly that which is agreeable and promotive of pleasure to the spirit, that as an inflexible imperative it should only form the contrast of the inclination of the will. Still the strangest of all is, that in this sphere there is not merely conflict, accompanied by repeated overthrows of the spirit, not merely a general preponderating power of the sensational nature over the spirit, but also a *retrogressive development*, a progressive depravation, in which the sensational nature subordinates the spirit more and more, and continually makes the will more and more completely the servant of its passions. Here, according to this theory, a power which the spirit already possessed, and which it, according to its nature, seeks to retain, was violently withdrawn from it against its will by the sensational nature, and indeed not merely for a moment, but often for the remaining course of earthly life, so that the sensational, the side of our being, by which we *become*

determined, negatives that which is produced by the independent principle of our being. And this relation is capable of becoming so thoroughly perverted, that in numberless individuals the spiritual has absolutely become means to the sensational, that *e. g.* occupation with the interests of the spirit has, for not a few, only so far any value, as it helps them to provide for their sensational wants and conveniences; at length indeed the spiritual is only used for the refinement and spicery of sensational enjoyment. These are facts of every day life, which are so thoroughly warranted by experience, that only an entire ignorance of life could put it in question; but what is there in such a theory, which absolutely derives evil from sensationalism, by which the possibility of such a positive perversion of relations may be made evident?

If one wishes to go back to the freedom of the will for the solution of this difficulty, which indeed just consists in the ability of the same either to incline towards the requirements of the spirit, of the reason, or to the excitants of sensational nature, and thus to elevate the one or the other to the predominating power, the explanation of evil as arising from sensationalism, is thereby not merely modified, but mainly given up. For that the sensational side of our being,—in the present condition of human nature,—operates as an *excitant* upon the will in order to determine itself against the requirement of the moral law, that further the superior power of the sensational impulses over the spiritual, is one of the chief forms, in which the moral perversity of human life shews itself, every theory of evil must ultimately recognize, which will not blind itself to facts. And much more in fact does not remain over to this theory, if it takes to its aid the notion of freedom in the manner above given. For if the ultimate decision, whether the spirit or sense is to have the predominance, be once carried over to the free will and its unrestrained self-determination, the real origin of sin is no longer to be sought for in sense, but only therein, that the will by virtue of its freedom has given to itself a perverted direction, and has thereby first of all brought disorder and preponderance into our sensuous nature. That the spirit makes sense and its impulse the principle of its conduct, instead of determining itself according to its own law, is just on account of the freedom which it possesses, not weakness, but *positive self-perversion of the will;* and how the spirit as deter-

mining power comes to determine itself not according to its own nature, but allows itself to be determined by the sensational nature, wherein this self-degradation, this giving itself up to ignominious slavery has its ground,—this is then the real problem in which the question concerning the origin of evil first presents itself for consideration. However naturally and psychologically conceivable it may appear, that the sensational representations, the objects of which are immediately present to man and promise him enjoyment in the immediate moment, operate more powerfully on him than the spiritual, and thus in the individual case bring about the origin of sin,—it only becomes intelligibly recognized by perceiving that the decision concerning doing or omission is not dependent upon the sensational nature, but on the will, therefore on the spirit, thus the entire web of subtilized psychological explanations, with which the enlighteners *(Aufklärer)* of the previous century especially loved to adorn their sensational theory, becomes broken through by the simple sentence, *that there is nothing nearer the Spirit than the Spirit.*[1]

If therefore the derivation of evil from sensationalism will remain true to itself, it is incumbent upon it not merely to denote the *nature* of evil, but also to explain its *origin*, thus it cannot at all take up in its connection the previously (hypothetically) assumed notion of the freedom of the will, as of an ability to determine itself *either* according to the impulses of the spirit, *or* according to those of the sensational nature. In both ancient and modern times it has, it is true, often done this; but we can only see in the same a remarkable want of consequential thinking. If this theory will not sacrifice the notion, or much rather the name of *freedom*, it can be regarded by it as nothing else than the power of the spirit, by which it determines itself in its conduct, according to its own nature, according to spiritual impulses, over against the power of sensational nature. But this power must still, in relation to the power of sensational nature, be in some way or other a limited one; for only thereby, in connection with this opinion,

[1] To such methods of explanation it is often replied that they first of all deny the Spirit, and degrade man to the sphere of nature, in order then to find it quite natural that he follows the animal, the merely sensational impulses, in his conduct. The problem to be solved, the predominant power of sense over man, is thereby presupposed, as the right order, and therefrom it becomes further argued.

is sin possible to man; it has its ground just in these *limitations of the spirit.* So little, according to this theory, can sin arise from freedom, from that only which it can understand by freedom, that it much rather has its beginning just there, where freedom ceases.[1] And indeed these limitations, which the spirit meets with in its endeavour actively to reveal its own nature, could not be placed by itself, by an original act, perhaps of self-limitation in relation to sensational nature—for in that case, this original act of the spirit were the original sin, and the superior power of sense were only a result of the same, but therewith the principle of this theory were given up;—but these limitations are assigned to it, without its aid, by a necessity coming from without. Therefore to the superior power of sensational nature there corresponds on the other side a *natural weakness* and *powerlessness of spirit;* indeed this more than proportionate strength, and excitability of sensational impulses, are altogether only a relative idea, which strictly has significance in relation to the deficiency of that energy, which the spirit requires, in order to subordinate senational nature entirely to its own service; therefore it will be the same whether we say: sin has its origin in sensationalism (in its superior power), or that, sin has its origin in the natural weakness of the spirit, here directly of the determining spirit. But if it is grounded in these essential limitations, it cannot be any longer regarded as perversion; on the contrary, if it is to be firmly retained in the consciousness as perversion, the appealing to the sensational does not in the smallest degree explain its origin.

[1] Otherwise *e.g. Bretschneider,* who sets out from this adduced notion of freedom, and nevertheless thinks to be able to ascribe sin to freedom. In the *system. Entwickelung aller dogmat. Begriffe,* p. 498, 3rd Ed. it is said: In the degree in which it (the reason) appears as an ability to work, it is will, rationality, and in the degree in which it is said to be the only ground of action, it is freedom. Moral freedom considered as an ability of man, is therefore the ability of human reason to follow the knowledge of the true and the good, as the only ground of determination and action, and to withstand all other impulses not proceeding from the reason.—But page 530: The formal of sin consists in the knowledge of the law, and in deviation from the law taking place *with freedom.* The origin of this manifest contradiction is indeed further to be looked for than in *Bretschneider's* dogmatic thinking, comp. the Appendix to this chap., and which indeed can only be answerable for the doubling of the contradiction contained in the explanatory clause to freedom: "*i.e.* in the condition of rationality."

From this point of view we see more clearly the relation of the sensational theory of the origin of sin to *Leibnitz's* theory of privation. If we look at the former theory in the light of the will as the real seat of sin, it appears to have the theory of privation for its general ground, and strictly is only to be regarded as a further extension of the same in an especial direction, however little it may seem to be conscious of it.[1] Here too the *contrast* of good and evil resolves itself into a *difference in degree.* The free determination of man has different degrees of strength; if the degree be a higher one, it subordinates sensational nature, and the result is *virtue;* if the degree be a lower one, the sensational keeps the upper hand, and the result is *sin* and *vice.*—

But has not the impossibility of making in this way, the origin of a total perversion of the relation between spirit and sensationalism at all conceivable, its ground perhaps herein, that we have hitherto conceived of this relation too generally, namely, of both, spirit and sense, as fixed, separated wholes, standing over against each other? This relation is not that of a being *at rest (ruhendes Sein)* but that of a *living development (lebendiges Werden).* Let us therefore call to mind the individual form of the same in the gradual development of human life, and the vacillations and changes springing out of it. The sensational side of our nature is not only the first to be developed, but also stands *alone* for human perception, through a proportionately significant space of time. Before the spirit awakes to consciousness and self-activity, the child has already accustomed itself to seek after the merely sensationally agreeable, to follow in its activities sensational impulses; and we do not wish to give out the same as a disorder, a disturbance, which is first of all to be deduced from a free act. When now the spirit steps out of its initial potential condition, and makes its demands in the life of man, it finds the sensational

[1] Nevertheless the consciousness of this connection is found *e.g.* in *Töllner, Theol. Untersuchungen* St. 2, iv. On original sin, p. 110, also in *Bretschneider, Grundlage des evangelischen Pietismus,* p. 126. Although here only in vacillating intimations which are not free from contradiction. On the contrary it is entirely wanting as the root of all sin in one of the most decided impugners of sensationalism, in *Michaelis,* in his "*Gedanken über die Lehre der heil. Schrift über die Sünde und Genugthuung.*"

impulses already in possession of the same, and grown up by the habit of dominion to considerable power, while it, naturally enough, at the beginning is only equipped with a minimum of power. Can we wonder that the sensational side opposes to the claims of the spiritual a constant resistance, and that in its endeavour to procure for them validity it has to stand a hard conflict and to suffer frequent defeats? And if in course of development the spirit gradually becomes possessed of an ever increasing power, at the same time the power of the sensational impulses is also increasing, so that they ever remain in advance, —an advantage, which can only be taken from them slowly and with difficulty. Then, too, one must not allow himself to be deceived by momentary conquests of the spirit, which give rise to the appearance, as if the sensational nature were now for ever subordinated, and as if therefore the superior power, with which it perhaps hereafter again shows itself efficient, must have its ground somewhere else than in itself. These conquests are always only partial, and while the power of sensational nature is forced to retreat from one point, it quietly fortifies itself in another, from which it then perhaps suddenly breaks forth with so much the greater force. Therefore the inequality, the frequent vacillations, and retrograde movements, in the progressing subjugation of sensational nature by the spirit.—

An especial augmentation of strength appears still to accrue to this theory, if we look to the fundamental opinion, which in modern times has undergone considerable modification, of the *relation of the spiritual side of our being to the sensational.*

Earlier, the derivation of evil from sensationalism was wont to support itself upon an abstract and mechanical conception of its relation to the spirit, which considered man as a being constituted of soul and body, spirit and nature. And in the same sense up to the present time many confess their adherence to this derivation. Under this presupposition, the resistance of sense against the spirit is easier to understand; on the contrary, it is doubly difficult to see, how indeed the spirit comes to endure the chains of the lower sensational nature which remain so entirely external to it; and further, why, if there is now imposed upon it by an outward arrangement such a yoke,—it imputes to itself what

is grounded in the power granted to the sensational nature.[1] The matter, on the contrary, appears to stand better, if one, according to modern opinion, sets out from the indivisible unity of the spirit with nature, and considers it as the awaking up, and development of nature to consciousness, and regards nature therefore as the sleeping spirit. Then it is certainly less strange that the spirit becoming self-conscious, cannot so easily and so quickly free itself from its complication with the powers of sensational nature; just as on the other side it is also easy to understand that it imputes to itself, what is really only an untamed power of sensational nature; for nature is just the spirit itself in the mere potentiality of its existence.

But as the mechanical conception of the relation between spirit and sense just spoken of—we may term it the composition theory—is so little ours, we must, notwithstanding, no less decidedly guard ourselves against the theory of identity forming here the basis, which wishes the human spirit to be regarded as the highest blossom of the life of nature, as the result of its process of development. Indisputably the *unity of the finite spirit and nature* may be maintained in a sense thoroughly sound, and which the theology of Christianity could only deny, by forgetting

[1] Many think to be able to solve this difficulty by the adoption of the opinion, that God Himself has so ordered it that the resistance of sense against the spirit in itself natural and necessary, may appear to us in our consciousness as one for which we are ourselves culpable, in order to spur us on with so much the greater energy in the pursuit of the good, by means of the consciousness of guilt. It is quite in keeping when such a naive attempt unobservedly to lift the veil a little, behind which God is said secretly to mechanize, carries home the reward of discovering, that God imposes upon man an error which He Himself had committed in His plan of the world, namely, the proportionately too small an amount of spiritual power lent to man, that He causes him to endure the guilt of the same in his consciousness, in order that He in the augmented endeavour of man, truly alas at the cost of his peace and self-unison, may find the necessary correction.—Placing ourselves upon this stand-point, ought we not nevertheless to suppose that God might more easily have effected this, if He had communicated to the spirit of man at once a sufficient degree of power, in order also immediately to realize the moral requirements planted within him, so soon as they in a given case appeared in the consciousness, in order to subordinate to himself, and to appropriate as an organ, sensational nature in proportional unlimited progress of development.

the significance of its own docirine of the Resurrection. In this doctrine there is manifestly contained, as an ultimate result, that spirit and nature are to be so perfectly one, that the latter as σῶμα πνευματικόν will absolutely no longer in any way stand opposed to the spirit, as that which is external and foreign, but will be perfectly adequate to it as its perfect manifestation and revelation. But if spirit and nature are *thus in the result*, one, they must of course also already be so in themselves, *i.e.* in the Divine understanding which beholds in an eternal manner the *ultimata* of all developments, the ideas, which they have to realize. What we reject, is a doctrine of identity, which makes the spirit to proceed from nature, and thus makes nature, which is only the presupposition, and mediating means of its phenomena, its *principal*.[1] That ideal unity carries in it the greatest *real distinction*; indeed it requires it, in so far as at the present stage of the development of man, his corporeity—the σῶμα ψυχικόν—is not yet perfectly adequate to the spirit, but is to become so—to be glorified. There is in truth no fixed transition from nature to spirit; the spirit is not merely elevated just above the form of nature immediately below it, but *qualitatively different* from nature as a whole, and exalted above it in an infinite manner; the spirit is absolutely a new beginning, which can never be thoroughly understood, not merely by that grade of the life of nature which approaches nearest to it, but cannot be understood by its totality in its inmost being. The most decided proof for this maintenance is contained in the fact, that man in distinction from all creatures of nature has religion, therefore not merely a relation to the world, but also an *absolute relation to God*. Therefore there is attributed to him alone as spirit, the dignity of the Divine race, Acts xvii. 28, 29.

If this is admitted, it remains absolutely unintelligible, and requires, in any case, a still ulterior derivation, a reduction to an original disturbance in the spirit itself, and in its relation to God,

[1] It is a hard, but very intelligible doctrine of history that the effacing of the holy line of demarcation between spirit and nature, has never wished to conduct to the *spiritualization of nature* (in man), but ever only to the *naturalization of the spirit*.—*Sobernheims* "*Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des Lebens*," 1841, contains an energetic protest against this identification in the name even of natural science, especially in the preface.

that the spirit just as it begins to become conscious of itself, and of its Divine destiny, does not immediately subordinate sensational nature to its will, and immutably exercise dominion through the same. If the child has before the awakening of the spirit already formed the habit of following sensational impulses, still of course not the habit of subordinating the moral impulses to the sensational, by which indeed the sensational nature really becomes a power *over against the spirit.* Then too the first quickening of the spirit to moral consciousness does not take place in the manner of an imperceptible augmentation of power from day to day, but by a sudden transition, as of a lightning illumination out of the twilight obscurity of unconsciousness. The light of consciousness, to use a word of *Baader* in relation to this, has the lightning for its father. Thus there arises in the spirit of childhood the foreboding, that the moral, which hitherto has appeared to it as the will of parents, teachers, and instructors, now appears as the Divine will, the first definite self-revelation of conscience possessed of an unconditional validity.

So much against the anthropological ground-basis of the above opinion. Nevertheless let us assume for a moment—we could only really admit it by overlooking the nature of freedom, by confounding its notion with that of a potentialized power of nature—that there is a *quantitative* relation between spirit and nature as factors of human development, therefore both are to be considered as magnitudes similar in their nature, whose mutual relation is entirely determined by increase and diminution, and at the beginning of this development, where nature ascends from the step prior to the earliest age of childhood, the spirit was given as smallest, the other factor, on the contrary, nature, as greatest, therefore with the fullest predominance. If in the course of development both magnitudes increase in equal measure, virtue were in that case absolutely impossible to man. If he is to be able to arrive at the same, either the second factor, nature, from that commencing moment must remain standing as of unchangeable magnitude, while the first, spirit, alone increases—which is inconceivable in the living individual—or the gradual ascent of both potencies, must on the side of the spirit more rapidly progress, than on the side of nature, so that in the course of development there must first of all be a point of indifference, where

both magnitudes are equal; after this turning point, the relation becomes inverted, and the spirit attains an ever increasing predominance over nature. What would follow from this construction? Indisputably this, that in the customary course of development of human life, therefore apart from individual, especially conditioned, deviations, the power of sin must be the greatest in the period of childhood, when the spirit elevates itself out of its potential condition to actuality, when the moral consciousness awakens. But those who deduce evil from sense, will not certainly wish to maintain that, since, experience, no less than the unequivocal declarations of Christ (Matth. xviii. 3, xix. 14), and of the apostle Paul (1 Cor. xiv. 20), would directly contradict it. On the other side, if sin were nothing more than the not yet subdued animal in man, if it had its ground in the animal nature, as the preparatory step to human consciousness earnestly striving to liberate the spirit from its bonds, and to subordinate itself to its dominion, the general law for the gradual vanquishment of sin would be this, that it must keep pace with the *progressing culture of the spirit.* But does experience confirm this? Certainly, not merely the prejudgement of the theory, but also a superficial observation of life, has often enough made the assertion, that immorality diminishes in the proportion in which spiritual culture increases, and the most genuine children of the age pride themselves not a little in the discovery, that not Christianity, but culture is the way to true freedom, and the remedial means for every imperfection in the world. But it only requires a sharp and unprejudiced glance into life to dissipate these illusions. It is rather in the higher paths of culture that we often meet with the deepest moral depravity and disorder, a frivolity of disposition dissolving all relations into corruption, an entire deadness for every stimulus of holy love, a cold, perfectly self-conscious egotism, which refuses the requirement to sacrifice any one of its own interests as something quite ridiculous, to which all other men with whom it comes in contact only pass for ciphers, in order by their help to bring out its own product. Spiritual culture does not destroy a single tendency of moral depravity, but only conceals and refines them all; so little is it able to redeem man that, if it does not become sanctified by a higher principle, it only more thoroughly confirms in him the dominion of sin.

Thus could we allow ourselves to be reconciled to the anthropological ground basis of this opinion, it would not enable us to understand the reality, but only involve us with it in insolvable contradiction.[1]

In putting this theory to the proof, we have hitherto allowed its factual presupposition to hold good, that experience everywhere in the manifold phenomena of sin, shows us as the ground type, the *unbridled power of sensational nature*, that therewith sin, as an immoderate inclination of man to sensationalism, has its essential object in the possessions and enjoyments of sense. But is this supposition correct? Can we deny that a distinguished power of the will over sensational nature, appears not seldom in union with that selfish character of mind which no one will hesitate absolutely to condemn on its own account? What have the passions of ambition, of love of dominion, to do with sensationalism? Indeed

[1] *Rothe* guards himself against this critique of a theory, with which his opinion of the nature of sin in its ultimate relation assuredly coincides, by especially remarking against it, that he finds the notion of the spirit here treated of, very obscure. Against a judgment so generally expressed, one cannot very well dispute, at least with definitions of the spirit; nevertheless I must disclose to my honoured friend, that so far as my perception extends, it is just his notion of the *spirit*, out of which that judgment proceeds which is accustomed to appear to the readers of his work especially difficult and obscure, namely, will they not remember how he makes the spirit to be considered as the product of the working of personality upon material nature (*Ethik*, vol. 1, p. 98, 99), since indeed personality cannot at all otherwise be conceived of than upon the ground-basis of spiritual essentia? Now, I must leave it to them to make out this with the theological *Ethik* and its use of language, and so much the more, as I find the Rothian notion of *matter* at any rate still more difficult.—But when *Rothe* so decidedly rejects the idea of a potential condition of the spirit, it hangs very well together with his opinion, that the spirit is only the product, and indeed not merely in relation to the Divine causality, but also in relation to creaturely working powers. It coincides so much the worse therewith, that according to *Rothe's* representation, if not the spirit itself, still the two factors of the spirit, the ideal and the real, become "*elicited*" (*hervorgelockt*) by the creative efficiency of God from pure matter, (vol. 1, p. 214); for how were that possible if they were not already contained in it *potentiâ*? Accordingly therefore matter were the double factor of the spirit *in statu potentia:* while according to our opinion neither matter, nor nature in general, may be denominated the potential condition of the spirit.

what violence has the passion for such a spiritual possession as fame, already done, to the demands of sensational nature! And how are we to look upon this as the operating cause in the impulses of those indomitable spirits which sometimes appear in history as disturbing meteors? We see here attributes, which in and for themselves, are worthy of highest admiration,—sharpness of understanding, clearness of reflection, immoveable fixity of purpose, a singular energy of spirit, united in the service of the constant endeavour to procure, at any price, unconditional validity to their own Ego, to constitute their own will, and its accidental contents, indeed even the mere formal caprice, which will not yield itself up to any determinate contents, as law for others in the widest possible sphere. Is that, too, a predominance of sensationalism over the spirit? Or are we, perhaps, since it manifestly is not that, to withhold our moral disgust at this disposition of mind with those of our co-temporaries, who have long since accustomed themselves to estimate greatness only according to power, and to regard the notion of the moral as nothing more than a *concealment of the idea of power*,[1] who from

[1] We cannot certainly confound *Göthe* with those, whom we have here pre-eminently in mind. Genius in her happy hours revealed to him concerning even the nature of sin, something far deeper than to any other modern poet of Germany. But in his *conscious* world-opinion, he creates, it is true, a fundamental bias, to consider power and activity as the real essence of morality; just as a sagacious interpreter of the poet, *Schubarth*, has years ago shown in his great work on *Göthe*. *The direction of power* does not absolutely decide concerning good and evil, but the good is everywhere somehow or other still present where power only remains in activity, in whatever direction it may be; only the torpidity of power, the vapidness of life is evil:

He, the constant endeavorer—with self earnest striving,
Him we are able to save.

How this is meant we see from *Faust's* arriving at the Heavenly gaol, by his ever restless endeavouring below, and by the eternal womanliness (*Weibliche*) above, apart from repentance and expiation; which indeed just pleases those, to whom the fundamental truths of the gospel have become so entirely unintelligible, that they can see nothing in those requirements more than an arbitrary fixation of certain conditions of forgiveness. This notion of goodness appears to belong to the fruits which the great poet appears to have earned from his study of Spinoza. For to him, goodness, as we have already earlier remarked, is nothing more than power, the reality, and just therefore the well known principle

this stand-point importantly look down upon the "common" moral judgment of such extraordinary phenomena as a very narrow one? Now, the Christian method of consideration of human affairs, will be obliged quietly to put up with this reproach, for certainly it is not there able to recognize any greatness, where man severs himself from the holy will and law of God, and assuredly it cannot look upon evil as being there cancelled, but only augmented and deepened, where it becomes elevated to Satanic presumption.

The great defect of this theory is clearly in relation to the facts of experience, that in reality it takes only notice of one series of the phenomena of evil in human life, those, it is true, in which sin *first of all* reveals itself as a predominance of sensational being over spirit, on the other hand it passes over all but unnoticed the manifold phenomena of sin which spring from *pride*, from a source quite independent of inordinate sensationalism. It only regards sin as a *degradation* of man, but not as a *false exaltation*, as the *defectus* of the spirit, not as its *excessus*. The consideration remains standing by the coarsest and most palpaple forms of sin; but in those forms it has not reached its maximum, but rather there where it permeates the human life as a fine, transparent, but all the more destructive poison; and whoever has a notion of the hard conflict which the soul in its deepest inmost has to sustain against the Satanic angel of pride, of ambition, of envy, on account of the spiritual superiority of others, to him it will appear almost laughable, when he is charged to behold his real enemy in the sensational striving against his spirit.—Already in the primitive history of our race, according to Genesis, this twofold tendency in the development of sin, as *D. von Cölln*

of the same although spiritually conceived of: *suum utile quaerere*, which also in *Göthe* in his correspondence with *Zelter*, sometimes finds a warm advocacy.

It is remarkable that also the *Fichtian* doctrine of morality, however much more the opposite starting-point of its investigations concerning evil appears to promise, still in the end arrives at no better notion of the same, than at that of an original *inertness of human nature.*

It is moreover the indisputable truth of this method of consideration, that conversion to good is never more difficult, than where there is united with the exclusive selfish tendency a general torpidity, a sunkenness into interestless indifference.

appropriately remarks,[1] shows itself, on the one hand, as the predominancy and perversion of the sensational impulse, on the other hand as usurpation and arrogance. The same contrast pervades the entire history of Israel. Somewhat differently modified it appears in the history of the Redeemer, as contrast between the sins of the Pharisees and Publicans. But the Pharisees stand further from the kingdom of God than the Publicans, Matt. xxi. 31.

This inclination, to overlook sin in pride, and in the fruits of pride, hangs closely together with the *practical ground tendency* with which this kind of explanation of evil must pre-eminently agree, and which nourishes and developes itself in it. Man is obliged to recognize the presence of sin in his life, however much he may wish to deny it; but therewith the propensity to self-righteousness rooting itself in the depths of selfishness, is not yet overcome; it now endeavours to maintain itself by removing sin from the real Ego of man, and placing it *in that which is external.* Christ says: sin appears first of all in the form of evil thoughts, out of the heart, *i.e.* out of the inmost centre of life, the seat of the inclinations and self-determination, and just for this reason it is able to make man unclean;[2] this theory on the contrary

[1] *Biblische Theologie*, vol. 1, p. 234, 235. Attention has moreover been already directed to this duplex development of sin, in Genesis, by cabbalistic authors.

[2] Matt. xv. 19, 20.—The διαλογισμοὶ πονηροὶ are in relation to the following: φόνοι, μοιχεῖαι, and so on, certainly not to be conceived of as an individual species of sin together with others, but as the first step of the development of sin, to which then the others attach themselves as factual realization of the same.—It may appear difficult to see in this passage, how the evil proceeding from the heart is said to profane man, since it appears directly, thereby that it proceeds from the heart, to presuppose a profanity of the inward as already existing. The difficulty becomes solved by the consideration, that the realization of that which first of all roots in the human heart as an impure propensity, now makes impure the real consciousness and conduct, in word and deed (ψευδομαρτυρίαι, βλασφημίαι.) That therewith the body, which is said to become a temple of the Holy Ghost, becomes profaned, is, according to the fundamental idea of the New Testament, always the secondary, but on that account is anything but a matter of indifference, comp. the Pauline: Καθαρίσωμεν ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ παντὸς μολυσμοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος (where the order is to be understood as an ascending one), 2 Cor. vii. 1.

maintains: it comes from sense, *i.e.* from a sphere of life, which is an external one in relation to the real Ego of man; from which it clearly follows that it is not able to effect a deep impurification of the entire man, but that it is more to be considered as an earthly impurity thrown on from without, by which the beaming forth of the true form of the inward life is prevented, and its *phenomena* disturbed. The heart itself remains thereby defended against every derogatory complaint; the will is strictly ever directed to the good (for if there is an evil, perverted will, sin assuredly comes from it, not from the rebellion of sense against the spirit); the good dissuades man from the evil only as it becomes a phenomenon, and it is thus, according to this theory, that it arises. Sin is then in truth no longer our *act*, but our misfortune, a lamentable disease of our nature, which can only have its ultimate ground herein, in that there ought to be unity in man however diverse spirit and sense may be, and that also sense is so strong and the spirit so weak; we ourselves *are* no longer evil, but only *suffer* evil. What *Oedipus* in *Sophocles* says of his deeds, that they were rather suffered than done (*Oed. in Colono*, v. 266, 267), would then hold good of every evil work of man.

And as every self-righteous excuse, is always only the reverse side of an unrighteous accusation, so this explanation of the origin of evil contains a gross libel against the sensational nature of man, by which that is laid to its charge, which the accuser himself has done, the spirit, whose will, sense is obliged to serve as its master and lord. *Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi.* Over against these false accusations it will be necessary to give attention to the declaration of *Hamann* quoted above (p. 170) respecting the relation of sense to the origination of sin. The sensational, strictly taken, is ever innocent; its impulses and inclinations are never, even in disturbed conditions, directed to the evil as such; the guilt is, in him choosing, who misuses it as the instrument of his perverted thoughts, standing in contradiction to both God and nature. The conscience of every one tells him this by making *him himself* guilty on account of sin. But it is easy to be understood, that a theory, which, in the derivation of sin ignores the relation of the finite spirit to God, must also mistake and falsify its relation to nature, especially in the sphere of its own life. Whoever instead of seeking the principle of

sin in its severance from God, *presupposes* man to be God-less, in order to find that principle, is in the best way of making him also nature-less. Since he passes over the true source of sin, he will scarcely be able to avoid making the innocent, Divinely ordered diversity in his being, an original and irreconcilable variance, in order to obtain a principle for the derivation of sin.

And here opens up to us another side of the practical consequences of this opinion—over against that trivial treatment of sin, which is found in the predominancy of the sensational nature over the spirit as in an insurmountable limitation of our existence, a gloomy melancholy turning away from the sensational sphere of human life, a practical spiritualism, which very nearly approximates to the Manichæan opinion of the world. If evil be nothing else than the resistance of sense against the spirit, why do we censure monastic asceticism, which seeks to weaken the sensational nature, and to suppress its impulses and wants? We can see in this nothing more than the simple consequence of this opinion, which urges itself of necessity there, where the spirit will not at all mar the impress of its nobility, where the endeavour after holiness is really in earnest. If it lies in the very essence of sensational nature to strive against the spirit, the spirit very properly strives to become nature-less, as far as it is able. One may censure the *methods*, by which asceticism seeks to attain this end; but the *end itself* he will be obliged to acknowledge.

Or will it be sufficient for the averting of these serious consequences that we appeal to this, that it is not sensationalism itself, and its impulses and inclinations, but only the *excess* of the same in relation to the spirit which is to be regarded as evil. But that which sensationalism develops from itself with necessity, when it has reached a certain degree, that it must have already possessed as a germ even in its smallest degree; the tendency must always be in it, to set itself against the spirit; and if sin consists in this state of opposition, it certainly seems to suggest, that the striving after holiness should especially direct its entire power to the taming and suppression of the sensational nature as much as possible. And the requirements to this, will be so much the more urgent, as according to the connection of this opinion, sensationalism is already in possession of the dominion of human

life, when the spirit puts forth its claims, therefore the moral development makes its beginning from the disturbed relation, from the preponderance of the lower over the higher sphere. The most powerful and most complete efficiency for the removal of sin, will naturally, according to this theory, proceed in both directions at the same time, namely, to strengthen the spirit, and to weaken sense; but if one regards the individual sides each for itself, it will be quite the same, whether one strives the more to strengthen the spirit or to weaken sense.

But what is still worse, in the more earnest application of the opinion under discussion, is, that, while the striving after holiness seeks the enemy entirely in the outworks, the serpent is only too often the more carefully nestled and nourished in the bosom. Sensational lust, and love of the world, are combated and suppressed; but the more dangerous powers, of self-conceit, of pride, of an exclusive, contracted, heartless disposition of mind, are quietly indulged in. Even its very conquests become in such a condition a snare to the mind, only serving to strengthen the inward foe, by providing nourishment for spiritual pride, and self-righteousness.

It cannot be denied, and is also easy to be understood after the previous discussions, that Pelagianistic opinions have pre-eminently formed the basis for the validity, if not for the real derivation of sin from sense—for this would by a very little consistency be excluded by the notion of freedom of choice everywhere so highly prized by Pelagianism—still for the one-sided opinion of sin as a *predominance of sense over the spirit.* If we compare with this fact that which we have just seen to be the practical consequence of this conception of sin, the frequent remark comes of itself to view, how very little the distinctions of light and heavy blood, of sanguine and melancholy temperament, are qualified for deriving from them the contrast of Pelagianistic and Manichaeistic modes of thought; just as it is in itself an entirely perverted undertaking to reduce one-sided directions,—which have proceeded from the deepest movement of the human spirit, which agonizes after the knowledge of eternal truth, and which still cannot come to the resolution truly to give itself up to it,—to the same physiological distinctions. Pelagianism has in fact a deeper root in the fundamental tendencies of human

nature, according to its present constitution ; and if, as is certainly the case in our time, it shows itself in general somewhat lax in its judgment and treatment of moral things, it is nevertheless just as well able to generate a gloomy zeal, a melancholy turning away from every thing pleasing and charming, which sensational life presents, to establish its own merit, and for this purpose, to devote itself entirely to a life of self-denial. Monasticism especially confirms this ; from the cells of which Pelagianism first of all proceeded, and in which it found the most cordial favour and advocacy against *Augustine's* form of doctrine.[1] It agrees very well with the view intimated above, that on the other hand in Monasticism, in so far as it lays claim to the perfection of human life, there is deeply grounded a powerful tendency to Manichaeistic opinions. The principal bond between both tendencies is just the inclination to seek the original object of sinful striving, not in the inward, but in the outward sphere of human existence, in sense and the lust of sense.[2]—

We have already seen, that a very significant place belongs to the preponderance of sensationalism over the spirit, in relation to the phenomena of sin in human life. But this opinion proceeds in a very unthorough manner, in that it not merely keeps entirely to the one side of sinful phenomena, it is true the most common and striking, but remains standing, even in the investigation of the nature and ground of sin, by the *immediate phenomenon* of the same, and its description, instead of proceeding to a point which lies deeper. From this it is clear, that a theory of evil, which has nothing more for the development of this notion than the contrast of *reason and sense, spirit and nature,* can never rise above the character of a certain superficiality in its entire treatment of this subject. We have seen in the first book of these investigations, that this disturbance of the true harmony between the two sides of our being—which, besides, is not merely the dissolution of this harmony, but in innumerable instances, everywhere where the spirit readily serves the sensational passions, an exchange of the true unity for a false perverted one—can only

[1] Comp. *Wiggers' pragmat. Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus,* Part 2, p. 19.

[2] Comp. *Nitzsch's System der christlichen Lehre,* § 106, Anm. 2, p. 206, 4th ed.

have its principle in a disturbance of our highest relation, of our relation to God.[1] And only when this principle here discovered, when sin, according to its inmost nature, is acknowledged as *departure from God to self-idolatry*, will the fearful variance, the unfathomable misery, which from sin has diffused itself over the whole of life, become truly intelligible; whoever places the real source of sin in an insusceptibility of sensational nature for the determining power of the spirit, he can only save himself from this untold amount of wretchedness,—indicative of something incomparably worse as the germ of all sinful being,—by seeking to hide it from himself as much as possible.

However, the method of explaining sin which we have controverted covers itself with the shield of the highest authority; it is said—a few decenaries ago it was the almost unanimous, and is to this day a very wide-spread opinion among theologians—to be distinctly the *doctrine of the New Testament*, that sin, as some say, originates from the body,[2] as others more cautiously express themselves, from the sensational nature of man, and its impulses and inclinations. Christ Himself is said to have taught this, Matth. xxvi. 41; John iii. 6, just so the Apostle James, chap. i. 14, 15, but very especially the Apostle Paul, who not merely in many passages places the seat of sin in the σῶμα or in the μέλη, but without doubt denotes the σὰρξ, especially in the epistles to the Romans, to the Galatians, as the source of sin, the man who has resigned himself up to sin as σαρκικὸς, the conflict of the πνεῦμα with the σὰρξ, and the victory of the former as the essential task of Christian sanctification. But σὰρξ is just nothing else than the sensational animal nature of man (to which, of course, must be reckoned as belonging to it not merely the

[1] Also in the deeply significant narrative in Genesis, of the fall, it first of all happens, as the result of an original presumptuous sin against God, and in punishment of the same, that the serpent, above all beasts of the field, becomes so fast chained to the earth, that it must go upon its belly, and must eat dust all the days of its life.

[2] *Ammon, e. g.*, in his *Handbuch der christlichen Sittenlehre*, Part i. § 11, accuses the Apostle Paul of a "moral dualism, which consists herein, that he considers matter as the seat of evil, but the spirit as the source of good!"

physical nature, but also the psychical principle of life, and the manifold variety of sensibilities, impulses, and passions springing out of it), and stands therefore over against the πνεῦμα, which signifies the higher rational nature of man, and its theoretical and practical abilities.

First of all, as to the *non-Pauline* passages, we are not at all justified in seeking in the declaration of Christ: τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα πρόθυμον, ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἀσθενής, Matth. xxvi. 41, general information respecting the *nature and origin of sin.* The Saviour does not say of man in general, and in all conditions, that the spirit is willing with respect to the good, but only of his disciples, of whose love to Himself He was acquainted, and when He warns them of the weakness of the sensational nature—for σάρξ is of course that here—it refers to the peculiar character of the approaching moment which should threaten their fidelity with horrors, which immediately operate upon the sensational nature.—If in this passage πνεῦμα manifestly signifies a component part of human nature, it is otherwise related with the words of the Lord in John iii. 6: τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σάρξ ἐστι· καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος πνεῦμά ἐστι. Here πνεῦμα, according to verse 5 and 8, is undoubtedly the πνεῦμα ἅγιον, and (in the second passage) the new life born out of it, the Divinely-allied life. The γεγεννῆσθαι ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς signifies, on the contrary, the sensational natural birth of man, from which, only sensational natural life can proceed, but not that by which man becomes a citizen of the Divine kingdom, comp. on this passage *Lücke's Kommentar zum Ev. Joh.*, vol. i. p. 524. The expression therefore only denies that which Nicodemus thought would capacitate him for participation in the kingdom of God; respecting the source of that which stands positively opposed to this participation, of sin, it gives no information. On the contrary, Jam. i. 14, 15, teaches us, it is true, the way in which the act of sin arises in the present condition of the human race; but it is quite arbitrary to understand by ἐπιθυμία only the desires directed to *sensational enjoyment.*

If in these and a few similar passages, the appearance of the derivation of sin from sense readily vanishes before a more attentive consideration, the investigation becomes much more difficult and

perplexing, when we turn our attention to the Apostle *Paul's modus docendæ* on this point. We must first of all bear this in mind, that Paul denotes the body, frequently the members not only as executive organs of sin, but also as the *seat of its power*, which can only refer to the irregular power of the sensational impulses and desires. Thus Rom. vi. 12, 13, 19, vii. 5, 23, 24. Interpreters commonly find the same sense also in Rom. vi. 6; Col. ii. 11. However, it will be later shown, that with respect to these passages an entirely different conception is the one more thoroughly founded in the same. *Neander* has shown what might have been the especial occasion of the Apostle's frequently and energetically bringing forward the exhibition of sin in the predominance of sensational passions.[1] But with this admitted signification of the sensational nature of man, the opinion with which we have to do, is still not yet at all grounded; and if in the treatment of this subject, by commentators and dogmatists, the notions: *source (Quell), seat (Sitz), organ (Organ)*, are often enough, and variously mixed up together, our further investigation has nevertheless only to keep to the first of these notions. The question is therefore, whether the presence of sin in human life, has, according to the Apostle *Paul*, its ground in the sensational nature of man, and in an original insusceptibility of the same with respect to the determining power of the spirit; with which in the connection of this theory the *nature of sin* were at the same time immediately determined, as consisting in the superior power of sense in relation to the endeavour of the spirit. And this the Apostle would most certainly teach, if σὰρξ in contrast with πνεῦμα really signifies in the Apostle's use of these terms, as is still maintained in our time by very many theologians,[2]

[1] *Geschichte der Pflanzung der christl. Kirche durch die App.*, vol. ii. p. 665 (4th ed.)

[2] *E.g.* by *Usteri, Entwickelung des Paul. Lehrbegriffes*, Pt. 1, *Abschn.* 3, B.; *Schulz, die christl. Lehre vom h. Ab.* p. 96 sq. 1st ed.; *de Wette, christl. Sittenlehre* § 10: *Bretschneider, Grundlagen des evangelischen Pietismus* § 12; *v. Cölln, bibl. Theologie*, vol. 2, p. 237, 248. Among the modern commentators of Paul, *Tholuck* first of all, opposed this conception of the notion σὰρξ, *Kommentar zum Br. an die Römer*, at cap. vii. ver. 14 (in the earlier editions). Vacillating to the last degree, *Baur*, expresses himself on this subject in his "*Paulus.*" On the one side he expressly says, p. 528: Man is regarded as flesh not merely according to the one side of his being, but he is so regarded

the sensational nature of man, with the wants and impulses, the sensations of pleasure and pain essential to it. For that to the Apostle the σὰρξ is not merely the seat or organ of sensational lust, but a *source of sin*, an operative principle in human life, which opposes God and his law, can, according to passages such as Rom. viii. 7 seq., Gal. v. 16 seq., Ephes. ii. 3, and according to his frequent designation of the life under the dominion of sin by κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν, ζῆν, εἶναι, scarcely be a matter of doubt.

That σὰρξ in this contrast with πνεῦμα should signify nothing more than the sensational, if one will, animal, nature of man, must appear to us very improbable, if we only cast a glance at the other moments of Pauline doctrine. If according to Paul the human body—perhaps because it is χοϊκὸσ—is said to stand in an essential variance with the spirit, and from this contrast, sin is said necessarily to arise, although in the form of contingency and freedom, how then could Paul require of Christians that they should devote body and members to the service of God? How could he declare their body, this present, earthly, material body, to be the temple of the Holy Ghost? Rom. vi. 13, 19, xii. 1; 1 Cor. vi. 13, 15, 19, 20. The 1 Cor. vi. 13, is here pre-eminently remarkable, where the great, holy significance of the human corporeity appears in contrast against modern spiritualism, especially in this, that the Apostle does not merely say: τὸ σῶμα τῷ κυρίῳ, but also inversely: ὁ κύριος τῷ σώματι. If the derivation of sin from sensationalism is earnestly meant, the sensational nature becomes regarded as the determining, the spirit and will as the determined; but therewith those moments can only be adjusted in the doctrine of the Apostle under the presupposition that he had ascribed to the sensational nature an ability to devote itself, of itself, either to the service of God, or to the service of sin, *i.e.* that he had attributed to it the predicates of will and spirit.—If further, it is just in the writings of the Apostle Paul that the doctrine of a future resurrection of the body so emphatically appears, this doctrine does not seem, it is true, to stand in immediate contradiction with the derivation of evil from

according to his natural constitution, according to his entire being, and then again σὰρξ is made equal to the physical nature of man, p. 551. Indeed according to Baur, σάρξ is equally principle, seat, and organ, of sin, which makes a definite conception of its notion almost impossible.

sensationalism—on account of the distinction between *σῶμα ψυχικὸν* and *σῶμα πνευματικὸν*, 1 Cor xv. 44;—but a deeply penetrating variance of the *tendency* of both doctrines we shall not be able to deny. Where the opinion, that sin springs from sensationalism, and the decided dualistic conception of the relation between soul and body in connection therewith, has once become firmly rooted, there the interest of the question concerning the preservation, and glorifying restoration of the body is abandoned, and finds its satisfaction in the idea of a mere spiritual existence of man after death. Indeed this variance of tendencies immediately augments itself to a *direct contradiction*, if we will not deny the Apostle every reflection concerning the immediate consequences of his doctrinal tenets. For if Paul has decidedly excluded sin from the Divine arrangement and causation, by his considering it as an enmity against God, he could not, if to him the positive ground of sin lay in the sensational nature of man, refer also the latter to God as author, but only to a principle standing in opposition to God, but then the redemption of man from the power of sin can so little complete itself with the glorifying awaking up of his body, that it much rather must begin with the destruction of the same.—Just as little can the derivation of evil from sensationalism be brought into agreement with the perfect Holiness of the Redeemer, a very ground pillar of Apostolic doctrine. If sensationalism does not merely contain an excitant for the will to determine itself against the will of God, but if it is the producing cause of sin, and accordingly if there arises with necessity, from the sensational nature under the given relations of human development, any degree of moral impurity, we find ourselves in the momentous, fatal dilemma, either, as many modern individuals have ventured to do from this opinion, to be obliged to sacrifice the unspotted Holiness of the life of Christ (the *ἁμαρτίαν μὴ γνῶναι*, 2 Cor. v. 21), or in a doketistic manner the full truth of the human nature in Christ (the *ἄνθρωπον εἶναι*, 1 Tim. ii. 4; Rom. v. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 21, *γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικὸς, ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ κατὰ σάρκα*, Gal. iv. 4; Rom. i. 3), to which indisputably also belongs the participation in the *σῶμα ψυχικόν* of our present body. But the one is just as contradictory as the other, with the definite declarations, and with the entire connection of the Apostolic development of doctrine, nay more, with the

deepest interests of the Christian faith. It is true, a way of escape still seems to present itself here, in the representation to which *Töllner's* sagacious mind finds itself necessitated, in order to unite with those presuppositions the sinlessness of Jesus. It is the representation that a supernatural influence of God came to the aid of Jesus, and preserved Him from sin in every critical moment, by a continued wonder.[1] But then the true notion of the inward purity of the Redeemer is nevertheless lost; sin is then even in Him *continually on the point of breaking forth*, and becomes only suppressed by an external power, and thus prevented from taking place in individual act. This mechanical mediation stands entirely upon the same line with the representation of the Catholic dogmatic of the primitive condition, especially developed by *Bellarmin*, according to which even in this primitive condition there is present a resistance of the sensational nature against the spirit, a *naturalis propensionum pugna*—*Bellarmin* does not hesitate to denominate it a *langour, morbus naturae humanae*, and to derive it *ex conditione materiae*—and is only restrained by the *donum supernaturale iustitiae originalis velut aureo freno*.[2] The offensiveness would not be removed if one should call to aid the doctrine of the personal union of the Divine and human nature in Christ, upon which the old Church dogmatic, it is true, founded the sinlessness of the Redeemer,[3] so that the Divine nature in Christ,

[1] *Theolog. Untersuchungen*, vol. i. St. 2, p. 126. In *Töllner* there is really the maintenance that sin proceeds with necessity from the original limitations of human nature which he seeks to reconcile by this representation with the sinlessness of Jesus. And of course this contradiction with a Christian fundamental doctrine, and therewith further the inability to recognise the incarnation of the Son of God, from this side *according to its possibility*, concerns not merely this theory of sensationalism, but, as from the investigations of the previous chapter was satisfactorily shown, the derivation of sin from the metaphysical imperfection of man at all.—*Bayle's* opinion is of the same kind as this thought of *Töllner's*, which *Strauss* agrees with in his dogmatic § 78 (vol. 2, p. 371.)—Of course only hypothetically, under the presupposition of the Christian doctrine of God, namely, that God, if He did not determine the evil, might prevent its realization by the withdrawment of the Divine concursus, so often as man wished to commit a sin.

[2] *De gratia primi hominis*, cap. 4, 5.

[3] Most certainly with impropriety, since by this conception of the holiness of Christ, partly the temptability which the author of the

as a bridle for the sensational nature, occupied the place of that supernatural miraculous influence of God, for in this way we should not retain the purity of human nature, and besides this, the personal union of the Divine and human nature in Christ would be exchanged for an entirely external (*Nestorianistic*) representation of the relation of both. There remains, therefore, here an insolvable contradiction, which we justly hesitate to impute not to our representations, but to the Apostle.

On the opposite side, it must make us very distrustful of the above conception of the notion of σὰρξ by Paul, that he also ascribes evil, and indeed in its highest augmentation, to such created beings as do not possess an earthly sensational nature, which possess no σῶμα ψυχικὸν, to the evil spirits. If the Apostle denies evil with respect to Christ who was partaker with us of the earthly sensational nature (Gal. iv.; Heb. ii. 14), and on the other hand recognizes it in demons, who are not partakers of that nature; does it not thereby alone become in the highest degree at least probable, that according to his opinion evil stands in no essential relation to the sensational nature of man, that therefore σὰρξ must, according to him, still signify something else than the sensational nature?—

If, now, we look at the Pauline use of the word σὰρξ itself, still more closely, it will not, in one of the main passages, Gal. v. 13—24, at all agree with the signification of *sense*. Previous to investigation, it must appear highly surprising in this signification how the Apostle is able to place over against the warning to use Christian freedom not in an impulse for the σὰρξ, the exhortation, to serve one another by *love*, 13th ver. And

epistle to the Hebrews just as much emphasizes as His spotless purity, partly the truth of His progressing moral development, which is especially guaranteed us by Luke ii. 52, and with both these, equally, the conceivability of the earthly life of Christ, becomes lost. This erroneous treatment of the sinlessness of Christ has its real root in this, that the older dogmatic, in its opinion of His earthly human life, did not firmly hold to the vast, full contents of the ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, Phil. ii. 7, and therefore was never able entirely to escape a certain vacillation between approximations, on the one hand to doketistic, and on the other hand, to Nestorianistic, determinations.—Concerning the relation of the holiness of Jesus to His partaking of our sensational nature, as well as to His temptability, comp. *Ullmann's* excellent work *on the sinlessness of Jesus*, especially p. 116—133, 153 sq. (5th ed.)

thus it is manifest that also in the following in the ἐπιθυμία σαρκὸς, according to the connection, he has especially in mind the passions of hatred, envy, and the like (ἀλλήλους δάκνειν καὶ κατεσθίειν, 15th ver.) Therefore he then also adduces in the series of the ἔργα τῆς σαρκὸς the following; ἔχθραι, ἔρεις, ζῆλοι, θυμοὶ, ἐρεθεῖαι, διχοστασίαι, αἱρέσαις, φθόνοι, φόνοι. What have all these sins to do with the sensational nature? Or if it ultimately is not difficult to shew in every sin, in so far as it becomes phenomenal, some *connection* or other with the tendency to the sensational nature, how are we nevertheless to demonstrate the sensational nature to be in them (ἔργα τῆς σαρκός) the *really operative?* In analogy with this passage the Apostle calls the Corinthians σαρκικοὶ, because envy, quarrelling, and division were among them, because they made themselves entirely dependent upon individual human teachers, instead of grounding themselves only upon Christ, 1 Cor. iii. 1—4. Also by the ἐπιτελεῖσθαι σαρκὶ, Gal. iii. 3, the Apostle by no means denotes a preponderance which the Galatians had gradually allowed in favour of the sensational inclinations and passions, but their trusting to the works of the law. The same holds good of the passage, in a certain measure parallel, Rom. iv. 1, where the order of the words, as given in the received text, is certainly to be preserved, and accordingly κατὰ σάρκα to be united with εὑρηκέναι (comp. *Fritzsche, Pauli ad Romanos Epistola*, tom. i., p. 213, 214.) Here too κατὰ σάρκα εὑρηκέναι refers to that which Abraham had arrived at by his righteousness of works—namely κάυχημα, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν θεόν—; but what has sensationalism to do here? Also the κατὰ σάρκα σοφοὶ, 1 Cor. i. 26, are manifestly, according to the Apostle, not merely the adherents to a materialistic or sensualistic direction in philosophy, but, as is seen from the entire connection of the first chapter of this epistle, all, without distinction, who sought their satisfaction in the different systems of the Hellenistic philosophy, in contrast with the simplicity of faith in the Divine grace in Christ, 2 Cor. i. 12. Indeed even the κατὰ σάρκα γεγεννημένος, Gal. iv. 23, comp. ver. 29, cannot signify those generated in a *sensational* manner; for Paul recognizes the sensational generation even in the case of Isaac, with respect to the γεγεννημένος διὰ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας, and nothing would justify us in imposing upon him the representation of some Rabbins

and Church fathers of a supernatural miraculous generation of Isaac; but κατὰ σάρκα refers to the advice of Sarah in so far as it rested upon her own opinion and human shrewdness, Gen. xvi. 2, in contrast with the Divine promise, Gen. xv. 4. But the limitations of the general conception of σὰρξ are most decidedly superseded by Col. ii. 18 seq. The Apostle controverts in this place a sect in which a strong asceticism united itself with theosophic speculation, to which he himself makes the ἀφειδία σώματος their reproach. These spiritualists, proud of their higher knowledge and their sensational renunciations, he denotes as puffed up by their *fleshly* mind, and maintains that their especial striving has no other purpose than to render satisfaction to their flesh; ver. 23.

If now according to all this the significance of sense is in no case sufficient for the Pauline σάρξ, what is the true and full notion of the word?

If we wish to attempt a genetic development of the same, we must go back to the notion of בָּשָׂר, to which the Old Testament use of language has given a significance stretching far beyond the original boundaries of the same. It is true that in innumerable passages the sensational root of the notion is firmly retained, the material substance of the human and animal body, is sometimes distinguished from skin or bones, sometimes without respect to this distinction, sometimes also in the tropical sense as Job xix. 22; Ps. xxvii. 2, lxxxiv. 3, Jer. xix. 9. To this attaches itself the signification, according to which בָּשָׂר denotes the human body generally in contrast with לֵב, רוּחַ, נֶפֶשׁ. Thus Ps. xvi. 9, lxxxiv. 3, Job xii. 10, xiv. 22. Upon this ground basis there then developes itself a more extended use of the word, which drops that contrast, and directly denominates all creatures of the earth, in which there is sensational life, בָּשָׂר *e. g.* Gen. vi. 17, 19, vii. 15, 21, viii. 17; Numb. xvi. 22, xxvii. 11; Job xxxiv. 15; Ps. cxxxvi. 25; Dan. iv. 9. It is especially the sensational nature and the individual being attached to it, which are denoted in the Old Testament Scriptures, pre-eminently by the Prophets, very frequently by בָּשָׂר, Gen. vi. 12; Deut. v. 26; Ps. lvi. 5, lxxviii. 39, cxliv. 21; Isa. xlv. 6, xlix. 26, lxvi. 16, 23, 24; Jer. xii. 12, xvii. 5, xxv. 31, xlv. 5; Ezek. xx. 48, xxi. 4, 5;

Joel iii. 1; Zech. ii. 13. The predominant idea in this designation of man and other creatures is that of the weakness, frailty, and perishableness of all earthly being. In many passages this idea very decidedly appears, *e.g.* Job xxxiv. 15; Ps. lxxviii. 39; Isa. xl. 6, especially in express contrast with God as the eternally enduring One, alone Mighty One, with the Spirit of God as the source of all power, Deut. v. 26; Isa. xxxi. 3; Jer. xvii. 5; Ps. lvi. 5. But it cannot be at all shown with respect to any one passage of the Old Testament that בָּשָׂר denotes the sensational nature of man as the seat of a resistance against the spirit, and of a yielding to sin. *Gesenius* in his *Thesaurus* (s. v.), and according to his precedence, many others find this signification, especially with respect to Eccles. v. 5, and also Eccles. ii. 3. But if one takes up the words: אֶת־בְּשָׂרְךָ אַל־תִּתֵּן אֶת־פִּיךָ לַחֲטִיא, according to their general thought as *Gesenius* does, they can still never be otherwise translated than: suffer not thy mouth to bring thy body—by vows (of offerings), which transcend thy ability, and which therefore will hinder thee from supplying the requirements of thy body—into sin; but the passage contains nothing of a sensationalism inclined to sin. Still less is there in chap. ii. 3, in the resolve to nourish the body with wine while the heart behaved itself wisely, anything referring to an inclination to sin, having its root in the body.[1] One might first of all find this representation in the difficult expression found in Gen. vi. 3. However one does not even here in the explanation of בָּשָׂר הוּא, although he may understand the immediately following words as determining the time for the perishing of this race on account of sin, or as limiting the duration of life for the following races (which indeed will not agree with chap. ix. 10—23) satisfy the notion with the signification on account of the perishableness and mortality of man, and in respect to his physical nature. This use of the word *σὰρξ* is also foreign to the Old Testament Apocrypha;[2] on the contrary it is often met

[1] As *Gesenius* himself thus determines the sense of the passage, v. under נָדַג and מִשְׁחַת, it can only be here by an oversight.

[2] It does not do to appeal here to *σῶμα σαρκὸς*, Sirach xxiii. 23, where *σὰρξ* is strictly and entirely to be understood of the substance of the body. One might rather find that signification, Sirach xxviii. 5. Still

with in the Son of Sirach in the signification: human nature, individual beings which bear this nature.

To this peculiar method of treatment of the notion בָּשָׂר in the Old Testament, as it stands closely connected with the fundamental representations of Mosaism, and of the revealed religion in general, the New Testament use of language, and especially that of the Apostle Paul, immediately attaches itself. He sometimes indisputably uses *σὰρξ* in the strictly physiological sense, for the *earthly material substance* of the human and animal *σῶμα*, in so far as it belongs to the organism; separated from the organic alliance it is termed *κρέας*, Rom. xiv. 21; 1 Cor. viii. 13.[1] Thus Paul uses *σὰρξ*, 1 Cor. xv. 39; Eph. v. 29. Setting out from this root of the notion, Paul frequently denominates *the external, sensationally sensible side of human existence*, by *σὰρξ* in contrast with the inward, spiritual—a relation which he expresses by *σῶμα* and *πνεῦμα*, 1 Cor. vi. 16, 17, vii. 34; Rom. viii. 10 (with which may be compared 2 Cor. iv. 10), once also by *ὁ ἔξω* and *ὁ ἔσωθεν ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος*, 2 Cor. iv. 16. *Σὰρξ* has this signification Rom. ii. 28; 1 Cor. v. 5, vii. 28, x. 18; 2 Cor. iv. 11 (comp. with ver. 10), vii. 5, xii. 7. Here also belongs the *μολυσμὸς σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος*, 2 Cor. vii. 1, the meaning of which becomes perfectly clear by comparison with 1 Cor. vii. 34 (*ἁγία καὶ σώματι καὶ πνεύματι*), and Rom. ii. 28, 29. Still entirely upon the same stage of development of the notion it has its place when Paul sometimes expresses by *σὰρξ* the *physical, sensational presence*, in distinction from spiritual fellowship (*ἐν πνεύματι*,) 2 Cor. v. 16, Col. ii. 1, 5. Here too the same contrast is in other passages denoted by *σῶμα* and *πνεῦμα*, 1 Cor. v. 3, 4; 2 Cor. x. 10. From this there is a natural progress in the development of the notion, when *σὰρξ* obtains the signification of the *earthly*

there is neither here any sufficient ground to depart from the otherwise allied representation every where met with, of abjectness, infirmity, and mortality.

[1] This might indeed be the real distinction in the New Testament use of *σὰρξ* and *κρέας*, not that commonly used of the living and dead flesh, compare Acts ii. 26, 31; Rev. xix. 21. In the classical use of language this distinction is also not a fixed one: therefore it has not merely *σαρκοφάγος* for a certain kind of coffin which, after our distinction, of the notion, could not surprise us, but also *σαρκοφάγος* and *σαρκοφαγία* in the strict sense, just so *σαρκοβόρος* and *σαρκοβορέω*, *σαρκολαβίς*, *σαρκίδιον*.

existence of man and of the conditions and relations peculiar to it. Thus *ζῆν, περιπατεῖν, ἐπιμένειν ἐν σαρκί*, Gal. ii. 20; 2 Cor. x. 3; Phil. i. 22, 24, further, especially Col. i. 22—*ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*, in the body of his earthly life—ver. 24. (in confirmation and explanation of which Heb. v. 7, x. 20, may be compared), then the *κατὰ σάρκι* in relation to Christ, Rom. i. 3, ix. 5 (Acts ii. 30?) There also belongs here Eph. ii. 15, where *τὴν ἔχθραν* depends upon *λύσας*, and is to be strictly united with the immediately following *ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ*. This *ἔχθρα* is the enmity between Israel and the Heathen, which still lasted so long as the earthly human existence of the Saviour continued, and which could only be removed by His expiatory death, which in connection with the sending of the Holy Spirit depending on the same, grounded an essentially new, over every preceding, absolutely exalted, relation of humanity in its entirety to God—*ἀποκτείνας τὴν ἔχθραν ἐν αὐτῷ* [sc. *τῷ σταυρῷ*—unless it is perhaps to be read: *ἐν αὐτῷ*].[1]—*Σὰρξ* has the same significance in 2 Cor. xi. 18; Gal. vi. 12, 13; Phil. iii. 3, 4; Eph. vi. 5; Col. iii. 22; Philem. 16, and indeed, so, that in all these passages the earthly human existence and its relations, all attributes, conditions, and activities which relate themselves to the position of man in the world, become conceived of in the formal contrast with the relation of man to God and Christ.[2] It lay then very near, to denote, with the Old Testament, human nature itself in its *present earthly stage of development*, and the individual creatures belonging to it especially conceived of, as one whole, by *σὰρξ*. Thus 1 Tim. iii. 16 (comp. John i. 14; 1 John iv. 2, 3), but also Rom. vi. 19; Gal.

[1] This conception of the deep passage which for the different moments of its thought finds explanatory analogies in Matt. x. 5, xv. 24; Gal. vi. 15; Col. iii. 11; 2 Cor. v. 16, 17; Col. i. 22, ii. 14; Heb. x. 20; John xvi. 7, appears to me more correct than that of *Harlesz* in his Commentary to this epistle, p. 216—234, which he has defended with great ability. It ever remains according to the connection of the passage somewhat forced, to refer the *μεσότοικον τοῦ φραγμοῦ*, therefore also *ἔχθρα*, to anything else than to the separation of Israel and the Heathen, and to place the progress of the thought of the reconciliation of both with *each other*, to the reconciling of both *with God* in any other place of the period than there, where this breaks off of itself, after *καταργήσας*.

[2] It is very deserving of observation that P. 2 Cor. xi. 23, seq. refers *κατὰ σάρκα καυχᾶσθαι*, ver. 18, also to the service of Christ—indeed only in so far as it also may be not genuine—with all his toils and sufferings.

iv. 13; further Rom. iii. 20; 1 Cor. i. 29; Gal. ii. 16 (comp. John xvii. 2; Matt. xxiv. 22; Luke iii. 6.)

In all these passages the notion of *σὰρξ*, whether it denote the external sphere of human existence in distinction from the internal, or the human in general in distinction from God and His efficiency, has nevertheless no immediate *ethical* significance. It first of all receives this, and therewith essentially oversteps the bounds within which the use of בָּשָׂר in the Old Testament confines itself, in so far as that necessary and guiltless distinction passes over into disjunction and real contrast. *Σὰρξ* is now no longer a particular, and in its place perfectly justified, sphere of human life, but a general *direction* of the same, that direction which in lust and passion is directed to the goods of this world, and is therefore turned away from God. *Σαρκικός, ἐν σαρκὶ ὤν, κατὰ σάρκα ὤν, ζῶν, περιπατῶν, στρατευόμενος* (Rom. vii. 14, viii. 4, 5, 8, 13; 1 Cor. iii. 3; 2 Cor. x. 2, 3), is man in so far as he is governed by this tendency. Resignation to the things of the *κόσμος* is essentially grounded in the proved genesis of the notion; the *ἐπιθυμία* (*ἐπιθυμίαι*) *τῆς σαρκὸς* in Paul, Gal. v. 16, 25; Eph. ii. 3, corresponds therefore entirely to the *ἐπιθυμία τοῦ κόσμου* in John, 1 Cor. ii. 17 (comp. the *ἐπιθυμίαι κοσμικαί*, Tit. ii. 12), while to the latter the *ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκὸς* is only a *given kind* of the *ἐπιθ. τοῦ κόσμου*, vers. 16. According to *Paul* himself the condition of *earthly-mindedness (Irdischgesinntsein)* Phil. iii. 19 is only a more objectively formed expression for the *mind of flesh*, Rom. viii. 6. On the contrary the principle of *selfishness* appears in the back-ground in the Pauline notion of *σὰρξ*. Thus this notion in our earlier genetic development of sin has its place there, where the principle of selfishness interposes and conceals itself by the *lust of the world* (comp. p. 164, seq.)

When the Apostle places *πνεῦμα* as the principle of everything good and holy in human life over against this *σὰρξ*, Gal. v. and Rom., viii. this cannot be interpreted of the *πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, either as it is distinguished from *σῶμα* or from *σῶμα* and *ψυχὴ*. How would this agree with the Pauline doctrine, that the *πνεῦμα* in this anthropological sense is itself susceptible of pollution, 2 Cor. vii. 1, and requires purification and sanctification just as much as *ψυχὴ* and *σῶμα*, 1 Thess. v. 23; 1 Cor. vii. 34; that it is that sphere of life which in the new birth is said

pre-eminently to become *renewed*, Eph. iv. 23; comp. Rom. xii. 2? The representation that the spirit of man cannot become corrupted, but only externally *limited* in its efficiency, and that sin is just the result of this limitation, cannot at all be ascribed to the Apostle according to what we have said, and when one commonly adduces Rom. vii. for the same, it rests, as we shall more clearly see, upon an unjustifiable generalization of this representation. The πνεῦμα in its ethical contrast with σὰρξ is not therefore, as *Usteri* expresses himself,[1] "the human spirit, if even always strengthened by the Divine Spirit," but the Divine Spirit itself, of course in so far as it is conceived of as operative and governing principle in man, appropriating to itself his spiritual life, the πνεῦμα τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, Rom. viii. 2, the πνεῦμα θεοῦ, Χριστοῦ, ver. 9, the πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐγείραντος Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐνοικοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν, ver. 11. Therefore the Apostle, Rom. vii. 6, places the καινότης πνεύματος over against the παλαιότης γράμματος, which indeed is itself in an objective point of view πνευματικὸν, ver. 14. And who could doubt that ἄγεσθαι τῷ πνεύματι, Gal. v. 18, corresponds in the mind of the Apostle entirely to ἄγεσθαι τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ θεοῦ, Rom. viii. 14? But it is out of the question, that in Gal. v. 16, 17, 22, 25, πνεῦμα is to be conceived of just as in ver. 18. If now notwithstanding interpreters have so often in this passage conceived of the human spirit instead of the Divine Spirit, it is explicable on this ground, apart from dogmatic prejudices, that the human spirit is just that which is susceptible of the operations of the Divine Spirit, Rom. viii. 10, 16.[2]—Also our German use of language has, according

[1] L. c. p. 43, ed. 4.

[2] Here too is easily shewn the relation of ἄνθρωπος ψυχικὸς, 1 Cor. ii. 14, with σαρκικός. If the spirit of man withdraws itself from the influence of the Divine Spirit, by which alone it is able really to become, what it ought to be, it falls under the punishment of its self-perversion in becoming serviceable to the lower powers of physical life, in which the relation of man to the world and time makes itself alone valid. These powers become the governing ones, entirely filling his consciousness and determining his will. Therefore it is that we find ψυχικὸς placed in contrast with πνευματικὸς, the spirit of which has its life principle in the spirit of God. Comp. the ψυχικοὶ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες in the Epistle of Jude, ver. 19, the σοφία ἐπίγειος, ψυχική, James iii. 15. The σῶμα ψυχικὸν in distinction from the σῶμα πνευματικὸν, 1 Cor. xv. 44, seq., serves also for explanation.

to the example of *Luther*, another denomination for πνευματικὸν in its contrast with σαρκικὸν as that of the merely spiritual *(das Geistige)*, namely, the Divinized spiritual, *(das Geistliche)*.—

In the most general significance he describes this contrast between πνεῦμα and σὰρξ, Gal. v. 13—25.[1] The flesh lusting against the spirit, ver. 17, is therefore the *life and movement of man in the things of the phenomenal world.* The flesh which is to become crucified, ver. 24, is just this, not the sensational nature of man, which to the unprejudiced investigator of Holy Scripture, must be so much the more clear, the less this crucifixion is capable of being explained by a mere "holding in restraint," *(im Zaume halten)* comp. δουλαγωγεῖν τὸ σῶμα, 1 Cor. ix. 27. This distinction of σὰρξ is just as easy to recognize 2 Cor. i. 17; Eph. ii. 3. ("We also formerly walked in the lusts of the worldly tendency of our life, separated from God.") The φυσιούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ νοὸς τῆς σαρκὸς οὐτοῦ, Col. ii. 18, is the puffed up, from his ungodly world-mind, who even in his apparent humilty and renunciation, nevertheless only seeks the gratification of this his vain world-mind. From this point of view it becomes clear how Paul is able exegetically to add to the words σαρκικοί ἐστι, 1 Cor. iii. 3: καὶ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε—namely, according to the mind of man separated from God, and therewith fallen down under subjection to worldly impulses. In the same general significance the Epistle to the Galatians treats the contrast between πνεῦμα and σὰρξ, chap. vi. 8, iii. 3.

In Rom. viii. 4—13 this antagonism between πνεῦμα and σὰρξ is conceived of in more decided relation to the life of the regenerate. From the signification of σὰρξ here developed it also follows, how Paul, ver. 7, can say of the φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς, that it is ἔχθρα εἰς θεὸν (with which compare 1 John ii. 15—18; James iv. 4), that it is not subject to the law of God, and that it also cannot be.—The πράξεις τοῦ σώματος, ver. 13, are indisputably the actions proceeding from sensational lust. If now to these, according to the structure of the sentence, the κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν at the beginning of the verse corresponds, it does not follow therefore that the two notions precisely cover one another, but only that they stand on one and the same side over against the πνεῦμα, and

[1] Compare *Neander*, l. c. p. 737, seq.

its works. The κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν relates to the πράξεις τοῦ σώματος as the genus to the species.

If we now turn our attention to Rom. vii. 14—25, we meet with the same contrast, still in another form. Before every thing we must remember, that in this place Paul describes a *given stage of the development* of the inward life, the representation being thereby still more individualizing, in that he gives in the same a reflection of his own experiences. The delineation of the life from faith in Christ first of all commences chap. viii. 1. As now according to apostolic doctrine only those, who are in Christ, have become participants of the spirit, the principal opposing itself to the power of sin prior to this turning point, cannot yet be the πνεῦμα (τοῦ θεοῦ.) And thus we also find that the Apostle otherwise denotes it; he denominates it ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, νοῦς, ver. 22, 23, 25.[1] But, on the other hand, the Apostle by no means intends to describe the condition of the unredeemed man in general, also including therefore the *undisturbed service of sin;* for in the latter the σὰρξ, is in the one or other form the alone prevailing: there nothing can be said of a real conflict of the same with an opposing principle. But in the condition which Paul describes, such a conflict is manifestly present, compare especially ver. 23. It is true the Divine principle over against man only first of all appears as law, nevertheless excites in the same the approval of itself, the wish to be in agreement with it also in life, and *in so far* a will conformable to the law; but this will has not the power to determine and to pervade the real life of man in its manifold spheres, if even only in its very beginning, because for this purpose there is wanting to him the power of redemption. Where now this striving after unison with the Divine law, the significance of which begins to disclose to the spirit itself more perfectly, has once been awakened,

[1] Indisputably Paul had been able to ascribe the συνήδεσθαι and δουλεύειν τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ also to the πνεῦμα, namely, τοῦ ἀνθρωπόν, but he chose the above denominations in preference, partly, because they in themselves rather than πνεῦμα, which predominantly includes in itself the accessory notion of power, present themselves there for use, where this higher element of our being in its powerlessness to realize itself by a corresponding form of the entire life, is said to become exhibited; partly to avoid confounding the same with the Divine principle of all true renovation in sinful man, with the πνεῦμα in the highest sense.

there it must also become recognized as the inmost self of man as a deep reflection of the same upon himself; therefore the epithet ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, ver. 22, therefore also the separation of the real Ego from the act of sin, ver. 17, 19. But in such an one the sinful being is thrust out into the *relatively external* sphere of existence, where it, while in the inward a better impulse already exalts itself, still indeed maintains its undisturbed dominion; therefore the representation of the good will as of one hindered by sin dwelling in the σὰρξ, ver. 18, therefore also the conception of the power of sin in such a man as of a captivating νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι, ver. 23, and therefore also the contrast: τῷ μὲν νοὶ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ· τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας, ver. 25.[1]) Since now ἁμαρτία is still distinguished from σὰρξ and the latter only conceived of in this condition as the peculiar *seat* of the former, the notion of σὰρξ is, strictly taken, still decidedly to be confined to the stage of the moral indifferent anthropological signification, which we have earlier shown. It denotes the *collective phenomenal manifested existence of man*, the life of the same in the world according to all his relations. As according to this ver. 25 obtains a definite, adequate thought, and free from all tautology, and as therewith the contrast in chap. viii. 4, the μὴ κατὰ σάρκα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα περιπατεῖν of the redeemed appears pure and distinct, so now also the stone of stumbling in ver. 18 becomes removed, the words of which: οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου ἀγαθόν, otherwise, let one translate σὰρξ by "sensationalism" or by "the life severed from God, governed by selfishness," or indeed by "immoral disposition of mind," furnish an equally strange sense.[2]) If σὰρξ is just the collective

[1] For the individual passages *Tholuck's Kommentar in der neuen Ausarbeitung* (1842) especially contains most striking observations entering in to the very pith of the question. A few deviations in the interpretation become apparent. When *Tholuck*, Rom. vii. 18, *now* translates σὰρξ by "sphere of the sensational nature," I am obliged with respect to even this passage to regard it as a too narrow, or still in any case unintelligible expression.

[2] By the second and third opinion there follows of course the tautology of the sentence, by the first opinion it appears partly inadequate to substitute sensational nature for the Ego, partly superfluous to maintain that in the sensational nature good (according to the connection, without doubt, moral good) does not reside.

phenomenal reality of human life, the Apostle could very well explain the ἐν ἐμοὶ by ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου.

Lastly, two declarations appear to furnish a strong support for the opinion, that the Apostle derives sin from sense, in which conversion is said to be represented, Rom. vi. 6; Col. ii. 11, as a destruction, or stripping off of the body of sin, of sense (σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, σῶμα τῆς σαρκός.) Let us examine these passages a little more closely. If σῶμα, Col. ii. 11, signifies, as indeed most modern commentators assume, the *real body* of man, the ἀπέκδυσις τοῦ σωματός, quite analogous to ἐκδύσασθαί, 2 Cor. v. 4, cannot possibly denote anything else than the physical death, never the subordination of the body and its impulses to the spirit. The καταργεῖν τὸ σῶμα, Rom. vi. 6, allows in itself indisputably the translation: to deprive the body of its power. But as the καταργεῖν τὴν κοιλίαν, 1 Cor. vi. 13, refers to physical death, it would also in that passage, on account of the immediately preceding, and on account of the succeeding ver. 7, be certainly more natural to understand the καταργεῖν τὸ σῶμα of the destruction of the body by death. The added genitives τῆς σαρκός, τῆς ἁμαρτίας, could not, under the presupposition of this conception, so alter the sense, as that, according to the apostolic representation, it is now no longer the body which is governed by sensational passions, which is apprehended by sin, but only just the sensational passions, the sins which are said to become stripped off, to be destroyed. But as now the Apostle, what no one will dispute, does not speak of death in the real sense in either of the passages, the body cannot strictly be conceived of. And here we meet with the connection by which a *figurative* conception becomes very closely allied to both passages. Not only the comparison, Rom. vi., of the regeneration of man by Christ, extends to physical death and resurrection, but Paul, immediately before these words, ver. 6, uses the image of the σταυρωθῆναι τὸν παλαιὸν ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπον; how natural it appears there to represent the mass of sin as a body, which, in the death of the old man, has been deprived of life! Also Col. ii. 11 stands in the greater connection of a figurative representation, which, making its beginning there, is carried on to chap. iii. ver. 9, and in which the moments of moral renovation by Christ

become conceived of as death, burial, and resurrection, with Christ. In this connection it is indeed grounded that the Apostle might represent the old sinful nature as a body which the Christian put off in the new birth (comp. iii. 9), in order to become clothed with a new one, with that of the *νέος ἄνθρωπος*. *Σὰρξ* is then to be understood entirely as in the *σῶμα τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ* (*τοῦ Χριστοῦ*), i. 22, of the earthly human life, of course within that figurative representation. In explanation, Col. iii. 5 especially serves: *νεκρώσατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, πορνείαν, ἀκαθαρσίαν κ. τ. λ.* If here, according to the grammatical structure of the sentence, the *πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία*, &c., are to be regarded as specification of the *μέλη ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*, different kinds of sins become represented as members of the body of the old man given up to the earthly.[1]—

It is to be hoped that by these discussions it has been satisfactorily proved that Paul does not deduce sin from the sensational nature, that his contrast of *πνεῦμα* and *σὰρξ*, as ethical principles, by no means corresponds to our contrast of the spiritual (rational) and sensational nature of man.

When the Apostle derives the individual forms of sin from *σὰρξ* this depends upon the perception, according to the results of our investigation, that man in his separation from God, in his

[1] *K. A. Fr. Fritzsche* gives another explanation of this passage, *im Komm. zum Br. an die Röm.*, vol. i. p. 386: Haec P. Mens est: Enecate corporis vestri membra, quae in terrae orbe habetis (np. *cupiditatum quas accendunt ardore restincto)*, enecate, inquam, scortationem, etc. But, in the first place, it is somewhat violent to break the close connection of the *πορνείαν, ἀκαθαρσίαν*, and in order to obtain a new beginning to push into the translation enecate, inquam. So then it is difficult to see by this conception what indeed the words: *τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*, which as the suppressed contrast, *μέλη τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς*— therefore perhaps the members of the resurrection body?—are strictly said to require; for to wish to explain them by a retrospective relation to the *τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*, ver. 2, would lead to an absurd representation. According to our conception, it is clear that *τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς* is nothing less than superfluous. The *μέλη* (*τοῦ νέου ἀνθρωπόυ*) *τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς* would then be the Christian virtues standing over against those vices. It is thereby in general necessary carefully to observe the above symbolic character remarked upon of the entire passage from chap. ii. 11. Still *Tholuck* also regards this conception of Col. iii. 5 as impossible, L. c. p. 313. On the contrary, it is to be found among modern interpreters of this epistle in *Bähr* and *Böhmer* v. on the passage.

state of abandonment to the κόσμος, is able to bring forth nothing truly good from himself, but only carries in himself the perpetually flowing fountain of sin and of death. And that this consciousness of the vanity and helplessness of all human thinkings and imaginings, apart from fellowship with God, belongs to the fundamental perceptions of the biblical doctrine in general and of the Pauline in particular, surely does not require first of all to be proved. Thus just in this penetrating relation of sin to the flesh the knowledge expresses itself in Paul, that the real origin of sin is not to be sought for in the relation of the creature to himself, nor in any one difference in its own being, but only *in its relation to God.* The notion of σὰρξ is not to be obtained from mere anthropology, but only from the depth of the religious consciousness.—Paul does not overlook the comprehensive signification which the rebellion of sensational nature, and its impulse against the spirit, has for the development and phenomenon. But this condition of rebellion is itself again, as Paul distinctly enough intimates, Rom. i. 18—32, only the consequence of man's not following the original bias Godward, and his not observing that his will is not the absolutely holy one.

That the notion of σὰρξ according to Paul stretches far beyond that of sensational nature, has also not been overlooked by the great Church fathers of different times. In the earlier time it is definitely declared, especially by *Augustine*;[1] in the middle ages *Anselm*[2] and *Thomas von Aquino*[3] pre-eminently attach themselves to him. The greatest among the Reformers, *Luther*,[4] *Melancthon*,[5] *Calvin*,[6] are agreed in the same; and according to their precedence the wider conception of the notion of σὰρξ, which even the great Catholic theologian *Bellarmin* recognizes at least in many passages of the New Testament, is the prevalent one in the old Protestant

[1] *De civitate Dei*, lib. xiv., c. 2 and 4.
[2] *Opera, ed. Gerberon*, epist. 133.
[3] *Summa, prima*, sec. qu. 72, art. 2.
[4] *De servo arbitrio ed. Seb. Schmid*, p. 167, 178.
[5] *Loci theol. ed. Augusti*, p. 20. *Comment in Epist. ad Rom.* at cap. 7, 14, cap. 8, 7.
[6] *Instit. rel. Christ.* lib. ii., c. 1, sect. 9. *Comment. in ep. ad Rom.* at cap. 7, ver. 18. Still it is not very exact when *Calvin* in this place thus determines the Pauline contrast between πνεῦμα and σὰρξ: utrumque nomen in animam competit, sed alterum, qua parte est regenerata, alterum, qua naturalem adhuc affectum retinet.

dogmatics.[1] In our time reference is especially to be made to the succinct development of this notion which *Neander* has given in his history of the planting of the Church by the Apostles.[2]

[1] Lib. V. *De amiss. gratiæ*, c. 7, 15. He generally however takes σὰρξ for sensualitas.

[2] Vol. 2, p. 662 seq. Compare p. 737 seq. Besides this, *Stirm* in the Anthropologico exegetical investigations, *Tüb. Zeitscher. für. Theol.* 1834. H. 3, treats the Pauline notion of σὰρξ in a sense essentially correct, although not without some obscure vacillations in the detail; less thoroughly *Olshausen*, *de naturae humanae trichotomia N. T.* scriptoribus recepta, *Haulesz Kommentar über den Br. P. an die Ephesier*, p. 162 seq., *Klaiber die neutestamentliche Lehre von der Sünde und Erlösung*, p. 29 seq., *Frommann*, *der. Johanneische Lehrbegriff*, p. 311 seq., *Beck*, *christliche. Lehrwissenschaft*, p. 276 seq.

APPENDIX.

THE RELATION OF KANT'S OPINION OF THE ORIGIN OF EVIL TO ITS DERIVATION FROM SENSE.

As the derivation of evil from sensationalism is one deeply rooted in, and pervading, the entire mode of thought and culture of the former century, its express confirmation has often been supposed to be found in the sphere of philosophy, in the greatest production of this thinking, in the criticism of *Kant*. And at the first blush of the matter this opinion appears capable of being very well justified. Does not *Kant* everywhere tell us that evil only consists in the perverted maxims (*Maxime*), subordinating the law of practical reason to the sensational impulses, in making the gratification of the sensational inclinations, which he subjectively conceived of, as comprehended under the notion of self-love, according to its object, under that of self-satisfaction, the condition of obedience to the law? And according to him is human freedom anything else than the ability of man to determine his conduct purely from the representation of the law of practical reason, independently of every sensational impulse, nay in opposition to it? And in the light of this philosophy, is it not, as such, together with this form of a universal law, to which it is essentially attached, that alone of which the intelligible nature (*Wesen*) of man can become conscious, and this only in so far as it is necessary for practical use? Accordingly if moral evil cannot possibly have its ground in freedom, nor in the intelligible being of man, what remains over, but that we deduce it from sensational nature?

And upon this stand-point, this will with difficulty be otherwise brought about, than by seeking the origin of evil in a *hindrance*, which the sensational nature of man opposes to his spiritual essential nature, and its manifestation in the phenomenal world, therefore on the other side in a powerlessness of the intelligible character of man, purely to represent itself in the empirical

world. And with this many expressions in the "*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*," and in the "*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*," very well agree; indeed in the "*metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Rechtslehre*" the possibility of deviating from the inward legislation of reason is expressly declared to be an *inability*, and every deduction of evil from freedom excluded.[1] But it is clear that by this, moral evil sinks down to a notion of mere *privation*, just as in *Leibnitz*, and indeed in such a manner, that, as with him, it has its real ground in the metaphysical imperfection of the creature, so here in the inability of the creature, purely to represent its intelligible character in its empirical existence, conditioned by space and time—by which then in judging of real life, the resolution of the antithesis of good and evil, into a mere distinction of degree, is unavoidable. It stands in close connection with this that *Kant* everywhere zealously seeks to deprive man of the hope, that at any period of his future development he will arrive at the goal of holiness, or get beyond that stage where the notions of reverence for moral law, duty, and virtue are the highest; that he regards a condition in which man loves to fulfil (*gern* erfüllt) the requirements of the law, as irreconcilable with the nature of a sensational, rational being, and recompenses us, for tearing away our prospects of a real freedom from every variance, with the Tantalian blessedness of an endless approximation to the goal of moral perfection.[2]

If, with these results, we turn our attention to that treatise of *Kant*, in which he expressly makes moral evil the subject of investigation, to his "*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloszen Vernunft*," we shall be surprised at finding here the development of an opinion which runs in the very teeth of the above sentences. The derivation of evil from sensational nature, is here expressly rejected, and indeed from the twofold ground, because the sensational inclinations have no direct relation to evil, and because the

[1] L. c. Introduction p. xxviii. (2 ed.) This remark at the same time very definitely refers evil only to man *as sensational being*. The natural extension of the *Kantian* theory, *on this side*, is the Fichtian doctrine of the original inertness of human nature, as the ground of evil, to which the identifying of morality, as of conduct, according to the idea of pure independency, with freedom, in the Fichtian sense, corresponds.

[2] V. especially *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, p. 89, 107, 122, 178, 189. (Ed. 6.)

imputation of evil becomes thereby removed; in order firmly to retain the latter, the origin of evil is transferred to the thing in itself, to the *intelligible being* of man, therefore to *freedom* determining itself independently of all conditions of time, to freedom which applies to man as *noumenon*.[1]

But how are we to reconcile maintenances so contradictory? Shall we not be obliged at last to acquiesce in the opinion of those among the adherents of *Kant*, who not at all knowing how to reconcile themselves to this radical evil, seek to obviate the difficulty by regarding it as an inexplicable lapsus of their great master, from himself, as a sort of mystic paroxysm in an hour of weakness, as an aberration of the sober understanding, the serious consequences of which had developed themselves in *Erhard's Apologie des Teufels*, and still further in *Daub's Judas Ischarioth?*[2] Indeed even *Schelling*, although of course his judgment of the value of this opinion of *Kant*, as compared with that sensational theory, is the very opposite, appears to favour the

[1] L. c. *erstes Stück:* On the indwelling of the evil principle in human nature together with the good, especially p. 21 seq., 27, 39 seq., (2d ed.)

[2] Among these obviating attempts of his pupils, one of the more remarkable is that of *J. A. W. Geszner's* work: "*über den Ursprung des sittlich Bösen im Menschen*," which endeavours to turn back the critical philosophy from its bold flight to the kingdom of the intelligible, into the well-known regions of the sensational, in order there to discover the ground of evil. The work contains many sagacious and striking remarks against *Kant's* opinion; but it shews at the same time, by its own example, at what a cost, upon this stand-point, liberation from radical evil grounded in an intelligible act, must be purchased—at no less an one than that of moral *imputation*. The mighty stumblingstone of this radical evil, which *Kant* rolls in the way, becomes broken by *Geszner* into innumerable little stones, in order therewith to construct the path of a natural successive development out of the dominion of sense into the dominion of the spirit.—Also *Ehrh. Schmid*, in his "*Versuch einer Moralphilosophie*," finds the doctrine of his master on this point *unendurably hard:* he is not able to understand, how he was able to say, that the rational nature *(Wesen)* produces its own character, if therewith also the inward source of transgressions is to be meant, that every thing which springs from the arbitrariness of man, as every premeditated evil action committed, has at the ground a free causality, l. c. p. 342, 343, (2d ed.) Had these emendators of *Kant* only considered, that if he had only wished to accommodate himself to the friendly doctrine, that man has imputed to his will only the good which he does, but not the evil, *Kant* had just been no longer *Kant*, the inspired prophet of the moral law and of its stern inviolability.

opinion that he had only arrived at the same later in life, contradictory to his former method of representation.[1]

Nevertheless, also this way of escape is debarred us, for already the *Critick of Pure Reason*, contains in its investigations concerning the relation of freedom to nature-necessity, the unmistakable ground basis of that first part in the "*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloszen Vernunft.*"[2] Then too it is not difficult to see that *Kant*, from the highest principles of his system, could not possibly arrive at any other result. For how were it indeed conceivable that the phenomenal world, which is only the reflex, in the sensationally perceptive forms (*Anschauungsformen*) of space and time, of the noumenal world, could be possessed of *independence*, and exercise a reaction? If man as noumenon, therefore as standing without and above all time, is found in real union with the law of practical reason, how were it conceivable that as phenomenon he should find himself in contradiction with it? For what can the empirical character of man, according to its good and evil elements, otherwise be, than the phenomenon of his intelligible character, which entirely determines it?—What too the *Critick of Pure Reason* expressly recognizes?[3] And if *Kant* every where sets out from the axiom,—the interposition of which must form the transition from the consciousness of a law of the practical reason to the notion of freedom:—what man ought to do, he must also be able to do, the fact, that he does *not* at least *always* what he ought, can manifestly not have its ground in weakness and inability, but only in *unwillingness*, which is only explicable by freedom; but this, as independence of the natural law of phenomenon, can only apply to man as noumenon. If even according to the fundamental tenets of the *Critick of Practical Reason*, evil were to be regarded as the preventing cause (*Hemmung*) of the perfect union of man with the law which merely attaches to the phenomenon, this

[1] *Philos. Scriften*, p. 472. It is true that *Schelling* conceived of the Kantian doctrine of evil differently at an earlier period, *in den Abhandlungen über den Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre aus den Jahren* 1796—97, compare l. c. p. 322 sq.

[2] In the section: *Auflösung der kosmologischen Idee von der Totalität der Ableitung der Weltbegebenheiten aus ihren Ursachen*, especially p. 429—433. (7. ed.)

[3] P. 422, 431, 432.

prevention could not be regarded as an *imposed one (Gehemmtwerden)*, but absolutely only as *self-imposed*—as sinful omission or neglect of the freedom which ought to be identical with reason.—The necessity of evil arising from intelligible freedom, may in this way also be shewn in the sense of *Kant*. According to the fundamental principles of criticism, it is just the requirement of the practical reason, and it alone, which, by virtue of its unconditionality, elevates man above the world of phenomenon into the kingdom of the intelligible. If now the real conduct of man were in direct unison with this requirement, there would be no difficulty here. But the moral reality of man stands in manifold contradiction to the moral idea. If this contradiction is to be explained by regarding human freedom as the necessary correlate of that intelligible requirement of reason *as not having the power*, properly to realize itself, this freedom itself, as intelligible becomes sacrificed, but therewith also the possibility of recognizing the practical law of reason in its unconditionality, therefore in the only transition from the sensational world into the intelligible, the Kantian fundamental principle according to its affirmative side is given up. Therefore evil must be deduced from intelligible freedom itself.

If now *Kant*, on the other side, in his "Religion within the boundary of mere reason," treats evil just as decidedly as in his earlier writings, as a subordination of a requirement of the law to the sensational impulse, we shall have to regard as the abiding fundamental opinion of *Kant* in relation to our question, the sentence: that the *object* which man seeks in sin, belongs it is true to the sensible, but its *source* to the intelligible world, that evil has not its origin in sensational nature, but in an intelligible act of the human spirit transcending the empirical existence and conditioning the same, whereby the maxims taken up into his will occasionally subordinate the motives of the moral law to the sensational impulses.[1] The distinction, between noumenon and phenomenon, in this Kantian opinion corresponds of course entirely with its dualism between duty and inclination, virtue and

[1] *Kant* denominates this by a very strange, and yet in the ground, necessary expression for him, namely, the *rational origin* of evil action in contrast with the *time-origin* of the same as mere phenomenon. *Rel. in der Gr. der bl. Vern*, p. 40, 43, 46, and in other places.

self-satisfaction; only the phenomenon in its resistance of, and superordination over, the noumenon, in the form of an impulse to self-satisfaction, does not receive this from itself, and by an original necessity, but receives it first of all from a self-perversion of the noumenon.

By this it will naturally, before all, be expected of us that we make the absolutely inconceivable conceivable, how a pure intelligible essence *(Wesenheit)*, the maxims in general, *could* assume to invest the sensational impulses and inclinations, the objects of which, for it, as merely intelligible, have no reality whatever, with a preponderance over its law, that is to say, over itself. If this inconceivability is perhaps to become justified by the transcendence of the intelligible, one cannot certainly earnestly enough protest against a procedure, which creates at pleasure contradictions within the very essential nature of man, and then employs the x of the thing in itself as loophole by which to avoid the requirement of solution. At the same time it is clear, that it was an essential extension of this theory when *Schelling* in his treatise: *Philosophie und Religion*, and after his precedence, *Daub* in his *Judas Ischarioth*, gave to this intelligible primitive act another, and certainly conceivable contents, that of a fall from the absolute to the state of independent existence *(Fürsichsein.)* Especially is it only a conclusion from antecedents, which in *Kant* lie plain enough before the eyes of him who is willing to see, when from this stand-point the existence of the phenomenal world became regarded as the result of that primitive fall.

Further there ever remains also in the above fixation of *Kant's* fundamental opinion, an altogether insolvable contradiction, when he on the one hand attaches freedom just as closely and inseparably to the law of the practical reason, as the natural cause is bound to the law of nature, when he maintains, that that practical law must have causality just as necessarily in relation to the free action of man as in nature, nothing can happen without a cause, which works according to laws, that a freedom which does not work according to the law of practical reason gives the idea of effects without cause, and is therefore a non-ens;[1]—and then on

[1] *Grundlegung zur Metaph. der Sitten.* p. 98, 118 (1791 ed.) *Kr. der pr. Vern.* p. 43, 49, 60, and in other places. Freedom and practical reason are, according to this side of the Kantian opinion, only

the *other side* he is obliged to regard freedom of the will as an ability, from which not merely the good, but also the evil proceeds, therefore the contradiction to the moral law. This perplexing ambiguity in the use of the notion of freedom which pervades the entire practical side of this philosophy, has been already conclusively shewn by *Herbart*.[1] The contradictoriness in this treatment of the notion of freedom, is in a measure concealed by *Kant's* commonly avoiding this expression where the origin of evil is spoken of, and by his rather speaking of a reversion *(Umkehrung)* of the motives in the general maxim of *arbitrariness*, of a rooting of evil in *arbitrariness*. But if indeed evil conduct is said to have its ground in the intelligible character of man, in what else can then this arbitrariness have its root than in his freedom as noumenon? Or if we should make an earnest matter of the distinction between arbitrariness and freedom in this respect, so that the notion of freedom were really only to be thought of in unity with the law: should we not be obliged necessarily to place in the intelligible being of man still an ability of arbitrariness, besides that of freedom, from which *evil* could then *only* originate? But to him who finds offence in an intelligible freedom which has in it the possibility of good *and* evil, how will such an intelligible arbitrariness appear to him in any other light than as being absolutely unendurable? Would not thereby the contradictions, which according to this theory absolutely lay waste the kingdom of the intelligible, only still more be increased, since together with the moral law and obedience to its command, also the transgression of the same, and then again the negation of this transgression by repentance and improvement, have in it their origin?—

The deep and true moments in *Kant's* doctrine of evil, together with the errors which they conceal, will again come before us in other parts of our investigations. Here we have only had to exhibit in brief the relation of this doctrine to the derivation of evil from sensational nature.

different expressions for one and the same thing; freedom is the practical reason in so far as it has causality, the practical reason is freedom in so far as it is law to itself.

[1] *Gespräche über das Böse*, p. 145, sq.

THIRD CHAPTER.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S OPINION OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF SIN.

Rosenkranz in his critique of *Schleiermacher's Dogmatic (Glaubenslehre)*, objects to the author of the same, that he does not find the principle of madness, which we term evil, in the spirit, nor in freedom, nor in the will, but in *sense*. *Schleiermacher* would scarcely be willing to appropriate this to himself as being somewhat inexact; but that the objection according to the matter itself is not void of ground, the first glance at his treatment of the doctrine of sin must convince every one. For this reason a short examination of the Schleiermachian derivation of sin finds here its most natural place. As to how that complaint stands related to the treatment of the point in question, in the doctrine of faith *(Glaubenslehre)*, we have here principally to do; still we may call to our aid for the explanation of the same, what *Schleiermacher* has taught in his other writings, concerning the nature and origin of evil in man.

The "*Entwurf eines System der Sittenlehre*" (sketch of a system of moral doctrine), published by *Al. Schweizer*, from *Schleiermacher's* posthumous writings, determines the notion of evil only in a passing manner, in order to ground its exclusion from the sphere of this science; still he says enough to confirm the above conception: As the good is here laid down as the attained unity of reason and nature, the evil on the other hand, is determined, in documents of an earlier date, as the negative factor in the process of the developing union of reason and nature, somewhat later, as a negative expression for the original non-rational being *(Nichtvernunftsein)* of nature, and ultimately as the separation of reason and nature in every individual moral sphere[1]—formulæ, which collectively lead to a *hindering resistance*

[1] L. c. § 91, p. 52, 54. Compare the note to p. 32 of this work.

of *the sensational side of our being against the spiritual.* Upon this too depends the remarkable designation of evil occasionally met with here as of an action of nature, to which there corresponds a suffering of the reason.[1]

But if we ask, how it is at all possible, to ascribe to the reason in this relation, a suffering, and to the sensational nature, an activity, determining the reason, therefore an action upon the reason, we find no answer to this question in the doctrine of Ethics, but the academical treatise "*on the distinction between natural, and moral law*" *(ueber den Unterschied zwischen Naturgesetz und Sittengesetz)*, which is of great value for ascertaining the angle about which the philosophical opinion of *Schleiermacher* turns.[2] Here we learn, that the "spirit entering into earthly existence, must become a quantum,[3] and as such appears insufficient in an oscillating life in the individual, in relation to the subordinated functions;" and in this insufficiency the deviations from the moral law, which is the pure and perfect expression for the nature and efficiency of intelligence, have their ground. The relation in the sphere of nature is quite analagous to this. Namely, if we must regard the notions of species, as true laws of nature, we meet with everywhere in this sphere, in the diseases of plants and animals, malformations and the like, numerous deviations from law, depending on this, that the real principle of every step has not yet perfectly subordinated to itself the potencies of the former. It follows of course that the subordinate functions, out of the power of which, as not being fully overcome by the spirit, evil, that which strives against the moral law, originates, are those of animal life.[4]

1 L. c. § 109, p. 71.

2 *Abhandl. der Berl. Akademie der Wiss. a. d. J.* 1825 *philos. Klasse* p. 27—30.

3 What, it is true, the "*Entwurf eines Systems der Sittenlehre*" expressely denies of the reason, and declares to be impossible, § 104, p. 64, and yet is this reason, as this same outline tells us, to be able to *suffer* from the quantitatively determinable nature?

4 Compare *Abhandl. der Berl. Ak. a. d. J.* 1819, *philos. Klasse*, p. 10 *(in der Abh. über den Tugendbegriff)*. If we could admit that the notions of species were to be regarded as laws of nature, still, in this parallelizing of the disturbances in the natural and moral life, there is a specific difference which could not remain unobserved, namely, while in those phenomena of nature, under the above supposition, given moments

The *Dogmatic* does not appear to us to maintain anything at all different to this. Here sin is denoted as a hindrance of the determining power of the spirit, caused by the independency of the sensational functions, or as a *positive resistance of the flesh against the spirit.*[1] The notion of the flesh, it is true, is not strictly that of Paul, but still also not entirely that of many modern theologians, who understand the body thereby, but it is determined as the totality of the so-called lower powers of the soul. But by this there is not a real diversity of view laid down; *Schleiermacher* has only by virtue of better anthropological notions *said* that which those in reality *mean;* for the body separate from the soul is dead stuff, there is not applied to it, strictly speaking, but to the soul, as that which animates the body, sensational sensibility and sensational impulse. But the other moment of the contrast, the notion of the *spirit, Schleiermacher* nowhere expressly explains; but only occasionally somewhat more approximately determines this notion, by employing as synonymous with it the expression: place of the God-consciousness.[2] This expression favours the idea, as if the spirit, the state of hindrance, or curtailment of the activity of which *(Gehemmtsein)* is sin, were the place for still other functions besides the God-consciousness, the hindrances of which by the sensational nature, must, according to the determination of that notion, be equally regarded as sin. But that this latter is by no means *Schleiermacher's* meaning, that much rather his notion of sin is none other than just that of *resistance against the determining power of the God-consciousness,* the paragraphs preceding, as well as following, the 66th, place beyond a doubt.

Here now the threads of the consideration become confusing. How indeed can it be explained that the *Schleiermachian* notion of

of natural law, the efficiency of which one should here expect, appear under restraint, or paralyzed, they nevertheless always take place according to natural law in general. On the contrary in moral evil, as such, while a moment of the law of the will is thereby actually contradicted, no other moments of this law do in any way become realized.

[1] *Der christliche Glaube,* Part 1, § 66, 2 (2 ed.)

[2] L. c. p. 398. The explanation which the first edition of the *Glaubenslehre* gives of the spirit is very remarkable, namely: that in us which produces the consciousness of God.

the spirit, which, although subjectively conceived of, still, in reference to the Christian life, is in its extent analogous to the Pauline notion of πνεῦμα, while the other member of the contrast, the flesh, embraces, according to him, a much narrower sphere than it does according to Paul? How is it, that by *Paul*, the Godly and the worldly, the human in its independency, stand opposed to each other, but by *Schleiermacher* the Divine and the sensational are opposed to each other? Does *Schleiermacher* really mean, that the spirit in distinction from the lower powers of the soul, is *only* place for the God-consciousness, and for nothing else? Were, according to his opinion, our being so constituted that in the animal nature the Divine consciousness is sown merely as germ of heavenly life, so that man is not at all essentially different from an animal, save that he has religion? This may have been maintained by others, *e.g.* by *Jean Paul*, although indeed scarcely in right earnest; but that *Schleiermacher* is far from this, we learn from his teaching us to regard the God-consciousness as the highest in human life, that to him the sphere below the God-consciousness contains much more than the sensational activities of life, the weaving and working of the lower powers of the soul; concerning this, the introduction to his dogmatics, especially paragraph 5, allows no room whatever for doubt. But then we must again ask: why do the disturbances of the Divine harmony of life, which spring from the higher places of this sphere under the God-consciousness, remain entirely overlooked in the section which treats of sin as condition of man? Or where is the proof given, that out of this higher region above the sensational activities of life, a resistance against the determining power of the God-consciousness *could* not break forth? Indeed how is it to be thought of, apart from its proof in experience, that the entire activities of the higher powers of the soul were so essentially one with the God-consciousness, as to make it ever impossible for them to withdraw from it?[1]—

If in such absence of all counsel we turn to *the introduction to*

[1] Because it treats of the unity of the God-consciousness in this sense, the difficulty cannot be solved by one's calling to his aid the proof out of the *Schleiermachian Dialectik*, § 214 sq., how all knowing and determining have for the transcendental ground of their possibility, the idea of the Absolute as the highest unity of all contrasts.

the Glaubenslehre, to see if it is able to give us light on these obscure relations of the notion, we find here too, § 4 and 5, the distinction between God-consciousness and sensational self-consciousness; but we immediately perceive that here the notion of sense has a different, a much wider significance than there. All excitations of the self-consciousness in which *the world*, the totality of divided individual being, is co-determining factor, belong to its sphere; and these excitations, just because everywhere in this sphere a reaction of our self-activity against that which works upon us is possible, divide themselves partly into feelings of dependence, and partly into feelings of freedom. "Here," *Schleiermacher* says, § 5, 1, "are also included those determinations of self-consciousness, which we have above laid down (paragraph 4, 2) as those approximating the nearest to the feeling of absolute dependence, so that under the expression, sense, we have also to understand the social and moral feelings, no less than the selfish, since indeed they have collectively their place in the sphere of individuation and of contrast." On the contrary, in the God-consciousness there is expressed[1] the feeling of an absolute dependence, which, just as such, cannot refer to the world, since the relation to this, even as a whole, ever falls in the consciousness as that merely of relative dependence, thus with the possibility of reaction—but to God, as standing above all contrasts. This feeling of absolute dependence, as relating to the unity, standing above all contrasts, in and for itself absolutely simple, and therefore also timeless, can only really become phenomenon in time, first of all inwardly as pious condition of mind, by its uniting itself with some one of the manifold determinations of the sensational self-consciousness.[2]

[1] *Schleiermacher* uses this expression, § 5, postscript, and appears to distinguish by the same between the feeling of absolute dependence and the God-consciousness, as between that which manifests itself and the manifestation. That, however, could only be the case, if he understood by the God-consciousness only the product of the uniting of the feeling of absolute dependence with a moment of the sensational consciousness, but he does not do this.

[2] The explanation of these relations in the first edition of the *Dogmatics*, § 9—11, is in part more clear and definite by the second, but also in part, in essential moments, withdrawn, especially so, with respect to the "amalgamation" of both grades of the consciousness in the pious excitation, compare p. 43, 45, 46 of the 1st ed. with p. 29, 32 of the 2d.

Here indeed we meet with a significant contradiction. First of all we learn (p. 28) that the consciousness of absolute dependence, where it has once made its appearance in human life, and so long as it is at all there, is always (as a constant, abiding one) there, in an uniform and equal manner, just as this also necessarily follows, according to *Schleiermacher's* fundamental tenets, from the simplicity and timelessness of that consciousness. Very shortly after however (p. 29), in relation to such a life, in which the God-consciousness is already present, he speaks of moments of a mere sensational consciousness as really to be met with; indeed the idea of the constant mutual-pervasion of both forms of the self-consciousness, previously sinks down to a mere *requirement*, to a future *imperative* of the reality, p. 33, 34, comp. § 60, 1, 63, 3 of the *Glaubenslehre*. It will be hereafter seen that this remarkable, and for the further development, deeply pervading disunion in the presuppositions, is also of very significant influence for the subject of our question.

When now this 5th §, p. 32 and 33, further lays down the distinction between the easier, and more difficult, procedure *(Hervortreten)* of the higher self-consciousness (of the easier or more difficult uniting of the feeling of absolute dependence with a determinateness of sensational consciousness), and from this distinction deduces the contrast of joy and sorrow in the sphere of religion: we may expect that we are here on the deciding point, where the consciousness of sin arises. Where else will it have its ground than in that same moment of our sensational consciousness, which, with respect to the finite, finds itself restrained in its union with the absolute feeling of dependence? This anticipation becomes fully confirmed, first of all, by the introduction to the doctrine of sin, § 62—64, as well as by some determinations in § 66. Here *Schleiermacher* developes how every hindrance of the tendency to the God-consciousness, by a moment of the sensational consciousness, excites displeasure in us, and further, how we have *the consciousness of sin* when the God-consciousness co-ordinated in a condition of the mind, determines our self-consciousness as one that is displeasing to us. But if now *Schleiermacher*, misled by the ambiguity in his own use of the word, sense, places in the further explanation of this § 66, as well as in the following paragraphs, this preventing cause

entirely in the functions of the lower life, in the flesh, according to his conception of this notion above given, while he still in the manner of his using the corresponding notion of spirit, firmly retains the exclusive relation to the God-consciousness: it is a confounding of two notions of entirely different extent (the sensational nature, as totality of the functions, which refer to the relation of man to the world, and the sensational nature, as totality of the functions of the lower animal life) which nothing can justify, and becomes the source of that strong oscillation between two points lying wide apart, which pervades *Schleiermacher's* entire treatment of the doctrine of sin, not merely in his *Dogmatic*, but also in his sermons. Sometimes he appears to occupy perfectly common ground with the theory of sense, as commonly held; but suddenly we behold him upon an entirely different standpoint, where he shows us in deeply moving discourse how that, every independent, merely self-conscious, determination of man, how that every endeavour severing itself from its relation to God, although, according to the judgment of the world, it may be the most exalted and grand, is sin, where he unveils to us selfishness as the inmost fountain of sin, and pursues the corrupting streams issuing from it even to the finest, most spiritual forms of evil.—

As the doctrine of faith according to *Schleiermacher's* notion is essentially nothing else than a description of the excitations of the directly Christian, pious self-consciousness, it has not of course to do with sin itself, but only with the *consciousness* of sin; and it must, strictly regarded, appear as an *opus supererogationis*, which, as is common with every excess according to its reverse side, is again a deficiency, when he troubles himself to show that in the life of the Christian, sin cannot appear without such a consciousness (Part i., p. 396, 397.) It is besides an entirely unjustifiable encroachment into the objective sphere, when, p. 405, the maintenance, which has already been shown, is laid down, that there is sin in general, only in so far as there is a consciousness of the same. Thus unobservedly appears in the place of the *methodological* sentence, that Dogmatics has not to do with the consideration of sin itself, but with the pious excitations, in which the consciousness of sin preponderates, the *objective* maintenance of the identity of sin and the consciousness

of sin; from which then surely would follow, in as far as this consciousness may be regarded as a power of good in the subject, that the notion of obdurateness is one which is composed of contradictory elements. If now we pursue our examination of these determinations, passing over into another sphere, we must certainly admit, according to the results of our investigations concerning the notion of guilt, as well as concerning unpremeditated sins, that an immoral action can only be so far *imputed* to man *as sin*, as there may be supposed to be in him some consciousness of the *moral law*, of its contents and binding authority. But here it is well to distinguish between the existence of this consciousness in human life in general, and the presence of the same in, or after, an individual action. By repeated neglects of its admonitions, it may, with respect to a given action, which decidedly contradicts the moral law, and arises entirely from unbridled selfishness, become suppressed, without the moral imputability of this action being thereby removed. From this it follows, that crimes committed from "coarseness and want of culture," and still more those committed from obdurateness of heart, even in the absence of the consciousness of their condemnable nature in the moment of the act, are nevertheless to be regarded as sins, and as incurring guilt; the first class, because we must unconditionally presuppose, that in every man who has passed the age of childhood, and who is not afflicted by imbecility of mind, conscience is in some degree present; the second class because there is in them manifestly, the guilty suppression of conscience by continued resistance against its claims. Besides we may only regard the immediate consciousness present in the committal of sin, of its being contradictory to the moral law, as some power of good in man, in so far as it is accompanied by an inward rejection of sin in the moral feeling, therefore, of an approval of the good and of a still existing pleasure in the good. But that objective knowledge and this feeling of approval, are by no means always bound to each other. Therefore if there is immanent in the human spirit any consciousness of the requirement of the moral law, there is by no means necessarily contained in that, a limitation of moral depravity, but just the very reverse, since indeed it is just the more aggravated character of this depravity, and its most presumptuous outbreaks, which are conditioned by

this consciousness. With its entire extinction man would sink down to a lower grade, but at the same time the energy of evil would also be lessened in him. But neither are we at all permitted to regard the mere feeling of being absolutely dependent, apart from all nearer determinations, as an essential limitation of moral perversion and disturbance.[1]

Without now allowing these distinctions their right, the *Glaubenslehre* will nevertheless not remain indebted to us for the answer to the question, whence comes the *hindrance*, which produces in us a consciousness of sin. It refers us, in the section on sin, as condition of man, first of all to the general course of human development, according to which (in the ascent of the spirit from nature) the sensational side of our being ever has the precedence of the spiritual, and further, that this development is not a uniform one, partly in so far as the development of the spirit follows an impulsive course, partly in so far as the spirit is one, while the flesh is manifold and in itself unequal, so that the spirit cannot maintain a proportionate relation to its manifold directions, and therefore, where in one direction it is less operative than in another, it appears as repulsed and besieged. Then further there is, dependent just on that impulsive development, the unequal progress of the understanding and the will, the latter remaining behind with respect to the former, by virtue of which, there is always given in the understanding an idea of a more perfect union of the sensational functions with the God-consciousness, than the will in this moment is able to realize, § 68, 1.[2]

But in attempting to appropriate this, we involve ourselves afresh in great difficulties. If indeed the spirit, in so far as we have here to do with it, according to the essential contents of the

1 Perhaps the considerations here laid down, together with the above adduced investigations of the first book, will be sufficient to convince the honoured friend, who in his review of the doctrine of sin, *Göttinger Gel. Anz.* 1839, St. 28, p. 266, rejects this polemic against the *Schleiermachian* identification of sin, and of the consciousness of sin, as an ungrounded one, at least of this, that it necessarily proceeds from the entire connection of the moments of that doctrine hitherto developed.

2 The *Advent Sermon :* Christ the liberator from sin and from law, *Schleiermacher's* sermons, vol. 2, p. 25 sq., especially serves for explanation in this place. The simple gist of the development in this sermon is the thought: no man can have a consciousness of sin, without there being in his knowledge something better than in his conduct.

notion, is nothing else than the God-consciousness, it is not at all to be seen, according to *Schleiermacher's* conception of the same, how it is able to become a determinate and bounded quantum, which the sensational functions are said to counterbalance, nay more, overbalance. These latter, because directed to the finite, may be represented as of *measurable magnitude*, but not the God-consciousness, the immediate entering in of the infinite into human life. *Schleiermacher* says indeed expressly that the spirit (the God-consciousness) becomes this, an *intensive magnitude* (p. 401), therefore capable of increase and diminution; but how, if we go no further than the *Glaubenslehre*, does this agree with that which is admitted in the introduction, p. 28, namely that the feeling of absolute dependence is said to be in itself an absolutely simple, timeless, in itself equal, and elevated above all change? In order to become determinate and bounded, and therewith real in time, it must first of all unite itself with a moment of sensational consciousness; *before* this union, *i.e.*, when it first of all treats of the question, how far this union takes place, or how far it becomes prevented by the resistance of the sensational consciousness, the feeling of absolute dependence can in no way be considered as a determinate magnitude, if even always as an intensive one. For is not God supposed in the feeling of absolute dependence, as absolutely determining our immediate self-consciousness? For how otherwise were the felt dependence an absolute one? And against this absolute determination, shall a preventing reaction of a moment of the finite consciousness be able to take place?—We must, according to *Schleiermacher's* own premises declare, *that sin is an absolute impossibility.*

This difficulty has hardly escaped *Schleiermacher* himself; probably therefore it is that he choses, in denoting the higher self-consciousness as an increasing and diminishing magnitude, capable of having its activity restrained and curtailed by the resistance of some functions of the sensational self-consciousness, rather descriptive expressions, as, tendency toward *the God-consciousness, efficiency, determining power of the God-consciousness, activity of the spirit*, p. 379, 380, 384, 393, 401. But the employment of these descriptive expressions which only mystify and obscure the thought, excite the appearance of other thoughts, where indeed the same is only repeated, and, if one wished to

regard them very strictly, often lead to the uniting of the feeling of absolute dependence with the sensational self-consciousness before the union, can in a strictly scientific work, especially where the exact fixation of the difficult notion of sin is the question, hardly become justified, and can in no case serve to explain the false positions here pointed out. Or must we perhaps regard the especially frequent use of the expression: tendency, direction, toward the God-consciousness, as being something more than a descriptive one? Then it would necessarily follow, that the God-consciousness, and the sensational consciousness, are no longer the two sole factors of every real pious excitation, as indeed § 5 teaches; but that between these two there stands still a third, which gives itself *either* a direction toward the God-consciousness and its union with the sensational consciousness, *or* a direction away from the God-consciousness, and opposing the union of the sensational consciousness with the same; and that this third factor contains the real causality of the every present condition, and of the hindrance or requirement of the activity of the God-consciousness contained in the same. If it were so meant what else could one regard this third factor than as an ability of the either —or, an optional ability, than as the *freedom of the will?* In this case, it were this freedom surely, which furnished the ground for the possible origin of evil.—However often *Schleiermacher's* development of thought appears energetically to urge on to this solution of the problem, he has still everywhere, especially in the celebrated treatise on the doctrine of election, and then again in the *Glaubenslehre*, § 80, 4, § 81, 2, decidedly excluded from the question after the ultimate ground of sin, every appeal to the free will of the creature. The feeling of freedom is by *Schleiermacher* nothing more than a determinateness of the sensational self-consciousness,[1] but not at all that which mediates with respect to the union between sensational self-consciousness, and the consciousness of unconditional dependence. The *absoluteness* of

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, § 4, 2, 3. "Accordingly," it is said, § 4, 2, "our self-consciousness is a consciousness of our being in the world, or of our being together with *(Zusammensein)* the world," (but this furnishes, according to § 5, 1, the notion of the sensational self-consciousness) "a series made up of the feeling of freedom and that of dependence."

this felt *dependence*, in the sense in which *Schleiermacher* means it, would also be at once nullified, if the entering in of this feeling of dependence into the real consciousness, which only happens by the union of the first, with a moment of the sensational consciousness, should be felt to be conditioned by freedom.

Accordingly we must remain by our above opinion, that, the direction of the God-consciousness, and similar expressions, are only to be regarded as descriptive, and therefore also by the result, that in what we have hitherto discussed, the ground of the existence of sin has been so little proved, that it much rather appears as an impossibility.

The last remarks form the transition to another side of *Schleiermacher's* doctrine of sin, to its determinations respecting the *relation of sin to the Divine causality*, and in connection therewith, to its conception of the *consciousness of guilt*.

Where the radical notions of a religious, or philosophical, opinion do not allow anything to proceed from the will of the personal creature, which is not at the same time entirely an effect of God; there appears to remain over to the question concerning the relation of evil to the Divine causality this only choice: if the evil is to be firmly retained as a real contrast to the good, one must also recognize it as *ordered by God* and produced by Him; if, on the contrary, it is to be excluded from the Divine causality, one must set it down to a mere *negation*. We shall see that *Schleiermacher*, by a peculiarly artistic theory, nevertheless seeks to *unite* both of these opinions together.—

In our representations of God, the absolute causality of God, the eternal omnipotence, corresponds to the feeling of absolute dependence, which, according to *Schleiermacher*, is the general principle of religion, and which therefore must become considered as ground basis of all our notions of the Divine attributes. In it everything, which is, and happens, is absolutely grounded; for only thereby is it the *absolute* causality. Over against this therefore, we cannot speak of an independent finite causality, but this latter is in its working entirely surrounded by, and absolutely dependent on, the Divine, so that, that which is brought about in time and space, by the finite causality, has been already appointed

by the Divine from eternity.[1] And there is here no distinction between the great and small vitality of the finite causality; between the causes, which belong to the sphere of freedom, and those which belong to the sphere of necessity of nature.[2] If now sin is an act, and as such, proceeding from the highest activity of causality in time, from freedom, it is also *appointed by the absolute producing will of God.* If we would perhaps deny this, we must adopt a causality independent of God, and therewith deny the Divine causality its absoluteness—which according to the terminology of our *Glaubenslehre* is Manichäism.[3] Nevertheless we cannot on the other side avoid the recognition, that sin, in so far as we are obliged to regard it as absolute contradiction against the imperative will of God, cannot have its author in God. For the producing will of God, although in our consciousness distinguished from His imperative will, cannot be thought of in opposing contrast with the same.

How now shall we have to consider sin, in order not to be obliged to ascribe something to the Divine causality, which cannot be grounded in it. In sin we find two elements related to each other, the expression of the impulse of sensational nature, and the God-consciousness. We deduce both, without hesitation, from the eternal causality of God; but both together are also not yet sin. Sin only arises by the determining power of the God-consciousness being insufficient in relation to the strength of the natural impulse. But this non-powerfulness of the God-consciousness at every given step of our existence we can only regard as a consequence of the gradual character of our spiritual development, and therefore as grounded in the conditions of the graduated existence on which the human race stands, and the original perfection of man is not thereby done away with. But therewith sin, as such, has been resolved into a mere negation, in relation to which we can no longer speak of a producing will of God.[4]

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, § 50, § 51, § 54, 1.
[2] L. c. § 49.
[3] L. c. § 48, 1, § 79, 1, § 80, 4.
[4] L. c. § 68, 1, 2, § 80, 1, § 81, 1, 3, 4, where the concluding words are especially to be observed, p. 498. *Schleiermacher* distinguishes himself here from *Calvin* and *Beza*, in that while they, in so far as they consider evil to be ordered by God, also firmly retain it in its

But it is clear, that in these sentences we are on the direct road to the most complete Pelagianism, according to the fixation of this notion lying at the basis of *Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre.* Sin must here of itself constantly disappear in the progress of development: the need of a redemption is no longer to be shown; the contrast of sin and grace, in so far as both expressions denote real moments of consciousness, resolves itself into *a distinction of degree;* and as in the place of conversion and regeneration of man, we have a direct course of gradual progressive improvement, so also Christ is no longer the absolute *turning-point,* but only a, although one ever so significant, point of transition in the history of our race. And if it were also possible in the connection of this opinion, to place in Him as the bearer of a perfect, powerful, God-consciousness, the completion of creation, still we had not therewith decidedly broken through the ban of the Pelagian-naturalistic system. For the idea of a second completing creation can indeed in no case, in *Schleiermacher's* sense, be so really conceived of, that therewith would be maintained a real transcendence of the phenomenon of Christ over the connection of nature, in the widest sense of the word, in which it also embraced all history. But Christ is a new creation in the sense, that He, free from all limiting and contaminating influence of the previous course of development of the race, has arisen out of the pure universal fountains of its life, an original act of human nature, the absolutely perfect man. If the first communication of the God-consciousness to man, in Adam, was insufficient, it had calculated upon the perfect satisfaction of human nature with the God-consciousness in Christ, as the higher degree, and in so far, is Christ the completed creation of this nature. But as on this stand-point creation and preservation are quite identical, this creation too is nothing more than a preservation of the God-consciousness originally implanted in man.[1]

Schleiermacher does not conceal from himself, that with this

fearful reality and positivity, he ultimately, in order to avoid dualistic consequences, takes his flight to the simple negative conception of evil (not strictly to the notion of privation). How essentially this distinction in them hangs together with the doctrine of eternal damnation, and in *Schleiermacher* with that of the ἀποκατάστασις πάντων, requires no showing.

[1] L. c. § 89, 2, 3.

form, satisfaction is not at all done to the declarations of the Holy Scripture, and of the Christian consciousness, concerning the significance of *sin* and of *redemption*. Therefore he endeavours to obtain a *contrast* within the simple progress of the moments, the positive contents of which is grounded in a perfectly equal manner in the Divine causality.

God has ordered that the relative non-efficiency of the God-consciousness becomes to us *sin*, in order that therewith its perfect power, as it has in Christ become real, and from Him constantly communicates itself to man, may appear, in our consciousness, as *redemption*. This powerlessness of the Divine consciousness becomes to us sin, in that it *negatives* the sensational impulse, which it is not yet able *to subordinate, as consciousness of the bidding and forbidding will of God* (in the conscience). Since in this way the higher step is already anticipated in the consciousness of the lower, and knowledge always precedes both the will and its executive power, we find ourselves determined to conceive of the sensational impulse, not yet subordinated on account of the imperfect power of the God-consciousness, as *disturbance of nature* and *departure from God*. But all this is so ordered in relation to redemption, which again presupposes hindrance and contrast. God is therefore author of sin, in so far as He is author of redemption, but sin is the condition of redemption, which cannot otherwise be ascribed to His absolute causality.[1] *Leibnitz* is everywhere contented in his *Theodicee*, strictly taken, to *postulate* the evil as *conditio sine qua non* of the best world; without bringing to our view the inward necessity of evil, he simply infers, from its presence in the world, related to the absolute power and wisdom of God, that it must belong to the Divine order of the same. This method of consideration we find essentially extended by *Schleiermacher* in his attempt definitely to *prove* that inward necessity; sin must be, in order that the dominion of the God-consciousness developing itself may be experienced by us as redemption.—

If now it here follows that sin is *necessary*, not merely according to the ætiological, but also according to the teleological opinion,

[1] L. c. § 80, 2, 4, § 81, 3, § 83, 1, § 89, 1, compare the treatise on the doctrine of election, *Theol. Zeitschr.* H. 1, p. 94 seq.

this stands in cutting contradiction to the former results, that sin, according to *Schleiermacher's* theory, was an *impossibility*. And still this contradiction is only an apparent one, and the maintenance of the necessity of sin is in fact only another way of denying its possibility. For in that we represent sin to be necessary by virtue of the Divine order, nothing less is lost to our conception than the very nature of sin.[1]—

If we more closely consider this opinion of the relation of sin to the Divine causality, we find ourselves placed upon a *double stand-point*. On the one, the *objective*, sin is nothing else than the expression of a negation, which attaches to the graduation of our moral development, therefore for God just as little present, as such, as everything else which we conceive of merely by negation, and therefore also not to be reduced to an especial Divine causality; for in the Divine causality only that which has being is grounded, although naturally, as individual, everywhere equally with its determinate bound. On the other stand-point, the *subjective*, but which is not perhaps an arbitrary one, but one ordered for us by God, and implanted in the human consciousness; sin is positive resistance against the determining power of the God-consciousness, and as such our own act, our guilt.

In the first place then, it is here clear, that the *notion of guilt* has its place only upon the *subjective*, human stand-point; in other words: we are only guilty before our own consciousness, not before God, in the Divine judgment—which indeed is self-evident if sin has no existence in the sight of God. The same naturally holds good of the notions of the Divine punitive justice

[1] *Lücke* strikingly remarks on this necessity of sin, according to *Schleiermacher's* mode of teaching: the universality of sin is of course thus explained, but not the nature of sin as free action, *Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1839, St. 28, p. 265. And indeed *Schleiermacher's* theory is not the only one which so explains the universality of sin, as to lose the nature of the same. When now, nevertheless, *Lücke*, as well as another well intentioned and sagacious reviewer of this work in *Rheinwald's Repertorium*, 1842, March No., p. 223, will not admit, that according to *Schleiermacher's* presuppositions sin becomes an impossibility, I only throw out here, for further consideration, whether a theory of religion which places every thing to the absolute dependance of man, and to the unconditional causality of God, which recognizes the freedom of the will only as potentialized animation of nature, must not make sin in one way or another an impossibility.

of God and of redemption; they entirely refer, like the notion of guilt, to the contrasted conception of the distinction between the consequences of the first and second, namely of the insufficient and sufficient communication of God-consciousness to human nature. Further, from this point of view it is clear, why *Schleiermacher* does not limit himself to the mere consideration of the *consciousness* of sin, agreeable to the method of his Dogmatic, but proceeds to the objective maintenance, *sin and the consciousness of sin are not at all to be separated*—namely for this reason, because sin in itself is a mere negation, and only something real and positive in our consciousness.[1] If now we could admit that, we should also be rid of this consciousness, which only prepares us misery and anguish! That we cannot do, answers the *Glaubenslehre;* for God has inseparably united this conception of the relative inefficiency of the God-consciousness, as sin and guilt, with our entire spiritual organization, in order that the completion of human nature in Christ may be regarded by us as Redemption. In such a case God had given us over by his creative arrangement to an inward variance, which every one not self-abandoned to frivolity or obtuseness has indisputably experienced as the deepest wretchedness, and the most powerful hindrance to his higher life, which plunges numberless multitudes into irremediable distraction, and drives them even to despair and the self-destruction of their earthly existence: and how are we able to reconcile this with His love? *Schleiermacher* himself perceives that the Divine appointment of the conscience would be a *cruelty*, if it were not requisite, in order both to turn man's attention towards Redemption, and give him perseverance in the same.[2] But thereby he has least of all satisfied this important consideration, since according to his opinion, the essential good, which Redemption provides us, would be realized by man even

[1] Thus then in the *Dogmatic* the Holiness of God, in so far as it produces this consciousness of sin by the conscience, may appear as an attribute by virtue of which sin is ordered by God, of course not in and for itself, but in relation to Redemption, comp. vol. i. p. 503 with p. 478, with the sentence of § 79. It is just the *conscience*, by which the gradualness of our moral development becomes felt by us in its inequality with respect to the progress of conviction and will, and thus arises the consciousness of sin.

[2] *Glaubenslehre*, vol. i. p. 505 (§ 83, 2.)

without redemption, as such, namely in the form of the completed creation of human nature. It is just as irreconcileable with the Divine veracity, with the harmony, which by *Schleiermacher* is augmented to identity (*Einerleiheit*), of the Divine knowledge and determination, that God is said to have appointed our consciousness to a conception of the relative inefficiency of the God-consciousness, in its gradual development, which has for Him no truthfulness whatever.[1]

And here we meet with the strange contradictions, in which the laying down of these two opposite stand-points unavoidably involves us, *of the one*, which regards all that is, and happens, as dependent, in an absolutely equal manner, upon the absolute causality of God, and therefore has positively no room for a contrast of sin and redemption in relation to the Divine causality; *of the other*, which so entirely attaches to this contrast, that it considers the one of its moments as not communicated by God, but grounded in man, the other as not being grounded in man, but communicated by God. If now the second stand-point had been firmly retained in the *Glaubenslehre* itself, the first perhaps merely found in the introduction, as a separate and *philosophically* established one, the author were not, it is true, but still the work were, in self-agreement. But both much rather are made *religiously* valid, and are divided in the Dogmatic, so that the first method of consideration is prevalent in the first general part, the second in the second especial part, still with many references from the one to the other. They are said mutually to limit each other, that the one may not go off into Pelagianism, the other not into Manichäism; but the one only crosses and perplexes the other; therefore the entire investigation concerning the relation of sin to the Divine causality entirely moves in mutually cancelling *limitations* (*Insoferns*);[2] nowhere do these stand-points positively unite themselves in a higher unity, which indeed is absolutely impossible from the nature of their relation. For if we have seen

[1] Compare what is said respecting this statement in a more general respect, p. 296 seq.

[2] This *result* essentially coincides with *Branisz'* sagacious, and in part, deeply penetrating review of *Schleiermacher's* Dogmatic, comp. especially p. 134 seq. of his work, although we are far from being in agreement with every step of the progress by which *Branisz* arrives at this result.

the first method of consideration to be the Divine one, the second as that, which is only true for man himself, does not the second by this knowledge, since it stands opposed to the first which is absolutely true, become even for ourselves immediately negatived?—And then again from the other side, if God has *decreed for us* the second method of consideration, must not the attempt, to look at that, which from our point of view is sin, from the same standpoint from which God regards it, appear as a violent intrusion into a secret which He has reserved to Himself, as a daring opposition against God, thus as the very worst sin? Or, since that plan in the sense of *Schleiermacher*, is indisputably to be referred, not merely to the command, but to the absolutely producing will of God, which by the command and conscience *works* that conception of sin: How is it then at all *possible* that in the consciousness of the dogmatist there should be found another method of consideration of sin such as that, which regards it as departure from God, as disturbance of nature, as our own act and guilt, and which knows nothing of its Divine causation? Nay still more; if God has planned, that we are to become conscious of that which, for Himself is a pure negative, for us, as of a disturbance, as of a positive contrast, in order that, *we* might become conscious of that as redemption, which *for Him* is only the completed creation of human nature: there must be for Himself also such a view of evil according to which it is not merely negation, but positive contrast: how otherwise could He plan it for our consciousness.[1]

And at this point we should like to keep *Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre* to its word. If it regards as the Divine plan, that we are thus to conceive of sin in our consciousness, be it so, but then we will, and must, retain and carry out this conception in full earnestness,

[1] Herewith it is assuredly shown, that if this arranging activity of God is to have a determinate sense, it is not possible for *Schleiermacher* to ward off the contradiction of two diametrically opposed methods of consideration of sin, from the Being of God Himself. It is at the same-time clear, that, in contradiction to that, which the Dogmatic expressly says, vol. 2, p. 18, sin according to the notion lying here at the basis, that is to say, the consciousness of sin in man, must of course become regarded as a *creating thought of God.* And this is of universal validity: if the evil is not regarded as an arbitrary fall of the factual reality from the idea, we shall be obliged, if we will not accommodate ourselves to a pure negative conception, in the sense of *Spinoza*, to regard it in some way or other as itself idea, or moment of, the idea.

and not allow ourselves to wish to stand upon our own shoulders in order to look beyond ourselves. Indeed we are much rather justified and obligated to condemn and reject every other opinion of the relation of sin to the Divine causality, which makes itself good over against that which is Divinely ordered for us, and that too because it is *Divinely ordered.* And thus we shall be obliged, from this point of view, decidedly to decline that first stand-point, although it regards itself as the absolute one. Its fundamental error in relation to our question consists just in that, from which this discussion started, viz. that it regards the relation of created personality to the uncreated, merely as *absolute dependence*, and correspondingly the relation of the uncreated personality to the created, only as absolute causality. This eternal omnipresent causality of God, which has not itself in its own power, but must everywhere work according to its absoluteness, just converts thereby the condition of every other being necessarily into that of passivity. But where the finite spirit in its relation to God is said to be only absolutely determined, where in this relation every freedom is denied it, there it appears in its own being still more or less involved with nature,[1] and it is then assuredly quite consistent with this opinion, to regard evil merely as the power of sensational naturalness limiting the spirit, and then again conditioning the vitality of its development. But with

[1] For an insight into this side of *Schleiermacher's* method of thought, the Treatise concerning the distinction between natural and moral law is especially important, as well as that on the doctrine of election. The Dialectic also furnishes for this purpose remarkable contributions. Thus it is not merely a paradoxical thought which flits across his mind, but lays deep hold of his connection of thought, when *Schleiermacher*, p. 150, thinks, that one may regard entire nature as a diminished ethic —to which then the necessary reverse side would be, that the spirit is to regard itself as the heightened physic. That herewith is involved *Schleiermacher's* renunciation of every philosophical proof for personal immortality, requires scarcely to be remarked. In the theological sphere, the manner in which, in the treatise concerning the doctrine of election, he explains the great contrast in the relation of man to God, rests upon the same. It expressly places it under the same point of view with the manifoldness in nature, and ultimately solves it by the ἀποκάταστασις πάντων, which, if it is not able to bring itself about with the power of resistance in itself inexhaustible, unavoidably sinks down to a mere *process of nature (theol. Zeitschrift Heft* 1, especially p. 99, seq. 103, seq. 109.)

that general fundamental basis of the Schleiermachian theory of religion, the genuinely Christian method of regarding Sin and Redemption, in their mutual contrast, which *Schleiermacher* builds thereon, stands in inexplicable contradiction. Firmly retaining *with Schleiermacher* this latter, we are therefore obliged, *contrary* to *Schleiermacher*, to reject the former.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

DERIVATION OF EVIL FROM THE CONTRASTS OF INDIVIDUAL LIFE.

Every glance at nature convinces us, that all its life is only brought forth from *contrasts*. The simple is also the abstract, and dead, the undetermined and void of contents; everything living and concrete is manifold: the original unity must separate into distinctions, and proceed in opposite directions, in order then in the mediation of the contrasts to restore itself in a higher manner, filled with determinate contents. Light in itself is colourless, empty, barren, just as much as darkness: both stand over against each other as extremes, which for themselves have no real life, but are in want of a mediation, in order to reveal themselves in a manifold variety of effects. This mediation is the troubled, transparent atmosphere of earth, and as in this medium light and darkness are reflected on our eyes, and on all earthly bodies, there arises from the enchanting conflict of opposing powers, the variegated world of colours. If there were only a single working power in the plant, it could never come to development, but as opposing powers and forces work upon it, it is impelled in the progress of its metamorphosis to unfold a rich fascinating life.

But the concrete notion of the *individual* is that of being many and still one, a manifold variety set together in the inmost indivisible unity. And thus we see that the formations of organic nature ever reveal more definite, and outwardly more independent, individuality, in the proportion in which new contrasts generate themselves at every new stage, and the already existing enter into ever more intense tentigenous energy of its members. By virtue of that polarity essential to everything finite, each new produced moment requires its contrast, but the endeavour too immediately makes itself valid, to find a mediation between both; and the more sharply and abruptly the moments separate from each other, the more powerful and vital is the activity

which seeks the union of the separated, so much the richer the contents which unfold themselves from this endeavour, so much the more individual and significant the impression of the form.

Can it surprise us, if at the highest point of finite being known to us, in the spiritual life of man, this antithetic relation stands out in a sharpness and intensity of energy, which appears to exclude all mediation? We refer to the *contrast of good and evil*, of which it is therefore easy to understand, because in fact it is more difficult to resolve than every other, that a moral feeling wishes to make it known to us as absolute and inviolable. But to allow it to stand in this unmediated, harsh abruptness, would be in reality nothing less than the abandonment of all scientific consideration, of all connected understanding, of the world and human life?

The mediation lies in the opinion, that *the individual and characteristic in the revelation of moral life* is conditioned by the coming forth of this contrast, and by the manifold modifications, under which the moments of the same mutually pervade each other in human nature, and in the individual instances of the same. Perfect moral ideality, without weaknesses and imperfections, without conflict and without passion, attributed to a finite being, what is that but an abstraction just as empty as wearisome, an external heaping together of general notions of attributes by which a living image never arises? These abstract notions of virtues, as perhaps Ethics lays them down, are only just the formulae for the function of the one factor of moral development; it cannot come to real life, to a determinate action in the crowd of earthly relations without the co-operation of the other factor; and a too effeminate dread of soiling one's self, leads only to doing nothing, and to a morbid retirement from life, thus to the deepest violation of the moral requirement.

Truly attempts have not been wanting to give life to, to incorporate, these abstractions of good and of evil for themselves. That is the origin of the Christian representations of angels and devils, which are only personifications of the abstract, firmly retained, notions of good and evil. But must we not also admit, that it is more than difficult to make such beings, conceivable to ourselves, as really existing? And this difficulty applies just as much to the idea of the angel, as of the Devil. Only in the regions

between heaven and hell, then, where man stands, fighting, retreating, conquering, there alone is individual life conceivable.

Who is not aware of the glorious, animating effect, which, both in nature and art, the contrast of light and shadow, is able to produce? Is man to resemble the Chinese painting, without shadow—and therefore too in reality without light? For only in its opposite does the nature of everything become revealed? The truth only becomes truly known, by its being distinguished from error, standing opposite it. If you take away pain from the life of man, you leave him no longer in possession of pleasure. Rest is no longer rest, if it has not its birth in activity, and what health is, one first of all learns by sickness. Is it to be otherwise with *the contrast of good and evil?* Looking into the mirror of evil, man first of all becomes conscious of the good, and in so far the evil is a moment of the good, as error is a moment of the truth. In order to recognize and truly to appropriate to one's self the good, man must experience the evil. How simple and void of interest, how insipid and colourless, would our life become, if sin entirely disappeared from it! The good itself would slumber, and lose all stimulus to activity, if it had not a powerful fermentation in the contradiction of evil, which incessantly keeps it in motion. Therefore the poet makes Mephistopheles appear among the servants of God in heaven in the presence of the Lord, and his destiny in the great world-administration of God is declared in the words:

> Too easily may man's activity its slumbers take;
> Too soon he loves his unconditioned rest:
> I therefore gladly give for him, associate, the best,
> Which excites, and works, and must, as Devil, make.

Indeed it is a feeling which we cannot expel and ought not, the feeling of horror and amazement which takes possession of us, when evil breaks from its restraints, in criminal deeds, when it makes men, by the violence of vice, its slaves, and threatens with destruction the essential arrangements of life. But the same powers, which as *prevailing*, plunge man into fearful division and deep destruction, must, *held within bounds*, be serviceable to the full vigorous development of individual life, and to all the directions placed within it.

And if we look more closely into the notion of evil, in what else do we find its root than in the determination of *the individual to be for himself*, that since he gives unconditional validity to his particular interest, to his individual will, he directly enters into opposition to other individuals, and therewith, at the same time, to the universal, according to the rule of equality for all? But all *individuality* is, according to its very nature, *excluding;* it negatives that which is foreign to it, and with anger and hate sets itself against that which limits and disturbs it: that which does not resist does not consist; he who cannot thoroughly hate that which hostilely opposes, has also no power of love towards that which is allied to him, and meets him in friendship. Indeed the more an individuality is conscious of its inward power, and therewith of its right to existence, so much the less will it hesitate to assert itself, even at the cost of other individualities, and to procure itself from those spheres, if necessary, the conditions of its healthy and unrestrained development. Thus the mighty oak sacrifices numberless smaller plants to its own development, withdrawing from them the nourishing juices of the earth, and hiding from them the vitalizing light of the sun, and every one sees in the same the holy order of nature. Is it to be otherwise in the relations among men? And if thereby they involve themselves in manifold strifes, these very conflicts are only productive of strengthening, concentrating effect; individuality requires the severest contrasts as means of excitation to the unfolding of its powers.

But this becomes most of all clear, when we elevate our eyes from individual beings, to the great national-individualities. Who has not often heard tirades respecting the immorality of *war?* And nevertheless, can we deny that a continued peace brings in its train, langour, and stagnation of the entire life? Just as the sea, if never agitated by storms, would become stagnant and corrupt, thus nations sometimes require, if they are not to perish in themselves, the mighty excitements and convulsion of war.

It is natural that the individuals in these complex relations with each other, often fall into *variance with the universal*, with the law of the whole, that they, in opposition to this latter, seek to retain and carry out their particular intentions. But how could it be hidden from a deep consideration that the spheres of individual personalities in human society, would indeterminately

and confusedly flow into each other, if there were not operative in the individual, together with its being in the whole, also an opposite tendency, *to maintain itself in its individual being?* Only thereby do fixed independent points arise out of the general stream, and become centres of individual spheres, which associate themselves together in an organic whole; it is only in this way that the intense energy of the individual against the whole arises, which is the condition of a higher and more energetic union. If the self-hood in the planets of our system were not powerfully operative as attraction towards their own centres, and did not react against the attraction of the sun, they would not be able to retain anything upon their surfaces, nay they themselves would at once be precipitated into the sun. Thus too the sensational world of selfishness cannot dispense with its individual-being, as counterbalancing power against the attractive force of the common centre.—

A wonderful conflict between the attractive and repellant powers, between the expansive and contractile forces, governs the world, not merely nature, but also our spiritual moral existence. *Affirmation* and *negation*, *love* and *hate*, *life in the whole, and Egotism*, these are the prevailing poles between which it moves itself; and only as good and evil in this way, become elements in it, does it obtain contents, significance, character.

And if at the glance into real life, the correct view lies easily concealed, if many bitter experiences, which we owe to our own sins, and to those of others, as well as fear of the practical consequences, easily perplex and prejudice our judgment: there is a sphere, in which, unhindered by our own interests, even were they the noblest, we may *orientiren*, with respect to this question, namely, the sphere of *art*. What would become of art, if the reality exhibited to us nothing more than the eternal sameness of perfect virtue and holiness? If everywhere only the uniform, quiet, harmonious development, without conflict, without disturbance—to what a scanty, impoverished mass, would the subjects of artistic representation for painting and music be then reduced! And poetry—would it esteem it an advantage, if it could rest contented with perhaps pastoral verses, and mere descriptions of nature? For much besides would not be left her, if the conflict of good and evil, with all its consequences, were entirely to cease

in the world. If everywhere exact proportions, untroubled clearness of spiritual life, perfect love, equity, self-denial, prevailed, how then could the complications of the single spheres arise, whose solution is the task of epic and dramatic poetry? Without the service of those dark powers, of folly, of passion, of vice, how would the tragic poet be able to bring about that tentigenous excitement, and complicateness, which necessitate the characters to reveal the deepest secrets of their inward life? Indeed even religious art, would, with the total disappearance of evil, have lost the very heart of its life, that, whereby it is able to operate most powerfully upon the human mind, the contrast of sin and grace.—That indeed is just the strange variance of our life, that we dare not yield ourselves up to those dark powers, and still cannot withdraw from them, without destroying the very stimulus of life. And the philosophical consideration, in the way here hinted at, can alone solve this enigma.

Indeed, this solution extends still further; from this point of view a phenomenon becomes explicable, which we were previously obliged to touch upon, without being able to explain. If evil has its origin in the universal antithetic character of the finite, just as all energetic development of human individuality depends upon it, this method of consideration nevertheless appears, in the innumerable cases where the evil attains such power as to subordinate the individual to itself, to leave us in the lurch. For if evil is easy to be understood as the basis of personal individual life, it immediately becomes unintelligible, when it makes itself the centre and focus of the same. But here we perceive that, what appeared to us contradictory in the individual, is able to furnish a higher stimulus to the whole to which it belongs. Thus dissonances in music serve to produce by their resolution keener and bolder harmonies, which victoriously originate themselves in contrasts. Thus too in a large picture, individual figures, not beautiful when in themselves considered, heighten the beauty of the whole by characteristic contrast. Evil may in numberless individuals be predominant, and assume to itself dominion; in the great whole of the human race it only exists, in so far as it becomes constantly overcome and subordinated by the ceaselessly progressing rhythm of the world's history.

We were indebted to this theory, which strongly emphasizes the necessity of regarding existence in its entireness, to allow it to represent itself in its connection with a certain completeness, according to its fundamental outlines, before we passed over to the examination of the same.[1]—A progress in relation to the previous theories is not to be overlooked. The conception of evil is more inward, and just thereby more energetic and comprehensive; the explanation of evil from the mere limitations of the spirit and its power, was no longer sufficient; inasmuch as in the sphere of the spirit itself evil is seen. And if in a given form of this opinion, negation plays a great part in the explanation of evil, still the notion of the same is quite different, much more positive, so to speak, than that of the negativity in those methods of consideration.—

The derivation of evil from the characteristic of all finite individual life, namely, to develop itself in contrasts, is by no means peculiar to the most modern times. Its germs are to be found within the Christian Church, apart from much allied to the same in some of the *Gnostics*, and the *Pseudo-Clementines*, so early as *Lactantius*, and indeed with a significant approximation to a dualistic consideration of the world, with which this opinion of evil, according to its nature, places itself in connection just as easily as with pantheism.[2] That which determines which of these directions it shall take, will in general be the distinction in the subject of the weaker or stronger moral consciousness. According to the manner of representation in *Lactantius*, the

[1] I allow therefore the above representative sketch to remain also in this edition, although a richly cultivated theologian has so been able to read it as to make quotations from the same, as of my opinion.

[2] Therefore the ground-thought of this theory of evil generates itself upon the soil of real dualism. Thus *Pococke* quotes in his *Spec. hist. Arabum* from *Abulfeda* the supposed declaration of *Zoroaster:* Bonum et malum e commixtione lucis et tenebrarum contigisse, quae nisi mixta fuissent, mundus nunquam exstitisset. Comp. *Stuhr's* religious systems of the Oriental Heathen nations (*die Religionssysteme der heidn. Völker des Orients)*, p. 361 seq. Also according to the Manichaeistic system the existence of a world of finite things has its ground in the mixing of the emanations from the good and evil principles, comp. *Baur's Manichäisches Religionssystem*, p. 41 seq. In connection with a pantheistic view of the world this method of explaining evil is not seldom to be met with in Oriental Theosophists and theosophistic sects, as well as in the deep minded Mahommedan mystic *Dschelaleddin.*

results of which he has expressed by the characteristic words: *malum interpretamentum boni*, the contrasts of heaven and earth, light and darkness, fire and water, heat and cold, and so on, out of which the world consists, and which reach up to the two first created spirits—to the Logos and the Devil, *antitheus*, *aemulus Dei*—concentrate themselves in man as contrast between the *soul*, from which the good, and the *body*, from which the evil, comes.[1] *Lactantius* ever maintains in this ground-opinion the absolute rejectableness of evil; and he thereby avoids at least the direct contradiction, by his maintaining that the second created spirit was not originally evil, but has only become so by freedom, and that the physical only is sin, in so far as it will not subordinate itself, but will domineer. As on the contrary this thought is later met with in *Joh. Scotus Erigena*, it runs into a kind of

Tholuck quotes in his "*Bluthensammlung aus der Morgenländischen Mystik.*" the following from the same:

Never does the power of Medicine appear,
Without a poor sick one full of disease.
Thus in the low is ever mirrored the high;
Thus want is ever the point whence fulness gleams forth.
Ever by contrast is contrast revealed.
Only by the sour is the sweetness of honey made known.

p. 108.

And in another passage:

If God appear in conflict with God,
Believe—that in this way an Eden will bloom:
Since in conflict and peace, God,—The Unity is,
Whose self-conflict is not injurious to self.

p. 122.

Plotin has similar thoughts respecting the necessity of evil in the universe, *erste Enneade*, Book 8, cap. 7 and 15.

The Stoic *Chrysippus* teaches the same opinion entirely of evil, namely, as foil for the good, especially according to the representation in *Gallius*, Book 6, c. 1. To which *Plutarch's* treatise *adversus Stoicos*, c. 14, 15, opposes in this respect striking observations. This theory also in *Chrysippus* rests upon a pantheistic basis.

[1] *Divv. inssitt.* lib. ii. c. viii., ix., xii., lib. v., c. vii., lib. vii. c. v. Very remarkable are the coincident points of his opinion, the fundamental outlines of which have been here only just hinted at, with the speculations of *Jacob Böhme*, and according to another side, with *Blasche's* work also to be mentioned here. The thoughts of *Jacob Böhme* relating to this question have been collected together by *Sigwart* in his work *das Problem des Bösen*, p. 173—to 198. Comp. *Baur's christliche Gnosis*, p. 558 seq. 569 seq.

pantheistic attenuation of evil from a nominally higher standpoint. *Scotus* considers evil in all its forms from an entirely aesthetic point of view, as the contrast in the entire image of the world, which, adverse in its relation to the individual, he finds in relation to the whole to be necessary and good.[1] The ground elements of this opinion are, it is true, to be found in the earlier writings of *Augustine*, as indeed ultimately every consistent *optimism*, which will immediately reduce to its principle not merely the world, as originally constituted by the creative will of God, but also its present form, which therefore makes not merely the *possibility*, but also the *reality* of evil, the indispensable condition of the greatest possible perfection of the world, unavoidably leads to such a solution. On the fundamental basis of this second form of optimism rest the writings of *Augustine de ordine*, and *de libero arbitrio*, in more modern times *Leibnitz's Theodicee*,[2] *Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre;* but as *Augustine* even in the first named writings appears to become perplexed by the consequences of his own principles, and the investigation at length rather breaks off (lib. 2, c. 7) than leads to a decided conclusion, we see that in his later works he continually more and more recedes to that first form of optimism,[3] by which *Thomas von Aquino* in his *Summa* remains standing.[4]

[1] *De divis. Naturae*, lib. v. 35, 36, 38, comp. the excellent treatise of *Fronmüller: Die Lehre des Scotus Erigena vom Wesen des Bösen, Tüb. Zeitschrift für Theologie Jahrg.* 1830, Hft. 1, p. 80, 81.

[2] It is in this respect that the agreement of the *Theodicee* with the *Optimistic philosophemen* of *Chrysipp*, in the same sense is grounded, to which *e.g. Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 4, p. 296, 307, directs attention. Also the earlier mentioned formula that the evil is attached par concomitance to the good, is formed after the Chrysippian κατὰ παρακολούθησιν, comp. *Theodicee*, Part 3, § 336.

[3] For if also in his later writings, sometimes for example in the *Enchiridion*, c. 96, the thought is still met with, bonum esse, quod mala sint, it has nevertheless ever respect to the already existent perversion of the human race. It is good that evil is, in so far as physical and ethical evil become decreed as punishment of the godless, and therefore as revelation of the righteousness of God, partly to serve as chastisement for the salvation of the pious. Beyond the above bounds the thought does not extend, which becomes repeated in different forms in the *Civitas*, namely that evil as punished, and thereby appointed to its proper place, is reconcileable with the beauty and good order of the world, and therefore has been permitted by God.

[4] Still not without some serious vacillations towards the other side. Thus he says, P. i. qu. 48, art. 2: perfectio universi requirit, ut sint

It was reserved for our own times to push this method of the explanation of evil to its extreme point. This is very fully, and in its way, thoroughly done in *Blasche's Book: Evil in unison with the plan of the world, (das Böse im Einklange mit der Weltordnung,)* 1827. God is here supposed as pure, absolute unity, genuine simplicity, as pure negation of everything real and determinate, p. 78, 79, 98; the particular, individual, the many and manifold, which is necessarily at the same time a relatively conditioned opposite, only arises by *a departure from unity, by evil;* all development of the world, of the individual spheres of nature, of the mineral, vegetable, animal kingdoms, is the unfolding of the multiplicity placed in them as unity, therefore nothing else than a continued falling away, a constantly repeated, ever more definite, primitive sin; just so the origin and continuation of conscious life, indeed every new awaking up of the same out of its daily sleep; in order that man may not boast himself of his derivation from God, he is reminded that this derivation is necessarily conditioned by a departure from Him, p. 198—210, 219—227. As now, God conceived of purely for Himself, in absolute separateness from the world, as the collective embodiment of all multiplicities, is, according to this theory a mere abstraction, *nothing real,* p. 99, so here, similarly to the process in *Buddhism,* something comes from nothing, *only by means of evil.* But then the fall from God is in truth more powerful than God himself, and the theory threatens in this way not so much to run out into Pantheism or Dualism, as much rather into *Pansatanism.* From the other side we see that this extension of the notion of sin, according to which it becomes the essential condition of all real existence, is a direct and entire dissolution of the notion. When everything is sin, then nothing is any longer sin.

The explanation of evil given in *Blasche's Book* belongs, it is true, to an earlier step in the development of natural philosophy,

quaedam, quae a bonitate deficere possint, *ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere.* Further on in the same article it is said ipsa rerum natura hoc habet, ut, quae deficere possunt, quandoque deficiant. If this were the right conception of the transition from possibility into reality in the moral sphere, then of course the reality of evil must become regarded as moment of the perfection of the world.—Besides if the reality in any way follows of itself from the possibility, *in this respect* the possibility is manifestly no longer possibility, but necessity.

which only knew how to mediate the existence of the finite and individual, with the idea of the absolute, by a *falling away from the primeval unity.*[1]) However, some moments of this opinion are to be found in *Schelling's* treatise on freedom, still, taken up into a higher and more living connection, by which they receive another significance.—The above sketched opinion more throughly coincides with *Hegel's* doctrine of evil, from which some of the lines of that sketch are borrowed; still the fundamental thoughts here too, receive a quite peculiar modification from the connection of the system, in which they stand. But in manifold forms of representation and degrees of development, the above sketched method, of regarding evil, is to be found in our day in the higher spheres of cultivated society, where some pre-eminently pride themselves in the possession of deeper, and more spiritual views of life, who are in fact too deep to allow themselves contentment with the common sensational theory, but not deep enough, or too genteel, apart from all pretensions, to enter into the quiet, inviolable earnestness of the Christian doctrine of sin.

In order not to become perplexed by diffuse discussions, we shall omit, in the further examination of this method of explaining evil, noticing the separate determinations which it has received, in connection with the one or the other philosophical opinion, and keep to the above outline we have sketched. For that we have drawn a caricature, in order to win the appearance of victory at little cost, no one acquainted with the matter, will object to us.

The great significance of the question with which we have here to do, is unmistakable. Is sin essentially and inseparably attached to self-conscious individuality? Is it a necessary moment of its development and manifestation? Or is the individual determinateness, the powerful excitation and activity of human life, compatible with perfect sinlessness?—That the truth of the consciousness of guilt, and thus too the other great truths of religion, which again depend on this, are conditioned by this possibility, is, according to our previous investigation of the notion of guilt, self-evident. If evil rests upon a general necessity of the development of the world, sinful man is only an organ by which

[1] Indeed there is therewith involved a cold, clever, and just for that reason, distorting conception of the fundamental ideas which ought to have been set right by *Schelling's Philosophie und Religion.*

this irresistible necessity completes itself; his sinful-being is not grounded in himself, and the real significance of guilt is destroyed. There is no less dependent on that alternative, than the decision whether in the earthly life of Christ perfect holiness was in union with human individuality—what doketism denies—and with true individuality, also perfect holiness—what an extreme Ebionistic opinion denies; last of all, whether the Christian doctrine of a kingdom of glory, and of a holy and blessed life of the redeemed in the communion of God is anything more than a dream, a charming picture seen from the distance, but by closer inspection falling to pieces into incongruous elements.[1] Especially as to this last, gifted co-temporaries have candidly confessed, that to them the idea of an eternal life, from which, with the disappearance of sin, all passion, all division of interests, all conflict with hindrances, all antithesis of love and hate, would also disappear, and which is said to be entirely pervaded by, and filled with, the love of God, and the love of each other, produces on them the dead impression of a waste and void, of unendurable ennui. In this they have only openly expressed what numberless individuals, more or less developed, feel. They fear the loss of themselves, and of everything, in the loss of sin, and that they shall sink down into the abyss of an indifferent, formless being, or much rather non-being. If with this feeling and opinion they require from themselves and others, a striving really to overcome and suppress evil, it assuredly contains the absurd demand of being incessantly occupied in the destruction of their own existence.—

We do not deny, that in this respect it is an honourable interest from which the above exhibition of evil sets out. It does not wish to lose at any stage of human existence the moment of *spiritual vitality, movement, activity*. But in order to this does good really require companionship with evil? Must man sink down into an indolent, do-nothing state of spiritual sleep, if the good is alone dominant in him, free from all excitation from its contrast? The question is already answered, if we only just recognize, that the vitality and energetic activity are essential moments of real good, of true morality; and were it not so, why

[1] One may thus express the disjunction in relation to the notion of a perfectly holy and blessed life; whether or not holiness and blessedness exclude life, and whether life excludes holiness and blessedness.

should not the good in its actualization not be able to dispense with the same? If this vigour and energy belonged to the good, only by some fellowship with evil, the good in its contrast with evil were no longer good, but just as much evil, and the evil no longer evil, but just as much good; the oppositional relation of both would become an entirely relative one, and the highest, the alone absolutely valid were at length good in its concretion with evil, in other words, the dialectical stream which sweeps away the determinate contents of both notions. But fortunately it is only a weak and insipid conception of good, which only sees in it weakness and langour, and on the contrary, attributes vigour and life, to evil. What sort of morality were that, which in order not to be dissipated into the indeterminate and void, required first of all a certain admixture with the cohesive elements of evil? What sort of love, which must first of all be wedded to hatred (only of personal hatred can here be spoken of) before it can manifest itself as vital motive power? That sinking down into inertness, from which the good is said to be preserved by evil, is indeed not a good, but itself an evil; therefore we see that here, admitting everything else, that *one* evil is fought against and repressed by another (indolence perhaps by passionateness), but not, that the good is at all in need of the evil for its self-realization.[1] —It were only just the other extreme of the error, controverted in the second chapter of this book, the derivation of evil from the sensational torpidity of human nature, if we wished to bring the *onward impelling*, all temporal existence changing, thus relatively *negativing*, power, only to the side of evil, the principle of *continuing* in being, on the contrary, only on the side of good.

[1] *Neander* strikingly remarks on the polemic of *Hermogenes* and *Tertullian* against the stoical opinion, that evil had been necessary ad illuminationem bonorum ex contrariis intelligendorum, that by this method of representation of the idea of good, its independency had been taken away, and therewith its being, and that evil was at the same time denied, *Geist des Tertullianus*, p. 429. Just so *Daub* in his *Judas Iscariot* had still the correct opinion, "that the idea of the absolute good, and with it reverence before God and conscience, forbid man to consider the truth as conditioned by the lie, love by hatred, and being by non-being, as if humanity and nature, which are limited and spoiled by that which is in them contrary to nature, could be nothing without the same, and were only by means of the same, true and genuine humanity and nature."—Part 2, p. 377.

But as there is an impulse of movement and change in history, which affirms being in its determinate essential existence, and only strives to make it more adequate to its true idea, which is therefore a power of good in history; there is also an endeavour unconditionally to conserve the existing, which, as hindrance of healthy development, resting upon the mere *vis inertiae*, is just as much evil as that wild lust for change and dissolution, which is only the consequence of a general antagonism of will against everything fixed, against law as limitation of arbitrariness. If now the utility and the necessity of evil are to be shewn from their preventing the falling asleep of history in that one-sided conservative direction, there is thus presupposed, by a circle in proof, as already present, the existence of that which will bring this theory in unison with the very plan of the world.—

There is a twofold truth, the knowledge of which is able to distinguish the false and perverted in this theory of evil, from the true and the deep, to which it attaches, and on which it supports itself.

The *first* is this, that the moral life of the spirit is in itself, and according to the original Divine plan, and without requiring evil for the same, a *mediated* one, and indeed a mediated one *by means of contrast.*—It is a perfectly correct determination, that all finite life, in nature, as in the sphere of the spirit, bears in itself from its very beginning the germ of the most manifold contrasts, and progresses in the ever new development and mediation of contrasts. It is no less true that just in this intense energy of contrasts, which seek their mediation, the most energetic stimulus, and powerful impulse, are contained for the progressing development of this earthly existence. With every new step, contrasts, the moments of which were still foreign and external to each other upon the preceding steps, become taken up into the inward unity of life, and mediated in themselves. Thus in the very stone there operates a principle of motion, but only in a determinate direction, the weight, which it, in other respects entirely passive, opposes against every derivative influence from without, sometimes as a hindering potency, sometimes as a potency breaking through hindrances; while in the plant, the weight of the stuff is not indeed destroyed, still entirely overpowered and pervaded by the organic formative power, and thus vitally

mediated with its contrast. Thus the plant is related to the outward world, not indeed merely passively as the stone, but still quite receptively; the potencies operating upon it from without serve it as means of stimulus for its organic process of development, in which it assimilates the stuff presented to it; while in the animal life receptivity and spontaneiety are inwardly united in the same individual. Thus man, according to the nature-side of his being, embraces the top stone and key stone of nature, collects together in himself all the contrasts, by which the lower degrees and species separate themselves, to a concrete unity, and so presents them in his natural existence as an epitome. But not merely in so far as he is nature-being, but also in so far as he, as spirit, is in species distinguished from nature, there ever attaches to his individual existence this *antithetic character*, not merely internally, where it is then already immediately subordinated to a higher unity, but also outwardly, so that the other moment of the contrast lies without the individual. This latter is the essential limitation of all finite existence developing itself in time, and just for this reason it can never, as an individual, withdraw itself from a certain *one-sidedness*, taking the word in its strict etymological sense. This insurmountable one-sidedness of all individual finite life, even of the highest—for our experience of the human as the sphere of self-conscious individuality—makes good its validity, in that it has part in the contrast of sex, which indeed is not a merely physical one, but just as decidedly pervades the spiritual sphere. But quite in general it essentially belongs to the notion of spiritual peculiarity, that from the infinitely varied *web* of spiritual human life individual points become prominent, which exercise an attractive and centralizing power upon innumerable threads and their contextures. But other central points stand over against these—given spiritual tendencies, talents, interest—as equally justified. And thus every human peculiarity, even the richest, although in itself an inexhaustible living whole, issuing forth from a perpetual source, and not at all to be derived by negation and limitation from a general notion of human nature, is nevertheless always only an individual section out of the great whole, in which the idea of humanity realizes itself; and it will also remain so, at the end of its development, when it perfectly corresponds to its *individual idea*.

But this antithetic character is only present, in so far as the antithetic moments are determined according to the Divine plan, not to separate from each other in mutual exclusion, but mutually to require and seek to unite themselves in undisturbed harmony, and powerfully to interlace each other; and in order to such a harmony, there must be a manifold variety, the moments of which in a relative manner are placed antithetically, and just thereby, as the dissimilar poles of the magnet, become attracted to each other. Therein the calling of man is declared, not to live in cold seclusion, not as a self-sufficient anchorite, but in society, to yield himself up to it in humility, to be a living member in the whole, and equally at the same time to realize his fulness and completeness in the relationship of others to him, and *vice versa*, —his calling to *love*, which, as the Apostle in the 12th, 13th, and 14th chap. of the first Epis. to the Corinthians teaches, is the *true mediation of the contrasts of all individuality and peculiarity of existence*, the real overcoming of the limitations therein contained. Since now these contrasts are only ordered by the creating will of God, in respect to the living unity, in which they are said mutually to find their fulness, it is surely to be maintained, that they are one in themselves, and only can *become* one, in so far as they *are* already in themselves one, namely, in the *Divine mind*. —The same holds good of the internal mediation of contrasts in the life of the individual, as it continually completes itself by the progress of spiritual development. It is only a twofold atomistic consideration, which quite as much isolates the individual moment in the development as severs the individual man from his relation to his species, in order to regard him in his independent existence as absolute totality; it is only such a consideration which can find insolvable difficulties, a real disturbance in this original and essential duality, in everything finite.

But from this normal Divinely ordered antithesis, that *of good and evil*, is *broadly* to be distinguished. It is very intelligible, that in the inexhaustible manifoldness of natural contrasts there are also such, which, considered from the one or the other side, reveal a certain analogy to the contrast of good and of evil, *e. g.*, the contrasts of the power of contraction and expansion, of light and weight, of heat and cold; and who can regard it as matter of surprise, that those, who have once accustomed themselves to

regard the spirit strictly as potentialized nature, should now directly identify the moral contrast with one among those natural contrasts, or even with them all? But that presupposition we have already regarded as a fundamental error, and an analogy is no identity.—The good in its full reality—the moral good, of which we everywhere here alone speak—is already, according to its nature, a *mediated* one in man, because it is not a natural one, from the beginning absolutely given, also is not to be produced at once, but because it can only be realized as the *result of a free development*, which has the task to unite the manifold tendencies of life, which stand among each other in relative contrast, in a powerful and undisturbed harmony. In such a manner are placed in contrast the tendency to continuance in being, and to living development, to rest and activity, to the individual and the universal, to depth and to extent, power and gentleness, independency and attachment. The creative beginning of the true moral life, is simply the act of the will, by which man gives himself up as a possession to God. But he realizes this beginning, only thereby that he does not (quietistically) rest in himself, but urged forward to the inexhaustible manifoldness of human life in order to mould and glorify all elements with the Divine power. After our former explications, no one will so misunderstand what we have recognized as principle of moral goodness, namely, love to God, as if it stood in that series of contrasts only *upon the one side*, negativing the other. If it were so, then either the task of morality would in fact be, absolutely to cancel this other side, or that love itself had only a relative significance and justification—both equally absurd. Much rather love to God essentially embraces both sides, does not allow that they separate from, and mutually exclude each other, and thus creates from their interpenetrating working the complete form of moral life. A Divine and human love which lamed the masculine energy of action and decision, which *necessarily* communicated to the entire life, so to speak, an effeminate character—as a contracted conception of Christianity has often supposed—were not the genuine.—Therefore this is the *truly* and *absolutely satisfying* method, by which the good mediates itself in human life.

But we do not deny, that the evil is also in a certain manner a mediation for the good. How this in an objective sense holds good—in so far as the doing of evil must be *possible* for man, in

order that he may be able truly to appropriate the good—will be hereafter investigated. But also in a subjective sense, in relation to the consciousness of good in the subject, it has its truth. If evil has once become real in the world, it ought also to become known to the personal creatures, and then in this knowledge it serves by the contrast against the will, to exalt the good to a deeper consciousness of itself.[1] And here we certainly see, in the sphere of life, which in this respect alone lies under observation, that those attain a more energetic consciousness of good, who after a deeper experience of the nature and power of evil, have in their own life truly turned themselves to the good, than those whose consciences have been only lightly and superficially moved by evil. But how then does he, who in himself has experienced the power of evil, truly attain the good? Never by his own power, but only by the redeeming grace of God; it is this alone, which really brings about the self-mediation of good by the evil, which the sinful man begins in criminal assumption of self-will, Rom. v. 20. But that which Divine grace knows to make out of evil when it is once present, and by its method of overcoming evil, knows how to subjugate both arbitrariness and perversity to purposes of salvation, that cannot of course be used in order to ground the necessity of evil.[2] Christian poetry may have ventured the expression:

O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi
morte deletum est!
O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit
habere redemptorem![3]

[1] *Plato* has already sa ' this in *de legg.* lib. vii. (P. iii., vol. 3, p. 57, *der Bekkerschen Ausgabe*): ἄνευ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία μαθεῖν μέν οὐ δυνατὸν, ἐι μέλλει τις φρόνιμος ἔσεσθαι, but indeed wisely adds: ποιεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἂν δυνατὸν ἀμφότερα, ἔι τις αὖ μέλλει καὶ σμικρὸν ἀρετῆς μεθέξειν, ἀλλὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τούτων καὶ μανθάνειν αὐτὰ δεῖ, τοῦ μή ποτε δι' ἄγνοιαν δρᾶν ἢ λέγειν ὅσα γελοῖα μηδὲν δέον, κ.τ.λ.

[2] This confusion would lie as an objection against the *Oxymoron* of *Bernhard von Clairvaux*: ordinatissimum est minus ordinate interdum fieri aliquid, Epist. 276, *ad Eugen*, P., if the same did not find its justification in the entire connection of *Bernhard's* mode of thought. One might here adduce the well known canon of Grammar: exceptio firmat regulam—which indeed also only holds good in the subjective sense.

[3] The *Missale Romanum* has these words in the Liturgy of the Easter

which the strict reflections of science can never appropriate. Evil is not the *contrast*, when it is strictly taken with the use of these determinations, but *real opposition against the good.*

It has, on the contrary, its direct external *contrast*, in which the nature of good is said clearly and distinctly to reflect itself in the consciousness, as the moral, according to the above, in the *merely natural*, that which according to its nature is free love, in the consciousless necessity of the dominion of nature. Real contrasts make mutual demands on each other; no moment is for itself the whole, but each one requires the other for its supplement; therefore there stands over both a higher *unity*, and it is perverted when the one wishes absolutely to exclude from itself the other. To wish to carry over these determinations to the relation of good to evil, could only occur to one utterly blind as to the nature of both. Much rather as the evil incessantly strives to destroy the good, the good constantly carries on an exterminating war against the evil; indeed it would, if it should wish to supplement itself by the evil, immediately cease to be good, and become itself evil.—

In that *self-mediation* of good *by internal contrasts*—we may call it the *immanent*, in distinction from the other mediation, which capriciously transcends the Holy limitations of Divine order—it is also grounded, that the true notion of virtue does not at all require that apathetic *nil admirari*, that unmoved, cold-heartedness, as in the negative morality not merely of the Stoics, but also of many modern philosophers, and theologians, has been dreamt of as the very ideal. Much rather true morality, in its development, as in its completion, carries in itself a fulness of the most powerful excitants. For instance, every truly great character rests upon the basis of powerful affections, and never has anything great and immortal, either in art or science, in church or state, been achieved without enthusiasm. Christ

vigil, in a beautiful hymn to the Wax-light Consecration, which ecclesiastical tradition ascribes to *Augustine*. Nevertheless these words are not to be found in *Gregor's liber Sacramentorum*, in the old Roman liturgy by *Muratori*, and in other old recensions of the Missale. Comp. *Daniel*, *Thesaurus hymnologicus*, tom. ii., p. 312—314.—Similar expressions may often be found in the spiritual poetry of older as well as more modern times, from the latter, especially in the Hymns of the congregations of Evangelical Brethren.

Himself, the perfectly Holy, speaks and acts in any way rather than heartlessly, He is alike powerful in the expression of His love, and His anger, which is only another mode of revealing love.[1]

By the insight into this immanent self-mediation of good, the hope of an *eternal and blessed life* of the redeemed in the completed kingdom of God, is justified. For him, to whom sin is necessarily given with self-conscious individuality, the Christian faith in an eternal life in the kingdom of God, can of course have no other value than that of a symbol for the so-called return of the individual into God, *i.e.* for the annihilation of itself, of its personal existence, whereby alone according to this opinion the consuming anguish of this inward strife of division is to be terminated. If there is already in the personal individuality of the creature, as such, a germ and commencement of evil contained, or if, according to another form of this opinion, the individuality itself is only the consequence of an original falling away from

[1] Only on the contrary we must guard ourselves, when *Schelling* in his celebrated Lecture on the relation of the Plastic Art to nature, as well as in his treatise on freedom, and *Hegel* in his *Encyclopedia*, essentially maintain of *passion*, what is here said of affection and inspiration. In the common forms of passion, the spirit, here immediately as will, stands related, *sufferingly* and unfreely, against that which is lower than itself, as to a power foreign to it, which works upon it as a dark power of nature; and this passionate resignation to any object of the impulse, of the entire existence into a selfish inclination or disinclination, is always, however enticingly set off by modern poetry in individual features of its directions, an unworthy relationship of the spirit, a condition of slavery. But even there where the inclination is not a selfish one, where its object is even spiritual, the condition of passion has nevertheless, in its consequences, since it places man in exclusive dependence upon this given object, a miserable contraction of the sphere of vision, a depression of the general spiritual life. Genuine *enthusiasm* on the contrary—and only that is genuine which is directed to a worthy object—is itself a higher freedom, a deeper self-reflection of the same upon its true being. Therefore no considerate use of language will speak of a passion for God, because the relation to Him is no exclusive one, but one which comprehends all, confirms all, and consecrates all, the relation which is absolutely liberative to the spirit.—When however *Schelling* himself in that lecture more closely designates his opinion in this way, virtue does not consist in the absence of the passions, but in the power of the spirit over them, we can only therewith be in agreement with him, but may passions over which the spirit has control any longer be denominated passions.—An attractive parallel is here furnished by *Ritter, History of Christian Philosophy*, vol. 2, p. 543, in the collected utterances of *Maximus Confessor* concerning the moral right and unright of the κινήσεις ψυχῆς.

God: there is indeed no other redemption for the most unhappy of all creatures, man, than that he in the contradiction, which he bears in himself, perishes, *i.e.* according to this euphemistic use of language, returns back into God. No less so, the idea of a kingdom of glory loses all tenability, and all significance, for an optimism, which, *holding itself merely to the present form of the world*, finds sin to be in the most beautiful unison with its presupposed perfection; indeed it must, strictly speaking, regard the hope of the same, and the longing after its revelation, as impious, blasphemous. The Christian Church, protected against similar errors of a one-sided speculation, by the Divine word, and the Living Spirit of God in it, rests entirely upon the faith in a future completion of the kingdom of God, here begun, and since it considers sin by no means as an essential condition, but thoroughly as a disturbance, of the moral development, it inspires the confidence, that first of all upon its elevation into the kingdom of glory, the true harmonious movements of human existence will commence.—

The *second* truth which we have to oppose against the opinion here controverted, is this, that sin is nothing isolated, nothing merely external, which only exists for us in so far, as it appears in an individual action, but, as we have already learnt from the investigations of the first book, an *operating principle*, diffusing its limiting and perverting influence over the entire existence of man. In this positive knowledge, the negative sentence, that the spiritual individual life does not require sin for its excitation and development, finds its supplement, and in both sides together, the above represented explanation of evil, finds its confirmation.

Sin proceeding from the *will* as the primitive ground of all personal being, penetrates deeply into human development, entwines itself as a deadly creeper in all directions and ramifications of the same, everywhere checking, disturbing, and complicating. No sphere shows us any longer its true order in undisturbed form; as sin to the will, so error attaches to thought, impurity to the fancy, unhappiness to the feeling, and pain and sickness to physical life. Indeed, by virtue of the internal dynamical connection between *nature* and man, there has proceeded from his sin, a separating, destructive working also into its sphere. As the sensational nature in man himself, manifoldly strives to resist

being the organ of the spirit, and must first of all by conflict and discipline become subdued, so also external nature denies him the subjection to which it was originally appointed, Gen. i. 26, 28. The willing serving relation of the same to man, is by no means entirely disturbed, but is still present in the most manifold traces; but these traces are as a tattered robe, torn into a thousand pieces; with them are mixed up, in a most enigmatical manner, innumerable expressions of the most violent resistance, of the wildest revolt; nay, in the place of that relation that of the very opposite, the dominion of nature over man, is often found. Not merely where it is ice-bound, but also where under the glowing heaven, the animal and vegetable world develope themselves in rich luxuriance and beauty, nature does not strive in vain to bring man under her yoke; and even there where it must acknowledge his power, it still exercises ever afresh its fearful violence, as making game with his toilsome labours, and often deprives thousands together in a moment of possessions and life. But no less than in its immediate relation to man, is nature convulsed in the depth of its own life, and involved in a strife with itself, which the eternal rule of the Divine order, it is true, everywhere overpowers and governs, but does not destroy. As in the sphere of the spirit, the golden mean, the secure self-limitation has been lost, so in nature, the productivity of its powers appears seized by a wild, fantastic tendency, that mixes in its productions the worthless, the disgusting, and the horrible, with the pure and the beautiful. Innumerable degeneracies, misbirths, malformations of every kind, bear testimony to a deep disturbance of the formative powers of nature, of a deeply penetrating principle of disorder and disproportionateness, which especially opposes the pure expression of the type of the species in its individual existences, in the effect of which, however, there is at the same time everywhere active, the invincible power of the universal law of nature, of the will of God in nature. But the most horrible of all in this sphere is, that multifarious copies of human sin are unmistakeably to be met with in animal life, implanted in it with a power of instinct, and impressing itself in part in the repulsive and horrible physiognomies of beasts, even the forms of evil which most painfully wound us in the human world, covetousness and envy, falsehood and malice, wild, murderous lust, and a cruelly

playing with the torturings of its victim, we must again find in nature as fixed, abiding characteristics of individual animal species.

In a word: the *entire present form of our being*, to which our relation essentially belongs, is so very much co-conditioned by sin, that we have not the ability to form a complete idea of a pure, undisturbed development of human life. It is true that the view of this purity is furnished us in the holy life of Jesus Christ, only however, in respect to the *inmost sphere*—for the miracles do not belong here; man would never have possessed such a power over nature even in sinless development,—and even here of one part not really of the development itself but of its result, of the other part, for *our knowledge* not complete, but only fragmentary. Add to this, that in Christ the revelation and activity of the perfectly holy disposition of mind is co-conditioned in the detail by the *externally* given contrast of evil.—If we attempt, notwithstanding these limitations, to sketch such a picture of human life in its multifarious directions and spheres, and for this purpose omit the fulness of solicitations to exertion of power, of excitations to activity, of the intensities of interest, which arises from the curtailing, disturbing power of evil: no other elements occupy the empty places for our internal intuition, and therefore it is not to be wondered at if that picture makes upon us the immediate impression of a certain monotonousness and want of life.[1] This impression will naturally be the strongest in those who have no inward experience of life in fellowship with God; to them it appears quite unintelligible, what there is at all to impel man and to set him in activity, when he has lost his selfish passions and lusts.

It is further easy to be seen, that sin, if it once became real in the will of the personal creature, must find the nearest point of attachment for its perverting, disuniting effects, just in those

[1] When a reviewer of this work asks me whence I, notwithstanding the admitted deficiency of that view, know only the possibility of an immanent development of good, without evil, we may reply that the entire course of our investigations makes it clear, that to us this possibility arises out of the harmony, ineffaceable for every religious opinion, of the idea of moral good with the ideas of life and development. The most powerful *factual* proof is then of course the *sinlessness of Christ*; for no one surely will wish to maintain that Christ had not been able to be holy if the men about him had not been sinners.

Divinely ordered *contrasts* which determine the development of the world in its entirety as of individual existences. If the will of man has placed him in dissension with the Divine will, the *contrast* in the spheres dependent upon that inmost centre of life degenerates into *dissension*. The contrasted tendencies which mutually require each other, and in their union produce the true healthfulness and beauty of human life, disconnect themselves from each other, and entering into inimical opposition, mutually strive to destroy each other. Therefore it belongs just as much to the rule of a life under the dominion of sin, as it is foreign to the original arrangement of God, that the way to a deeper and independent knowledge of the truth, lies in the surmounting of a multiplicity of error, and the road to peace, through the painfulness of division. Therein is also contained the key to the fact, that individualities greatly gifted only find their way to the good through the severest vacillations, through the most painful aberrations. Just for this reason, because they are constituted for a bolder and richer union, the elements of individuality, being in the whole and self-being, spirit and sense, more energetically separate themselves; and often while in their spirit the noblest endeavours arise, while even in many hours the tendency to the highest powerfully breaks forth from the inmost depth of their soul as burning longing, they wrestle in vain to liberate themselves from the fearful power of sensational passions. Heaven and hell strive for them, and in their heart and life there are often to be found, side by side, the most contradictory thoughts, desires, and deeds, in the most immediate proximity to each other. Woe be to them if they in supposed geniality *(Genialität)* place themselves above the eternal norms of morality, and as strong spirits demand an especial rule for their conduct; but who would overlook, that to them has been assigned a more difficult task than to individualties of a simpler, weaker organization? And if they do not solve this task, if their life does not come forth from the ensnarement of these divisions and contradictions of all kinds, who among us shall dare to throw the first stone at them?

And is the course of *the history of our race*, in the whole and entire, anything different? It is conducted to its appointed ends not in the manner of a constant uniform development, which in the unfolding of the individual moments preserves unity with the

centre, but through the most violent dissension, and the wildest confusion.[1] History moves forward not merely in antitheses, but in abrupt one-sidednesses, which reciprocally produce each other, struggle with, and repel each other, in order with each other to make place for the conflict of new eccentric directions. The present commonly builds itself just as much upon the ruins, as upon the foundations, of the immediate past. No age is conscious of how many living swelling germs, sown by the previous generation, it neglects and tramples underfoot, in order to foster and develope others with one-sided preference; no age is perfectly just towards all its predecessors. And should any age, in order certainly to avoid every extreme, save itself by a general system of equity, in a mediating theory equalizing everything, it were only a new extreme, a characterless equalization of the bad with the good, of the hollow and worthless with the genuine, of the destructive with the healthful, which indeed were anything but righteous.

It is true since the phenomenon of *Christianity*, a powerful stream, rich in blessing, flows in the midst of the world-history, and preserves it, after the destruction of the old world, from again sinking into wild chaotic confusion. In it there is given to the historic nations a strong bond of unity, amid the concussions of opposing elements, an inexhaustible spring of regeneration, for the sick and dying ages. As the order of *nature*, from the time of the flood, has been placed under Divine guarantee, by the promise: so long as the earth endures, seed time and harvest, frost and heat, summer and winter, day and night, shall not cease: so, for the indestructible order of *history*, the words of our Lord, Matth. xvi. 18: the gates of the under world shall not prevail against my Church,[2] comp. Matth. xxiv. 35, xxviii. 20, and especially Matth. xiii. 33, furnish Divine protection. In the latter passage it is expressly denoted, as the destiny of Christianity, gradually as a

[1] When Satan said to Christ, of the kingdoms of the world then existent, that their power was given over to him, and that he might give them to whom he would, he of course said this as the liar from the beginning; but he had the appearance even here for himself.

[2] A thought expressed by *Steffens* in his *Anthropology*, vol. 1, p. 350, and which he explains by deep insight into the arranging principles of nature and history.

Divine fermentation entirely to leaven the mass of human life. But as long as this permeating process is so far removed from its end as at present, even in the historical sphere of Christianity, so long can that order maintain itself only in the *disorder*, so long history too continues to move onward in strong oscillations. Powerful reactions against the one-sided tendency, only with great difficulty escape the danger of themselves going off again into other one-sidednesses, and from the means of recovery from disease there is generally developed a new poison.

But all that has its ground in sin, which has convulsed the course of human development down to its very centre, and set it in vacillating movement. It rests upon this convulsion that even historical phenomena, which ultimately have their own origin in sin, may become beneficial, as limiting reactions against other directions of sin. Thus assuredly is *war*, as the above sketched opinion maintained, frequently a great benefit for the life of nations. But from what ground? They cannot endure too long a quiet, because it develops in individuals the propensity to wither and shrivel up into petty selfishness, and to contemptible, narrow, civic dispositions of mind, because it augments and confirms their dependence upon earthly possessions, by the vain thought of their indisturbable nature. If war then must preach to them the instability of all earthly things, they only require indeed such palpable preaching, because sin has chained them to the earthly. But if war itself has its general origin in sin,[1] it is indeed perfectly intelligible that it, in treading down one weed richly sows another, namely, moral wildness and unrestraint.—

As to the *relation of sin*, and its effects, *to art*, especially to poetry—for indeed it is this especially to which those assertions refer—the truth shows itself here in the idea, that in the entire exclusion of the inward division in human life from its sphere, its representations would suffer the loss of all powerful individual impression, and sink down to a pale shadowy ideality, to a simplicity void of interest. Without doubt, its most beautiful and most honourable task is just that of pointing out the threads of a secret order *in the confusion* of our existence.—Indeed this

[1] Its *general* origin, for in the individual case, when once the relations of nations are formed, war may of course arise without any determinate guilt or unrighteousness, and the like, from the one side or the other.

we can never admit, that the possibility of a living development, and individual form of poetry, is conditioned by the moral discordant condition of human nature; for this manifestly depends upon the erroneous idea that a life undisturbed by sin would lose all impulse to action, all intenseness of contrast, that all sympathy with the pure human relations, with the sufferings and joys of earth, would vanish in the same measure in which the principle of a Divine life extended its dominion. If a mind turns itself indifferently, or neglectingly, or condemningly away from the earthly, worldly side of our existence, from the infinite manifoldness of its contents, if it remains unmoved by the most remarkable phenomena, by the deepest movements of this sphere, it cannot certainly be regarded, and very properly so, as in any sense a higher degree of strength and perfection of love to God; but in so far as it does not chiefly depend upon a natural defect of the individuality, as an aberration in the dreamy monastic character of piety, which wishes to solve the problem of human existence by separation, and negation, instead of by union and pervasion. But we must certainly acknowledge that poetry, when that self-variance in our being has once made its appearance in our existence and has penetrated into all spheres of the same, creating disturbance and dissension, generating the deepest pains, and the most difficult complications, cannot do otherwise than to take it, and its effects, up into the sphere of its representations. It is of course self-evident that its task cannot be to represent dissension, as such, and on its own account, but only that, of representing it together with its reconciliation; however little moreover we may be able to maintain that from modern poetry this requirement, in the Christian sense, in which alone true reconciliation is given even for art, has, in any thorough manner, received satisfaction.

Another opinion of the determination of poetry, is given by one of our most excellent poets, *Fr. Rückert*, in a poem rich in thought, which applies so strictly to our present subject, that we cannot avoid quoting at least the commencing verses:—

When thou turnest over the thick book of history,
On each page stands recorded the dark mystery
Of adverse conflicts, and cruel treacherous wounds;

And every deed of light stands upon shadow'd ground.
And even the poet's art which calls itself free,
Only runs servilely in the track of history ;
And knows of nothing better wherewith to delight,
Than gloomy fatality, and the dark deeds of night :
As if in God's world there were only such to make known,
Which one by concealing should rather seek to dethrone.[1]

It could never enter our thoughts theologically to defend a poetry which only arbitrarily sinks itself into the dark abyss of human existence; but such a silence and concealment of the same may well become the still, retiring, self-reflecting disposition of mind of the Brahmin; but it could least of all be promotive of a deep and powerful development of poetry. How is it ever thereby to come to such poetry, with respect to which we should feel, as *Göthe* before *Shakspeare's* Dramas, as if the storm unrolled the leaves of the world-history? "If every deed of light stands upon a dark ground," the *knowledge* of this dark ground is inseparately inwoven with the deepest interests of human life, every other enigma of our existence concentrates itself in this one—it may be the "delight" of the poet's art, but the deep of our own bosom it is not able to disclose, if it determines to be silent about the variance of man with himself. If one of the first poet's the world has ever seen, has made Paradise the subject of a rich poem, full of characters, he could only succeed in the same, by everywhere in the harmony maintaining in us the consciousness of the *dissension* as *overcome*.

Thus for our present stand point; even for the perfect, there can no longer be an especial sphere of poetical representation distinguished from the reality, because to them, in that state, the reality itself has become highest poetry, purest development, and living harmonious union of peculiarities in their primitive, now, perfectly realized, form, as they are contained from eternity in the Divine thoughts. For sin is so little attached to the nature of the *peculiar*, that much rather, as *Steffens* excellently develops, especially in the caricatures of the most holy, sin is just that which disturbs and perverts the peculiarity, which restrains the revelation of its primitive form in the earthly life. Holiness,

[1] *Die Weisheit des Brahmanen*, vol. i., p. 85.

which according to its inmost nature is love, does not disturb the peculiar, but establishes and glorifies it, and no one needs to fear that he would immediately suffer the loss of his peculiarity, if sin had no longer any part in him.—

Oppressed by the thousandfold phenomena in human life, in which so fearful a power of sin over the same reveals itself, that it can no longer occur to any one to declare it, in such conditions, to be only a mere means of excitement for the powerful development of individuality, this theory often ultimately withdraws itself *from the individual to the general.* Out of the moral ruin of the individual there arises, to it, the beautiful triumph of the species. The dark shadows of sin, which lie spread out over a part of the human race, must, by the contrast with the light of virtue, in which now the other part beams forth all the more brightly, serve to the glorification of the whole. This fundamental thought has been variously employed, even from other stand-points than that above sketched, modified of course by the diversity of these stand-points, especially from optimistic theories, as well as theories of predestination; that which, *Augustine*, especially in his books *de ordine, and de libero arbitrio,*[1] *Leibnitz* in many passages of the *Theodicee,*[2] and *Schleiermacher* in his lectures on religion,[3] as well as later in the treatise concerning election,[4] develop concerning the significance of evil in the great whole of the

[1] *De ordine,* lib. i., c. 7. *De lib. arb.*, lib. iii., c. 9. *Augustine*, in these earlier writings, treats the contrast between the pious and Godless, the blessed and the condemned, from the point of view of the Divine arrangement, and often entirely as the distinction of higher and lower species of nature, which very well agrees with his inclination, before noticed, to a quantitative conception of the contrast of good and evil. Comp. concerning this side of *Augustine's* system the deeply penetrating discussions of *Ritter, Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie*, vol. 2, p. 319 seq., 328 seq.

[2] *E.g.*, part 2, § 119, 122, 123, 128. The expression, § 123, is especially remarkable: puisque cis maux (le péché et le malheur) devoient exister, il falloit bien, qu'il y eût quelques uns, qui y fussent sujets, et nous sommes ces quelques uns: by which then again another declaration becomes intelligible, § 122: Si quelqu'un est méchant et malheureux avec cela (avec cet ordre de l'univers), *il lui appartenoit de l'être.*

[3] Ed. iii., p. 126, 130 seq. There is here especially to be observed the confounding of *moral* contrasts with the *natural* distinctions of peculiarities.

[4] *Theologische Zeitschrift,* H. 1, p. 80, 81.

Divine plan of the world, is partly therewith identical, and partly indeed borders on the same. One has also sometimes appealed to passages of Scripture, which are said to contain this opinion, especially to John ix. 3; 1 Cor. xxi. 19; 2 Tim. ii. 20.

Let us then before every thing else seek to ascertain the meaning of these declarations of the Divine word; it is by no means the purpose of the Apostle in the last passage to *explain* the existence of sin, but setting out from the power of the same in the human race, as from a fact, he compares the external Church to a large house, which, besides vessels of honour, contained also vessels of dishonour. That this belongs to the true order, he does not even intimate; his declaration is purely *factual.* Indeed, when he, in the immediately following 21st verse, speaking of one who becomes a vessel to honour, *εὔχρηστον τῷ δεσπότῃ*, represents the same as being conditioned by his own conduct, how can he there be seeking the ultimate ground for the opposed constitution in a Divine arrangement, and not much rather in the very will of the being thus constituted? In the first passage on the contrary, 1 Cor. xi. 19, Paul, it is true, explains it as a Divine arrangement (*δεῖ*) that the *inward divisions* of the Church (*σκίσματα*, ver. 18) into *decided sections and parties* (*αἱρέσεις*, ver. 19, where it is well to observe the augmenting *καὶ*) made its appearance, in order that the genuine Christians, as such, should become manifest in distinction from the spurious. But thereby the inward presence of the division is already supposed; but that this had been grounded in the Divine arrangement in order that the good should become manifest in contrast with the evil, the Apostle neither teaches here nor anywhere else, but in this respect he has indisputably kept to the word of the Lord, Matt. xiii. 39.[1] In the last place, John ix. 3 says nothing of *malum morale* (*Bösen*), but only of *malum physicum* (*Uebel*).

But as to the *internal ground* of the opinion, that the Divine

[1] Still less difficulty, when more strictly considered, can Matt. xviii. 7: *ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν τὰ σκάνδαλα*, create. When, in 1 Cor. xi. 19, *δεῖν*, together with *ἵνα οἱ δόκιμοι φανεροὶ γένωνται ἐν ὑμῖν*, attributes a certain teleological necessity for the arising of divisions, so here *ἀνάγκη* (in Luke xvii. 1, *ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστι τοῦ μὴ ἐλθεῖν τὰ σκάνδαλα*) denotes that necessity only aiteologically. It is grounded of course on the present power of sin in the human race. Compare *Ruckert's* Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians ch. xi. ver. 19.

plan of the world has sacrificed to moral destruction one part of the human race, in order that the other part, or, if one will, even God himself, may rejoice over a higher, bolder harmony of the whole, there can indeed scarcely be a greater violation of the dignity with which God has invested man, since he has elevated him above all creatures to *personality*, and therewith to His own image. In comparison with such a violation the slavery of the present day, and the Helotism of the ancients, are mild and liberal institutions, and their justification, as the necessary gilding of the consciousness of the freedom of citizens, is a thought more human: for in these latter, man is only treated in his earthly and relative relations as a thing and means, instead of as a person whose end is in himself, but in the former, in his eternal and absolute relation to God. It is just by means of his personality that God has placed man in this absolute relation to Himself, and by virtue of which he has sacrificed no one individual to the whole, but has entirely directed to each His redeeming love, in order to draw him into fellowship with Himself.

Most of all injurious to this dignity of the personal creature, and therewith to faith in the highest truth of the Divine love, is the extreme to which *Beza's* one-sided consistency of understanding, drives a thought of *Augustine* in the *Mümpelgartschen Religionsgespräch*. According to *Beza's* opinion sin, and its power in the world, could not be missing, because that contrast of the two Divine attributes, of punitive justice on the one hand *(iudecium)*, and mercy on the other *(misericordia)*, quite dualistically exhibited, required objects in which to reveal itself.[1] When next to the word of Christ Himself, it is especially to the Apostle Paul that we are indebted for the knowledge of how highly esteemed man, even as an individual, is, in the eyes of God, and of the impossibility of his being to his Creator a mere instrument for the revelation of His attributes, an apparently contradictory utterance of this Apostle, as Rom. ix. 21, would not lead us to err, even if there were no satisfactory solution of this contradiction.[2] For it is not merely by individual passages of

[1] A germ of this theory of *Beza* is also to be found in the sagacious anti-Manichaestic dialogue: de causa et ortu malorum. Quorum enim, miseratus fuisset, cum non essent, qui peccarent? Qui bonus esse queat, cum nemo malus esset, qui ea Dei bonitate opus haberet?

[2] This solution is principally contained in the fact, that Paul here, as

Holy Scripture, as perhaps Luke xv. 7; Matt. xviii. 14; Rom. xiv. 15; 1 Cor. viii. 11, by which he makes secure this infinite significance of personality, but the recognition of this significance belongs to the deepest root of Christianity, the power of which pervades the whole. From this the ethical fundamental intuitions of the same arise, by the power of which it has become a transforming principle for the historical form of the world, casting out from marriage, family, and the State, in progressing development, everything, which stands in contradiction with the recognition of the infinite value of a human soul.

We appropriate in the conclusion of this investigation a striking remark of *Nitzsch's*: the dogmatic tenet: the good requires the evil for its glorification, is not less objectionable than the ethical axiom: let us do evil that good may come, or: ἐπιμενοῦμεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις πλεονάσῃ, Rom. vi. 1[1]—which is so much the more true, as there is so much the less sufficient protection against this ethical axiom, so long as that dogmatic tenet is retained.

It was remarked above that the Hegelian doctrine of evil, is to be regarded as an especial modification of the theory hitherto discussed. It is a matter of course, that the ground-thought of this theory will, in the connexion of a developed philosophical

in the entire chapter, has every where in mind the human race, out of which God has the power to form vessels of dishonour as well as vessels of honour, as being already under the apprehension of sin and guilt. This thought is contained in the entire connection of the Epistle, but is especially made prominent in the passage under consideration by the Apostle's representing those who are lost as objects of the Divine anger, ver. 22. It is therefore *nōt strictly*, as even *Tholuck* in his Commentary on this passage appears to adopt, the relation of Creator to creature, from which Paul sets out: the φύραμα is already that which is corrupted.—If we hold fast to this, *the opinion*, that the *ultimate ground* for the presence of sin in the personal creature, is nowhere else contained than in himself, does not become shaken by the sharpest conception of the difficult expressions of this verse and chapter at least. But thereto is added the second consideration, that Paul does not *in this place* at all state the real procedure of God, but only how He *might* proceed without violating any righteous claim. Compare the coincident remarks of *Petersen*, in his work, full of rich contents, concerning *die Lehre von der Kirche*, vol. 1, p. 62.

[1] *System der christl. Lehre*, p. 197 (ed. 4.)

system, adopt peculiar determinations, we cannot therefore avoid an especial examination of these determinations.

In the first place, as to the *very nature* of evil, it is by *Hegel* placed in the abstract subjectivity, more exactly in arbitrariness, namely the making one's own distinct individuality a principle over the universal, in the subject's knowledge of his individuality as of the determining, in so far as it gives to itself the contents of a subjective interest against the good.[1]

If we now ask, what the contents of this subjective interest is, *Hegel* gives us the answer, that that formal independent existence is only able to draw its contents from the determinations of the natural will, the passions, impulses, inclinations, and so on.[2] In this sense, evil becomes more exactly determined as the standing still of the spirit in its naturalness, in another form of expression, as the self-introgression of the natural existence of the spirit.[3] It is the naturalness, the state of immediacy, or the condition of undeveloped unity (*Naturlichkeit, Unmittelbarkeit*) from which spirit must begin; but if its notion is that of mediation, it must proceed out of this condition, in order to be spirit; the naturalness is, for it, that which ought not to be, and if, nevertheless, it makes it the contents of its will, this is the negation of the spirit, *evil.* The animal is innocent, neither good nor evil; but man is in his naturalness wild and evil, just for the reason that he is will, consciousness.[4] Therefore the naturalness in itself is not evil, but only in so far as it enters into the sphere of the spirit, of consciousness, and is made valid by the subjective arbitrariness as the essential. According to this, because the naturalness, as such, is still innocent, and its separation arises first of all by consciousness, will, it is no contradiction, but only a remarkable example of the flexible and amphibolic nature of this formalism, when *Hegel*, in another place, determines the evil as the stepping forth out of the condition of naturalness, as the self-withdrawment of self from the same.[5]

[1] *Philosophie des Rechts*, § 139 (*Werke*, ed. 1, vol. 8, p. 184.) *Encyklopädie*, § 511 (ed. 3, p. 513.)

[2] *Philos. des Rechts*, p. 184.

[3] *Vorles. über die Philos. der Rel.*, vol. i. p. 163, 167, (*Werke*, vol. ii.) *Phänomenal*, p. 582 (*Werke*, vol. ii.)

[4] *Vorles. über die Philos. der Rel.*, vol. i. p. 194, vol. ii. p. 64. *Philosophie des Rechts*, p. 185, 187.

[5] *Vorles über die Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii. p. 210 seq. *Phänom.* p. 587.

It is true the notion of this *naturalness* has by *Hegel* a wider extent of meaning than in the theories which derive evil from the antagonism of the sensational nature against the spirit. But that this notion, even so conceived of, remains still insufficient to furnish to the evil will its object, that it can only lead to the concealment of the inmost depth of evil, to the misunderstanding of the spiritual, and for this reason to the worst forms of the same, is sufficiently clear from our previous investigations concerning the nature of evil. Thus, for instance, there is a bold, reckless self-idolatry of the human spirit, which does not at all make its appearance there, where that naturalness and its impulses and passions prevail, but rather upon the very culminating heights of the most cultivated and richly furnished intelligence.[1] There is at the ground in this, the presupposition already discussed, of the ascent of the spirit from nature, which we now indeed within this system cannot object to, as a violation of human dignity, since God Himself in this respect is said to have no pre-eminence over the human spirit. The unsatisfactory representations of the overcoming of evil, which follow from this conception of its nature, we shall again meet with below.

More important for us here is the second question: *How does man come to give* validity to the naturalness as the especial individual contents of his will, over against the universal? The ground, *Hegel* tells us first of all, does not lie in a necessity of nature; man *can* will the evil, but he *must* not will it. Much rather a necessity stands over against the evil excluding the same, viz. the ethical, which only applies to the good; evil is an arbitrary act, an act of spiritual fatality (*Zufälligkeit*), *that which is not to be, i.e. that which is to be removed by being superseded* (*aufgehoben*).[2] But are then these two last notions identical? Certainly, in the use of language in the *Hegelian* system, and

[1] The naturalness in this philosophical use of language, in which it stands opposed to the spirit, as the condition of immediacy stands opposed to that of mediation, is not at all to be identified with naturalness in the theological use of language, in which it stands opposed to the state of grace. One may in the Hegelian sense have the state of nature completely behind him, who according to the judgment of Christianity still stands in the very midst of the same.

[2] *Philos. des Rechts*, § 139. *Philos. der Rel.*, vol. i. p. 195, vol. ii. p. 217. *Encykl.*, § 248.

this is an important point for our investigation. Evil is not to be, is generally expressive of: *It shall not at all occur*, but here only, *It shall not stand, is not to consist, is not to remain*, it is to be overcome. But then it is at once clear, that thereby the universal necessity of evil is not at all excluded, much rather included, because, in order that this not standing, not remaining, complete itself in evil, in order that it may become overcome, it is clear that evil must indeed be previously there. *Hegel* himself expressly recognizes this necessity.[1] Therefore the evil which is not to be, must nevertheless be, by virtue of a higher speculative-logical necessity.[2] The true affirmation is not the simple, immediate negation, but the negation of the negation;[3] the idea must separate itself, it must in the progress of its moments estrange itself from itself, in order, by again overcoming this estrangement, to become real, as spirit. The spirit is the infinite mediation of the eternally evolving contrasts, that, for which it makes itself; but the natural unity from which it sets out is, as immediate, undeveloped, the spiritless, which must be superseded by its becoming divided. "Man must eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, otherwise he is not a man but an animal."[4] Man is essentially man, as spirit; but it is essential to the spirit to be for itself, to be free, to oppose itself to the natural, to elevate itself out of its sunken state in nature, to divide itself from nature, and only to reconcile itself to nature by means of, and upon the condition of this disunion, and not only with nature, but also with its own being, with its own truth.[5] According to this *Hegel*

[1] Especially § 139, *der Rechts philos.*, comp. *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. i. p. 193, 194, vol. ii. p. 77.

[2] *Vatke*, who treats the problem of the necessity of evil, from the Hegelian stand-point, in the most detailed and careful manner (*die menschliche Freiheit in ihrem Verh. zur Sünde und zur göttl. Gnade*, p. 362—303, comp. p. 467 seq.), denominates this necessity an intelligible one.—The universality of this opinion may perhaps most simply in this way be denominated: physical necessity has no relation whatever to the happening of evil; ethical necessity excludes it; metaphysical necessity requires it, but only as condition of the realization of the good.

[3] *Philosophie des Rechts*, p. 187. *Vermischte Schriften*, (*Werke*, vol. xvi.), p. 469, 470.

[4] *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. iii. p. 100, 105 (*Werke*, vol. xv.) comp. *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. i. p. 196, vol. ii. p. 212.

[5] *Phil. der Rel.* vol. i., p. 193. In order here not to have three

does not hesitate directly to declare, that this separation of man from himself, which is just that which constitutes evil, belongs to the idea of man.[1]

Then again these determinations have not at all the sense, which some of *Hegel's* disciples wish to give to them, as if that necessity was only applied to the moment of independent existence, in so far as it remains *immanent* in the universal, and removes the possibility of severance, but not, in so far as it really severs itself. Since, for example, independent existence first of all becomes evil by this severance, it would, were that interpretation correct, quite naturally follow, that we could only speak of evil perhaps in exoteric considerations, but not within the system, which indeed is simply the evolution and carrying out of all logical moments—which is refuted by every glance into *Hegel's* writings, viz. in the §§ 507 to 512, *der Encyklopädie*, as well as in the §§ 82 to 184, 139, 140, *der Rechtsphilosophie*. The spirit renounces itself to the very extreme of estrangement, in order to become certain of its identity in the very hardest contrast. "It only attains its truth, when it finds itself in absolute disseverance."[2] Not triflingly, but in full earnest it continues the distinctions, and urges them on to contrast and contradiction, in order to overcome them by labour and conflict, and to evolve in this struggle a rich fulness of determinations.

In this way the necessity of evil is to be regarded, as *Strauss*

negations instead of two, *Hegel's* opinion will be obliged to be thus understood: the state of naturalness is not in itself the negation of the spirit, but it is this only, in so far as it is made valid by the will as the essential. The negation of this negation is then just the reality of the spirit. It is true, we find also here the earlier mentioned amphiboly in the treatment of the state of naturalness. For only by virtue of the same was *Hegel* able, in the above adduced passage, first of all to characterise it as the nature of the spirit, to separate itself from nature, and then directly to continue to represent it as an enhancement of this separation, that the spirit also separates itself from its own nature, from its own truth, and that too, as we have earlier learnt, by the self-introgression of its natural existence. Accordingly therefore the spirit elevates itself out of its sunken condition in nature, in order, by the self-introgression of its own natural existence, itself to mediate its reality as spirit.

[1] *Phil. der Rel.* vol. 2, p. 217, 218. Comp. *Philos. des Rechts*, p. 187. The will is in its notion just as much good as evil.

[2] *Phanomenal*, p. 26.

very properly maintains,[1] as an advance beyond the stand-point of *Spinoza*, which cannot be overlooked. In *Spinoza* all living practical impulse becomes entirely absorbed by a contemplative pacification of mind, with respect to human condition and conduct, just as they are; the moral consciousness, with its distinction between good and evil, is set down for a mere prejudice; that which he denominates as evil, is in its place by the same absolute necessity, by which the good is in its place. Here on the contrary, according to *Hegel*, the necessity of evil *is conditioned by the necessity of good;* evil is only, because the good requires it in order to realize itself in overcoming it; therewith the spur to a progressive movement is given which is perpetually to supplant the evil.

But is there really therewith satisfaction done to the moral consciousness?[2] First of all we perceive, that these two necessities, the metaphysical and the ethical, stand in conflict with each other; what the one requires the other excludes. Will it now be possible for the *ethical* necessity, which *forbids* the evil, victoriously to maintain itself in a consciousness in which the metaphysical necessity of evil has been recognized? The *Hegelian* system will be obliged to allow those, who, by an unprejudiced consideration of human nature, have learnt what undivided earnestness of the inward life is requisite in order to overcome evil, to doubt the same.[3]

[1] *Dogmatik*, vol. ii., p. 380, seq.

[2] So far we are in agreement with *Strauss*, l. c., p. 339, that even the very best grounded "moral denunciations" against the results of a system are, in themselves, no refutation of the same in the sphere of science. Nevertheless it will ever remain, that a system which lays claim to truth, must also be able to shew itself in unison with the moral consciousness of the human spirit, for to be willing to sacrifice moral truth to the idol of logical consistency, if it should demand the sacrifice, can only occur to a ruined moral consciousness. Even *Strauss* himself is not able to avoid the recognition of this task; otherwise why did he not find rest in *Spinoza?* Or, in this "*presuppositionless*" speculation, is indeed the notion of *life* to lay claim to become explained without being resolved, but not the notion of *moral good?*

[3] *Vatke*, l. c. p. 279, in order to exclude such consequences, lays down the maintenance: whoever begins to reflect upon the necessity of evil, has long since come forth from the dialectic process by which evil becomes. If this sentence is to cut off those consequences, it must be thus understood, that evil after the commencement of such reflection

But also apart from the practical results in the consciousness, how can the *contradiction of two necessities* be at all tolerated? This contradiction becomes indeed most of all intolerable for abstract Theism,[1] which must certainly consider this intelligible necessity of evil as a moment in the Divine plan of the world, and which ought to hesitate at the blasphemy of imputing to God, a deceitful ambiguous determination and plan. Nevertheless this contradiction is just as burdensome in all essential matters upon the stand-point of that philosophical system; for how pitiably at variance with itself does the notion appear, which in one of its moments *is* not, ought not, to realize itself, and nevertheless *must!*

However if we look a little more closely into the matter, the contradiction is in fact removed, but only in this way that the *moral imperative shall* is just so much *defeated* as it ventured to make disputable the position of the speculative *must.* The *Philosophy of Right* has already told us, p. 539, what we have to

cannot be further explained by that necessity, therefore that after this turning point, evil can no longer at all appear, or indeed no longer in general appear in human life. That the matter were so related, were for the consistency of this opinion according to another side very much to be wished for; but experience by no means confirms it. This also has not escaped *Vatke* himself; therefore further on, he beats out for himself quite another path, in order to avoid the collision of the moral consciousness, and of its practical interest, against this necessity. The necessity is said to hold good only of such moments of the immoral, of which even the life of the best is not free; sins of weakness, of indolence, and precipitancy are said to suffice for the necessary contrast, p. 456, 471. In his review of this work, *Vatke* requires still less, *Hall. Jahrb.* 1840, p. 1134. According to this, the experience of sin requires only to be made *in sinful thought. Strauss* very properly denotes this, *Dogmatik*, vol. ii., p. 382, as an inconsistency done in favour of the dogma of the sinlessness of Jesus, which moreover does not suffice to save the same, and as being therefore, apart from this, useless.

[1] In explanation of the abstract Theism spoken of in *Vatke* and others, we are here reminded of a remark, which *Schleiermacher* somewhere makes, namely, that to those who have fallen into a direction entirely to the left, he who proceeds just in the middle, necessarily appears to deviate from the same, toward the right side. Thus the Christian doctrine of God, in all its moments from the creation to the very last things, although it decidedly excludes the deistical separation, must, on account of its real distinction between God and the world, from the sides of a pantheistic confusion of course, suffer the reproach of abstract separation between God and the world. Thus at another time a moderate deism has thundered pantheism into essential doctrines of Christianity.

understand by the is-not-to-be *(Nichtseinsollen)* of evil, in the moral requirement, viz. this, that it is again to become destroyed, that it is not to remain. According to this the relation stands thus: In so far as the evil is not to be, *i. e.* as continuing element of life, it is also not required by the metaphysical necessity; but so far as by virtue of this necessity it must be, it cannot be that it is required by the ethical necessity not to be. Now herewith the solution of that contrariety were achieved; but at what cost? The conscience which denies the *continuance* of evil, has no less a decided *No* against the *happening* of evil at all, and if there is to be no longer faith in this latter judgment, will it in the former remain unshaken? If it could not maintain itself, as entire and united, against that metaphysical necessity, will the judgment of conscience, as that of a half and dissevered one, be able to do this? From the other side these determinations unavoidably lead us to the astounding result, that the *evil itself*, that which in real earnest is not to be, the subjectivity remaining standing in contrast against the universal, is not at all recognized in its necessity, that therefore, if it is not to become directly denied, the entire deduction becomes labour in vain, and real evil remains not at all understood.[1] But such an uncomprehended evil, were nothing else

[1] This resultlessness shows itself very distinctly in the hard endeavourings of *Vatke* to make, if possible, this intelligible necessity of evil equal to the moral necessity. It is true that, p. 290, it is observed for the comfort of human infirmity, every individual need not realize evil in all its relations, what indeed is also impossible; but what the individual is not able to do, humanity in its entirety may complete. However it follows from the further development, that according to *Vatke's* opinion also humanity in its entirety might allow itself to be satisfied with those sins of infirmity, indolence, and precipitancy, on the contrary, vice, crime, and every grosser form of immorality may disappear from human society without thereby superseding morality, p. 471. These sins of infirmity lose for the consciousness, which recognizes them as absolutely necessary, the character of real sin; but real sin, since it is said not to be co-comprehended by that necessity, and still nevertheless everywhere makes its appearance, remains *uncomprehended*. This becomes still more evident by the monstrous distinction between *normal and abnormal*, in the entire empirically given mass of evil, which is openly said to correspond to the just mentioned division of sin. But the appealing to the dialectic of arbitrariness which is then said to explain that tacking round of normal evil, into the abnormal, is a mere shuffle of arbitrary dialecticism; the question here is, that of a thoroughly pervading phenomenon, deeply penetrating into the life of the individual,

than an unsurmounted contradiction against the absolute of this philosophy, which indeed is said completely to explicate itself in the totality of comprehensive thinking, *i. e.* this absolute were no longer the absolute, but dissevered into an absolute dualism.—

It is self-evident that in this necessity of evil the notion of guilt cannot possibly receive its just claims. If now, notwithstanding evil is everywhere denominated by *Hegel* as the guilt of man, the question only is: In what sense? *Hegel* says, if the subjectivity remains standing in the contrast against the universal, *i.e.* is evil, it is therewith *for itself*, it regards itself as individual, and is itself this arbitrariness. The individual *subject* as such has absolutely therefore the *guilt of its evil.*[1] But thereby in reality is only tautologically repeated, what is already directly contained in the notion of evil. Our previous investigations have taught us, that guilt is only there, where a being by his self-determination is, in *this* manner, author of his perverted actions or conditions, that it could also have determined itself differently. This now is absolutely incompatible with that necessity. If in any case it may equally be said, that man could also have omitted every individual evil which he does, this possibility indeed is just because it takes the individual abstractedly, in reality an *empty* one, which, for a concrete thinking, conceiving of the individual in the universal, no longer exists; but that man could have altogether foreborne this variance in his nature, which is evil, directly contradicts its notion, as we have seen. Therefore the constitution given to the notion of evil by *Hegel* just stated, is

and of society, and when in relation to this, the intelligible necessity is said not to have the power to subordinate arbitrariness and its dialectic to itself, it were better to leave this necessity entirely out of the question. Besides it is easy to see, and from *Hegel's* writings, especially from his *Rechtsphilosophie*, to show, that upon the very stand-point of this theory "real vice and crime" cannot at all be dispensed with (*Vatke*, l. c. p. 456); what, according to it, evil is said to render to the good, it can only thoroughly render to it when it has decidedly given an impression of itself according to its nature; if the intense energy of the contrast becomes somewhat weakened down, in the same degree the impulse too becomes weakened. Thus this opinion develops itself in nothing but contradictions, and violates, since it wishes to enter into a capitulation between the moral religious censciousness, and its intelligible necessity of evil, both interests, in the severest manner.

[1] *Phil. des Rechts*, p. 185, comp. *Philos. der Religion*, vol. i. p. 193, vol. ii. p. 350.

for our question without significance, when *Hegel*, with express reference to the necessity of evil contained in the notion, assures us that the resolution of man is his own act, the act of his freedom and of his guilt.[1]

According to this it is also easy to judge what degree of truth belongs to the nearer determination which *Hegel* gives to the necessity of evil, viz., that it only *is, in order to become removed.* *Hegel* has himself already refuted this, since he indeed recognizes an evil, which will not allow itself to be removed, but remains standing. With this, experience also perfectly agrees, and he in whom it is not entirely wanting, will at any rate find the thought very unpractical, that man must take up the evil into his will, in order to be able to cast it out again. For the devil in this respect knows nothing of jest, but relentlessly takes man at his word; his axioms in this respect are: by the first you are free, by the second you are a slave, and; he who gives me his finger, I have his hand.[2] That which ought to be to man only a point of transition in the progress of his self-development to freedom, retains him immoveably fixed as between brazen walls. Least of all can that, which is praised in this philosophy as the true salvation of man, as the highest in the practical sphere, the moral and just life of the state—*das sittliche und rechtliche Staatsleben*"—(comp. *e. g. Phil. der Rel.* vol. 2, p. 279), have the power to help him out of this strait. Indeed there is a liberating power, it is that of redeeming grace; but as certainly as we regard this as the free act of Divine, assisting love, we shall not wish to reduce it to a dialectical metamorphosis of divisions and enslavement in the redemption and reconciliation of the world with God. The self-

[1] *Phil. des Rechts*, p. 188. When *Vatke*, p. 279, says: the consciousness of guilt and the admonishing conscience against the possible evil, are immediately the negation of the necessity of evil, there is rather to be seen in the same, the open admission of the insolvable contradiction in his method of considering evil, than any ground for ascribing to him the fundamental axiom: trust to the consciousness of guilt, and conscience in moral conduct: but pay no attention to them in speculation. Speculation could at least have no greater reproach made against it, than when one banished it in this manner not merely to the sphere of empty abstractions, but also made it a negative principle absolutely opposed to all holy and Divine contents of human life.—To us, the consciousness of guilt is also a goad of development, namely, a goad for the development of philosophy, which drives it beyond all Pantheistic systems.

[2] Words of *Göthe* in his *Faust.*

development of man in evil, taken in itself, only ends in an insolvable perplexity.

Nevertheless one would do the Hegelian system great injustice, if he should regard this standing still of evil, this resistance of the same against its removal, after it is positioned, as something which it involuntarily experiences. Regarded from the one side the system certainly appears only to require an evil, which passes over, which merely appears in the transition from the condition of immediacy, or of naturalness into the kingdom of the spirit, in order to disappear. But from the other side, it decidedly requires an evil which continues, and asserts itself, as contrast, at every point of moral development.[1] For if the reality of evil is the necessary mediation of good, it were indeed assuredly a very mechanical, unspiritual method of representing this mediation to one's self, if one should conceive of the same as something once happening, and then done with, finished. Much rather since the moral vitality of the spirit consists in the activity and mediation of the moments of this contrast, with the total disappearance of the contrast, at any point of the development, would also be the extinction of moral life.[2] For could there be true vitality without the excited energetic tension of this contrast, the necessity for the division at all, and why the spirit had not pursued from the beginning this course of undivided development, were no longer to be understood. Therefore the removal of evil can here only be represented as *perpetually taking place, but never accomplished;* in order that it may become ever and anon removed, it must indeed after every removal still exist; wherewith then the *progressus in infinitum* so abused by this system breaks

[1] This and many other contrasts of tendencies in the Hegelian system, as well as the vacillation of *Hegel* himself between such contrasts, appears to have its ultimate ground in the elastic nature of his *principle of negativity*. By virtue of the same it may merely become used by a moderate disposition, in order by a tolerably simple metamorphosis to procure for the substantial in the consciousness the form of self-certitude and freedom, while a more reckless direction will require that every thing substantial, without reservation, be given over to the resolving process, which this principle conducts in order that it may first of all make out of the same—that which is produced.

[2] The excellent review of the Hegelian doctrine in *Ulrici's* Work of Evil essentially arrives at the same result: *v. Ulrici, ueber Princip und Methode der Hegelschen Philosophie*, p. 174 seq.

forth from its own midst as the last result. The state of division is truly in itself removed, the evil is overcome, and is known as such in a direct manner, in the belief of the forgiveness of sin, in an indirect manner in the speculative notion;[1] but how it is to come to the real removal in the subject, which has still only just *to make* its "*will good*," is not to be seen. For a finite life which developes itself in pure undisturbed harmony with God, and with itself, there is no place in this system, and it is an entirely vain endeavour to wish to force this idea into it. Accordingly *Hegel* occasionally employs in his logic, infinite and holy, as correlative notions,[2] and in his lectures on the philosophy of religion, the finite and evil, as also correlative with the nearer determination that the evil is the *extreme point of the finite*.[3]—Indeed we must go further and maintain, that God himself, as he has only his reality in man, shares in this fate. Were the contrast absolutely to be overcome in any one point of human development, the *absolute process of the Divine life*, the impelling power of which is just the inadequacy of all finite to the infinite, would have reached its end, and therewith the Divine life itself, which is only in this process, "when this inadequacy vanishes, the primitive division (*Urtheil* = *Ur-theil*—Tr.)[4] of the spirit also vanishes, its vitality, thus it ceases to be spirit,"[5] and therewith the history would stand still, its problem were solved. In order that God retain Himself in life, in order that there ever be present a ground for the production of the finite—both express in reality the same—*every thing* finite, not merely all creature existences, but even the spirit as finite, and individual, must perish in its own

[1] *Phil. der Rel.* vol. ii. p. 273.

[2] *Werke*, vol. v. p. 328.

[3] *Phil. der Rel.*, vol. ii., p. 250, 251.

[4] According to *Hegel*, *das Urtheil*, sometimes = *die Enzweiung*; it is so here.—Tr.

[5] L. c., p. 231. In another passage, vol. 1, p. 122, it is said: "God is this activity, movement, in Himself, and only thereby alone living God."—There would moreover follow from the premises above given that God can only reveal Himself in the inadequacy, and in the self-removal of Himself, from which then, unless perhaps there is said to be ascribed to God a vain struggle to reveal Himself, it further follows, that just this endless coming forth and perishing of every thing finite, is the absolutely satisfying form of His revelation and self-realization, that therefore, as *Ulrici*, l. c., p. 19, expresses this, the nature of the spirit consists in its absolute negativity.

contradiction. Only from the cup of this kingdom of spirits, which in the endless perishing of every individual, is equally the true kingdom of shadows, there foams to him His own infiniteness.[1]

We cannot therefore accuse *Strauss* of a misunderstanding of the *Hegelian* doctrine, when he, from its stand-point, denies the possibility of a sinless Christ as a historical individual.[2] In so far as Christ is *this single individual*, He cannot be excepted from the inadequateness to the idea, from the universal contradiction of all that is finite. If the contradiction, which is evil, belongs especially to the notion of man, if man, as *Hegel* says, Philosophy of History *(Philos. der Geschichte*, p. 333*)*,[3] first of all becomes man by the fall, Christ can only be absolutely freed from the same at the cost of His humanity. Thus the human race, after having suffered the loss of its *undivided primitive condition in God*,[4] now becomes spoiled of its *crown*, or much rather robbed of the *new beginning* in the perfectly holy Son of both God and man, and therewith the *completion* of the Divine kingdom; and that which remains to the unfortunate consciousness, is the infinite waste of an endless conflict and division.—

It was above intimated, whereby this philosophy, in which there is often to be found a very energetic consciousness of the depth of evil, becomes driven to elevate the same to a necessary moment in the Divine process. We find the ultimate ground in

[1] *Hegel's* own words at the close of his *Phänomenologie.*—Tr.

[2] *Das Leben Jesu*, vol. ii., p. 716, 717, Ed. i. *Dogm.*, vol. ii. § 66. That the system of *Hegel* cannot at all avoid this consequence has been very abundantly shown by *Dorner*, *Entwickelungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*, in the section: the Christology of the Hegelian school, which belongs to the most thorough writing of what has been said concerning this Philosophy from a theological point of view.

[3] "The animal," it is there taught, "is one with God (!) but only in itself. Man only is spirit, *i. e.* for himself. But this independent existence, existence for self, this consciousness, is equally the separation from the universal Divine spirit. If I hold myself in my abstract freedom opposed to the good, this is just the stand-point of evil. The sin-fall, is therefore the eternal mythus of man, by which he becomes man." By virtue of that thoroughly pervading amphiboly, *Hegel* is able immediately to continue: the standing still upon that stand-point is however evil—according to which therefore the sin-fall had still been without sin.

[4] Comp. above, p. 425.

the nature of the spirit being one-sidedly conceived of as *thinking*, but this thinking as *necessary process*. Therefore the will, which is an original principle of reality, indeed the peculiar principle of real existence,[1] must submit to become subordinated by this monism of logical thinking, as a mere mode of intelligence, an especial form of thinking.[2] But the reality in nature and history is to this system according to the well known sentence: that which is rational, is real, and that which is real is rational, nothing else, and can be nothing else, according to its ground determinations, than the real separation, dualism of the logical reason, so that, when any moment of reality is not perfectly transparent to the thinking as its own being, this can only be the guilt of the individual subject. If now there is in empirical existence every kind of impenetrable plus, which cannot be reduced to the pure essentia of logic, it is just the *accidental, absolutely insignificant*, which in the sphere of nature becomes explained as a powerlessness of the same firmly to abide by the notion in its carrying out.[3]

With this then there presents itself to *Hegel* the fatal dilemma, of either explaining evil as a thoroughly insignificant matter, unworthy of philosophic regard, or of regarding the same as integrating moment of the very idea, therefore of attributing to it necessity, nay more, reality, and even rationality. The first opinion is superficial to the last degree, and entirely incapable of firmly retaining the positive *contrast* of evil against the good; consistently it must regard evil as something entirely void of connection, as accidental hindrances of the good in its outward realization, which absolutely belong to the phenomenal world, and have only in this their insulated appearance a moment of *Scheinexistenz*. But just with this it enervates the *consciousness of guilt* and the moral conflict against evil, and the deeply penetrating significance of the same for the history of the human race, but still more the redemption from sin by the Son of God, must remain by it not understood; wherefore these immeasurable preparations of God, in order to overcome and destroy something

[1] One may here remember that *Leibnitz* in the *Theodicee*, § 8, has denoted the understanding of God as the source of essences, his will as the source of essential existences.

[2] *Encykl.* § 443. *Philos. des Rechts.* § 4, p. 35.

[3] *Encykl.* § 250.

so perishable and powerless, which, indeed, in so far as it has the mere appearance of existence, must continually without that fall to pieces of itself? At the same time the impossibility of a science of Christianity for this philosophy would necessarily follow from the above opinion. If, namely, it recognizes everywhere that the ground-idea of Christianity is that of redemption and reconciliation, and if this entirely rests upon the presupposition of sin, there could not manifestly be a *speculative dogmatic* in the sense of this system, if sin becomes excluded from the sphere of the comprehensible. But that opinion also decidedly contradicts the interest of the system, considering the same entirely for itself. For if the thought most peculiar to it, *is just* that notion of negativity, a germ laid down by *Jacob Böhme*, which it has extended to a principle of movement and progression pervading the whole of his perceptions of the world, it can never be compatible with the energy of this motion, as well as with the fulness and characteristic determinateness of the contents thereby produced, if the system should wish to cast out of its world of thought the evil, the immoral, the criminal, which in the connection of this method of consideration can only appear as the veriest culminating point of negation as unintelligible accidentality. The second opinion, it is true, allows first of all to a dialectic, which wishes to understand the contradiction itself as moment of unity, because to it the distinctions necessarily proceed to contradiction, a deeper, more positive conception of evil; but in its remoter consequence it must not merely enervate and attenuate the consciousness of guilt, and the notion of evil, but entirely destroy it.

Although the system impels with greater force to the latter opinion, the consideration of evil appears nevertheless to vacillate between the two. For certainly it inclines to the former of the two, not merely in passing expressions,[1] but it also appears to exercise a powerful influence upon the entire philosophico-historical consideration of the system; everywhere evil is regarded as that which is absolutely insignificant and powerless, which is not at all able to restrain the real development of the logical moments in their necessary course. But where the notion of evil is expressly treated, as in the above quoted passages of the

[1] *E.g. Encyklopädie*, § 6, p. 8.

Encyclopaedia and the *Philosophy of Right*, there the consideration entirely takes the side of the second representation, and ascribes to evil, *necessity*, in very plain language. And indisputably we must regard this conception, without allowing ourselves to be deceived by occasional oscillations towards the other side,[1] as the true doctrine of the system with respect to evil; so much the more so, since even that apparent opposite historical consideration may be easily reduced to the same. For if evil be itself a necessary moment in the absolute process, it is certainly clear that it cannot at all restrain, but only facilitate the brazen course of the same through history. But if the matter is thus related, then we are obliged to admire the magnanimous reason, and the bold artifice of the Hegelian world-spirit pre-eminently in evil. Thus too in the *Phänomenology*, evil is to be understood as an event foreign to the being of God, and is passed by as a mere idea, and just as much, with unmistakeable reference to *Jacob Böhme*, it is to be regarded in the Divine Being Himself, as *His anger;* then both representations destroy themselves in the notion of the estrangement of the Divine Being from Himself,—by virtue of which "His existence goes into itself and becomes evil,"—and in the notion of its return back to itself.[2]

It is easy to perceive that by this opinion of evil and of its necessity, and in the thereby conditioned inability to recognize the possibility of a personal Redeemer, the Christian doctrine of *Redemption*, if it is not to be directly rejected, must submit to an entire distortion. First of all it must surprise us, although more closely considered it is quite consistent, that in this system we read of a *reconciliation of evil with good*.[3] Of such a reconciliation Christianity at least knows nothing, but only of a reconciliation of man with God; but to identify these two reconciliations could only occur to a thinking, which according to a dualism of principles,

[1] These vacillations of *Hegel* have nevertheless manifestly their ground in the resistance of his moral consciousness against the fearful consequences of the universal necessity of evil, and in so far are a factual refutation of the Vatkian opinion, that this necessity, because it, as intelligible, lies on the other side of the moral consciousness, cannot at all come into conflict with the contents of the same.

[2] L. c. 582, seq.

[3] This is not so much to be found in the author of the system —nevertheless comp. the *Phänomenologie*, p. 583 seq.—as much rather in many other of his disciples.

or by virtue of reducing the notion in question to the indeterminate, to the notion of the finite, of the subjective consciousness and the like, regards it as superfluous to distinguish between the being infected with evil, and evil itself. According to the Christian doctrine man becomes reconciled to God, since the evil in him becomes first of all removed *potentiell, principiell*—objectively by the reconciling work of Christ, subjectively by justifying faith—then actually and explicitly—by the progressing sanctification completing itself in the fellowship of God. As evil has neither any justification of its existence in the notion of the world, of the finite in general, nor in the notion of man, so that it, so to speak, might request to be removed like other, natural, contrasts of finite being, merely by mediation and reconciliation with the good standing opposed to it, as it much rather is only there by the will perversely reverting into arbitrariness and assumption, it is to become absolutely *destroyed*, in those who do not exclude themselves from redemption. Herewith it is equally said, that the disunion which has come in with the evil *cannot be really resolved* by any knowledge, any speculation, but only by Redemption. Originating in an act, it can only by an act be removed. Here on the contrary, in the Hegelian system reconciliation is resolved into a necessary dialectic of the idea; its significance lies just in this logical removal of the contrast between the oneness of the state of immediacy and its disunion *(der unmittelbaren Einheit und der Entzweiung)*, the subjectivity fixing itself in itself *(dem in sich seienden Fürsichsein.)* As knowledge produces evil, the state of division or dualistic state, as thereby the spirit comes forth from its naturalness, it is also again knowledge, which alone has the power to overcome the contradiction as negation of the negation—ὁ τρώσας καὶ ἰάσεται;—indeed the disunion carries in itself the principle of its removal.[1] That is the eternal, speculative contents of the Christian doctrine of reconciliation elevated to the idea; but if it places this contents in that simple fact, which transpired in a past age upon Golgotha, it therewith submits to the form of the sensational representation.[2]

[1] Compare especially the *Phänomenologie* in the section: Revealed Religion—*Werke*, vol. ii. p. 582 seq.: further, *Phil. d. Rel.* vol. 2, p. 217, 228, 250, 254. *Vermischte Schriften*, p. 471.

[2] *Phänomen.* p. 573. *Phil. d. Rel.* vol. ii. p. 240, 250, 263 seq. Comp. vol. i. p. 140, 141.

But if this is the notion of reconciliation, it were a vile μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, to condition the participation of the subject in this reconciliation, originally and essentially by *a moral transformation, a new birth.* As such a condition only the transition of the subject from the spheres of sensational representation and of abstract subjective opinion, into that of the speculative idea, can be directly valid, or the insight into the unity of the infinite and the finite, of God and man, of good and evil existing in and for itself. Evil in its contrast with the good is only abstraction; if this abstraction is removed by speculative thinking, which is the truly concrete, the reconciliation is realized in the subject, which is taken up into the universal spirit.[1] If one now will call this transition, a new birth out of the spirit, as *Hegel* occasionally does, who can prevent it? We can only not allow ourselves to be required to regard this speculative new birth as identical with the Christian, but that which becomes substituted in the practical sphere of regeneration, as the necessary "reconstruction" of man, from the beginning only natural, therefore evil, *Hegel* himself more definitely denominates as *discipline, education, subjugation,* and *cultivation.*[2]

It is a beautiful testimony to the power of Christianity over the mind of the great philosopher, that he was not himself able throughout firmly to hold the opinion of evil here laid down, that in more than one place a deeper consciousness of the nature of sin overpoweringly breaks through the limitations of his system.

[1] *Phil. d. Rel.* vol. 2, p. 270, seq.

[2] *Phil. des Rechts,* § 18. *Phil. der Rel.,* vol. 2, p. 214. *Gesch. der Phil.,* vol. 3, p. 105, 106, in the first passage it is said: "the Christian doctrine, that man is evil by nature, stands higher than the other, which regards him as good; it is therefore to be regarded according to its philosophic interpretation. As spirit, man is a free being, which has the distinction not to allow himself to be determined by natural impulse. Man as in the immediate and uncultivated condition is therefore in a condition in which he ought not to be, and from which he must free himself. The doctrine of original sin, without which Christianity were not the religion of freedom, has this signification." When *Hegel* here and elsewhere often resolves the Christian doctrines of original sin, reconciliation, and regeneration, first of all into determinations, which even the plainest Pelagianism has never disputed, and then nevertheless over against "modern piety" assumes the air as if he must place himself before the gap for the protection of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, who can help, at the same, the deepest indignation?

It is especially in this respect very remarkable, what *Dorner* in another interest animadverts upon, and justly so, as an inconsistent and unmethodic procedure,[1] that *Hegel* in his lectures on the philosophy of religion, where he had to show the necessity of the reconciliation of man with God, suddenly breaks off from his high *speculative* course, and comes down all at once to an *anthropological* one, setting out from the necessity of the subject's knowing himself to be reconciled with God. A factual admission is contained in this, that the variance of man with God is not to be *theoretically discovered*, but can *only be experienced*, therefore is not a moment of a necessary process, but absolutely an act of arbitrariness.

[1] L. c. p. 406.
[2] Vol. 2, p. 209 seq., 222 seq.

FIFTH CHAPTER.

DUALISTIC DERIVATION OF EVIL.

Dualistic theories, which regard the contrast of evil with the good, as an absolutely original one, and thus enhance the evil to absoluteness, according to *Twesten's* striking remark, are to be regarded as just as foreign to our method, as pantheism was not a very long time ago.[1] And if notwithstanding they are here made a matter of consideration, it may appear as if they had to thank for this the desire for a certain completeness, the wish, in this progression, starting from an entirely negative conception of evil, to arrive at that most extreme point, where the contrast between good and evil is found in its unmediated antagonism, as it became in the first step softened down to amicableness, and thereby removed. But apart from the fact that the light which we obtain from this side serves to discover to us significant moments in the nature of evil, which have not yet been brought to light, in the examination to which the hitherto presented theories have been subjected, the theological and philosophical character of the present time can only furnish us with a poor guarantee, that perhaps very soon the inclination to a dualistic consideration of the world, will not again extend itself in a similar manner as a few decennaries ago, and then again as the pantheistic tumult in still later times. Indeed the energy of moral motive, by which a certain tone and tendency of spirit finds itself urged to place all being as such, under the contrast of good and evil, is so little the characteristic of our time, that this on the contrary decidedly tends to moral torpor and enervation. But dualism has also manifestly its theoretic and dialectic occasionings, and it has them in the mode of thought which apparently stands diametrically opposed to it; the pantheistic views of the time, as the previous chapter has shewn us, have in them distinctly enough certain

[1] *Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik*, vol. 1, p. 136, ed. 3.

germs of the same; and if dualism according to *Schelling's* expression, is a system of self-disruption and despair of reason, the tone of the present day appears for the most part adapted to favour the development of those germs. If the God who, from abstract elevation is indifferent towards good and evil, towards love and hatred, must yield to that God, who gives himself entirely up to them in the world, and brings about His own vitality, not merely by means of the good, but also by means of the evil, who estranges Himself in the evil from Himself, in order to return to Himself, it is from this stand-point, only another step to two equally eternal principles, which as yes, and no, as love and hatred, struggle with each other dividing the dominion of the world. The transition then forms perhaps a doctrine like to that of *Jacob Böhme* of the two principles in God, of which the second is in God, but not yet evil, but only becomes evil in the creature.

From another side *Daub's* "*Judas Ischarioth*" contains decided germs of a Dualistic consideration of the world. Here over against the relative evil in man and in nature, *an absolute, and in itself, evil,* is required and maintained. Not merely has it infected man, and brought many disturbances into nature, but even *time* and *space* become deduced from its negativing efficiency. This opinion nevertheless distinguishes itself from real Dualism, by making a being created by God the basis of the self-production and efficiency of its evil principle. But in spite of this conditionality of his existence, the Satan of the theory has elevated himself to a real ἀντίθεος; in the region of the very absolute there are two kingdoms, the kingdom of Satan and the kingdom of the Godhead.[1]

[1] As *Daub* himself is well known to have given up the opinion of evil developed in his *Judas Ischarioth*, we are thereby saved the trouble of subjecting the same to our criticism. Moreover, with all respect for the deep thought in which this book abounds, we should be obliged to subscribe the result of *Strauss'* judgment (*Charakteristiken und Kritiken,* p. 123), that *Daub* "had here fallen into a blind Alley, where in the impossibility of further proceeding, nothing remained to be done than simply to turn round," but alas only to run into another from which he has never come out. — It is interesting to compare this application of the notion of the Absolute to evil—from which one must however well distinguish the question, whether a being may be so evil that it has absolutely nothing more of good in it—with the proof of *Thomas von Aquino,* that there cannot be a summum malum, quod sit

Thus indeed, as the dualistic system in ancient time has been represented by the Manichæns, it can in its fundamental bases, quite apart from its fantastico-mythological investment, never wear even the appearance of being tenable. If here, just as later in Flacianism, evil is conceived of as *mala substantia, mala natura*, it is only an impoverished uncultivated thinking, which can bring together in this manner, the notion of evil with that of *substance* or *nature*. Here the contrary grounds of *Augustine* and of *Titus von Bostra*, as well as those of the first article in the *solida declaratio* of the *Konkordienformel*, are sufficient to exhibit the absurdity in the representation of a *substantia mala*, and, in the consideration of the world, being based upon the same. If evil is to be referred to the notion of substance, it is assuredly not to be represented as substance, but on the contrary, with *Augustine*, as *perversion (corruptio) of the substance*, just as the good is to be represented as being the ground of its permanence and conservation. But the real ground of the error those opponents could not discover, because they were not themselves entirely free from it; it lies in the deficiency of the view that in the sphere of the idea: Substance, reality, nature, the ethical contrast of good and evil has not at all its root. So long therefore as the consideration only treats of these notions, the contrast of good and evil still remains undisclosed; in order to understand it in its ethical significance concreter determinations are required. But the ethical significance is in itself the *original;* and if the notion of *malum* still embraces besides the *m. morale*, the *m. physicum*—the so-called *m. metaphysicum* is only *malum* by a misuse of language,—the latter has its origin in the first, as the old, just as deeply significant as simple, division of *malum* into *m. culpae* and *m. poenae* already properly expresses this—in relation to beings which can make themselves guilty.[1]

There is here a remarkable relation not to be passed by unnoticed. The Dualistic view of the world proceeds unmistak-

causa omnis mali, *Summa* I., qu. 49, art. 3. *Summa contra gentiles*, lib. iii., c. 15.

[1] In the same sense *Thomas* shows I., qu. 48, art. 6, that the malum culpae has plus de ratione mali than the malum poenae: comp. on the division into m. culpae and m. poenae the preceding article of the same questio.

ably, for the most part, from a very honourable *ethical* interest, from the consciousness of the unfathomably deep significance between *good* and *evil*, and of the impossibility of adjusting their two sides, to each other, from the necessity of discovering a key, to all the contradictory phenomena which we meet with, without the real moral sphere in the world of earth, which does no violence to the moral feeling, and to the moments in the idea of God in which the same has its root.[1] But as the consideration pursues this interest quite exclusively, blind to every other, it experiences that it arrives at the very opposite of that which it seeks; the contrast of good and evil is destroyed when carried to the extreme under consideration; if evil be represented as *substance*, it loses its ethical significance, and receives an entirely *physical* one; it is a natural necessity by which man falls into evil, and if there is a liberation from its power, this also proceeds by a natural process. Therefore the physical conception of the conflict between the kingdoms of light and darkness in Manichäism, does not at all belong to the mere form of representation, but to the contents itself.

We are however not at all justified in maintaining the application of the notion of substance to evil, as the real nerve of ethical dualism. If any system makes for its basis the notion of an eternal substance, which is the absolute indifference of all contrasts, also of the contrast of good and evil, and makes to proceed from the same in an equally original, eternal manner, two opposing personal principles, the one, the will of love, of self-communication; the other, the will of hatred, of division and disturbance, bearing in themselves equal immutability, and realizing themselves with equal energy; such a system remains in spite of its approximation to a realistic pantheism, essentially dualistic. The dualism is not of course contained in the recognition of the

[1] This moral interest as starting-point also distinctly appears in *Mant*, especially in the epistle to the *Jungfrau Menoch* (*August. op. imperf. c. Jul.* lib. iii., § 172 seq.) In his making as foundation, the representation, that the sensational impulses are evil, he appears to sanction the reduction of sin to God as its author.—Besides, therewith it is of course not to be denied, that in Manichaeism as well as also in Parseeism, the contrast of good and evil, since it is still quite identified with that which brings *salvation* and *mischief*, is not yet at all recognized in its pure ethical significance.

existence and efficiency of a *God-opposing endeavour* in the world, and becomes destroyed in every positive derivation of the same from Divine causality and arrangement,—for both these are to be found in Christianity,—but in this, that the evil shares with the good *equal originality*, and is equally without beginning, accordingly, the radically evil being is represented as *independent* of the good God, as an evil radical being, and is clothed with another power, which conditions a doubtful conflict between the two. Since a second active principle,[1] in its being independent of God, is placed over against Him, He is absolutely in His efficiency and self-revelation, placed under an *original* dependence and conditionality—*i. e.* under such an one which does not depend upon free self-limitation, self-conditioning,—absolutely under a fate.

Such a form of dualism is not only conceivable, but also historically real, and indeed as its primitive form. In the Parseean dualism there is, as is well known, above the division of the good and evil principle, of the *Ormuzd* and *Ahriman*, an eternal primitive being, *Zeruane akerene*, in which both principles have their origin. There is therewith rendered, it is true, some degree of satisfaction to the irrefusable demand of the reason for unity. But as the idea of *Zeruane akerene* is only very seldom mentioned in the *Zendavesta*, this notion remains entirely isolated, without interfering in any way with the further construction of the system, in the development of the combat between the two principles; this highest unity is in its abstract indeterminateness much too poor and weak to have the power to deprive the evil ground-being of its power, or to reconcile it with the good.[2] The relation is

[1] If the second being is represented as a purely *passive* absolutely determinable one, which exercises upon the determining Divine efficiency no modifying influence, to say nothing of its opposing to it a reaction—perhaps as *Aristotle* appears to have conceived of the ὕλη—such a system can certainly no longer be regarded as dualistic.

[2] For if there belongs in general, which indeed is not to be denied, to the original circle of ideas of Parseeism, such a finite reconciliation, nevertheless it does not certainly appear as act or work of *Zeruane akerene*.—Moreover it is in the highest degree a singular objection to this reconciliation, when *F. Schlegel* (*Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*, p. 126) thus expresses himself on the same: "If, as is commonly the case, the opinion is adopted that in the last development the evil principle, overcome, and changed, *Ahriman* becomes again united and

indeed different, in so far as the Parseean religion really teaches, that *Ahriman* was originally really good, and only became evil by a fall, therefore by an act of freedom. In this case it is of course no longer to be seen, how the name of *Dualism*, strictly speaking, is to be applied to it.[1]

It is not necessary for us further to dwell upon the consequences of the dualistic theory; we only ask whether, in respect to the ground-notion of evil itself, it corresponds to the contents of the developed moral consciousness, whether it correctly expresses the nature of evil, as it therein announces itself to us. That to which, from this point of view, we must direct especial attention, is the maintained *independence* of the evil principle with respect to the good with which dualism stands or falls. The good is assuredly, as was shewn in the previous chapter, absolutely independent of the evil; although it is essential to it, after the evil has once made its appearance in the world, to reveal itself in contrast to the same, it nevertheless does not itself require the evil for its self-realization; love would be eternally the same, and conscious of its being, if there were no hatred. Evil, on the contrary, is *dependent on the good*, in so far as it only realizes its existence at all, as *contrast* with the good. As the opposition presupposes the position, the evil presupposes the good according to its very notion, and is only conceivable as departure from it. If the evil is represented as absolutely original, it cannot any longer in any

reconciled with *Ormuzd*" (which indeed can only manifestly happen that *Ahriman* abandons evil), "the disunion in reality becomes resolved; every thing pantheistically becomes one being, and the eternal distinction of good and evil vanishes." Such a finite reconciliation may be an inconsistency in this system; it does not agree at least with the originality of the evil principle, and in reality removes therewith the essential character of dualism. But to explain the variance between good and evil, and its eternal consistence as necessary, *because otherwise every thing must pantheistically resolve into one being*, therefore to consider the evil as the necessary condition of a world distinct from God, that is certainly the very worst pantheism.

[1] When *Baur* in his learned exhibition of the *Manichaen System of Religion*, p. 42, 43, finds this severest form of dualism at the same time pantheistic, this rests upon the recognition that the dogma of the unity of the substance might not immediately remove the essential character of dualism. Compare moreover the discussion of the relation in which *Manichäism* stands, on the one hand, to *Parseeism*, on the other hand to *Buddhaism*, in *Neander's* master work, in the new edition of his *Ecclesiastical History*, vol. ii. p. 825 sq.

sense be regarded as evil, as that which *ought not to be*. This dependence of evil is more closely determined, when we remember, that the evil indeed, as this contrast, is nothing else than the perverted severance of an essential moment in the idea of good, the exaltation of self-hood to the principle of being. Thus then the good is not merely that which is intelligible in itself, but also by itself, the evil, on the contrary, is only to be understood by the good—*bonum index sui et mali*, analogous to *Spinoza's* beautiful word: *verum index sui et falsi*.

Let no one object, that we, in this determination, admit again by a back-door, the metaphysical notion of good which our earlier investigations have rejected, since we require the same. The good, the positive negation and denial of which constitutes the evil, evil, is not at all the mere reality, but the inmost being of *ethical good, love*. If in the depths of our moral consciousness, evil reveals itself, not merely as an irrationality, emptiness, nothingness, but as something fearful and horrible, as a streaming source of thousandfold woes, this will not be truly intelligible to us, so long as the Eternal primitive Being, from whom man in evil turns himself away, is conceived of, only as *absolute substance*, as the *most real of all being*, and the like. But the very pith of the Christian doctrine of God, is, just that the very God, who is the *absolute being*, and contains in Himself the ground of all other reality, is at the same time *personality and love*. It is only now, since we recognize that man, in evil opposes the holiest love, by a will of separation and of enmity, that the peculiar character of our moral consciousness in relation to evil, the deep abhorrence, which can only there disappear, where this consciousness is lamed, discovers itself; it is only now that the feelings of shame, of repentance, of anxiety, of conscience, find their true significance. Were not God love, there might indeed be badness, nothingness, but not evil.

Thus the evil as contrast to the good is at the same time directly dependent on the good, and it already appears from this general consideration of its notion, how impossible it is to apply to it the same originality with the good. But that dependence has still another, positive, side. The evil in order to realize itself in earthly life, and to attain if possible the arbitrarily assigned end of its endeavours, is necessitated in some way *to attach itself*

to the good, actually to recognize certain requirements of the same, in their authority. Evil in itself has no truly uniting power; it is only able to produce an inwardly hollow unity, an appearance of fellowship, which perpetually vanishes; it not merely separates and isolates its servants, but it drives them inimically against each other by the incessant collisions of the divided selfish interests, so that if evil had anywhere in human life the sole dominion, nothing else could arise than that natural condition of *Hobbes*, the *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Only in the battle against the good, would the powers which render service to evil, laying aside their internal disputes, unite themselves, in order immediately after the victory, to strive again individually and inimically against each other; and it is only such a combined operation which Christ ascribes to the *βασιλεία τοῦ σατανᾶ*, Matt. xii. 25, 26. But in a condition thus constituted, the evil would every where stand in its own way; its inward pain would even here break through every covering of earthly pleasure; the thousandfold woes and oppressions, with which the wicked, as unwilling instruments of the Divine punitive justice, persecute each other, would then extend to and fill out the entire existence, and thus the present life would become, to the sinful, a very hell. It is first of all the sensational necessity of man, which compels him, when the impulse of reason and the Divine command no longer hold sway over him, to seek the fellowship of his fellows, and just in order to possess and enjoy that, after which he strives in sin, the individual must subordinate his will to certain regulations of society. But these arrangements, the carrying out of the principle of *righteousness*, through the manifold variety of human relations, have their deepest objective ground in *love*.

We have here this remarkable fact revealed to us, that evil, in order not to destroy its own subjects and instruments, is everywhere in our earthly life under necessity to give place to a certain power of the good over itself. Just for the reason, because the nature of evil is *selfishness*, therefore *dividing and separating*, there lies in all ordered society, as such, a powerful bulwark against its encroaching violence; and indeed even the most decided self-abandonment to evil must render in some way its share to the preservation of this bulwark. Thus every horde of robbers, which has relinquished moral intercourse with

the rest of the world, and has declared open war against the laws of the state, must immediately again establish these laws, partially at least, in order to set certain limitations to the dominion of evil so destructive among themselves. Thus in our time we see the demoniacal rebellion against heavenly and earthly majesty, so soon as it has itself any where attained dominion, immediately carry out with fire and sword its own fundamental axioms, with the utmost possible unbounded arbitrariness with respect to the individual. Driven by its own inward variances, the evil ever anew bears testimony to the power of good in society, and no less than the good, must the evil be serviceable to that power, for the prosecution and punishment of disorder and crime. Even if the wicked expressly unite themselves to hold battle against the good, they must subordinate themselves to certain moments in the notion of good, if only to the most abstract and formal, such as order, and obedience to a general norm, in order merely to be able to begin the warfare. Evil has in itself no *productive formative power;* it is not able to give itself, in certain forms and arrangements of human life, peculiar to it, an historical reality, separate and for itself alone, but it only arrives at dominion in any sphere of human society, by supporting itself on ground bases derived from the good. There is in connection with this a phenomenon, to which our earlier attention was directed, namely this, that the evil never appears in human life in every respect perfectly open, but that it always seeks to conceal itself on the one side or the other, John iii. 27. *Evil ventures not to be itself;* it is seized with a restless flight from itself, and hypocritically conceals itself behind every appearance of good. Herein lies especially the common origin of the so-called, lies of necessity, in which the relation of evil to the good reflects itself in a significant manner. In the lie pusillanimously denying itself, it is obliged to confess the good to be the only true and right, but itself as that which absolutely ought not to be, which only has an assumed existence. The moral basis on which every society rests, compels the most resolute villain, who has destroyed in himself the feeling of shame, who no longer places himself before the inward judgment seat of conscience, to make the same confession. There is to be found, indeed, in the mightiest and proudest tyrant, so long as the principle of the sole dominion of his caprice has not

attained to a kind of absurdity destitute of all sense, the mask held up before the one side or the other, induced by sagacious considerations, as if he did not pursue his own especial interest, but perhaps something more general, it may be the fame, the well-being of his nation, and the like.

If now we must recognize the Holy power in all that, which the Divine arrangement of the world also exercises over that resisting it, and by which it perpetually completes itself according to its objective fundamental features in the very midst of the confusion of selfish interests and passions: how can there still be maintained the dualistic representation of an *independent principle of evil?* Evil is able, in consequence of the conditions under which the Divine purpose has placed itself in the history of our race, to hinder and retard, but not to frustrate and defeat, the realization of the same. The previous chapter has shewn how deeply the disturbing power of evil has laid hold of the entire earthly development of the human race; but however earnest the conflict is in which we find ourselves engaged, there is nevertheless eternally present to the eye of God the *victory of the good.*

If we pursue that variance of which evil is itself possessed, still a step further, we perceive it not less than as before in the sphere of human society, now also in the *inward life of the individual man.* Passion strives with passion; one desire steps, hindringly, in the way of another; in slavish dependance upon the different objects of desire, of which every one assumes for itself undivided claim; man never finds in the service of sin the rest and satisfaction after which he restlessly hunts. Not then even, when he entirely subordinates himself to an individual passion; for—even apart from the impossibility of really satisfying any one passion—for so exclusively, it is never able in the long run to usurp to itself the mastery, that it can fully withdraw him from the claims of other impulses striving equally for unlimited self-indulgence.—It is especially the two opposed fundamental hindrances of sin, earlier exhibited, namely, *pride,* and *the predominance of sensational lust,* which stand in incessant warfare with each other. Whoever falls between these two currents becomes restlessly driven hither and thither by them: as he escapes the power of the one, he is carried away by the other.

This change in the slavery of sin becomes in the sphere of more extensive cultivated reflection a secret play of caprice. One learns the dismal art of casting himself now upon this, now upon that side. The virtuous flights which carry him aloft, from time to time, from his state of sensational degradation, must serve him in order to lift up again his humbled self-consciousness, and he relinquishes the pleasures of lust in order to invigorate himself by the endeavourings of his pride.—Correctly recognizing the fact of this disunion, modern education has, in separating itself from the Christian fundamental basis, upon which alone true self-feeling and genuine self-esteem rest, often placed its art in combating in youth the sins of self-degradation and self-abandonment by the passionate excitation of pride and ambition; but alas, thereby it has done nothing else than to drive out the devil by Beelzebub the prince of the devils.

The good, on the contrary, is that which is in agreement with itself; its individual moments, the multiplicity of its endeavourings and activities, in which it realizes itself, mutually support and confirm themselves; that which is denied by the idea of the good cannot at the same time, as the unholy fundamental tenet, of the sanctification of the worst means by the good end, maintains, become affirmed and promoted by the same idea. Evil is not merely at variance with the good, but also with itself; if the good has only one enemy, the evil has two, *the good and the evil.* This contradiction of evil against itself has, besides the exhibited ethical psychological signification, still a peculiar *metaphysical* moment. If there belongs to the evil no existence independent of God, of the absolute good, it nevertheless incessantly strives after the same, and we have seen that the evil is just nothing else than this turning away from God, this languishing after separate independency. In the abandonment of the creature to evil, it factually denies its being created by God; it will not have the ground of its existence in God, but it will live, act, and enjoy itself as if it had existence in itself, and were its own lord. How now if God should allow it to succeed in this endeavour, if He should separate Himself from it, just as it does from Him? The moment of *such an emancipation* of the creature from God were equally that of its sinking into nonentity, for it is not able for a single moment otherwise to exist than in

the hand of God, than His *mancipium*, be its will moreover good or bad. But as now the evil has not in itself any subsisting being, but, as the *Konkordienformel* explains it, according to *Augustine* against *Flacius*, is only present in so far as it attaches to a being as perverted constitution, tendency, of the same: it is manifestly by this endeavour to separate itself from God, which is its very notion, placed in a destructive contradiction with itself. For if it could therein succeed, it would at the same time with the destruction of its own basis, immediately destroy itself. Thus a parasitic plant strives to suck out all the juices from the organic body, in order to draw them into its own perverted, poisonous process of development; but just as it attains the end of its endeavour it has also found its own death.

END OF VOL. I.


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